Telangana High Court
Thirunagari Govind vs The State Of Telagana on 26 March, 2026
Author: Juvvadi Sridevi
Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
CRIMINAL PETITION No.4031 OF 2024
DATED: 26th MARCH, 2026
Between:
Thirunagari Govind ...Petitioner
AND
The State of Telangana represented by
Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor
for ACB Cases and two others ...Respondents
O R D E R:
This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused
No.3 seeking to quash the proceedings against him in Crime
No.05/RCO/ACB-NZB/2020/ACB, Nizamabad, registered for
the offences under Sections 7(a)(c) and 12 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act (for short ‘the Act’) and Section 120B read
with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC‘).
02. Heard Sri Ch. Vidya Sagar Rao, learned counsel,
representing Sri N. Manohar, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri K. Rajashekar, learned counsel,
2
representing Sri T. Bala Mohan Reddy, learned Standing
Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for the Anti-
Corruption Bureau for the respondents. Perused the record.
03(a). The brief facts of the case are as follows: One
Gaddam Satish Goud, shown as the respondent No.2,
became acquainted with Bathula Sudhakar, shown as the
respondent No.3. One Sujay was habitually engaged in
betting on IPL cricket matches, and the respondent No.3
used to act as a mediator in such betting activities. Sujay
used to pay money through the respondent No.3 in
connection with the said betting transactions. Subsequently,
the respondent No.3 decided to discontinue his involvement
in cricket betting and ceased to act as a mediator. However,
Sujay allegedly began coercing the respondent No.3 to
continue acting as a mediator. He is stated to have
threatened the respondent No.3 that, in the event of non-
compliance, he would lodge a complaint against him and
ensure that a betting case was registered, asserting that he
had influence over the officials of Kamareddy Police Station,
including the Inspector.
3
03(b). It is further averred that the respondent No.3
informed the respondent No.2 about the said threats, who in
turn apprised their common friend by name Ande Ramesh.
On 05.11.2020, the respondent No.3, accompanied by a
Police Constable by name Ravi, went to the residence of the
respondent No.2 and informed him that the said constable
was taking him to Kamareddy Police Station. The
respondent No.3 requested the respondent No.2 to
accompany him, and accordingly, he did so. However, the
respondent No.2 was not permitted to enter the Police
Station and waited outside. After some time, he was called
inside and met the respondent No.3. He advised the
respondent No.3 to disclose the truth as to whether he had
participated in betting activities. Shortly thereafter, the
respondent No.2 was directed to leave the premises by the
police officials. Subsequently, the respondent No.2
approached the accused No.1 and requested permission to
speak with him briefly. The accused No.1 declined and
directed him to speak with the accused No.2 instead. Upon
speaking with the accused No.2, the respondent No.2 was
4
informed that a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was required to secure
the release of the respondent No.3 from the proposed betting
case. Thereafter, the respondent No.2 came into the
verandah and informed the respondent No.3 that accused
No.1 was demanding Rs.5,00,000/- for his release, out of
which Rs.3,00,000/- was allegedly the share of the accused
No.1 and the remaining Rs.2,00,000/- would be shown as the
amount seized in the betting case to be registered against
him.
03(c). Thereafter, the Police Constable by name Ravi,
the accused No.2 and one Ramesh came out along with the
respondent No.3. Sujay informed the respondent No.2 that
the respondent No.3 was being taken to Banswada. The
respondent No.3 was taken in the car of the accused No.2,
and the respondent No.2 was unable to follow them.
Approximately, half an hour later, the respondent No.3
telephonically informed the respondent No.2 that they had
returned to the Police Station and requested him to come
there. The respondent No.2 accordingly went to the Police
Station but was not permitted to meet the respondent No.3
5
and therefore returned. On 06.11.2020, the respondent No.2
informed his friend Ramesh about the matter. On the same
day, Ramesh informed the respondent No.2 that the accused
No.1 was demanding Rs.5,00,000/- as illegal gratification.
Meanwhile, the respondent No.3 contacted Ramesh
telephonically, enquired about his location, and requested
him to arrange Rs.5,00,000/-. It was further informed that an
amount of Rs.1,50,000/- had already been collected.
Thereafter, the respondent No.3 again called Ramesh and
asked him to bring an additional amount of Rs.50,000/- or
Rs.1,00,000/-. He repeatedly enquired about Ramesh’s
whereabouts and urged him to bring the money at the
earliest.
03(d). As the respondent No.2 was unwilling to pay the
bribe amount, he approached the officials of the Anti-
Corruption Bureau (ACB). On 06.11.2020 at about 7:45
p.m., Ramesh went to Kamareddy Town Police Station after
activating the electronic recording device provided by the
ACB officials. After some time, he returned and informed the
ACB officials that the accused No.2 had taken him aside in
6
the verandah of the Police Station and enquired as to the
amount brought by him. Upon being informed that he had
brought Rs.50,000/-, the accused No.2 directed him to hand
over the said amount and leave. When Ramesh enquired
whether the respondent No.3 would be released, the
accused No.2 informed him that the respondent No.3 would
remain inside. Ramesh further stated that when he
attempted to speak with the accused No.1, the respondent
No.3 prevented him from doing so.
03(e). At about 9:15 p.m., as per the instructions of the
ACB officials, the respondent No.2 went to the Police Station
with the electronic recording device activated. On seeing
him, the accused No.1 directed him to leave his cell phone
outside. The accused No.2 then entered the chamber of the
accused No.1. Inside the chamber, the accused No.2
enquired about the bribe amount. The respondent No.2
stated that since it was Friday, he was unable to mortgage
gold and would arrange the amount on the following day. The
accused No.1 stated that he had already given his word to
higher officials and was unable to retract it. He further
7
demanded Rs.1,50,000/- as advance. When the respondent
No.2 informed that Rs.50,000/- had already been paid
through Ramesh, the accused No.2 denied receipt of any
such amount. Thereafter, the accused No.1 directed them to
go outside and discuss the matter. The respondent No.2
subsequently handed over the recording device to the
Inspector of Police, ACB, Nizamabad Range.
03(f). On 07.11.2020, the respondent No.2 and
Ramesh met the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB,
Nizamabad Range, who instructed them to once again meet
the accused No.1 while carrying the electronic recording
device and record the conversation. Accordingly, they
proceeded to Kamareddy. At that time, the accused No.1
was coming out of the Police Station. He stopped his vehicle
and asked them to follow him to the office of the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Kamareddy. They complied and
waited outside as instructed. After some time, the accused
No.1 came out and directed them to come to the Police
Station.
