Jharkhand High Court
Union Of India Through Secretary … vs Ram Sewak Mahto on 26 March, 2026
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
2026:JHHC:8710-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
-----
W.P.(S) No. 6790 of 2025
—–
1. Union of India through Secretary Department of Post, Dak Bhawan,
New Delhi, Post Office and Police Station- Sansad Marg, District
New Delhi-110001.
2. The Chief Post Master General, Jharkhand Circle, At Meghdoot
Bhawan, Doranda, Post Office and Police Station-Doranda, District
Ranchi, Jharkhand,834002.
3. The Director of Postal Service, Office of the CPMG Jharkhand
Circle, Post Office and Police Station Doranda, District Ranchi,
Jharkhand, 834002.
4. The Dy. Director Postal Accounts, Jharkhand Circle, Kanke, 1st Floor,
Post Office Building, Post Office and Police Station- Kanke, District
Ranchi Jharkhand-834008.
5. Senior Superintendent of Post Office, Ranchi Division, Ranchi, Post
Office and Police Station Sadar, District Ranchi, Jharkhand 834001.
6. Senior Postmaster, Ranchi GPO, Post Office GPO, Police Station
Sadar, District Ranchi, Jharkhand, 834001.
…… Respondents/Petitioners
Versus
Ram Sewak Mahto, aged about 60 years, son of late Budhu Mahto,
resident of village-Katam Kuli, Post Office, Katam Kuli, Police
Station-Kanke, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
……Petitioner/Respondent
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
——-
For the Petitioner(s) :Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, Senior Panel Counsel, UOI
For the Respondent : None
——
C.A.V. On: 17/03/2026 PRONOUNCED ON: 26/ 03 /2026
[Per: Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.]
1. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India has been filed against the order dated 15.3.2024 passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Circuit Bench, Ranchi in
O.A./051/00624/2019, whereby and whereunder, the following orders
have been passed:
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“20. Considering the entirety of facts and legal aspects as discussed
above, we are of considered view that applicant was liable to be
considered for grant of Temporary Status and further for
regularisation as Group ‘D’. The order passed by Respondent No. 5
(Annexure 4) rejecting the case of applicant on the ground that he was
a part-time casual worker was against the aforesaid directions of the
Department of posts and the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Further, the applicant was entrusted the responsibility of a vacant
Group ‘D’ post at Ranchi GPO w.e.f. 05.05.2008 (Annexure-25) which
means that vacancy was available.
21. We feel that Interest of justice would be served if the order dated
4.8.1993 (Annexure-4) passed by Superintendent of Post Offices is
quashed and set aside and respondents are directed to consider the
case of applicant for grant of ‘Temporary Status to applicant in terms
of the observation in above para.
22. Accordingly, the order dated 4.8.1993 (Annexure 4) passed by
Superintendent of Post Offices is quashed and set aside. Respondents
are directed to consider the case of applicant for grant of ‘Temporary
Status’ from the day he became eligible, and further grant of
Temporary Group ‘D” status after three years and also his
regularistion as Group ‘D’/MTS keeping the fact in view that he was
asked to function against vacant post of Group ‘D’ w.e.f. 5.5.2008.”
2. The brief facts of the case which require to be enumerated herein
read as under:
(i)It is stated that the applicant was appointed to the
sanctioned and vacant post of Contingent Paid Chowkidar
Ranchi, H.O. Cycle Stand by the competent authority vide
Memo No. B-1/dated 22.02.1982. He performed the duty of
Chowkidar in the Cycle stand Ranchi G.P.O for 5.00 Hrs.
from 22.02.1982 to 22.05.2007. He was brought on duty of
Letter Box Poen at Ranchi G.P.O. for 8.00 Hrs from
23.05.2007 till his retirement i.e. 30.06.2019.
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(ii) It is stated that the service of the applicant as contingent
paid staff was for 5.00 hrs. duty and part time casual
labourer was not entitled for conferring the temporary status
as such Sri Mahto as not granted temporary status. Vide
point 1.1 of clarification of OM No. 51016/2/90-Estt (C)
dated 10.09.1993. The facility of temporary status was
extended up to 01.09.1993 vide Dept. of Posts, letter No.
