Allahabad High Court
Executive Engineer,Sharda Sahayak … vs Shahida Ansari And Others on 22 April, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:28034
Reserved On : February 27, 2026 Pronounced On : April 22, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
SECOND APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 63 of 2023
Executive Engineer,Sharda Sahayak Khand 16,Sultanpur And Another
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Shahida Ansari And Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
C.S.C.
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Mohiuddin Khan
Court No. - 20
HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.
C.M. Delay Condonation Application No.IA/1/2023
1. This is an application for condonation of delay in filing the instant appeal.
2. The office has reported delay of 678 days in filing the instant appeal.
3. This second appeal has been filed by the appellants under Section 100 C.P.C. against the judgment and decree dated 16.04.2019 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No.4, Sultanpur dismissing the Civil Appeal No.10 of 2014 and affirming the judgment and decree dated 17.12.2013 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (J.D.) Sultanpur, Court No.26 in Original Suit No.847 of 2000.
4. Heard Shri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State-appellants and Shri Mohd. Zaid Khan along with Ms. Annapurna Agnihotri holding brief of Shri Mohiuddin Khan, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record along with the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application.
5. The reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application is as follows:-
“3. That the husband of respondent /plaintiff no.1 and father of respondents/plaintiffs no.-2 to 5 Late Abdul Mazid Ansari had filed a suit for recovery of arrear of rent and eviction against the appellants /defendants before the Learned Additional Civil Judge(J.D.) Sultanpur, Court No.26 which was registered as Original Suit No.-847 Of 2000(Abdul Mazid Ansari Vs Executive Engineer & others) wherein the appellants/defendants were appeared and their written statement. The Learned Additional Civil Judge (J.D.) Sultanpur, Court No.26 vide their judgment and decree dated 17-12-2013 decreed the suit of respondents/plaintiffs.
4. That against the judgment and decree dated 17-12-2013 passed by the Learned Additional Civil Judge (J.D.) Sultanpur, Court No.26,the appellants/defendants filed first appeal before the Learned District ant Session Judge, Sultanpur later on which was transferred to the court of Learned Additional District Judge Court No.4, Sultanpur which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2014 (Executive Engineer & others Vs Abdul Mazid Ansari) The Learned Additional District Judge Court No.4, Sultanpur without considering the documentary evidence and grounds of appeal vide their judgment dated 16-04-2019 dismissed the appeal of the defendants /appellants.
5. That information about the dismissal of appeal was provided to the higher authorities of Irrigation Department.
6. That legal opinion was sought from the learned District Government Counsel (Civil), Sultanpur. The learned D.G.C (Civil) vide order dated 31-10-2019 opined for filing IInd Appeal before the Hon’ble High Court against the judgment and decree dated 16-04-2019 and 17-12-2013 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge Court No.4, Sultanpur and Learned Additional Civil Judge(J.D.) Sultanpur Court No.26.
7. That after approval of Chief Engineer of Sharda Sahayak and Chief Engineer and Head of Department of Irrigation and Water Resources Department, the matter was sent to the State Government U.P. for filing of IInd appeal.
8. That the State Government, Irrigation and Water Resources Department, Anubhag-3 vide G.O dated: 31.10.2019 granted permission for filing IInd Appeal
9. That thereafter the authorized pairokar was nominated by the Executive Engineer, Sharda Sahayak, Anubhag-16, who contacted the office of the learned Chief Standing Counsel, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow.
10. That on 08-01-2020 the paper book was assigned to one of the Standing Counsel, by the Learned Chief Standing Counsel and on very same date the paper book was handed over to the Standing Counsel.
11. That due to Covid-19 physical work and appearance of the Hon’ble High Court was closed from February 2020 to February 2022.
12. That on 04-08-2022 the learned Standing Counsel who was assigned paper book was disengaged from the post of Standing Counsel.
13 That on 08-08-2022 the paper book was assigned to another Standing Counsel who after studying the file, demanded a copy of the rent agreement and other relevant documents from the authorized pairokar.