8
03(g). At the Police Station, the accused No.1 informed
them that the respondent No.3 had been detained for a few
days and that a case would be registered against him, but
that he would grant station bail. He assured them that he
would manage the higher officials and ensure that the
respondent No.3 would not face future difficulties. He further
remarked that the respondent No.3 had accumulated
substantial wealth, including plots and a house, and enquired
whether they had brought the bribe amount. Ramesh, to
ascertain his intention, informed him that they had brought
Rs.4,00,000/- as per his instructions. However, the accused
No.1 asked them to come on the following day and pointed
out a person to whom the bribe amount was to be handed
over. Shortly thereafter, the said person approached them
and reiterated that they should come on the next day. The
entire conversation was recorded by Ramesh.
03(h). On 08.11.2020, the respondent No.2 submitted
a further complaint to the ACB authorities stating that he was
not willing to pay the bribe amount. Upon verification, it was
found that the accused No.1 did not enjoy a good reputation.
9
As there was prima facie material indicating demand and
acceptance of Rs.50,000/- as part of the bribe, efforts were
initiated to lay a trap. However, in the meantime, the
accused No.1 registered Crime No.404 of 2020 against the
respondent No.3 under Sections 3 and 4 of the A.P.Gaming
Act, notwithstanding the alleged receipt of Rs.50,000/- as
part of the illegal gratification. Consequently, the proposed
trap could not be executed.
03(i). On 13.11.2020, the ACB officials met the
respondent No.3, who submitted a typed complaint
reiterating the above facts. He further alleged that the
accused No.2 forcibly took his Canara Bank ATM card and
withdrew an amount of Rs.89,500/- from his account. He also
stated that, on the instructions of the accused No.1, the
petitioner-accused No.3 and his staff took him to a tin shed at
CSI Ground, Kamareddy, where photographs were taken
and a panchanama was purportedly conducted, and a false
case was registered against him. After registration of the
case, he was released. However, on 10.11.2020, he was
again summoned to the Police Station, compelled to sign
10
certain documents, and the petitioner-accused No.3 allegedly
demanded an additional bribe of Rs.20,000/-. Upon
verification, it was found that the petitioner-accused No.3
also did not enjoy a good reputation. Thus, accused Nos.1
and 3, being public servants, are alleged to have failed to
maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in the
discharge of their official functions and to have abused their
official position for illegal gratification.
04(a). Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused No.3
submits that the petitioner has no manner of involvement
whatsoever in the alleged offences. It is contended that as
per the complaints lodged by the respondent No.2 dated
06.11.2020 and 08.11.2020, the allegations were directed
only against the Inspector of Police (accused No.1) and the
private person i.e. accused No.2 and upon subsequent
complaint dated 13.11.2020 submitted by the respondent
No.3, the allegation against the present petitioner-accused
No.3 is that he allegedly demanded a sum of Rs.20,000/- for
granting station bail and for accepting sureties in Crime
No.404 of 2020 registered against the respondent No.3. It is
11
further submitted that no case was registered by the ACB
authorities either on 06.11.2020, 08.11.2020, or 13.11.2020,
and that the present crime bearing No.05/RCO/ACB-
NZB/2020 was registered only on 19.11.2020, hence, as on
the date of the alleged complaint dated 13.11.2020, no case
had been registered against the petitioner-accused No.3.
04(b). Learned counsel further submits that the
petitioner-accused No.3 was working as Sub-Inspector of
Police at Kamareddy Police Station from September, 2018 to
November, 2020. During the said period, the accused No.1
was the Station House Officer of Kamareddy Police Station.
On 08.11.2020 at about 8:00 p.m., the accused No.1
instructed the petitioner-accused No.3 to proceed to a tin
shed situated at CSI Ground, Kamareddy Town, to verify
information regarding illegal online cricket betting allegedly
taking place there. Pursuant to such instructions, the
petitioner-accused No.3, along with police staff and two
mediators, proceeded to the said location and found the
respondent No.3 along with others present at the scene. The
police team surrounded the persons found there, informed
12
them of the purpose of their presence, and conducted
enquiries. As the respondent No.3 and others, namely
Jagan and Amarnath, failed to provide satisfactory
explanations for their presence, a search was conducted.
During the search, an amount of Rs.1,14,000/- and a Redmi
mobile phone were recovered from the possession of the
respondent No.3. From Jagan, an amount of Rs.16,000/-
and one OnePlus mobile phone were seized. Upon enquiry,
they allegedly disclosed that they were engaged in online
cricket betting using code “VIK” through phone number
7979028143 and were in contact with one R.K. (phone
number 7887005487), stated to be the main organiser,
through whom betting amounts were credited to participants’
accounts. It was further disclosed that the respondent No.3
used to receive commission through PhonePe and Google
Pay. The petitioner-accused No.3, in the presence of
mediators, recorded the proceedings, prepared a
panchanama, and seized the incriminating articles, namely
the cash of Rs.1,14,000/- and the mobile phones, under the
cover of the panchanama duly signed by the mediators.
13
Thereafter, the respondent No.3 and another person were
taken into custody and produced before the accused No.1,
the Station House Officer, who registered Crime No.404 of
2020 and entrusted the investigation to Mr. M. Ravi Kumar,
Sub-Inspector of Police. The Investigating Officer completed
the investigation and filed a report before the learned
Magistrate. Subsequently, the accused therein were
arrested, remanded to judicial custody, released on bail, and
ultimately the respondent No.3 pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-.
04(c). It is further contended that the petitioner-
accused No.3 never demanded any illegal gratification from
any person while discharging his official duties. No official
favour was pending with the petitioner in respect of the
respondent No.3. The entire case was initially dealt with by
the accused No.1 and thereafter investigated by the said Mr.
M. Ravi Kumar, Sub-Inspector of Police. It is further
submitted that there is absolutely no material or evidence to
substantiate the allegation of any criminal conspiracy
between the petitioner-accused No.3 and the other accused.
14
The essential ingredients required to constitute offences
punishable under Section 120B of IPC and Section 7(a) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act are conspicuously absent,
and therefore the continuation of proceedings against the
petitioner-accused No.3 is wholly unsustainable in law. It is
also submitted that the proceedings against the accused
No.1 were already quashed by this Court vide Order dated
01.08.2022 passed in CRL.P.No.9027 of 2021.