66-52/92-SPB. 1, dated the 1st November, 1995 as amended
by letter, dated the 8th November, 1995.
(iii) It is further stated that as per instruction issued by the
department of Posts vide letter No.45-14/92 SPB. 1, dated
the 16th September, 1992 the services of part time casual
laborer working for five hrs or more was to be examined
and they were to be made full time casual laborer by
readjustment or combination of duties. Accordingly Sri
Mahto was employed for 8 hrs duty from 23.05.2007.
(iv) It is stated that in response to the application dated
03.05.2007 and Circle office letter No. Staff/Mice-ED/07
dated 09.10.2007 a reply had been submitted to circle
Office, Ranchi vide this office letter of even No. dated
13.11.2007. In this letter as mentioned Sri Mahto was
performing 7.21 hrs duty from 01.10.2004. In the mean time
Sr. Postmaster Ranchi GPO informed vide his letter No.
CPM/Misc/07-08 dated 23.05.2007 that Sri Mahto was
performing duty for 8.00 hrs per day. Sri Mahto again
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applied for granting Temporary Status dated 30.12.2008
addressed to Chief Postmaster General, Jharkhand Circle,
Ranchi. In this regards, Sr. Postmaster Ranchi G.P.O
reported vide his letter No. Sr. PM/Misc/Ranchi GPO/2018-
19 dated 09.08.2018 that there is restriction of granting
temporary status after 01.09.1993 vide the Dte. Letter No.
01-07/2016-SPB-1 dated 22 July, 2016.
(v) That it is stated that the services of Sri Ram Sevak
Mahto was as contingent paid staff for 5.00 hrs duty less
than 8.00 hrs duty and part time casual labourer was not
entitled for conferring the temporary status as such Sri
Mahto was not granted temporary status. Vide point of
clarification to OM No. 51016/2/90-Estt(C) dated
10.09.1993.
(vi) That it is stated that as per instruction issued by the
department of Posts vide letter No. 45-56/92, SPB. 1, dated
the 16th September, 1992 the services of part time casual
laborer working for five hrs or more was to be examined
and they were to be made full time casual labourer by
readjustment or combination of duties. Accordingly Sri
Mahto was employed for 7.21 hrs. duty from 01.10.2004
and 8.00 hrs duty from 23.5.2007.”
3. The respondent-applicant before the Tribunal has raised the
grievance for his regularization in service by seeking following relief(s):
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“(i) That Hon’ble Tribunal may be pleased to direct the concerned
Respondents to grant Temporary Status to Group ‘D’ (Now Multi
Tasking Staff) since 03.03.1985 as per ratio laid down by Hon’ble
Supreme Court Judgment dated 17.01.1986 in Surender Singh case
and/or as per Government Rule and Instructions and/or if not
practicable to in that case, Temporary Status should be granted from
the date from which subsequently appointed (junior) casual labourer
granted Temporary status to the Group ‘D’ (MTS) and the applicant
should be regularized to Group ‘D’ / MTS from 10.09.1995, the date
from which subsequently appointed (juniors) have been granted
Temporary Status to Group ‘D’ /MTS to the Departmental post.
(ii) That the Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased to direct the
concerned respondents to give all consequential service benefits to the
applicant from date, subsequently appointed (junior) labourers have
been granted and paid.
(iii) That the Hon’ble Tribunal may further be pleased to direct the
concerned respondents to pay the due arrears of wages for the period
8 Hours worked against the sanctioned and vacant post Contingent
Paid Chowkidar from 03.03.1982 to the date of regularization as the
applicant has been appointed to the vacant post.
(iv) That the Hon’ble Tribunal may be pleased to direct to give other
consequential relief(s) for which the applicant is legally entitled to in
accordance with the Rule, Resolution, order, letter and instructions
issued time to time by the appropriate Government for the
benefits/welfare of its employees in accordance with law.”
4. The learned Tribunal has called upon the respondents who have
contested the case on merits.
