The Municipal Corporation Of Greater … vs Mumbai Municipal Kamgar Sangh And Anr on 23 April, 2026

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    Bombay High Court

    The Municipal Corporation Of Greater … vs Mumbai Municipal Kamgar Sangh And Anr on 23 April, 2026

    Author: Amit Borkar

    Bench: Amit Borkar

    2026:BHC-AS:19147
                                                                               911-wpst267-2020-J.doc
    
                        MPBALEKAR
    
                                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    
                                         WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO.267 OF 2021
    
                          1. The Municipal Corporation of Greater
                             Mumbai, being sued through it's Chief
                             Executive Officer, namely, The
                             Municipal Commissioner, Mahapalika
                             Building, Mahapalika Marg,
                             Mumbai 400 001
                          2. The Education Officer,
                             The Education Department, Education
                             Office Building, The Municipal
                             Corporation of Greater Mumbai, Opp.
                             IES King George School, Matunga,
                             Mumbai - 400 019                            ... Petitioners
    
                                                   Vs.
    
                          1. Mumbai Municipal Kamgar Sangh,
                             105-106, 1st Floor, Swapnapurti
                             Building, Dr. Ambedkar Road,
                             Parel, Mumbai 400 012
                          2. Rajashree Manohar Loke,
                             C/o. Manohar Govind Loke,
                             C/101, Snehadeep Coop. Housing
                             Society Limited, Vishal Chavan Marg,
                             Parel, Mumbai - 400 012                     ... Respondents
    
    
                        Mr. Suresh Pakale, Senior Advocate with Mr. Santosh
                        Parad for the petitioners-MCGM.
                        Ms. Anupama Talekar for respondent No.2.
                        Ms. Prajakta Naik, Administrative Officer, Secondary
                        Education Department, present in-person.
    
    
    
    
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                                   CORAM            : AMIT BORKAR, J.
    
                                   RESERVED ON      : APRIL 18, 2026.
    
                                   PRONOUNCED ON    : APRIL 23, 2026
    
     JUDGMENT:

    1. By the present writ petition filed under Article 227 of the
    Constitution of India, the petitioners challenge the impugned
    judgment and order dated 29 January 2020 passed by the
    Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra at Mumbai, in Complaint (ULP)
    No. 103 of 2015.

    2. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition are, in brief,
    as follows. Complainant No. 1 is a registered trade union. The
    deceased mother of Complainant No. 2 was a member of the said
    union. Complainant No. 1 espoused the cause of Complainant No.
    2 seeking appointment on preferential treatment basis, commonly
    referred to as P.T. case basis, in place of her deceased mother, who
    died while in service. It is the case of the complainants that
    Complainant No. 2 and her father had repeatedly approached the
    respondents seeking employment on compassionate grounds, but
    their requests were consistently declined. According to them, such
    conduct amounts to unfair labour practices under Item Nos. 5 and
    9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. It is further
    pleaded that the mother of Complainant No. 2, late Manisha
    Manohar Loke, was employed with Respondent No. 2 as a
    secondary school teacher. She came to be appointed on 1 April
    1986 and expired in harness on 2 February 1994 prior to attaining

    SPONSORED

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    the age of superannuation. At the time of her demise, she was
    serving at Shindewadi Secondary Municipal School situated at S.A.
    Palave Marg, Dadar (East), Mumbai. She was survived by her
    husband, Manohar Govind Loke, and two daughters, namely
    Complainant No. 2 and her younger sister Siddhi Manohar Loke.
    At the relevant time, Complainant No. 2 was aged about five and a
    half years, whereas her younger sister was aged about two and a
    half years. Since both daughters were minors, no application for
    appointment on P.T. case basis could be submitted at that stage.
    After the death of late Manisha Loke, her provident fund and
    gratuity amounts were paid to her husband. Family pension
    commenced after about twelve years. Initially, the same was
    received by Complainant No. 2 till she attained the age of twenty-
    two years. Thereafter, the respondents started disbursing the said
    pension to the younger daughter. It is further stated that the
    husband of the deceased employee was serving with Bombay Port
    Trust and retired on 31 October 2010, and is receiving pensionary
    benefits. According to the complainants, except the pension
    received from the Petitioner and Bombay Port Trust, the family
    has no other source of livelihood.

