Tmt. P. Shanthi vs Branch Manager M/S. United India … on 19 March, 2026

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    Supreme Court – Daily Orders

    Tmt. P. Shanthi vs Branch Manager M/S. United India … on 19 March, 2026

    Author: Rajesh Bindal

    Bench: Rajesh Bindal

                                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    
                                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3605 OF 2026
                                     [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 11914 of 2023]
    
    
    
           TMT. P. SHANTHI & ANR.                                   ….APPELLANT(S)
    
    
                                                VERSUS
    
           BRANCH MANAGER M/S                                     …RESPONDENT(S)
           UNITED INDIA INSURANCE
           COMPANY    LIMITED   &
           ORS.
    
    
    
                                                       ORDER
    

    1. Leave Granted.

    2. The present appeal has been preferred by the Appellants

    SPONSORED

    challenging the judgment dated 21.07.2022 (hereinafter referred to as

    “Impugned Order”) passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras

    (hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”) in C.M.A. No. 399 of 2022

    and C.M.P. No. 2782 of 2022 wherein the High Court allowed the

    appeal, and set aside the order dated 19.03.2021 passed by the

    Commissioner for Employees Compensation (Joint Commissioner of

    Labour-I), Chennai (hereinafter referred to as “Commissioner”) in E.C.
    Signature Not Verified

    Case No. 220 of 2013, thereby granting a total compensation of
    Digitally signed by
    ANITA MALHOTRA
    Date: 2026.04.06
    17:27:16 IST
    Reason:

    ₹2,37,320/- to the Appellants.

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    FACTUAL MATRIX

    3. The deceased, K. Paramasivan was employed by Respondent No.

    3 for driving a heavy vehicle container lorry which transports goods

    from one place to another. On 06.08.2007, the deceased was driving a

    16 wheel container lorry bearing registration no. TN09 AD 4521, from

    Chennai to Melvisharam to unload leather. At about 6.30 PM he

    reached M.A.K.H. and sons company, Ranipettai to unload and get a

    receipt of the same, when he suffered a cardiac arrest and died.

    4. A claim petition bearing E.C. Case No. 220 of 2013, was filed by

    Raani, the wife of the deceased (herein after referred to as “original

    claimant”) before the Commissioner, seeking compensation of

    ₹5,00,000/-. During the pendency of the claim petition, the Original

    Claimant died on 07.03.2016. Later, Appellants and Respondent No. 2

    were impleaded as the legal representatives of the original claimant.

    AWARD PASSED BY THE COMMISSIONER

    5. The commissioner after considering the contentions raised by

    both the parties, passed an order dated 19.03.2021 and held that

    there existed an employer-employee relationship between Respondent

    No. 3 and the deceased, and the death was caused in the course of

    employment. In addition to this, the commissioner noted that the

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    death of the deceased was due to stress and strain of the nature of

    work. The Commissioner, relying upon the judgment of Kerala High

    Court passed in Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation vs.

    Mohanan, reported as (1988) SCC OnLine Ker 16, and the judgment

    of Orissa High Court passed in National Insurance Company, Ltd.

    vs. Ranjulala Bhuyan and Anr, reported as 1996 ACJ 716, held that

    the Appellants and Respondent No. 2 were entitled to claim

    compensation.

    6. Furthermore, the commissioner held that the vehicle of

    Respondent No. 3 was duly insured with Respondent No. 1 and the

    date of death was within the policy period. Consequently, Respondent

    No. 1 was directed to pay a total sum of ₹2,37,320/- (inclusive of

    administrative expenses of ₹2500/-) as compensation under Section

    4A(3)(a) of Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (herein after referred

    to as “the Act”) along with an interest @12% p.a.

    JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT

    7. Aggrieved, by the order passed by commissioner in E.C. Case 220

    of 2013, Respondent No. 1 preferred a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal

    bearing C.M.A. No. 399 of 2022 before the High Court. The High Court

    while considering the contention of maintainability of the claim

    petition by the Appellants, discussed the definition of “dependant” as

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    defined under Section 2(d) of the Act. The High Court held that the

    Appellants being married daughters and the Respondent No. 2 being

    major son do not fall within the definition of dependant and in terms

    of Section 22(1A) of the Act a claim petition by them is not

    maintainable.

    8. Furthermore, the High Court while considering the question

    whether the death was on account of stress and strain caused due to

    work, relied on the principles set out in the judgment passed by this

    Court in Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti Vs. Prabhakar

    Maruti Garvali and Anr., reported as (2007) 11 SCC 668, and held

    that there is no proof to show that the deceased suffered cardiac arrest

    because of the stress and strain of the work. Additionally, the High

    Court noted contradictions between the statement of original claimant

    and the FIR of the incident lodged by the eyewitness, wherein it was

    stated that the deceased had not died while driving the container

    lorry, instead he died when he was going to collect the receipt after

    unloading the goods.

    9. Consequently, the High Court vide its judgment dated

    21.07.2022 allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the

    Commissioner.

