Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. vs Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar And 2 Others on 30 July, 2026
Bench: Abdul Moin, Pramod Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH [Reserved on 16.07.2026] [Delivered on 30.07.2026] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW APPLICATION U/s 378 No. - 194 of 2018 [Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:51912-DB] State of U.P. ..Applicant(s) Versus Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar and 2 others ..Opposite Party(s) Counsel for Applicant(s) : Govt. Advocate, Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Court No. - 11 HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.
HON’BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
[Per Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.]
[Order on Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal)]
1. The present Government Appeal has been preferred by the Appellant-State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment and order dated 13.02.2018 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Court no.2, Ambedkar Nagar, in Special Sessions Trial No. 46 of 2010 (State of U.P. vs. Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar & Others), whereby the learned trial court acquitted the accused-respondents Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar, Rakesh Kumar Jaiswal and Ramashankar Singh @ Sakaru in Case Crime No. 478 of 2008, under Sections 328, 307, 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred in short as IPC) and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred in short as SC/ST Act).
2. The genesis of the prosecution case lies in a written tahrir (Exhibit A-1) submitted by the complainant, Tribhuwan (PW-1), son of Ram Laut, resident of Village Arbat, Police Station Maharajganj, District Faizabad on 27.07.2008. The complainant’s son, Surendra Kumar, aged about 25 years, belonged to the Scheduled Caste community and was employed as a computer operator at Sunny Gas Service, located at Katehari, Station Ahirauli, District Ambedkar Nagar. Due to an excessive workload at the gas agency and on the instructions of the agency’s owner, Dr. Bharat Lal, the deceased stayed overnight at the gas station on the intervening night of 4th-5th July 2008. Staying back with him was Kishan Lal alias Lallu (PW-2), the younger brother of the agency owner. On the morning of 5.07.2008, an employee of the gas agency informed the local Ahirauli Police Station that Surendra Kumar had died under mysterious circumstances. The body of the deceased was sent for the postmortem examination, viscera was preserved and subsequently deceased was cremated.
3. Upon receiving initial information from Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar on 05.07.2008 at 08:45 PM regarding death of deceased Surendra Kumar, Panchayatnama (Inquest Report, Exhibit A-2) of deceased Surendra Kumar, necessary police forms (Challan), Photo Nash etc., Exhibits A-6 to A-9) were prepared and were sent in a sealed cover through Constable Amresh Singh Sodhi to the mortuary for postmortem examination. On 05.07.2008, Sub-Inspector K.S. Pandey collected and sealed a container containing vomit excreted by the survivor, Kishan Lal alias Lallu, preparing a recovery memo (Exhibit A-13).
4. The complainant, Tribhuvan, who was working in Punjab at the time of the incident, rushed back. He asserted that his relative, Amar Kumar (PW-3), had attempted to report the suspicious death of Surendra Kumar in Ahirauli Police on 06.07.2008 and to the Superintendent of Police, Ambedkar Nagar on 09.07.2008, but no action was taken. Ultimately, a written complaint (Exhibit A-1) was lodged by Tribhuwan on 27.07.2008. Consequently, a formal First Information Report was registered on 28.07.2008 at 12:25 PM as Crime No. 978 of 2008, under Section 302 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act at Police Station Ahirauli District Ambedkar Nagar against five initially named accused, namely, Kishan Lal alias Lallu, Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar, Rakesh Kumar Jaiswal, Atal Bihari Shukla and Devika.
5. The investigation was subsequently taken over by the Circle Officer, Ram Krishna Magan (PW-7), who inspected the place of occurrence and drew the site map (Exhibit A-10) on 08.07.2008. On 03.11.2008, the Forensic Science Laboratory (hereinafter referred in short as FSL) report was received, wherein Baygon (an insecticide toxin chemically identified as 2-isopropoxyphenyl-N-methylcarbamate) was found. On 11.11.2008 the statements of Doctor Dinesh Kumar was taken regarding the survivor Kishan Lal alias Lallu. Dr. Dinesh examined him on 05.07.2008 at Primary Health Centre, Katehari. The patient was brought in a highly critical, limp and in a semi-conscious state who was unable to recognize anyone. Due to his deteriorating state, he was immediately referred to Devi District Hospital, Ambedkar Nagar in a critical condition (Medical Report Exhibit A-14).