    3. It is further pleaded that Complainant No. 2 is presently
    aged about twenty-seven years and possesses a Master’s Degree in
    Literature. Her younger sister Siddhi is aged about twenty-two
    years and pursuing M.Sc. Part II studies. The father of
    Complainant No. 2 submitted applications dated 1 July 2006 and 3
    July 2006 to the respondents seeking compassionate appointment.
    Thereafter, as required by the respondents, Complainant No. 2

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    herself submitted an application dated 1 October 2010 seeking
    appointment on P.T. case basis. Further applications are stated to
    have been submitted on 3 September 2010, 1 October 2010 and 3
    November 2011. The father, Manohar Govind Loke, also submitted
    another application on 2 February 2011. It is further the case of
    the complainants that immediately after the death of the
    employee, Manohar Govind Loke had addressed a letter dated 3
    May 1994 to the Headmaster of Shindewadi Secondary Municipal
    School requesting release of pension, gratuity and provident fund.
    By the said communication, it was also informed that both
    daughters were minors and one appointment under P.T. case
    category be reserved for either of them upon attaining majority.
    According to the complainants, the said letter was duly received by
    the respondents. It is alleged that despite repeated representations
    made by Complainant No. 2 and her father, no effective decision
    was taken, and they were merely informed from time to time that
    the applications were under active consideration. Ultimately, on 2
    February 2015, the Headmaster of Shindewadi Secondary
    Municipal School orally informed the complainants, with reference
    to letter dated 27 January 2015, that the Chief Labour Officer had
    rejected the claim for appointment on P.T. case basis.It is further
    stated that by forwarding letter dated 25 February 2015, the
    Headmaster supplied a copy of the communication dated 27
    January 2015, whereupon Complainant No. 2 came to know that
    her request for appointment on P.T. case basis had been rejected on
    grounds which, according to the complainants, were untenable
    and unjustified. On these assertions, the complainants contended

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    that the respondents had indulged in unfair labour practices under
    Item Nos. 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971
    by rejecting the application of Complainant No. 2 for employment
    under the said category.

    4. The respondents filed their written statement and opposed
    the complaint by contending that the same was founded on
    misconceived facts and was not maintainable in law. It was pointed
    out that Manisha Manohar Loke expired on 2 February 1994 and
    Complainant No. 2 attained majority on 17 July 2006. However,
    she applied for appointment on P.T. case basis only on 1 October
    2010, when her father was nearing the age of superannuation. The
    complaint itself came to be filed on 3 March 2015. According to
    the respondents, the proceedings were therefore barred by
    limitation and liable to be dismissed. It was further contended that
    the action taken by the respondents was purely administrative in
    nature and in accordance with applicable rules and policy. Hence,
    Item Nos. 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971
    were not attracted. The complaint was described as false, frivolous
    and vexatious. It was also specifically contended that Complainant
    No. 2 was never an employee of the respondents and, therefore, in
    absence of an employer employee relationship, the Industrial
    Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the
    complaint.The respondents further contended that there was no
    breach of any award, agreement or settlement and therefore Item
    No. 9 of Schedule IV had no application. According to them, an
    application seeking appointment on P.T. case basis ought to have
    been submitted immediately after the death of the employee. A

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    belated application, according to the respondents, could not be
    entertained. Reliance was placed upon Circular dated 22 March
    2007, under which if any member of the deceased employee’s
    family was employed in Government or semi Government service,
    or was otherwise well placed and capable of maintaining the
    family, no appointment in municipal service on P.T. case basis could
    be granted. It was stated that when the mother of Complainant
    No. 2 expired, her husband Manohar Govind Loke was in service
    with Bombay Port Trust till 31 October 2010. It was further stated
    that after the death of Manisha Loke, family pension was paid to
    her husband till the date of his remarriage on 11 June 1996.
    Thereafter, the Petitioner paid pension to the elder daughter,
    namely Complainant No. 2, till she attained the age of twenty two
    years, and thereafter the same was being paid to the younger
    daughter. In substance, all averments of the complainants were
    denied. It was reiterated that the application for appointment was
    not submitted within the prescribed period, that the complaint
    itself was beyond limitation, and that the rejection of the request
    for employment was on valid and lawful grounds. On these
    premises, dismissal of the complaint was sought.