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    SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

    10. The learned counsel appearing for the Appellants contended that

    the deceased died on 06.08.2007 due to an injury caused out of and in

    the course of his employment. In addition to this, driving a 16-wheeler

    heavy container lorry is a crucial and stressful job that creates high

    tension and blood pressure, which resulted in his fatal heart attack.

    Further, the learned counsel for Appellants contended that the

    definition of “unmarried daughters” is narrow and does not explain the

    status of divorcees or women living with a partner without marriage.

    They also submitted that once married, the stability of married life can

    be questionable, and the mere existence of a marriage or surviving

    parents should not be the sole rating scale for dependency.

    11. The learned counsel for Respondent No.1 contended that the

    appellants being the married daughters of the deceased does not come

    within the ambit of term “dependants” as defined under Section 2(d) of

    the Act. Further, the learned counsel relying on the judgment of

    Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra), contended that there

    was no evidence demonstrating that the deceased was subjected to

    sudden stressful conditions during his duties that brought on the

    cardiac arrest, and a heart attack during the course of employment

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    does not automatically amount to an accident without a crucial nexus

    with employment being proved.

    12. Having considered the rival submissions made at the bar and the

    materials on the record, the controversy in the present appeal can be

    crystalized on two counts:

    a. Whether the married daughters and major sons have the locus

    standi to pursue the claim for compensation as legal heirs after the

    death of the original claimant (widow)?

    b. Whether the death of the deceased driver by cardiac arrest arose

    out of and in the course of his employment?

    ANALYSIS

    13. Before delving into the specific issues, it is imperative to remind

    ourselves of the nature and object of the Employees’ Compensation

    Act, 1923. As observed by this Court in Jaya Biswal & Others vs.

    Branch Manager, IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Company

    Limited & Another, reported as (2016) 11 SCC 201, the Act is a

    social welfare legislation providing for compensation to people who

    sustain bodily injuries or get killed. The grant of compensation must

    be expeditious, and procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to

    defeat the just purpose of the Act. The Courts, while construing such

    social welfare legislations, are duty-bound to adopt a beneficial rule of

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    construction which fulfills the policy of the legislation favorable to

    those in whose interest the Act has been passed. Judicial discipline

    demands that the words of a remedial statute be construed to secure

    the relief contemplated and not to deny it to the intended class.

    ISSUE I

    14. The High Court and the respondents have fundamentally

    misdirected themselves in law. The initial claim was instituted by Tmt.

    Rani, the widow of the deceased, who undeniably qualified as a

    “dependant” under Section 2(d)(i) of the Act at the time of her

    husband’s death and after her death the Appellants were impleaded as

    her Legal Representative in the claim petition. This Court in the case

    of Shobha And Ors. vs. Chairman, Vithalrao Shinde Sahakari

    Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. And Ors., reported as (2022) 13 SCC 172,

    has held that as per Section 4A(1) of the Act, compensation payable

    under Section 4 of the Act is required to be paid as soon as it falls

    due. In cases of death of an employee arising out of and in the course

    of employment, the compensation becomes due immediately upon

    such death. Additionally, as held in Oriental Insurance Company

    Limited vs. Kahlon And Another, reported as (2022) 13 SCC 494,

    even after the death of the injured claimant, the claim petition does

    not abate, and the right to sue survives to the heirs and legal

    representatives insofar as the loss to the estate is concerned. Thus,

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    applying these legal principles to the facts of our present case, the

    claim petition is maintainable by, if continued, the legal

    representatives after the death of the original claimant.

    15. Furthermore, in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Birender,

    reported as (2020) 11 SCC 356, and later reiterated in the case of

    Jitender Kumar & Anr. vs. Sanjay Prasad & Ors. in Civil Appeal

    No. 7199 of 2025, it was clarified that major married and earning

    children are considered as legal representatives, and have a right to

    apply for compensation. The term ‘legal representative’ is of wide

    amplitude and includes anyone who inherits the estate of the

    deceased, regardless of their financial dependency at the time of

    death. Therefore, the High Court erred in invalidating the claim based

    on the marital status of the heirs who merely inherited a pending,

    validly instituted action.

    Issue II

    16. The High Court, relying on Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti

    (supra), concluded that a heart attack does not automatically presume

    an accident and that since the FIR indicated the deceased had stepped

    out of the lorry to get a receipt, there was no proof of stress or strain

    causing the death. We find this reasoning to be flawed and contrary to

    the settled jurisprudence regarding the employment of heavy vehicle

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    drivers. The case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra) is

    clearly distinguishable on facts as the deceased workmen was a

    cleaner in a vehicle. It must also be noted that in the said case there

    were no specific allegations by the claimants to the effect that the

    deceased died by reason of any strain of work, whereas in the present

    case, there were clear pleading stating that the nature of employment

    i.e. driving a 16 wheeler container, of the deceased required more

    attention and caused strain. In addition to this the High Court has

    misapplied the factors to be established to prove that the accident has

    taken place, which has been properly applied by this court in Param

    Pal Singh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., reported as (2013) 3

    SCC 409, wherein this Court recognized that the very nature of the

    job of a professional driver, who is required to drive a heavy vehicle for

    long distances, is such that it causes a great deal of stress and strain.