04(d). With the above submissions, while praying to
quash the proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.3,
he relied upon a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court
in CBI v. Dr. Anup Kumar Srivastava 1 wherein it was held
at Paragraph Nos.15, 16, 24, 26, 31 that:
“15. A final report was filed in the Special Court,
Patiala House in the FIR being No. RCAC 2012
A0001 dated 29-2-2012 alleging that on 28-12-2011,
the respondent herein, who was at the relevant time
posted as the Commissioner, Central Excise, Delhi-I
Commissionerate, along with other persons of the
Department and with one Hemant Gandhi (private
person), planned a fake raid at the premises of Mr
Dilip Aggarwal and Anand Aggarwal at Najafgarh1
(2017) 15 SCC 560
15Road, New Delhi in order to obtain illegal gratification
by illegal and corrupt means through Hemant Gandhi.
16. It is the case of the prosecution that on 28-12-
2011, a team of officials of the Central Excise
Department led by Lallan Ojha, Superintendent,
conducted an illegal raid at the premises of Dilip
Aggarwal and Anand Aggarwal at 71/7, A-4, First
Floor, Najafgarh Road Industrial Area, New Delhi.
Further, Lallan Ojha, in conspiracy with the
respondent herein and Hemant Gandhi and others
negotiated with the owners of the premises for illegal
gratification in lieu of not taking any action against
them and finalised the bribe amount of Rs 60 lakhs to
be paid by them through the private person. The
factum of the said raid was telephonically conveyed
by Lallan Ojha to the respondent herein through
Hemant Gandhi. Hemant Gandhi was in regular touch
with the owners of the premises and received a huge
amount of Rs 20 lakhs in cash along with a cheque
signed by Anand Aggarwal for Rs 20 lakhs as security
for the remaining amount of illegal gratification.
Hemant Gandhi also spoke to Lallan Ojha and the
respondent herein for some concession in the
amount.
24. The statements under Section 164 of the Code
also do not implicate the respondent herein in the
present case as the witnesses have retracted from
their statements. Further, on the contrary, the said
witnesses have deposed that the aforesaid
statements under Sections 161 and 164 were
obtained under threat of arrest and false implication in
the case and therefore are not voluntary. Admittedly,
the statements of Lallan Ojha as well as the
respondent herein are not on record. Even from the
statement made by Ms Rekha Rani (PW 6) PS to the
respondent herein, it can be easily seen that Hemant
Gandhi was a frequent visitor to the office of the
respondent herein. Several times, PW 6 connected
his call to the respondent herein but in her deposition
she clearly mentioned that earlier he used to call on
16
the landline number of the office but for the last 5-6
months he was meeting the respondent herein
personally in his office. Though the said deposition
proves the nearness of that particular private person
with the respondent herein but it cannot be inferred
that the private person was in constant touch with the
respondent and was apprising him about every
development before, during and after the alleged raid.
The claim of his nearness to the respondent herein is
baseless as he was working as the informer to the
evasion wing and the alleged phone calls made by
him to the respondent herein or meetings with the
respondent herein cannot and will not be sufficient to
implicate the respondent herein.
26. Similarly, the law on the issue emerges to the
effect that conspiracy is an agreement between two or
more persons to do an illegal act or an act which is
not illegal by illegal means. The object behind the
conspiracy is to achieve the ultimate aim of
conspiracy. For a charge of conspiracy means
knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or
a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some
cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods
or services in question may be inferred from the
knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not
to establish that a particular unlawful use was
intended, so long as the goods or services in question
could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the
ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it
would not be necessary for the prosecution to
establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy,
that each of the conspirators had the knowledge of
what the collaborator would do.
31. We have no doubt to hold that in Call No. 48, the
respondent herein was not at all in the picture and
even in Call No. 51 he was talking to Hemant Gandhi
but it is not proved that they were talking about the
same raid as they have used certain other cryptic
codes as mentioned above which makes the call
highly improbable for connecting the respondent
17
herein in commissioning of the offence. Even
otherwise, in Call No. 51, the benefit of doubt must go
to the respondent herein where the language of the
call is dubious and no logical understanding of the
actual conversation can be drawn. Further, in the
absence of any details with regard to the amount of
“six zero”, we are of the view that Call No. 48
categorically brings out that the respondent herein did
not have any knowledge of the alleged criminal
conspiracy and Call No. 51 is also unable to prove the
complicity of the accused in the crime because of its
out of the context conversation. In view of the above,
we are of the considered opinion that Calls Nos. 48
and 51, heavily relied upon by the prosecution, lack
object and purpose to prove the complicity of the
respondent herein in the crime.”
04(e). Further, he relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in N.S.Gnaeswaran v.
Inspector of Police 2 wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.8
and 9 that:
“8. Further, in identical proceedings filed by the CBI
against the appellants in C.C. Nos. 13 of 2006 and
151 of 2010, the charge sheets were quashed by the
High Court after taking note of the settlement reached
in the recovery proceedings. The special leave
petitions preferred by the State being SLP (Crl) No.
711 of 2021 and SLP (Crl) No. 825 of 2021
challenging the said quashing were dismissed by this
Court, rendering the orders final. Since the facts and
legal position are the same in the present matter, we
see no reason why the appellants should not be given
the same relief.
2
(2025) SCC Online SC 1257
18
9. In our view, allowing the present criminal
proceedings to continue would serve no meaningful
purpose, particularly when the dispute between the
parties has already been resolved through a full and
final settlement. The settlement between the parties
having taken place after the alleged commission of
the offence, and there being no continuing public
interest we see no justification for allowing the matter
to proceed further.”
04(f). Further, he relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in CBI v. Srinivas D. Sridhar3
wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.7, 12, 14, 18 and 21
that:
“7. An application for discharge made by the
respondent (Accused 7) was rejected by the learned
Special Judge of CBI Court. In a revision application
filed by the respondent before the High Court, by the
impugned judgment [Srinivas D. Sridhar v. CBI, 2017
SCC OnLine Guj 2900] , the High Court has
discharged the respondent. The appellant CBI, being
aggrieved by the said judgment, is before this Court.
12. We have perused the statements of the relevant
witnesses and the documents on record in the
charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet.
We may note here that there are no allegations
against the respondent as regards the sanction of
SBLC. There is no material placed in the charge-
sheets to show that the respondent has played any
role in sanction of SBLC.