    5. Mr. Pakale, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
    petitioners, submitted that a claim for appointment on P.T. case
    basis is required to be considered only in favour of the nearest
    eligible dependent of the deceased employee and that too within
    one year from the date of death of such employee. According to
    him, in the present case, no relationship of employer and
    employee existed between the Petitioner and the present

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    complainants, and the original complainants had failed to establish
    such foundational relationship. On that ground alone, according to
    the learned Senior Advocate, the complaint was not maintainable.
    He further submitted that Complainant No. 2 had submitted
    applications seeking appointment on P.T. case basis on 1 October
    2010, 3 September 2010 and 31 January 2011, whereas her
    mother had expired on 2 February 1994. Thus, the claim was
    raised after an inordinate lapse of time and beyond the stipulated
    period prescribed under the policy of the petitioners. It was
    therefore contended that Complainant No. 2 was not eligible to
    seek compassionate appointment.

    6. It was further urged that Respondent No. 1 Union was not a
    recognised union and only a recognised union could maintain
    proceedings on behalf of employees who were its members. Late
    Manisha Manohar Loke, who was in service of the Petitioner ,
    expired on 2 February 1994, and any request for compassionate
    appointment ought to have been made immediately and in any
    event within one year thereof. The same having not been done, no
    enforceable claim survived. It was also pointed out that
    Complainant No. 2 was a minor aged about six years at the time of
    death of her mother and she sought appointment only after
    attaining majority. According to the petitioners, the very nature of
    the claim demonstrates absence of employer employee relationship
    between Complainant No. 2 and the Petitioner , and therefore the
    complaint deserved dismissal.Mr. Pakale further submitted that
    Section 3(5) of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 defines the
    expression “employee”. Under the said provision, in cases

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    governed by the Bombay Act, the definition contained therein
    would apply, and in other cases the term would mean a workman
    as defined in clause (s) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
    1947.

    7. According to the learned Senior Advocate, the present
    complaint proceeds on the footing that the Petitioner has a policy
    whereby, if an employee dies during service, one eligible member
    of his or her family may be considered for appointment on P.T. case
    basis or compassionate grounds. The grievance of Complainant No.
    2 is that she and her father repeatedly approached the Petitioner
    seeking such appointment and that the request was rejected after
    considerable delay. It was submitted that such rejection may at
    best furnish a personal grievance, but it does not create status of
    employment.He therefore contended that Complainant No. 2 was
    never employed within the meaning of Section 3(5) of the MRTU
    and PULP Act, nor did she satisfy the definition of workman under
    Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In absence of
    such status, no cause of action could arise for filing a complaint
    under the provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act.

    8. Per contra, Ms. Talekar, learned advocate appearing for
    Respondent No. 2, submitted that late Manisha Manohar Loke was
    a member of the complainant union and, after her demise, the
    union had espoused the cause of Complainant No. 2. She
    submitted that since Manisha Loke died while serving the
    Petitioner on 2 February 1994, Complainant No. 2 became
    entitled, in terms of the policy of the Corporation, to be considered
    for appointment on compassionate ground, namely on P.T. case

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    basis. According to learned counsel, the cause of Complainant No.
    2 was validly espoused by the complainant union and therefore the
    strict principles relating to direct employer employee relationship
    between the complainants and the Petitioner could not be
    mechanically applied in the facts of the present case. She
    submitted that though Complainant No. 2, being legal heir of the
    deceased employee, was otherwise entitled to consideration, her
    application came to be rejected on untenable and erroneous
    grounds.It was therefore contended that the complainants were
    justified in instituting the complaint under Item Nos. 5 and 9 of
    Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. According to her, an
    implied nexus arising from the service conditions of the deceased
    employee and the policy governing compassionate appointment
    was sufficient to maintain the proceedings. Hence, the complaint
    could not be defeated merely on the plea that no direct employer
    employee relationship existed.