5. The learned Tribunal after hearing the parties has quashed the
order dated 4.8.1993 passed by the Superintendent of Post Offices and
directed the respondents to consider the case of applicant for grant of
‘Temporary Status’ from the day he became eligible, and further grant of
Temporary Group ‘D” status after three years and also his regularization
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as Group ‘D’/MTS in view of the fact that he was asked to function
against vacant post of Group ‘D’ w.e.f. 5.5.2008. which is under
challenge in the present writ petition.
6. Mr. Prabhat Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioners, at the outset, has submitted that he is only
challenging the issue of regularization and not assailing the decision of
conferment of the temporary status to the respondent-applicant.
7. It has been argued by him that the order of regularization as has
been directed by the learned Tribunal should not have been passed taking
into consideration the non-availability of vacancies but that aspect of the
matter has not been taken into consideration. It has been submitted that
claim of the applicant has already been dealt with by rejecting the
conferment of the temporary status vide order dated 4.8.1993 but without
challenging the aforesaid decision, again prayer has been made before
the learned Tribunal and based upon that the conferment of temporary
status has been granted and subsequently order has been passed for his
regularization. The argument, therefore, has been advanced that the
claim of the respondent-applicant has already been rejected vide order
dated 4.8.1993 then there was no occasion to regularize the respondent-
applicant in service that too when the order dated 4.8.1993 has not been
assailed. The learned counsel on the aforesaid grounds has submitted that
the order passed by the learned Tribunal is not sustainable in the eye of
law.
8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioners. Before proceeding further, it needs to refer herein that the
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matter was heard yesterday, i.e., on 16.3.2026 when Mr. Prabhat Kumar
Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ- petitioners
has submitted that he is not challenging the conferment of temporary
status in view of the Policy Decision dated 9.8.1996 rather he is only
contesting the direction of regularization of the respondent-applicant.
9. The aforesaid submission has been taken note by this Court in the
order dated 16.03.2026 which is being refereed herein under:
“Order No.07/Dated 16th March, 2026
1. Mr. Prabhat Kr. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners, in
course of argument, has submitted that the learned Tribunal has
passed the direction in two folds:-
(i) The conferment of temporary status in favour of the one
or other applicants, who is respondent herein.
(ii) In consequence upon the grant of conferment of
temporary status, to consider his case for regularization.
2. The part of the order by which the temporary status has been
conferred upon the respondent is not under challenge. Only part,
which is being questioned herein, is the issue of regularization of
the concerned respondent, who has been conferred with the
temporary status.
3. For further argument, list this matter tomorrow i.e., on
17.03.2026.”
10. The question of regularization is only being argued said to be
not a proper direction by the learned Tribunal. Therefore, this Court is to
decide the issue of regularization only as to whether the direction passed
by the learned Tribunal after conferment of the temporary status of the
respondent-applicant as also the arrears of salary in view of the order
passed by the Labour Court and by virtue of that 8 hours wages to the
applicant have been provided, can it be said that in such pretext the order
of regularization which has been passed by the learned Tribunal suffers
from any error.
11. This court proceeding in premise of the fact that the conferment
of temporary status of the applicant has not been assailed by the
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applicant and although the same has been prayed before the Tribunal.
But as has been argued by the learned counsel appearing for the writ
petitioner putting reliance upon the decision dated 9.8.1996 that the
respondent-applicant herein has been found to be in employment on
10.9.1993 and, as such, he is entitled for conferment of temporary status
which has already been granted w.e.f. 23.5.2007. The applicant has also
been allowed to carry out the work for 8 hours and from the date of
passing of an Award by the Labour Court the arrears of differences of
salary, on account of the enhanced hours of working, has also been paid
w.e.f. 23.5.2007, the date when the applicant has been conferred with a
temporary status. The conferment of temporary status is on the basis of
the Policy Decision dated 9.8.1996.
12. In OA/051/00624/2019, the learned counsel for the applicant, in
support of his averment, has annexed an order of Dept. of Posts, Ministry
of Communication dated 09.08.1996 which is reproduced herein under:
“Govt. of India
Ministry of Communication
Deptt. of Post
Dak Bhavan, Sansad Marg
New Delhi-110001No.66-52/72SPB 1Dated 9.8.96
To,
All the Chief Postmaster General
All the Postmaster General
All Principal, Postal Training Centre
Controller Foreign Mails, Bombay
Director, Postal Staff College, GhaziabadSub: Casual labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and
Regularisation) Scheme.