    If the deceased was performing his duties and the stress of driving

    contributed to or accelerated his death, it must be considered an

    accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The relevant

    extract of the case is as follows:

    25. In a recent decision of this Court in Shakuntala
    Chandrakant Shreshti, the factors to be established to prove
    that an accident has taken place have been culled out and
    stated as under in para 26: (SCC p. 677)
    “26. In a case of this nature to prove that accident
    has taken place, factors which would have to be
    established, inter alia, are:

    (1) stress and strain arising during the course of

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    employment,
    (2) nature of employment,
    (3) injury aggravated due to stress and strain.”

    XXX

    29. Applying the various principles laid down in the above
    decisions to the facts of this case, we can validly conclude that
    there was causal connection to the death of the deceased with
    that of his employment as a truck driver. We cannot lose sight
    of the fact that a 45-year-old driver meets with his unexpected
    death, may be due to heart failure while driving the vehicle from
    Delhi to a distant place called Nimiaghat near Jharkhand which
    is about 1152 km away from Delhi, would have definitely
    undergone grave strain and stress due to such long distance
    driving. The deceased being a professional heavy vehicle driver
    when undertakes the job of such driving as his regular
    avocation it can be safely held that such constant driving of
    heavy vehicle, being dependent solely upon his physical and
    mental resources and endurance, there was every reason to
    assume that the vocation of driving was a material contributory
    factor if not the sole cause that accelerated his unexpected
    death to occur which in all fairness should be held to be an
    untoward mishap in his lifespan. Such an “untoward mishap”
    can therefore be reasonably described as an “accident” as
    having been caused solely attributable to the nature of
    employment indulged in with his employer which was in the
    course of such employer’s trade or business.

    (emphasis supplied)

    17. Furthermore, the High Court’s reliance on the fact that the

    deceased was not physically steering the vehicle at the exact moment

    of his cardiac arrest ignores the theory of “Notional Extension”.

    Considering the theory of notional extension as discussed in the

    judgment of Poonam Devi and Ors. vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.,

    reported as (2020) 4 SCC 55, and the facts of the present case is that

    if a driver is away from home due to his duties, he is deemed to be “on

    duty”. In the present case, the deceased had alighted the vehicle solely

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    to obtain a delivery receipt for the goods he had transported for his

    employer. He was at the premises strictly for the purpose of his

    employment. The nexus between his work and his presence at the

    location is unequivocally established.

    CONCLUSION

    18. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that:

    i. The Appellants, being the legal representatives of the

    original claimant (widow), are fully entitled to inherit and

    pursue the claim for compensation.

    ii. The death of the deceased due to cardiac arrest while

    obtaining a delivery receipt during a transit trip falls

    squarely within the scope of an accident arising out of and

    in the course of employment.

    19. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and

    order dated 21.07.2022 passed by the High Court in C.M.A. No. 399 of

    2022 is hereby set aside. The order of the Commissioner for

    Employees’ Compensation dated 19.03.2021 is restored. The

    Respondent Insurance Company is directed to release the

    compensation amount to the appellants, along with interest as

    originally awarded.

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    20. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

    ………………………., J.

    (RAJESH BINDAL)

    ………………………., J.

    (VIJAY BISHNOI)

    NEW DELHI;

    MARCH 19, 2026.

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    ITEM NO.28                 COURT NO.15               SECTION XII
    
                   S U P R E M E C O U R T O F      I N D I A
                           RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
    
    Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)    No(s).    11914/2023
    
    

    [Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 21-07-2022
    in CMA No. 399/2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
    Madras]

    TMT. P. SHANTHI & ANR. Petitioner(s)

    VERSUS

    BRANCH MANAGER M/S. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE
    COMPANY LIMITED & ORS. Respondent(s)

    (IA No. 85055/2023 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)

    Date : 19-03-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.

    CORAM :

    HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BINDAL
    HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI

    For Petitioner(s) :

    Mr. C Raghavendren, Adv.

    Mrs. C Rubavathi, Adv.

    Mr. Ch. Leela Sarveswar, Adv.

    Mr. K Gopinath, Adv.

    Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy, AOR

    For Respondent(s) :

    Mr. Abhishek Kumar Gola, Adv.

    Mr. Anshul Mehral, Adv.

    Mr. Mohit Singh, Adv.

    Mr. Ravinder Singh, Adv.

    Mr. Sudhir Naagar, AOR

    UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
    O R D E R

    Leave granted.

    The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
    Pending application shall also stand disposed of.

        (ANITA MALHOTRA)                          (MANOJ KUMAR)
           AR-CUM-PS                              COURT MASTER
                  (Signed order is placed on the file.)
    
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