    9. Ms. Talekar further submitted that soon after the demise of
    Manisha Loke, an application dated 3 May 1994 was submitted to
    the Head Mistress of Shindewadi Municipal Secondary School,
    Dadar, seeking consequential benefits and consideration of a P.T.
    case claim. The said application was forwarded by the then Head
    Mistress to the Education Department of the Petitioner . However,
    neither Complainant No. 2 nor her father Manohar Loke received
    any response thereto. She submitted that thereafter Complainant
    No. 2 and her father repeatedly submitted further applications to
    the Petitioner , but the same remained unattended for years
    together. It was further submitted that on 16 January 2015, the

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    Chief Labour Officer of the Petitioner addressed a communication
    to the Head Master of the said school, who thereafter informed the
    complainant and her father that the request for compassionate
    appointment had been rejected.The rejection, according to learned
    counsel, was founded on the ground that after the death of
    Manisha Loke, her husband Manohar Loke continued in
    employment with Bombay Port Trust till 1 November 2010 and
    therefore Complainant No. 2 was not entitled to compassionate
    appointment. She submitted that only upon receipt of the
    communication on 25 February 2015 did Complainant No. 2 and
    her father acquire knowledge of the rejection. The complaint was
    thereafter filed on 3 March 2015. It was therefore contended that
    the complaint had been instituted well within ninety days from the
    date on which cause of action accrued and was not barred by
    limitation.

    10. In rejoinder, Mr. Pakale, learned Senior Advocate for the
    petitioners, reiterated that on the date of filing of the complaint no
    relationship of employer and employee existed between
    Complainant No. 2 and the petitioners. Placing reliance on the
    judgment of the Supreme Court in Cipla Limited Vs. Maharashtra
    General Kamgar Union
    , 2001 (2) Scale 152 , he submitted that for
    entertaining a complaint under Section 28 of the MRTU and PULP
    Act, existence of employer employee relationship is a necessary
    precondition. He further submitted that even the Industrial Court
    had recorded a finding that Complainant No. 1 Union was not a
    recognised union, and yet proceeded to hold that since
    Complainant No. 2 was espousing the cause of her deceased

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    mother, she could be treated as an employee for the purposes of
    Section 28. According to him, such reasoning was legally
    unsustainable. He also submitted that Complainant No. 2 was not
    a dependent within the meaning of the applicable policy.

    11. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of this Court in
    Hemant Govind Vaidya Vs. Vasant Dada Sugar Institute, 2000 (86)
    FLR 49 to contend that an allegation of unfair labour practice is a
    serious charge and any allegation of victimisation must be
    specifically pleaded and duly proved. Mere illegality, according to
    him, would not by itself amount to unfair labour practice.
    He
    further relied upon Krishna Ganpat Kasar Vs. India United Mills
    No.2 A Unit of NTC Ltd., S. S. Hirurkar
    , 2004 (102) FLR 188 to
    submit that in absence of an application for condonation of delay,
    a time-barred complaint cannot be entertained. On these
    submissions, he prayed that the writ petition be allowed.

    12. In reply, Ms. Talekar, learned advocate for Respondent No. 2,
    invited attention to the application dated 3 May 1994 addressed
    by the father of Respondent No. 2 to the Head Mistress, wherein it
    was specifically stated that the deceased employee was survived by
    two daughters and that a P.T. case be sanctioned in favour of either
    of them upon attaining majority. She submitted that no reply was
    ever furnished to the said application. She further invited attention
    to the subsequent communication dated 1 July 2006 addressed by
    the father to the Administrative Officer requesting compassionate
    appointment in favour of the elder daughter. According to her, the
    last communication came to be replied to only by the school on 25
    February 2014, based upon the decision of the petitioner

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    Municipal Corporation dated 29 January 2015. The said
    communication, according to her, constituted the only formal
    rejection of the several requests made by Complainant No. 2. She
    also relied upon the Circular dated 18 May 2007 prescribing the
    procedure for deciding P.T. case claims. Under the said circular,
    such claims were required to be scrutinized by the Chief Labour
    Officer and thereafter forwarded through the Joint Commissioner
    to the Commissioner for approval. She submitted that no final
    decision in accordance with the prescribed procedure had been
    duly communicated earlier and therefore the cause of action to
    institute the complaint arose only upon rejection being conveyed.