14. At this stage, we may note that according to the
prosecution, the usual procedure followed by the
Bank at the relevant time was that credit proposals3
(2025) 1 SCC 378
19were processed by the Branch and submitted to the
zonal office. After the recommendation of the zonal
office, the proposals were examined by the Credit
Department in the Head Office. The memorandum
duly signed was used to be placed before the Loan
Advisory Group of six General Managers. The loan
proposals were thereafter presented before the
Managing Committee, comprising the Chairman and
Managing Director, whole-time Directors, RBI
Nominee Director, and 3 other Directors, including at
least 2 independent Directors, one of them being
Chairman of the Audit Committee. The memorandum
placed before the Managing Committee was prepared
by the Bank’s Credit Department and signed by the
Deputy General Manager (Credit) and General
Manager (Credit).
18. We find that the Loan Advisory Committee’s
favourable recommendations regarding the
Company’s proposal are also on record, apart from
the memorandum submitted to the Managing
Committee. We have also seen the executive brief
prepared containing the proposal.
21. Therefore, we see no scope to interfere with the
impugned order [Srinivas D. Sridhar v. CBI, 2017
SCC OnLine Guj 2900]. While we say so, we must
observe here that we have examined only the role
ascribed to the respondent in the process of
sanctioning the facilities to the Company. We have
examined the charge-sheet only for that limited
purpose. Therefore, any observation made in the
judgment will not affect the trial against the other
accused persons as we have not recorded any
findings about the material against them.”
04(g). Further, he relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Pandey v.
20
Shesha Ram Saini 4 wherein it was held at Paragraph
Nos.27, 32, 40 & 42 that:
“27. In Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of
Gujarat7, this Court, in a very recent judgment held,
that where the allegations pertain to the abuse of
official position and corrupt practices while holding
public office, such actions fall squarely within category
of cognizable offences and therefore, they are to be
inquired into, and holding of any preliminary inquiry
before the registration of the FIR is not necessary. If
the information provided to the police or the
preliminary report discloses a commission of a
cognizable offence, the police is duty bound under
Section 154 Cr.P.C. to register an FIR without any
delay.
32. Since, it is the duty of the police to register an FIR
if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out, the
police is not required to go into the genuineness and
credibility of the said information. It has been so laid
down very clearly in Ramesh Kumari (Supra) that the
genuineness or credibility of the information is not the
condition precedent for registration of an FIR.
40. Secondly, in view of the law laid down in Lalita
Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh11, and
reiterated thereafter to the effect that registration of
FIR is mandatory under Section 154 Cr. P.C. if the
information discloses commission of a cognizable
offence and no preliminary inquiry before FIR is
permissible in such a situation; however, if the
information received does not disclose a cognizable
offence but indicates necessity of an inquiry being
conducted, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted
only to ascertain facts disclosing cognizable offence,
if any. Thus, treating the inquiry conducted by the
Joint Director, CBI as a preliminary inquiry, we permit
the same to be looked into, if necessary, by the I.O.
4
2025 Law Suit SC 1233
21during the investigation by him, but not to treat it as
conclusive. The I.O. would conduct the investigation
strictly in accordance with law without being
influenced by any finding or observation made by the
High Court in the impugned order(s) or by this Court
hereinabove and shall conclude the same as
expeditiously as possible, preferably within three
months as the matter is quite old.
42. The two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and
S.L.P.(C) No. 7897 of 2019] stand disposed of in the
above terms and the two appeals [D. No. 10495 of
2019 and D. No. 10508 of 2019] are partly allowed by
modifying the judgment and orders of the High Court
dated 26.06.2006 as indicated above.”
04(h). Further, he relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in Vishnu Kumar Shukla and
another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another 5 wherein it
was held at Paragraph Nos.19, 21 & 22 that:
19. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N.
v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3
SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] , it was
observed notwithstanding the difference in language
of Sections 227 and 239CrPC, the approach of the
Court concerned is to be common under both
provisions. The principles holding the field under
Sections 227 and 228CrPC are well settled, courtesy,
inter alia, State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [State of
Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC
(Cri) 533] ; Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal
[Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3
SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] ; Stree Atyachar Virodhi
Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia [Stree Atyachar5
(2023) 15 Supreme Court Cases 502
22Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1
SCC 715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] ; Niranjan Singh
Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya
[Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra
Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri)
47] ; Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra
[Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002)
2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310] ; Chitresh Kumar
Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Chitresh Kumar
Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] ; Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC
(Cri) 986] ; Dinesh Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Dinesh
Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2014) 13 SCC 137 : (2014) 5
SCC (Cri) 614] ; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v.
State of Gujarat [Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v.
State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Cri) 361] and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Charan
Bansal [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Charan Bansal,
(2020) 2 SCC 290 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 594] . We
need only refer to some, starting with Prafulla Kumar
Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal,
(1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , where, after
considering Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh
Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] , K.P.
Raghavan v. M.H. Abbas [K.P. Raghavan v. M.H.
Abbas, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 76 : AIR 1967 SC 740]
and Almohan Das v. State of W.B. [Almohan Das v.
State of W.B., 1968 SCC OnLine SC 85 : (1969) 2
SCR 520] , it was laid down as under : (Prafulla
Kumar Samal case [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar
Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , SCC
p. 9, para 10)
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities
mentioned above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code
has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
23whether or not a prima facie case against the accused
has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which
has not been properly explained the Court will be fully
justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the
trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is
difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By
and large however if two views are equally possible
and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced
before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not
grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully
within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section
227 of the Code the Judge which under the present
Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act
merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the
prosecution, but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and
so on. This however does not mean that the Judge
should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons
of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.” (emphasis supplied)
21. In a recent judgment viz. State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao [State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh
Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1294] , this Court held : (SCC paras 7-10
& 12-13)
“7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being
necessary to determine whether a case has been
made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial
and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros
and cons of the matter by examining the defence of
the accused when an application for discharge is filed.
At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine
the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to
24
determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to
proceed against the accused on basis of charge-
sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded
or collected by the investigating agency or the
documents produced in which prima facie it reveals
that there are suspicious circumstances against the
accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and
such material would be taken into account for the
purposes of framing the charge. If there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused
necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if
the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of
the material there are grounds for presuming that
accused has committed the offence which is triable,
then necessarily charge has to be framed.
8. At the time of framing of the charge and taking
cognizance the accused has no right to produce any
material and call upon the court to examine the same.
No provision in the Code grants any right to the
accused to file any material or document at the stage
of framing of charge. The trial court has to apply its
judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be
necessary to determine whether a case has been
made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of
charge-sheet material only.