6. Upon evaluating the chemical examination reports and recording the statements of the witnesses, the Investigating Officer found Kishan Lal alias Lallu, Atal Bihari Shukla, and Devika not to be involved in the cases crime and thus their names were dropped and the accused Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar, Rakesh Kumar Jaiswal, and Rama Shankar @ Sakaru were found involved in commission of the offecne and subsequently, a charge-sheet (Exhibit A-12) was submitted against three accused persons under Sections 328, 307, 302 IPC, and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. Later, on 26th January 2009, on the basis of the statement of accused Ramesh Kumar, the shop of Ram Janam (Verma Seed Store) was inspected and a second site map (Exhibit A-11) was prepared.
7. After filing of the chargesheet before the trial court, copies of relevant documents were furnished to the accused persons.
8. On 30.08.2011, the Special Sessions Court framed the charges against the three accused-respondents under Sections 328/34, 307/34, 302/34 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. The accused persons denied all the allegations levelled against them and claimed to be tried.
9. To prove its case, the prosecution produced Tribhuwan (PW-1) the complainant, father of the deceased-Surendra Kumar, Lallu @ Kishan (PW-2), the injured survivor who was poisoned alongwith the deceased, younger brother of the gas agency owner, Amar Kumar (PW-3), a relative of the complainant who attempted to report the incident to the police initially, Bantesh Bahadur Singh (PW-4), Head Constable, Dr. R.K. Singh (PW-5), the Medical Officer who conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased-Surendra Kumar, Krishna, Sahay Pandey (PW-6) Retired Sub-Inspector of Police who conducted the initial spot procedures, sealed the survivor’s vomit sample and prepared the inquest report (Panchayatnama), Ram Krishna Magan (PW-7), the Investigating Officer, prepared the site maps and submitted the charge sheet and Dr. Dinesh Kumar (PW-8), the medical officer at the Primary Health Centre, Katehari, who examined the survivor, Lallu alias Kishan Lal.
10. After the prosecution concluded its oral and documentary evidence, the incriminating circumstances were put to the accused-respondents. They denied all allegations, claiming complete innocence and false implication due to local animosity. Accused-Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar stated he was falsely implicated due to partibandi. Accused-Ram Shankar Singh @ Sakaru contended that he had been implicated due to long standing litigation with one Ram Ujagir Singh. The accused-respondents, however, had not produced any defence witness or any written statement in their support.
11. After having heard learned counsel for both the parties and on perusal of the record, learned trial court has observed that prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case and consequently, accused persons were acquitted for the charges levelled against them.
12. Impugned judgment and order dated 13.02.2018 has been challenged on the ground that without considering the facts, evidences and circumstances in its totality, the learned trial court has passed the impugned judgment and order in arbitrary manner, which is not in consonance with the law. The learned trial court held that with the conspiracy of accused-Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar, accused Ramashanker Singh @ Sakaru with an intention to kill the Lallu, in the night meal which was brought by Rakesh Kumar Jaiswal and after taking the meal, the deceased-Surendra had died, while Lallu @ Kishan Lal had fainted, but the learned trial court did not consider this point. In the analysis of viscera, in Forensic Science Laboratory (hereinafter referred in short as FSL), Vegan Insecticide (Isopropoxy Phenyl-N-Methyl Corbonate), the poison was found. Despite of the fact, the learned trial court acquitted the respondents-accused.
13. Another ground is also taken by the learned AGA that Lallu @ Kishan Lal had illicit relation with the with accused-Sakru @ Rama Shankars wife. Therefore, Sakru had made a plan to kill Lallu @ Kishan Lal and the deceased Surendra Kumar, but fortunately, Lallu @ Kishan Lal remains alive, due to treatment, while Surendra Kumar has died.