14. That the rent agreement which is the basis of subject matter was handed over to the learned Standing Counsel in the month of February 2023 thereafter the present IInd Appeal is prepared and filed before this Hon’ble Court
15. That due to Covid-19, the Hon’ble Supreme Court freeze the limitation period from 15-03-2020 to 28-02-2022
16. That the delay in filing the IInd Appeal is genuine, bonafide, and unintentional. The IInd Appeal could not be filed earlier as it took time in filing the administrative formalities by following certain norms and procedure of disciplined and systematic performance of official functions, which includes preparation of office notes etc., after scrutinizing various records, movement of files step by step through different sections and to different officers and lastly to the head of the department and thereafter forwarding the matter to the Administrative Department in the Government for appropriate decision. The similar procedure is adopted in the Administrative Department also. The aforesaid process takes some time as it depends upon so many factors/ circumstances, such as preparation of office notes etc., as stated above, non-availability of the certain necessary information, as stated, non-availability of concerned officials/ officers, various holidays in between, and certain unavoidable and unspoken circumstances. It also took some time in obtaining the requisite permission of the law department and also in preparation for the IInd Appeal and its appendices
17. That the Appellants are advised to state that the delay in filing the IInd Appeal is liable to be condoned and the same is liable to be heard and decided on merits, in view of a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1996 S.C. Page 1623-State of Haryana Versus. Chandra Mani and others, AIR 1996 S.C. Page -2750-Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala Versus. K.V. Ayisumma, AIR 1996 S.C. Page-2173-State of U.P. and others Versus Harish Chandra and others, AIR 1987 S.C. Page-1353-Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Versus Mst. Katiji and others, and several others, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court also stressed the decision of the case on merits instead of dismissing it on technical grounds of delay and latches.”
Argument of Appellants
6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the instant appeal has been filed with a delay of 678 days, which was neither intentional nor deliberate. The delay had occurred primarily due to the time taken in securing the requisite administrative sanctions and approvals, which are mandatory procedural prerequisites for filing an appeal. It is further submitted that the State operates through an impersonal bureaucratic framework, wherein decisions are required to be taken through multiple levels before attaining final approval. Furthermore, the functioning of offices was significantly disrupted during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in further procedural delays. Therefore, the delay is sufficiently explained and deserves to be condoned in the interest of substantial justice.
7. He further submits that this Court in a number of cases has condoned the delay which were far much more than the delay in this case and hence, the delay in this case should also be condoned. For this, he has cited a number of orders passed by the Court.
8. He further submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. M/s S.V. Global Mill Ltd., arising out of SLP (C) Nos.215-216 of 2023 passed by this Court on 09.02.2026 has categorically held that the law of limitation is to be applied in a pragmatic and justice-oriented manner. The Court has clearly held that while considering applications for condonation of delay, a pedantic approach should be avoided and a pragmatic view should be adopted, particularly where the delay is not substantial or deliberate.
9. He further submits that the instant appeal has merit and if the same is dismissed on the ground of delay then the appellants will face a great irreparable loss.Argument of Respondent
10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that the instant appeal has been preferred after a delay of 678 days however, no sufficient cause has been given for such delay neither any day to day explanation has been made in the appeal. The entire efforts shown in the affidavit is nothing but an eyewash and has been engineered to explain the delay in which they have clearly failed to do so.
11. He further submits that the appellants have only relied on a decision passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of M/s S.V. Global Mill Ltd. (supra) which was delivered on 09.02.2026 but further failed to show that on the same date, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Odisha and ors. vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School reported in [2026 INSC 148] has also given a judgment wherein the court has clearly stated that the condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right and subject to the discretion of the court. The court further said that even giving a latitude to the State in filing the appeal the State is duty-bound to put-forth an explanation showing sufficient cause for not moving the court in time. The cause should be sufficient but not a lame excuse.
12. He further placed reliance on a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. versus Karnataka Housing Board and others, 2025 SCC Online SC 1969 wherein the supreme Court has held that sufficient cause should exclude negligence inaction and lack of bona fides. The entire period of delay has to be satisfactorily explained and the court should not mechanically condone the delay just to extend a liberal attitude towards the State Government. He further submits that the explanation given in the delay condonation application in this appeal does not pass the test and does not meet the threshold laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments.
Conclusion 13. A bare perusal of application for condonation of delay shows that the appellants were well aware about the impugned order dated 16.04.2019 and information was provided to the higher authorities. After a lapse of more than six months, a legal opinion was sought from the District Government Counsel on 31.10.2019 and no explanation has been given for this delay and thereafter, the file was sent for approval of Chief Engineer, Sharda Sahayak as well as Chief Engineer, Irrigation and Water Resource Department and thereafter the matter was sent to the State Government for approval of filing the appeal and on the very same day i.e. 31.10.2019, the State Government granted approval.