Sir,
I am directed to refer to the scheme on the above Subject
issued this office vide letter No. 45-95/97 SPB I, dated 12.04.91
and no. 66-9/81 SPB I dated 30.1.1.92 as per which part time full8
2026:JHHC:8710-DBtime casual labourers who were in employment as on 10.9.93 were
liable to be conferred “Temporary Status” on satisfying other
eligibility conditions.
The question of extending the benefits to the scheme to
those part time &full time casual labourers who were
engaged/recruited after 10.9.93 has been considered in this office
in the light of Judgement of CAT Ernakulam Bench Ernakulam
delivered on 15.4.96 in OA No.750/94.
It has been decided that part time &full time casual
Labourers recruited after 10.9.93 and upto 12.11.95 may also be
considered for grant of benefits under the scheme.
This issues with the approval of the TA and Dy. No.2455.96
dt 10.6.96.
Yours faithfully
Sd/-A.K.Kaushal
Assts. Director General
SPBI
Copy to:
1) The Officer-incharge A.P. record office camptee
2) SPB II/ADMN/VIG-I, II, II/MCOY/TAP/PAT/PENSIC/ PE/1-11/PSOT,
AR/STN.
3) Civil Wing (Postal) Lucknow
4) All recognised Union
Sd. A.K. Kaushal
Assts. Director General (SPB I)”
13. The only question remains to be considered by this Court is that
after conferment of the temporary status, the order of regularization can
be said to suffer from any error.
14. Before appreciating the aforesaid issue, the law relating to
regularization which is prevailing as of now requires to refer herein.
15. At this juncture, the reference of the judgment passed by Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(3) and Others, (2006)4 SCC 1 needs to be referred herein along with
its background as to why such proposition has been laid down by
Hon’ble Apex Court, as would be evident from paragraph Nos. 7 to 10
and paragraph Nos. 33, 34 and 45 are being referred herein.
“7. These two sets of appeals reflect the cleavage of opinion in the
High Court of Karnataka based on the difference in approach in two
sets of decisions of this Court leading to a reference of these appeals
to the Constitution Bench for decision. The conflict relates to the9
2026:JHHC:8710-DBright, if any, of employees appointed by the State or by its
instrumentalities on a temporary basis or on daily wages or casually,
to approach the High Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus
directing that they be made permanent in appropriate posts, the work
of which they were otherwise doing. The claim is essentially based on
the fact that they having continued in employment orengaged in the
work for a significant length of time, they are entitled to be absorbed
in the posts in which they had worked in the department concerned or
the authority concerned. There are also more ambitious claims that
even if they were not working against a sanctioned post, even if they
do not possess the requisite qualification, even if they were not
appointed in terms of the procedure prescribed for appointment, and
had only recently been engaged, they are entitled to continue and
should be directed to be absorbed.
8. In Civil Appeals Nos. 3595-612 of 1999 the respondents therein
who were temporarily engaged on daily wages in the Commercial
Taxes Department in some of the districts of the State of Karnataka
claim that they worked in the Department based on such engagement
for more than 10 years and hence they are entitled to be made
permanent employees of the Department, entitled to all the benefits of
regular employees. They were engaged for the first time in the years
1985-86 and in the teeth of orders not to make such appointments
issued on 3-7-1984. Though the Director of Commercial Taxes
recommended that they be absorbed, the Government did not accede
to that recommendation. These respondents thereupon approached the
Administrative Tribunal in the year 1997 with their claim. The
Administrative Tribunal rejected their claim finding that they had not
made out a right either to get wages equal to that of others regularly
employed or for regularisation. Thus, the applications filed were
dismissed. The respondents approached the High Court of Karnataka
challenging the decision of the Administrative Tribunal. It is seen that
the High Court without really coming to grips with the question
falling for decision in the light of the findings of the Administrative
Tribunal and the decisions of this Court, proceeded to order that they
are entitled to wages equal to the salary and allowances that are being
paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service
with effect from the dates from which they were respectively
appointed. It may be noted that this gave retrospective effect to the
judgment of the High Court by more than 12 years. The High Court10
2026:JHHC:8710-DBalso issued a command to the State to consider their cases for
regularisation within a period of four months from the date of receipt
of that order. The High Court seems to have proceeded on the basis
that, whether they were appointed before 1-7-1984, a situation
covered by the decision of this Court in Dharwad District PWD
Literate Daily Wage Employees Assn. v. State of Karnataka [(1990) 2
SCC 396 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 274 : (1990) 12 ATC 902 : (1990) 1 SCR
544] and the scheme framed pursuant to the direction thereunder, or
subsequently, since they have worked for a period of 10 years, they
were entitled to equal pay for equal work from the very inception of
their engagement on daily wages and were also entitled to be
considered for regularisation in their posts.