    13. Ms. Talekar lastly submitted that Complainant No. 1 is a
    recognised union and was therefore competent to espouse the
    cause of Complainant No. 2. On the aforesaid grounds, she
    submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merit and liable to be
    dismissed.

    REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

    14. I have heard the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners
    and the learned advocate for respondent No. 2 at length. I have
    also gone through the record and the rival pleadings. The matter
    turns on a small but important question. Whether the present
    complaint under Section 28 read with Item Nos. 5 and 9 of
    Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 could at all be
    maintained by Complainant No. 2, when she was never in service
    of the Petitioner and when the claim for appointment on P.T. case
    basis was raised after a long lapse of time from the death of her

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    mother. The answer to this question has to be found from the true
    nature of the claim, the policy relied upon by the parties, and the
    legal character of the proceedings.

    15. The undisputed facts which come from the record are that
    late Manisha Manohar Loke was serving as an employee of the
    Petitioner and she expired while in service on 2 February 1994. It
    is also clear that at the time when unfortunate death took place,
    Complainant No. 2 was of tender age and was only a small child.
    This circumstance creates sympathy, but sympathy by itself cannot
    decide legal rights. The material further shows that after death of
    the employee, the family was extended service terminal benefits
    such as provident fund, gratuity, and family pension. Therefore, it
    cannot be said that the employer had denied all post death
    benefits arising from service of deceased employee. Those dues,
    which had become payable because of service already rendered by
    deceased employeee.

    16. The sole grievance is that Complainant No. 2 ought to have
    been granted appointment on compassionate ground.
    Compassionate appointment does not arise automatically on death
    of employee like pensionary dues. It depends on scheme, eligibility,
    financial condition, timing, and satisfaction of policy norms.

    17. The admitted position is that such request for appointment
    was raised after passage of many years from date of death and
    rejection came after the matter remained pending for long time
    before authorities. Thus, the controversy before Court concerns
    whether a dependent daughter, after lapse of substantial time,

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    could invoke labour jurisdiction alleging unfair labour practice
    because request for compassionate appointment came to be
    rejected.

    18. The principal submission advanced by the petitioners is that
    there never existed relationship of employer and employee
    between Complainant No. 2 and the Petitioner . This objection
    goes to root of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction under Section 28 of
    the MRTU and PULP Act is a statutory jurisdiction. The statute
    creates rights, remedies, and limitations. Therefore, the
    complainant must first show that the dispute answers the statutory
    description. Unless foundational facts exist, the Court cannot
    assume jurisdiction. A person invoking labour jurisdiction must
    demonstrate that she is an employee, workman, union
    representing employees, or that the dispute directly concerns
    service conditions recognized by the Act. In the present case,
    Complainant No.2 was not a serving employee, nor was she in
    employment of the Corporation. Therefore, the employer and
    employee relationship is absent.

    19. It is true that labour jurisprudence in some cases adopts
    liberal approach, but liberal interpretation cannot erase statutory
    limitations. If a stranger to service claims employment because of
    family relation with deceased employee, such claim may be
    considered under compassionate policy, but it does not create
    service relationship. Hence, the objection of the petitioners strike
    at competence of the proceedings.

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    20. The respondent No.2 has attempted to meet this objection by
    contending that the union had espoused the cause of the legal heir
    of the deceased employee and therefore insistence upon employer
    employee relationship ought not to be made. This submission
    cannot be accepted. Espousal by union has recognized place in
    industrial law. Many disputes are carried through collective
    representation, and individual workmen obtain support. But such
    espousal operates where a service dispute already exists in relation
    to persons who are employees or where the industrial character of
    dispute is established. A union may lend voice to a grievance. It
    may provide support. But union support cannot create a legal
    relationship which never came into existence. If the complainant
    herself never entered service, then by adoption of her cause by a
    union, the jurisdiction under labour statute cannot stand enlarged.
    Otherwise, every disappointed applicant for public employment
    could route claim through union and invoke unfair labour practice
    jurisdiction.

    21. The cause projected by Complainant No.2 may genuine from
    human angle. Her mother died in service. She seeks benefit said to
    flow from such death. Yet genuineness of cause and
    maintainability are two separate matters. A litigant may have
    hardship, but remedy must still lie before proper forum.
    Therefore, while the union may support the claimant, such support
    alone cannot cure the legal defect.