14. It is further submitted that the appellants have attempted to narrate that after obtaining approval from the Chief Engineer, Sharda Sahayak, as well as the Chief Engineer and Head of Department, Irrigation and Water Resources Department, the matter was forwarded to the State Government for approval, which was allegedly granted on 31.10.2019 by way of a Government Order. Significantly, the same date has been mentioned for the alleged legal opinion of the DGC as well as for the approval of the State Government. Such a sequence of events occurring on the very same date, involving multiple levels of administrative consideration and decision-making, is inherently improbable and renders the explanation concocted and devoid of credibility.
15. It is further noteworthy that despite claiming such extraordinary administrative alacrity on 31.10.2019, the appellants thereafter allowed the matter to remain dormant for a further period of nearly two months, and the paper book was allegedly assigned to a Standing Counsel only on 08.01.2020, as stated in paragraph 10 of the affidavit. However, no documentary proof such as an allotment order, office memorandum, or official communication has been annexed to the application, thereby leaving the statement entirely unsupported and unsubstantiated.
16. It is further stated that after the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which substantially subsided by February 2022, the appellants again remained completely inactive for a period of nearly six months, and it is only on 08.08.2022 that the file is alleged to have been reassigned to another Standing Counsel. The application is conspicuously silent as to what transpired during this period of six months, and no explanation has been given for such prolonged administrative lethargy.
17. Furthermore, in paragraph 14 of the affidavit it is stated that all relevant documents, including the alleged rent agreement, were made available by February 2023, yet even thereafter the appellants took an additional three months to institute the present second appeal, for which again no explanation whatsoever has been provided.
18. It is also significant to note that the entire period from August, 2022 to the February, 2023, spanning approximately five months, remains wholly unexplained.
19. The delay has not been explained on a day-to-day basis, as required by settled principles governing condonation of delay, but in fact no explanation of any nature has been offered for this substantial period.
20. The counsel for the appellants placed reliance on various orders passed by this Court however, this Court is of the view that each and every order was passed on its own merits. The explanation of one case cannot be said to be an explanation of another case. Just because, the court has condoned the delay in few matters, the same cannot be used as a yardstick to condone the delay in other matters.
21. The explanation given in the delay condonation application is nothing but a bunch of lame excuses and no sufficient cause has been shown.
22. Before proceeding further, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is being reproduced hereinunder:- “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.? Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.?The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”
23. A plain reading of the Section 5 of the Limitation Act clearly shows that an appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellants satisfy the Court that they had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such prescribed time. The burden to prove sufficient cause lies on the appellants, who are seeking condonation of delay and they have to prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real, bonafide and free of negligence.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a number of cases as propounded with the expression ‘sufficient cause’ treated elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which would sub-serve the ends of justice.
25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs Mst. Katiji & Ors reported in [1987 2 SCC 107] has held that the court should take a liberal approach and distinguished the State from the private parties when it comes for condonation of delay.
26. The Hon?ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana Versus. Chandra Mani and others reported in [AIR 1996 SC 1623] reiterated that some latitude must be shown to the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay. It observed that ?the State represents the collective cause of the community? and so a pragmatic view ought to be adopted while dealing with applications for condonation of delay filed by public authorities. It further emphasised that technicalities of limitation should not result in grave injustice to the public interest, especially where the delay was not tainted by mala fides. The relevant observations read as under: –
?11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court ? be it by private party or the State ? are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay ? intentional or otherwise ? is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression ?sufficient cause? should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice- oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis–vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.?
(Emphasis added)
27. The Hon?ble Supreme Court in the matter of Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma, reported in (1996) 10 SCC 634 held that since the State represents the collective cause of the public, any delay on its part ought not to be viewed through the same lens as that of a private party. It observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof in respect of the State or its instrumentalities, where no one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously, would lead to grave miscarriage of public justice. Thus, it held that in such circumstances, the correct approach to be adopted is to be pragmatic and condone the delay without insisting upon explaining every day’s delay. The relevant observations read as under: –
?2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day-to-day delay. The transaction of the business of the Government was being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court should be pragmatic but not pedantic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge has rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every day’s delay in filing the review application in the light of the law laid down by this Court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned.?