9. Civil Appeals Nos. 1861-2063 of 2001 reflect the other side of the
coin. The appellant association with indefinite number of members
approached the High Court with a writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution challenging the order of the Government directing
cancellation of appointments of all casual workers/daily-rated workers
made after 1-7-1984 and further seeking a direction for the
regularisation of all the daily-wagers engaged by the Government of
Karnataka and its local bodies. A learned Single Judge of the High
Court disposed of the writ petition by granting permission to the
petitioners before him, to approach their employers for absorption and
regularisation of their services and also for payment of their salaries
on a par with the regular workers, by making appropriate
representations within the time fixed therein and directing the
employers to consider the cases of the claimants for absorption and
regularisation in accordance with the observations made by the
Supreme Court in similar cases. The State of Karnataka filed appeals
against the decision of the learned Single Judge. A Division Bench of
the High Court allowed the appeals. It held that the daily-wage
employees, employed or engaged either in government departments or
other statutory bodies after 1-7-1984, were not entitled to the benefit
of the scheme framed by this Court in Dharwad District PWD case
[(1990) 2 SCC 396 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 274 : (1990) 12 ATC 902 :
(1990) 1 SCR 544] referred to earlier. The High Court considered
various orders and directions issued by the Government interdicting
such engagements or employment and the manner of entry of the
various employees. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of their claim,
the members of the associations have filed these.
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10. When these matters came up before a Bench of two Judges, the
learned Judges referred the cases to a Bench of three Judges. The
order of reference is reported in Secy., State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(1) [(2004) 7 SCC 132 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 935 : (2003) 9 Scale 187] .
This Court noticed that in the matter of regularisation of ad hoc
employees, there were conflicting decisions by three-Judge Benches
of this Court and by two-Judge Benches and hence the question
required to be considered by a larger Bench. When the matters came
up before a three-Judge Bench, the Bench in turn felt that the matter
required consideration by a Constitution Bench in view of the conflict
and in the light of the arguments raised by the Additional Solicitor
General. —
33. It is not necessary to notice all the decisions of this Court on this
aspect. By and large what emerges is that regular recruitment should
be insisted upon, only in a contingency can an ad hoc appointment be
made in a permanent vacancy, but the same should soon be followed
by a regular recruitment and that appointments to non-available posts
should not be taken note of for regularisation. The cases directing
regularisation have mainly proceeded on the basis that having
permitted the employee to work for some period, he should be
absorbed, without really laying down any law to that effect, after
discussing the constitutional scheme for public employment.
34. In A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies [(2004) 7 SCC 112 :
2004 SCC (L&S) 918] a three-Judge Bench made a survey of the
authorities and held that when appointments were made in
contravention of mandatory provisions of the Act and statutory rules
framed thereunder and by ignoring essential qualifications, the
appointments would be illegal and cannot be regularised by the State.
The State could not invoke its power under Article 162 of the
Constitution to regularise such appointments. This Court also held that
regularisation is not and cannot be a mode of recruitment by any State
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution or any body or
authority governed by a statutory Act or the rules framed thereunder.
Regularisation furthermore cannot give permanence to an employee
whose services are ad hoc in nature. It was also held that the fact that
some persons had been working for a long time would not mean that
they had acquired a right for regularisation.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be
regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the fact that12
2026:JHHC:8710-DBthe person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for
a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an
engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the
nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes.