9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the
charge-sheet material at the stage of framing the
charge which might drastically affect the very
sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that
such material should not be considered or ignored by
the court at that stage. The main intention of granting
a chance to the accused of making submissions as
envisaged under Section 227CrPC is to assist the
court to determine whether it is required to proceed to
conduct the trial. Nothing in the Code limits the ambit
of such hearing, to oral hearing and oral arguments
only and therefore, the trial court can consider the
material produced by the accused before the IO.
10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of
considering an application for discharge the court
25
must proceed on an assumption that the material
which has been brought on record by the prosecution
is true and evaluate said material in order to
determine whether the facts emerging from the
material taken on its face value, disclose the
existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence
alleged.
***
12. The defence of the accused is not to be looked
into at the stage when the accused seeks to be
discharged. The expression “the record of the case”
used in Section 227CrPC is to be understood as the
documents and articles, if any, produced by the
prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the
accused to produce any document at the stage of
framing of the charge. The submission of the accused
is to be confined to the material produced by the
investigating agency.
13. The primary consideration at the stage of framing
of charge is the test of existence of a prima facie
case, and at this stage, the probative value of
materials on record need not be gone into. This Court
by referring to its earlier decisions in State of
Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [State of
Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 :
1996 SCC (Cri) 820] and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal
Soni [State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC
338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] has held the nature of
evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of
framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima
facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of
charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to
the existence of factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into
probative value of the material on record and to check
whether the material on record would certainly lead to
conviction at the conclusion of trial.” (emphasis
supplied)
22. On a careful conspectus of the legal spectrum,
juxtaposed with our view on the facts and merits
26expressed hereinbefore, we are satisfied that there is
no suspicion, much less strong or grave suspicion
that the appellants are guilty of the offence alleged. It
would be unjustified to make the appellants face a
full-fledged criminal trial in this backdrop. In an appeal
dealing with the refusal of the High Court to quash an
FIR under Section 482CrPC albeit, this Court, while
setting aside the judgment [Pushpendra Mishra v.
State of M.P., 2019 SCC OnLine MP 7164] impugned
therein and quashing that FIR, took the view that :
(Priyanka Mishra case [Priyanka Mishra v. State of
M.P., (2023) 15 SCC 480] , SCC para 24)
’24. … the Appellants are to be protected against
vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, and
from unnecessarily being put through the rigours of an
eventual trial.’ [Priyanka Mishra v. State of M.P.,
(2023) 15 SCC 480] The protection against vexatious
and unwanted prosecution and from being
unnecessarily dragged through a trial by melting a
criminal proceeding into oblivion, either through
quashing an FIR/complaint or by allowing an appeal
against an order rejecting discharge or by any other
legally permissible route, as the circumstances may
be, in the deserving case, is a duty cast on the High
Courts. The High Court should have intervened and
discharged the appellants. But this Court will
intervene, being the sentinel on the qui vive.”
04(i). Further, he relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in Mohd. Wajid and another v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and others 6 wherein it was held at
Paragraph Nos.35, 38, 39, 45 and 46 that:
6
(2023) 20 Supreme Court Cases 219
27
35. However, as observed earlier, the entire case put
up by the first informant on the face of it appears to be
concocted and fabricated. At this stage, we may refer
to the parameters laid down by this Court for
quashing of an FIR in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . The parameters are : (SCC
pp. 378-79, para 102)
“102. … (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision
in the Code or the Act concerned, providing
28
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
In our opinion, the present case falls within
Parameters Nos. 1, 5 and 7, respectively, referred to
above.
38. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court
owes a duty to look into many other attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case
over and above the averments and, if need be, with
due care and circumspection try to read in between
the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the
Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of
a case but is empowered to take into account the
overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation.
Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs
have been registered over a period of time. It is in the
background of such circumstances the registration of
multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting
the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or
personal grudge as alleged.
39. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State
of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522
: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , a two-Judge Bench of this
Court elaborated on the types of materials the High
Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a
fine distinction between consideration of materials
that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of
such evidence. Only such material that manifestly
fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be
considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held :
(SCC pp. 526-27, paras 5-7)
29“5. … Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that
authority so as to produce injustice, the court has
power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of
the process of the court to allow any action which
would result in injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is
sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto.
State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960
SC 866] , this Court summarised some categories of
cases where inherent power can and should be
exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine
SC para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report
or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in
their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to
bear in mind the distinction between a case where
there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence
which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations
made, and a case where there is legal evidence
which, on appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under
30
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the
evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge.
Judicial process, no doubt should not be an
instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment.
Court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts
and circumstances into consideration before issuing
process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of
a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass
any person needlessly. At the same time the section
is not an instrument handed over to an accused to
short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden
death.” (emphasis supplied)
45. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced
that the continuation of the criminal case arising from
FIR No. 224 of 2022 registered at Mirzapur Police
Station, Saharanpur will be nothing but abuse of the
process of the law. In the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case, we are inclined to accept
the case put up on behalf of the appellants herein.
46. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned order [Mohd. Wajid v. State of
U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine All 967] passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside.
The criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 224 of
2022 dated 19-9-2022 registered at Police Station
Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby
quashed.”
04(j). Further, he relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in R. Ashoka v. State of
31
Karnataka and others 7 wherein it was held at Paragraph
Nos.12 and 21 that:
“12. Before proceeding to the merits, there are two
aspects that this Court must remind itself of. One, that
even though the parameters of the powers of
quashing cases and proceedings under Section 482
CrPC are well-settled, the same must 2be re-
appreciated, with reference to certain cases. Two,
that the concept and Origins of the Lokayukta, its
powers and scope of operation.
Principles of Quashing
I. Bhajanlal (supra)
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise
of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we have
given the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an7
2025 Supreme (SC) 2057
32investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
II. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa10, a
bench of three judges held:
“6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code
in a case of this nature is the exception and not the
rule. The section does not confer any new powers on
the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which
the Court possessed before the enactment of the
Code. It envisages three circumstances under which
the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i)
to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to
33prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule
which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with
procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly
arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from express provisions of law which are necessary
for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed
upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds
expression in the section which merely recognizes
and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All
courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the
absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do
the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice on the principle quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine
quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a
person anything it gives him that without which it
cannot exist). While exercising powers under the
section, the court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the
section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down
in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of
the court exists for advancement of justice and if any
attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to
produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to
allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it
finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse
of the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
34complaint, the court may examine the question of fact.