(Emphasis added)
28. In the matter of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752, the Hon?ble Supreme Court acknowledged the bureaucratic realities that on account of delay in governmental decision-making. It held that deference must be shown to the fact that governmental actions are ?conducted by officers who cannot act on their own but must obtain approvals at different levels,? and thus, the element of delay is almost ?inbuilt in the governmental decision-making process.? Accordingly, it held that factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions requires adoption of pragmatic and justice-oriented approach by the courts in matters pertaining to condonation of delay. The relevant observations read as under: –
?13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra [1987 Supp SCC 339] this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.
***
15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay ? intentional or otherwise ? is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression ?sufficient cause? should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis–vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.
(Emphasis added)”
29. Hon?ble Supreme Court in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) explicitly held that the State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be put on the same footing as that of a private party for the purposes of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It observed that an individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants, bound by bureaucratic methodology. Thus, it held that although equality before law is sacrosanct, equality does not mandate a refusal to recognise institutional realities.
30. However, what is equally significant to note is that the aforesaid observations in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) were accompanied by a clear message to the State and all its instrumentalities, that a leisurely and lethargic approach cannot continue for all times to come. The State and all public authorities were directed to constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts, if not then the endeavour should be made towards arriving at a settlement instead, rather than reagitating the belated causes before the courts. It further observed that where the case requires an appeal or application to be filed, despite the delay, then prompt action should be taken by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any.
31. For a long period, the Court has noticed the lethargic and apathetic manner in which appeals are filed by the State and its instrumentalities. Such conduct of dilatory tactics and a bureaucratic approach has become the order of the day. Almost every second matter filed by the State is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. It is then the Apex court took a divergent stand then what was taken earlier.
32. The Hon?ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 has held as under:
?27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.?
(Emphasis added)
33. In this judgement, the Hon?ble Supreme Court has clearly held that no delay can be condoned mechanically. The delay on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The Hon?ble Supreme Court has also clearly held that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government equally. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as a benefit for the government departments.
34. From the aforesaid, it is manifest that prior to the decision of Hon?ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General (supra), the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, reported in [1972] 2 SCR 874 and Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P., reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same.
35. In State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, Hon?ble Supreme Court expressed its deep anguish over the routine manner in which the State and its instrumentalities continue to seek condonation of delay on the pretext of bureaucratic inefficiencies. It held that the earlier decisions that had afforded a degree of leeway for such inefficiencies no longer reflects the correct position of law insofar as condonation of delay is concerned. It was further held that in view of the decision of Postmaster General (supra), any delay as a result of unavailability of the documents or the process of arranging them through bureaucratic process is no longer an acceptable ?reason or excuse? to condone such delay.
36. A similar view was reiterated by Hon?ble Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460, wherein the Court placing reliance on Postmaster General (supra) held that a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down merely because the Government is involved. The relevant observations read as under: –
?59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.?
(Emphasis added)
37. In State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sunanda Mahakuda, reported in (2021) 11 SCC 560, Hon?ble Supreme Court held that the leeway which was earlier enjoyed by the State and its instrumentalities on account of bureaucratic inefficiencies in matters of condonation of delay is no longer available in view of the technological advancement and the shift in jurisprudence as elucidated in Postmaster General (supra). It observed that no case under Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be said to be made out where there is no reason or excuse given in respect of the period for which condonation is sought.
38. Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Sabha Narain, reported in (2022) 9 SCC 266, Hon?ble Supreme Court once again deprecated the tendency of State and its instrumentalities to proceed on the assumption that they may approach the courts at their own convenience and sweet will, disregarding the period of limitation prescribed by statute, as though the Limitation statute does not apply to them. It held that the leeway which was at one point extended to the Government/public authorities on account of innate functional inefficiencies is no more the norm, particularly in the wake of the decision of Postmaster General (supra). The relevant observations read as under: –
?3. We have repeatedly discouraged State Governments and public authorities in adopting an approach that they can walk in to the Supreme Court as and when they please ignoring the period of limitation prescribed by the statutes, as if the Limitation statute does not apply to them. In this behalf, suffice to refer to our judgments in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] and State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda [State of Odisha v. Sunanda Mahakuda, (2021) 11 SCC 560 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 300 : (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 393] . The leeway which was given to the Government/public authorities on account of innate inefficiencies was the result of certain orders of this Court which came at a time when technology had not advanced and thus, greater indulgence was shown. This position is no more prevalent and the current legal position has been elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] Despite this, there seems to be little change in the approach of the Government and public authorities.?