It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain–not at arm’s
length–since he might have been searching for some employment so
as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that
ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the
constitutionalscheme of appointment and to take the view that a
person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be
directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating
another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the
court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the
ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that
too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A
total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not
possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would
only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily,
contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment
when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to
them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search
of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or
temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an
employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis
that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and
the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while
accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of
his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of
the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is
temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered
to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure
established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the
services of the State. The argument that since one has been working
for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even
though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first
took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure
established by law for public employment and would have to fail
when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of
opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
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16. It is evident from the aforesaid paragraphs that the reason for
rendering such judgment by the Hon’ble Apex Court is to put restriction
upon the backdoor entry. However, after giving the consideration about
illegal entry and bifurcating the recruitment/appointment in two
categories i.e., irregular and illegal, parameter has been fixed at para-53,
i.e., if the appointment is irregular, the same can be regularized
depending upon the condition of more than ten years continuous service
without any aid of the order of the court and the appointment being made
against the sanctioned post. Such employees to be regularized by the
State by taking one time exercise to be completed within six months
from the date of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said
case, for ready reference Para-53 is being referred hereunder as :-
“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where
irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V.
Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071] , R.N.
Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N.
Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR
937] and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in
duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the
employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without
the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of
regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be
considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court
in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that
context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their
instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time
measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked
for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of
orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that
regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned
posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees
or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in
motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that14
2026:JHHC:8710-DBregularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be
reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further
bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or
making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional
scheme.
17. The crux of the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) (Supra) is
that the restriction is to be put on the backdoor entry vis-à-vis the issue
of exploitation and unfair level practice has also been taken of that is the
reason the State has been directed to do the exercise by way of one time
exercise to regularize the services of such employees who are working
since last more than 10 years without any aid of an order passed by the
court of law so that unfair level practice of exploitation by making
payment of only minimum wages be taken care of.
18. In the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3)
(Supra) it has also been laid down as would be evident from para 53 that
the reference of appointment made against the sanctioned post has also
been taken care of. The appointment, if not made against the sanctioned
post, then such appointment has been considered to be illegal
appointment and the moment such appointment has been found to be
illegal, such appointees are to be dispensed with from service
immediately.
19. The Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of Jaggo v. Union
of India and Others2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826, while dealing with
the issue of regularization in a case where the issue of regularization
relates to the part time worker who has not been appointed against the
sanctioned post, the Hon’ble Apex Court, after taking note of the
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judgment passed in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi (3) (Supra), has been pleased to hold at paragraph 20 that the
decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) (Supra)
does not intend to penalize employees who have rendered long years of
service fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions of the State or its
instrumentalities. The said judgment sought to prevent backdoor entries
and illegal appointments that circumvent constitutional requirements.
However, where appointments were not illegal but possibly “irregular,”
and where employees had served continuously against the backdrop of
sanctioned functions for a considerable period, the need for a fair and
humane resolution becomes paramount. Prolonged, continuous, and
unblemished service performing tasks inherently required on a regular
basis can, over the time, transform what was initially ad-hoc or
temporary into a scenario demanding fair regularization.
20. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the said judgment, has also referred
the judgment rendered in the case of Vinod Kumar v. Union of India
[(2024) 1 SCR 1230], wherein it was held that procedural formalities
cannot be used to deny regularization of service to an employee whose
appointment was termed “temporary” but has performed the same duties
as performed by the regular employee over a considerable period in the
capacity of the regular employee.