When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is
permissible to look into the materials to assess what
the complainant has alleged and whether any offence
is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.”
III. Recently, this Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani
v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh11, reiterated the steps
laid down by this Court in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal
Kapoor12 to be taken by the High Court in exercising
its quashing powers:
“20. The following steps should ordinarily determine
the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an
accused by invoking the power vested in the High
Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.:– (i) Step
one, whether the material relied upon by the accused
is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the
materials is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii)
Step two, whether the material relied upon by the
accused, would rule out the assertions contained in
the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the
material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual
assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the
material is such, as would persuade a reasonable
person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of
the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the
material relied upon by the accused, has not been
refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the
material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by
the 13 prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four,
whether proceeding with the trial would result in an
abuse of process of the court, and would not serve
the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in
the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court
should persuade it to quash such criminal –
proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Such exercise of power,
besides doing justice to the accused, would save
precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted
in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising
35therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same
would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.
[(See: Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal
Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]” (emphasis supplied)
Origins, Powers and Scope of Operation of
Lokayukta
The concept of Lokayukta has been adapted from the
Scandinavian concept of Ombudsman, the origins of
which can be traced back to the early 1800s. In India,
it was recommended by the First Administrative
Reforms Commission in 1966. The State of
Maharashtra became the first State to establish the
body in 1971. The State of Karnataka, with which, we
are concerned, enacted this law in 1984. The scope is
given in Sections 7 & 8 of KLA. Section 7 provides for
the jurisdictional framework of the Lokayukta and
Upalokayukta. It details who the Lokayukta or
Upalokayukta can investigate, transfer complaints,
bars legal challenges and provides for continuity in
cases of vacancies. Section 8 is the counterpart to
Section 7 and, as such details the restriction on the
jurisdiction of the Lokayukta and Upalokayuktas.
This Court in Chandrashekaraiah v. Janekere C.
Krishna13, had occasion to consider the act in
extensive detail. We may quote some of the relevant
paras:
“Functions of the Lokayukta/Upa-Lokayukta —
Investigative in nature
32. The provisions discussed above clearly indicate
that the functions to be discharged by the Lokayukta
or Upa-Lokayukta are investigative in nature and the
report of Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta under sub-
sections (1) and (3) of Section 12 and the special
report submitted under sub-section (5) of Section 12
are only recommendatory. No civil consequence as
such follows from the action of the Lokayukta and
Upa-Lokayukta, though they can initiate prosecution
before a competent court. I have extensively referred
to the object and purpose of the Act and explained the
various provisions of the Act only to indicate the
36nature and functions to be discharged by Lokayukta
or Upa-Lokayukta under the Act.
33. The Act has, therefore, clearly delineated which
are the matters to be investigated by the Lokayukta
and Upa-Lokayukta. They have no authority to
investigate on a complaint involving a grievance in
respect of any action specified in the Second
Schedule of the Act, which are as follows:
“(a) Action taken for the purpose of investigating
crimes relating to the security of the State.
(b) Action taken in the exercise of powers in relation
to determining whether a matter shall go to a court or
not.
(c) Action taken in matters which arise out of the
terms of a contract governing purely commercial
relations of the administration with customers or
suppliers, except where the complaint alleges
harassment or gross delay in meeting contractual
obligations.
(d) Action taken in respect of appointments, removals,
pay, discipline, superannuation or other matters
relating to conditions of service of public servants but
not including action relating to claims for pension,
gratuity, provident fund or to any claims which arise
on retirement, removal or termination of service.
(e) Grant of honours and awards.”
…
37. The Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta while
exercising powers under the Act, of course, is acting
as a quasi-judicial authority but his functions are
investigative in nature. The Constitution Bench of this
Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills
Division and Appeals [AIR 1958 SC 398] held: (AIR p.
408, para 14)
“14. … Whether or not an administrative body or
authority functions as a purely administrative one or in
a quasi-judicial capacity, must be determined in each
case, on an examination of the relevant statute and
the rules framed thereunder.”
…
37
40. The provisions of Sections 9, 10 and 11 clearly
indicate that the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta are
discharging quasi-judicial functions while conducting
the investigation under the Act. Sub-section (2) of
Section 11 of the Act also states that for the purpose
of any such investigation, including the preliminary
inquiry the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta shall have
all the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under
the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, in the matter of
summoning and enforcing the attendance of any
person and examining him on oath. Further they have
also the power for requiring the discovery and
production of any document, receiving evidence on
affidavits, requisitioning any public record or copy
thereof from any court or office, issuing commissions
for examination of witnesses or documents, etc.
Further, sub-section (3) of Section 11 stipulates that
any proceedings before the Lokayukta and Upa-
Lokayukta shall be deemed to be a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 of the
Penal Code. Therefore, the Lokayukta and Upa-
Lokayukta, while investigating the matters are
discharging quasi-judicial functions, though the nature
of functions is investigative.”
21. Consequent to the above discussion, the FIR
subject matter of the present case deserves to be
quashed and set aside in view of Bhajanlal (supra).
The appeal is allowed.”
04(k). Further, he relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in State of Telangana v.
Jerusalem Mathai 8 wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.6
to 8 that:
8
2025 SCC Online SC 2086
38“6. The FIR indicates that the information was
received on 28.05.2015 at 15:00 hours but the
general diary reference shows the entry made as on
31.05.2015 at 23 : 00 hours. The FIR is also dated
31.05.2015. As noted above, no FIR was registered
on the written complaint made by the complainant, a
Member of the Legislative Assembly, under Section
154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The FIR
further indicates that the police were present at a
particular location, wherein the persons referred to in
the second paragraph of the complaint along with
another, having come to the residence of the friend of
the complainant. There were arrangements made for
audio and video recordings. It is also stated that the
materials recorded disclosed reasons to suspect the
crime and cognizable offence by the accused on
which reasoning the crime was registered under
Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
for the offence of offering bribe on the eve of the MLC
elections to the MLA for exercise of franchise in a
particular manner.
7. Admittedly, the petitioner before the High Court, A4
was not present on the occasion when the transaction
is alleged to have occurred. As we indicated earlier,
the allegation made in the complaint against A4 is not
in any way linked with the allegation of a higher offer
having been made by another. The presence of A-4 is
not reported when the alleged transaction occurred.