(Emphasis added)
39. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, Hon?ble Supreme Court held that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning a gross delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be. It held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The relevant observations read as under: –
?25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ?Sword of Damocles? hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
30. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. In that case, this Court held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process cannot be accepted. [?]
(Emphasis added)
40. The Hon?ble Supreme Court in this judgement has clearly stated that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and it shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to prove that they have acted with bona fides and remained vigilant in pursuing the lis throughout and for some unforeseen reason, the appeal could not be filed then only the delay can be condoned.
41. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of M/s S.V. Global Mill Ltd. (supra) on 09.02.2026 had held that we must also remain conscious that any interpretation having the impact of destroying a right in seeking an adjudication on merits, should be eschewed unless it appears so on the very face of it. It was further held that accountability is an important facet in a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law. When an instrumentality of the State and its officials act with such connivance and collusion, it not only undermines the administration of justice but also erodes public confidence in the legal system. The repeated failure to pursue remedies within time cannot be brushed aside as mere negligence and calls for fixing responsibility on the erring officials. Even assuming that all the cases may not involve an act of collusion, there is certainly abject carelessness and indifference, especially when disputes involve substantial amounts of money. In most of these cases, it has not been brought to our notice whether any action has been initiated and, thereafter, taken against the officers concerned. Certainly, the malice must be addressed by creating a better management and monitoring system. High Courts shall avoid a pedantic approach as against a pragmatic one in dealing with the applications seeking condonation of delay.
42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court on the very same day on 09.02.2026 in the matter of Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School (supra) held that sufficient cause should be shown for exercise on discretion in favour of the State. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer reported in [(1988) 2 SCC 142], following the law laid down in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji reported in [(1987) 2 SCC 107] with much optimism that matters would improve. The Apex Court, however, found no visible support for such optimism was shown and the Court’s patience having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government.
43. In the above mentioned matter, the Supreme Court categorically held that bureaucratic delay cannot be acquitted with sufficient cause and the condonation of delay cannot be a matter of right.
44. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up.
45. The administrative insufficiency or routine file movement cannot dilute statutory limitation. The appellants herein seeking indulgence solely on account of characteristics of functioning which is impermissible in law. In Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) the Apex Court has further held that, no court, especially a constitutional court, shall obviate the procedure applicable to a litigating State and its instrumentalities, which must be placed on the same footing as other litigants when it comes to applications under the Limitation Act.
46. In light of the ratio laid down by latest judgement passed Hon?ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra), it is clear that limitation laws are themselves grounded in public policy, as already discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, it is based on the maxim ?interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium? i.e., ?it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation?. Therefore, public interest is better served by timely governmental action than by condoning repeated lapses. State cannot simultaneously seek to represent the interest of the public and yet consistently fail to protect that very interest by allowing limitation periods to lapse.
47. Public interest is best served by ensuring efficiency and diligence in governmental functioning, rather than by condoning its lapses as a matter of course. Thus, a liberal inclination towards the State or any of its instrumentalities, in matters of condonation of delay, cannot be adopted. Merely on the presumption that, if the delay is not condoned, public interest runs the risk of a meritorious matter being thrown out. Public interest lies not in condoning governmental indifference, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely action.
48. To allow condonation of delay as a matter of course, for the Government would have the deleterious effect of institutionalising inefficiency. It would, in substance, incentivise indolence and foster a culture where accountability for delay is eroded. If the State is assured that its lapses will invariably be excused under the rubric of ?public interest,? there would remain little incentive for its officers to act with vigilance or for its instrumentalities to streamline procedures for timely action. The consequence would not be the advancement of public interest but rather its betrayal.
49. In the aforesaid circumstances, the conduct of the appellants clearly demonstrates a pattern of prolonged inaction, unexplained administrative delay, and lack of bona fide diligence. The explanation offered in the application is vague, unsupported by documentary evidence, and riddled with improbabilities. Consequently, it cannot be said that the delay was either bona fide, genuine or unavoidable and therefore, the delay of 678 days in filing the present second appeal does not deserve to be condoned in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.
50. In view of above, the delay condonation application is rejected. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed.
(Prashant Kumar,J.)
April 22, 2026
Saurabh Yadav/-