    22. The next aspect is delay, which in matters of compassionate
    appointment assumes significance. The mother of Complainant
    No.2 died in the year 1994. The first communication relied upon

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    by the complainants is dated 3 May 1994. Thereafter, further
    representations are shown in 2006, 2010 and 2011. Thus, the
    matter moved in scattered representations over long years.

    23. Compassionate appointment is not hereditary succession to
    service. Public employment must be filled through open
    competition, equal opportunity and transparent procedure.
    Compassionate appointment stands as exception carved out to
    relieve sudden financial distress caused by death of breadwinner in
    harness. Because it is an exception, conditions governing it must
    be strictly viewed. It is intended to tide over immediate crisis. It is
    not meant to reserve a vacancy for child to claim upon attaining
    majority after many years, unless policy expressly so provides.

    24. When many years pass after death, the immediate crisis
    either gets mitigated or replaced by circumstances. The foundation
    of compassionate scheme therefore becomes weak with lapse of
    time. In the present matter, delay extends over a decade. Such
    lapse cannot be regularised merely because representations were
    periodically sent.

    25. The respondent No.2 has submitted that Complainant No.2
    was a minor when her mother died. A child of tender age could
    not herself seek appointment. But that circumstance alone does
    not conclude the issue in her favour. The father of the
    complainant was alive. The record indicates that retiral dues and
    pensionary benefits arising from service of deceased employee
    were received. It is also not disputed that the father was in
    employment with Bombay Port Trust for substantial period

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    thereafter. Thus this was not a case where entire family was left
    wholly without means on account of death. Presence of surviving
    employed parent is relevant factor under compassionate schemes,
    because object is financial rescue. The purpose of compassionate
    appointment is to save family from sudden collapse of livelihood.
    It is not designed to provide second chance of employment to an
    heir after lapse of many years when family had subsisted through
    other income. This principle cannot be diluted because claim is
    advanced by daughter after attaining majority and educational
    qualification. Sympathy for claimant cannot rewrite nature of
    scheme. Therefore, minority of Complainant No.2 at time of death
    explains delay but does not erase legal consequences flowing from
    family circumstances.

    26. I am also of the view that no sufficient material has been
    brought on record to show any clear breach of settlement, award
    or binding agreement so as to attract Item No.9 of Schedule IV of
    the MRTU and PULP Act
    . For invoking that provision, there must
    be obligation arising from settlement, award, agreement or
    statutory service arrangement which is shown to have been not
    implemented. In the present matter, no such instrument conferring
    right of appointment has been satisfactorily established before the
    Court. Likewise, mere refusal of appointment on compassionate
    ground does not by itself amount to unfair labour practice under
    Item No.5. Every rejection by employer cannot be branded as
    unfair labour practice. For such finding, there must be convincing
    material of hostile discrimination, victimisation, mala fide
    exclusion, favouritism, arbitrary pick and choose, or conduct of

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    nature contemplated by the statute. In the present record, such
    proof is absent. What emerges is this. The family made repeated
    requests. The authority did not decide with promptness. Ultimately
    the request was rejected. These facts may generate grievance and
    dissatisfaction. They may even indicate delay. But grievance is not
    equal to unfair labour practice in legal sense. Hence, invocation of
    Item Nos.5 and 9 remains unsubstantiated. Therefore, on an
    overall assessment of all the submissions, I am unable to sustain
    the impugned judgment and order.

    27. In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons
    recorded hereinabove, the following order is passed:

             (i)      The writ petition is allowed;
    
             (ii)     The judgment and order dated 29 January 2020 passed
    

    by the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra at Mumbai in
    Complaint (ULP) No.103 of 2015 is quashed and set aside;

    (iii) Complaint (ULP) No.103 of 2015 filed by the
    respondents stands dismissed;

    (iv) It is clarified that dismissal of the complaint under the
    provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 shall not
    preclude respondent No.2 from availing such other remedy
    as may be permissible in law, if otherwise available;

    (v) Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms;

    (vi) In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall
    be no order as to costs.

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    911-wpst267-2020-J.doc

    (vii) Pending interim applications, if any, do not survive and
    stand disposed of.

    (AMIT BORKAR, J.)

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