8. We would not speak on the incident that occurred
on 31.05.2015 since the persons allegedly involved in
the said transactions are not before us. However, we
cannot but notice that there is nothing to connect A4
to the crime, but for a casual allegation raised on a
call having been received by the complainant without
any indication even of the time when such call was
received. We find absolutely no reason to interfere
with the order of the High Court and dismiss the
Special Leave Petitions.”
39
04(l). Further, he relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar Mathur v
State of Madhya Pradesh 9 wherein it was held at Paragraph
Nos.2, 4, 12 to 14 that:
2. The facts, as emanating from the record, are that:-
2.1 House No. D-90, Dindayal Nagar, Ratlam, was
allotted on hire purchase basis to one Gopaldas s/o
Narayandas, vide agreement between him and the
Madhya Pradesh State Housing Board on 10th
January, 1991. He sold the said property, and handed
over possession thereof, to one Mangi Bai upon
receipt of Rs. 12,500/- as consideration. It was agreed
inter se these parties that upon being granted the
registration of the house, Gopaldas would execute a
sale deed in favour of Mangi Bai. An agreement to
sell to such effect was drawn up on 11th January,
1991.
2.2 Mangi Bai, subsequently for a consideration of Rs.
19,000/- sold the said property to respondent No. 22
vide agreement to sell dated 17th December, 1994.
2.3 One Ashok Dayya, who has been made co-
accused in the complaint, has allegedly, in
connivance with other persons namely, Ramesh
Sharma, Jitendra Sharma, Narendra @ Pappu
Sharma and members of the Housing Board, forged
the Power of Attorney of the original seller – Gopaldas
in his favour and got the said property registered in
his own name.
2.4 The appellant herein is an official of the Housing
Board and it is said that the act perpetrated by Ashok
was with his aid and assistance. It is against this
transfer of property that the subject FIR was lodged,
and after investigation a chargesheet filed under
9
2025 SCC OnLine SC 21
40
Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B r/w 34,
Penal Code, 18603 against five persons, namely,
Ashok (A-1), Ramesh Chand (A-2), Nanalal (A-3),
Krishna Singh (A-4) and Dinesh Kumar D.K. (A-5).
4. Before proceeding further, it is important to note
that the complainant filed a civil suit against five
persons, namely, Gopaldas, Mangi Bai, Nirmlabai,
Ashok Kumar and Manager Housing Board, Housing
and Infrastructure Development Board Division,
Ratlam, M.P. bearing No. 99A/2014 on 5th May, 2014
which was on the file of the learned Vth Civil Judge,
Grade-2, Ratlam, contending inter alia as follows:-
“4. That after the execution of the agreement to sell
by the defendant No. 2 and 3 in favour of the
defendant No. 1 on 17.12.1994 in respect of the
house No. 90, situated in the Deendayal Nagar on
receipt of the amount of Rs. 19,000/- (Nineteen
Thousand, the defendant No. 2 and 3, found that it
was agreed that after the registration of the sale deed
to be executed in favour of defendant No. 2 and 3, the
defendant No. 1 executed a general power of attorney
in favour of the plaintiff on 27.01.1995. According to it,
by making the payment of the money which is due to
the defendant No. 5, the defendant No. 1 informed the
defendant No. 1 & 5 that the registry of the sale deed
may be executed properly in favour of the plaintiff in
respect of the House No. 90, Deendayal Nagar for
which today the defendant No. 1, 2 and 3 have also
indicated their consent in writing in the presence of
the defendant No. 5.”
It was prayed therein that the defendants, namely,
Gopaldas, Mangi Bai and the Manager of the Housing
Board among others should, in compliance with the
agreement dated 17th December, 1994, get the sale
deed registered in respect of the property, the subject
matter of dispute in favour of the plaintiff, directly; and
further that an injunction be issued against the
defendants to not, either personally or through any
other person, transfer the disputed property to a third
party.
41
12. The ingredients of Section 420 IPC as described
in Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B.11 are:
“34. Section 420 IPC is a serious form of cheating
that includes inducement (to lead or move someone
to happen) in terms of delivery of property as well as
valuable securities. This section is also applicable to
matters where the destruction of the property is
caused by the way of cheating or inducement.
Punishment for cheating is provided under this
section which may extend to 7 years and also makes
the person liable to fine.
35. To establish the offence of cheating in inducing
the delivery of property, the following ingredients need
to be proved:
(i) The representation made by the person was false.
(ii) The accused had prior knowledge that the
representation he made was false.
(iii) The accused made false representation with
dishonest intention in order to deceive the person to
whom it was made.
(iv) The act where the accused induced the person to
deliver the property or to perform or to abstain from
any act which the person would have not done or had
otherwise committed.”
There is nothing on record to suggest, even prima
facie, that any of the above-said ingredients are met
in the case of the present appellant. No intent can be
hinted to, where the appellant had willfully, with the
intent to defraud, acted upon the allegedly forged
Power of Attorney. Neither has anything been brought
in the chargesheet upon completion of the
investigation to show that the requirements of Section
120-B have been met. Nor that the appellant had any
information or knowledge about the subject Power of
Attorney being forged. For the ingredients of this
section to be established, Bilal Hajar v. State12,
records as follows:
“31. The expression “criminal conspiracy” was aptly
explained by this Court in E.G. Barsay v. State of
Bombay [E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay, (1962) 2
42SCR 195 : AIR 1961 SC 1762 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 828].
The learned Judge Subba Rao, J. (as his Lordship
then was and later became CJI) speaking for the
Bench in his distinctive style of writing said : (AIR p.
1778, para 31)
“31. … The gist of the offence is an agreement to
break the law. The parties to such an agreement will
be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act
agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not
an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should
agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the
commission of a number of acts.”
32. Therefore, in order to constitute a conspiracy,
meeting of minds of two or more persons to do an
illegal act or an act by illegal means is a must. In
other words, it is sine qua non for invoking the plea of
conspiracy against the accused. However, it is not
necessary that all the conspirators must know each
and every detail of the conspiracy which is being
hatched and nor is it necessary to prove their active
part/role in such meeting.”
Sections when put into a chargesheet, cannot be
based on bald assertions of connivance, there must
be a substance which is entirely lacking in the present
case.
13. If the intent is on the face of it is absent qua one
of the offences in the same transaction, it is absent in
respect of the other offence as well, viz., Section 467,
468.