1. Recently, in the case of Bhola Nath vs. State of Jharkhand and
Others 2026 SCC Online SC 129, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that
Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for regularization
cannot override constitutional guarantees. Acceptance of contractual
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terms does not amount to waiver of fundamental rights, and contractual
stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary State action from constitutional
scrutiny. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid
judgment are being quoted as under:
“Legitimate Expectation of the employees: –
13. Another facet requiring consideration in the case of contractual
employees, such as the present appellants, is the doctrine of legitimate
expectation. Where employees have continued to discharge their
duties on contractual posts for a considerable length of time, as in the
present case, it is but natural that a legitimate expectation arises that
the State would, at some stage, recognize their long and continuous
service. It is in this belief, bolstered by repeated extensions granted by
theExecutive, that such employees continue in service and refrain
from seeking alternative employment, notwithstanding the contractual
nature of their engagement. At this juncture, it is thus apposite to
advert to the principles governing the doctrine of legitimate
expectation as enunciated by this Court in Army Welfare Education
Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, wherein it was held as follows:-
“63. A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings forth the following
features regarding the doctrine of legitimate expectation:
63.1. First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed
to a mere hope, wish or anticipation;
63.2. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an
express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom
followed by an authority in its dealings; …
63.5. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public
law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a
public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past
practice, without any reasonable basis. …
64.The aforesaid features, although not exhaustive in nature, are
sufficient to help us in deciding the applicability of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation to the facts of the case at hand. It is clear that
legitimate expectation, jurisprudentially, was a device created in order
to maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action. It does not extend17
2026:JHHC:8710-DBto and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private
parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.”
(emphasis laid)
It is, therefore, not difficult to comprehend the expectation with which
such contractual employees continue in the service of the State. The
repeated conduct of the employer-State in expressing confidence in
their performance and consistently granting monetary upgrades &
tenure extensions reasonably nurtures an expectation that their long
and continuous service would receive further recognition.
13.1. Another Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi,
cautioned that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot ordinarily
be extended to persons whose appointments are temporary, casual or
contractual in nature. The relevant extract of the judgment reads as
follows:
“47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets
engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the
engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by
the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of theconsequences of
the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature.
Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation
for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post
could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection
and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service
Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation
cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or
casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out
any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them
where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot
constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory
cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in
the post.” (emphasis laid)However, this Court in Umadevi (supra) clarified that the bar against
invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies only to
those temporary, contractual or casual employees whose engagement
was not preceded by a proper selection process in accordance with the
extant rules. Consequently, where such engagement is made after
following a due and lawful selection procedure, there is no absolute
bar in law preventing such employees from invoking the doctrine of
legitimate expectation.
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FINAL CONCLUSION:
21. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing paragraphs, we
summarize our conclusions as follows:
I. The respondent-State was not justified in continuing the appellants
on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade under the nomenclature
of contractual engagement and thereafter denying them consideration
for regularization.
II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing engagement solely
on the basis of contractual nomenclature, without either recording
cogent reasons or passing a speaking order, is manifestly arbitrary and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for
regularization cannot override constitutional guarantees. Acceptance
of contractual terms does not amount to waiver of fundamental rights,
and contractual stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary State action
from constitutional scrutiny.
IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on contractual labels
or mechanical application of Umadevi (supra) to justify prolonged ad-
hocism or to discard long-serving employees in a manner inconsistent
with fairness, dignity and constitutional governance.
V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the respondent State
to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the
sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed. The
appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits
accruing from the date of this judgment.
22. The reference of the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench
of this Court in L.P.A. No.529 of 2019 [The State of Jharkhand &
Others v. Md. Ahsanullah Khan] also needs to be referred herein
wherein also as per the decision made by the State in the said case, Md.
Ahsanullah Khan was working for the last 26 years but not against the
sanctioned post, rather, his appointment was said to be seasonal. This
Court, after taking into consideration the long length of service of 26
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years, has passed direction for his regularization in service on the
consideration of the fact that the identically placed employees have
already been regularized in service.
23. The said judgment passed by this Court has been challenged by
filing Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.9318 of 2022 but the same was
dismissed. The relevant paragraph of the judgment passed in L.P.A.