14. When examining a prayer for quashing, what is to
be considered by this Court has been laid down most
notably in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal13. The
principle as applicable in this case is:
“102…
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
43
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code…”
As the discussion in the previous paragraphs would
evidence, no intention whatsoever could be attributed
to the present appellant, and in the absence of any
intention attributable to him, no criminal offence can
be made out. Further, the FIR and other materials are
unable to disclose any cognizable offence, and
therefore, would fall into the first and second criterion
discussed in the landmark judgment.”
05. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel-
cum-Special Public Prosecutor for the Anti-Corruption
Bureau appearing for the respondents filed counter
reiterating the prosecution case and contended that there are
triable issues and factual aspects to be examined by the
learned trial Court and it is not a fit case to quash the
proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.3 at this
juncture and the matter is to be decided after conducting trial
by the learned trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal
Petition.
06. Having heard the submissions made by learned
counsel on either side and upon perusal of the material
44
available on record, the sum and substance of the
allegations is that the accused No.1, the Inspector of Police,
Kamareddy, and the accused No.2 allegedly demanded
illegal gratification of Rs.5,00,000/- from the respondent No.2
for not implicating the respondent No.3 in a betting case. It is
stated that on 06.11.2020 and 08.11.2020, complaints were
lodged before the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) by the
respondent No.2, and certain electronic recordings were
allegedly made in relation to the said demand by the accused
Nos.1 and 2. Subsequently, on 13.11.2020, the respondent
No.3 submitted a complaint alleging that the present
petitioner, who is arrayed as the accused No.3, demanded a
sum of Rs.20,000/- for granting station bail and for accepting
sureties in Crime No.404 of 2020 registered under Sections 3
and 4 of the A.P. Gaming Act. Significantly, the name of the
petitioner-accused No.3 does not find place in the earlier
complaints dated 06.11.2020 and 08.11.2020. The
petitioner-accused No.3 implication surfaced for the first time
only in the complaint dated 13.11.2020.
45
07. In view of the above scenario of the issue, it is
apt to extract Sections 7 and 12 of the Act, which reads as
under:
“7. [ Offence relating to public servant being bribed.
[Substituted by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.]
Any public servant who, (a) obtains or accepts or
attempts to obtain from any person, an undue
advantage, with the intention to perform or cause
performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly
or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such
duty either by himself or by another public servant; or
(b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue
advantage from any person as a reward for the
improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or
for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself
or another public servant; or
(c) performs or induces another public servant to
perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to
forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or
in consequence of accepting an undue advantage
from any person, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
three years but which may extend to seven years and
shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation 1:- For the purpose of this section, the
obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an
undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence
even if the performance of a public duty by public
servant, is not or has not been improper.
Illustration:- A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ to
give him an amount of five thousand rupees to
process his routine ration card application on time. ‘S’
is guilty of an offence under this section.
Explanation 2:- For the purpose of this section,-
(i) the expressions “obtains” or “accepts” or “attempts
to obtain” shall cover cases where a person being a
public servant, obtains or “accepts” or attempts to
46
obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for
another person, by abusing his position as a public
servant or by using his personal influence over
another public servant; or by any other corrupt or
illegal means;
(ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a
public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to
obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third
party.”
12. Punishment for abetment of offences [Substituted
by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.] Whoever
abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether
or not that offence is committed in consequence of
that abetment, shall be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which shall be not less than three years,
but which may extend to seven years and shall also
be liable to fine.”
08. It is not in dispute that no trap was laid against
the petitioner-accused No.3 and no recovery, either in whole
or in part, was effected from him. Crime No.404 of 2020 was
registered pursuant to a raid conducted at CSI Ground under
the instructions of the accused No.1. The said raid was
conducted in the presence of mediators and culminated in
registration of a case against the respondent No.3 and
others. Ultimately, the respondent No.3 pleaded guilty and
paid a fine of Rs.1,000/-, thereby lending prima facie
legitimacy to the gaming case.
47
09. It is also pertinent to note that the proceedings
against the accused No.1 were quashed by this Court in
Crl.P.No.9027 of 2021, by order dated 01.08.2022. Though
quashing of proceedings against one accused does not
absolve the other accused persons, the primary allegations
of demand of illegal gratification were directed against the
accused No.1, and the substratum of those allegations has
already been set aside.
10. For constituting an offence under Section 7(a) of
the Act, proof of demand of illegal gratification is sine qua
non. In the absence of proof of both demand and
acceptance, the statutory presumption under Section 20 of
the Act cannot be invoked. In the present case, there is no
material on record to demonstrate that the petitioner-accused
No.3 either demanded or accepted any illegal gratification
from the complainant. The allegation of demand of
Rs.20,000/- rests solely upon a solitary and uncorroborated
statement made in the subsequent complaint dated
13.11.2020. There is no independent material or supporting
evidence to substantiate the said allegation. Further, the
48
record reveals that no official favour or act was pending with
the petitioner-accused No.3 in relation to the respondent
No.3. On the contrary, the matter had already been
entrusted by the accused No.1 to Mr. Ravi Kumar, Sub-
Inspector of Police. In the absence of any pending official
act within the domain or authority of the petitioner-accused
No.3, the essential ingredients required to attract Section
7(a) read with clause (c) of the Act are conspicuously absent.
Insofar as the allegations under Sections 120-B and 34 of the
IPC are concerned, it is well settled that to sustain a charge
of criminal conspiracy or common intention, there must be
cogent material demonstrating an agreement or meeting of
minds to commit an illegal act. A careful scrutiny of the
record does not disclose any material indicating that the
petitioner-accused No.3 had entered into any agreement with
the other accused to demand or accept illegal gratification.
The prosecution has failed to establish any nexus or linkage
suggestive of either a criminal conspiracy or a common
intention.
49
11. In view of the above, the foundational
requirements necessary for invoking the presumption under
Section 20 of the Act, or for establishing the offences under
Section 7(a)(c) of the Act and Section 120-B read with 34 of
IPC, are conspicuously absent insofar as the petitioner-
accused No.3 is concerned. Continuation of the criminal
proceedings against him would therefore amount to an abuse
of process of law. Therefore, the proceedings against the
petitioner-accused No.3 are liable to be quashed.
12. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and
the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.3
in Crime No.05/RCO/ACB-NZB/2020/ACB of ACB,
Nizamabad Range, are hereby quashed.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if
any, shall stand closed.
__________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
Dated: 26-MAR-2026
KHRM