No.529 of 2019 are being referred herein :-
“31. We have gone through the judgment rendered by the learned
Single Judge and found therefrom that the consideration has been
made with respect to the appointment of three persons out of which
two persons, namely, Ram Sewak Mahto and Mithilesh Kumar
Tiwary have been appointed on the basis of the order passed by this
Court and one Sri Kamleshwar Rana has been appointed on the basis
of the assurance of the Legislative Assembly of the State and further
consideration has been made that the land of the writ petitioner has
been acquired sometime in the year 1986 and his case has been
considered but he has not been provided appointment on regular basis
rather on temporary basis to which he is still continuing. Taking into
consideration this aspect of the matter, if the order has been passed to
come out with the advertisement for appointment of writ petitioner by
giving priority in age and relaxation by granting weightage in marks
the same cannot be said to suffer from any error. It cannot be said to
be excess in jurisdiction by issuing a direction upon the State-
appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to come out
with an advertisement rather according to our considered view, since
the Writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the
Court of equity and if in exceptional circumstances a Writ Court
considers it just and proper case by issuing a command upon the State
to come out with an advertisement, the same cannot be said to be
excess in jurisdiction.
32. Herein also, in the given facts as discusses hereinabove, it is a case
of exception in which the land of the writ petitioner has been acquired
way back in the year 1986 but he has been offered temporary
appointment while other similarly situated persons like Ram Sewak
Mahto and Mithilesh Kumar Tiwary have been appointed on the basis20
2026:JHHC:8710-DBof the order passed by this Court by invoking the jurisdiction of this
Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and one Sri
Kamleshwar Rana has been appointed on the basis of the assurance of
Legislative Assembly of the State, this Court cannot be a mute
expectator in exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
33. If the writ petitioner has been subjected to hostile discrimination
that too without any reason since time and again this Court has passed
judicial orders but no reason has been explained for differentiating the
case of Ram Sewak Mahto, Sri Kamleshwar Rana and Mithilesh
Kumar Tiwary with the case of the writ petitioner.
34. In view thereof, this Court in the entirety of the facts and
circumstances, is of the view that the order passed by the learned
Single Judge suffers from no infirmity, accordingly, the instant appeal
fails and is dismissed”
24. In the background of the aforesaid settled position of law, this
Court is now re-adverting to the fact of the present case. The Applicant
has been conferred with temporary status w.e.f. 23.5.2007 and such
conferment has been granted on consideration of the admitted fact that
the respondent-applicant has been found in employment as on 10.9.1993.
As per Policy Decision dated 9.8.1996, the employee(s) found to be in
employment on 10.9.1993 is/are to be conferred with the temporary
status, meaning thereby, the fact about discharge of duty by the applicant
at least from 10.9.1993 is not in dispute.
25. The applicant therefore, continuously discharging his duty from
10.9.1993 till the date of his superannuation, i.e., 30.06.2019. Hence, the
applicant has been found in regular service from 10.9.1993 till the date
of his retirement i.e. 30.06.2019, the period more than about 25 years.
26. Further in the present case, the ground which has been taken by
the writ petitioner that the claim of the applicant has been rejected vide
order dated 04.8.1993, even though, the same has not been challenged
21
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but it has been quashed, this Court with respect to such argument is of
the view that even accepting claim of the applicant for conferment of
temporary status has been rejected vide order dated 04.8.1993 but
subsequent thereto the writ petitioner himself has come out with a Policy
Decision dated 09.8.1996 to confer temporary status if employee(s)
found to be in employment on 10.9.1993.
27. Admittedly, the applicant has been found to be in employment
on 10.9.1993 and, as such, he has been conferred with the temporary
status as per the Policy Decision dated9.8.1996 and for this specific
reason conferment of temporary status has not been challenged as per the
submission made on behalf of the writ petitioners, as stated herein above.
28. Therefore, this Court is of the view that even the order dated
04.8.1993 has not been challenged by the applicant and if it has been
quashed and set-aside with a direction to grant temporary status to the
applicant, the same is now available to the writ petitioners to challenge
that part of the order once the submission has been advanced that the
respondent-applicant has not challenged the issue of temporary status.
29. The issue of regularization since is under challenge and as such
in view of the law down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred and
discussed herein above, the applicant since has been found to be in
regular service of the writ petitioner for long 25 years, hence, order of
regularization cannot be said to be suffer from an error.
30. In view of above discussions, this court is of the view that the
order passed by the learned Tribunal suffers from no infirmity,
accordingly, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed.
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31. Pending interlocutory application (s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Date: 26/03/2026
KNR/AFR
Uploaded On:26 / 03/2026
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