14. It is also submitted that Dr. Dinesh Kumar PW-8, who examined Lallu @ Kishan Lal, has stated that the patient was in a serious condition, who was in half-conscious and he was referred to the District Hospital. But the learned trial court without analyzing the facts and evidences has passed the impugned order on the basis of surmises and conjectures, which is erroneous, perverse and is liable to be quashed and the appeal is liable to be allowed.
15. We have heard the learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-appellant and perused the record.
16. On the perusal of material available on record, it reveals that there is a no eye witness of the alleged incident. The case rests upon circumstantial evidence. With regard to circumstantial evidence, the law as propounded by Honble the Apex Court is reproduced here:
17. While prosecution has adduced the evidence in the nature of circumstantial evidence. To bring home the guilt of accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence Hon’ble Apex Court in Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs State Of Maharashtra AIR 1984 SC 1622 laid down that the following conditions, which may be called five golden principles or the “punchsheel” of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
“(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’ as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra(‘) where the following observations were made:
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
18. In view of the principles laid down by the Honble Apex Court, it has to be seen that whether the prosecution has succeeded to link all the chain of the circumstances which may draw an inference of culpability of the accused persons?
19. Before marshalling the facts and analyzing the evidences given by the prosecution witnesses, at the very outset, it is expedient to mention that the alleged incident of the case is said to be happened on the night of 5th July 2008. The deceased-Surendra Kumar S/o Tribhuwan (informant) was found dead. The First Information Report (hereinafter referred as FIR) was lodged on 28.07.2008.
20. As evident from the testimony of Head Constable Bantesh Bahadur Singh PW-4 who has stated that on the basis of the written Taharir given by informant Tribhuwan, he had lodged the FIR on 28th July 2008, at about 12:25 PM, against accused persons, namely, Kishan Lal @ Lallu, Ramesh Kumar, Rakesh Kumar Jaiswal, Atal Bihari Shukla and Devika, but during the course of investigation, the names of the accused persons, namely, Kishan Lal @ Lallu, Atal Bihari Shukla and Devika were dropped out, finding no indulgence of them in the said incident, while the name of another accused Rama Shankar @ Sakru was added and after concluding the investigation, chargesheet was filed by Sri Ram Krishna Magan, Circle Officer PW-7.
21. The Investigating Officer, PW-7 has stated that during the course of investigation, he has inspected the place of occurrence and prepared the site plan and recorded the statement of witnesses. During the course of investigation, names of Kishan Lal @ Lallu, Atal Bihari Shukla and Devika were dropped out, since their indulgence in the alleged offence was not found. Thus, it is apparent that the accused Rama Shankar @ Sakru was not named in F.I.R, his name was surfaced during the course of investigation.
22. This fact has also not disputed that the death of the deceased-Surendra was not occurred in normal circumstance. In this regard, Dr. R. K. Singh, PW-5, who had conducted autopsy of the dead body of the deceased-Surendra, has deposed that on 07.05.2008 at about 03:00 P.M. he had conducted the postmortem of the dead body fo the deceased-Surendra and the postmortem report was prepared which is as follows.
External Examination
The deceased body was built average average having normal muscularity. Eye was closed. 16/16 teeth were present on both jaws. Rigor mortis was present on the whole body. Foam was coming out from the mouth. Stool was present at the anal opening.
Antimortem injuries
23. No marks of antimortem injury was present on the dead body.
Internal Examination
24. Membrane of brain congested, both lungs congested, chamber of the heart were filled with blood. In intestine semi-digested food was present. In small intestine Semi-solid contended fecus material was present. In large intestine, fecus and gases were present and liver was congested. Pancreas was empty. Both the kidneys were congested. Urinary bladder was half-filled.
25. Duration of death of the deceased was opined one day prior to the postmortem. The cause of death was not ascertained. The viscera was preserved.
26. Viscera was sent to FSL for examination, wherein it was found that there was Isopropoxy phenyl (poison).
27. The Investigating Officer, Ram Krishna Magan stated that in FSL report, in the content of viscera, Vegan, Isopropoxy Phenyl-N-Methyl Corbonate. (insecticide poison) was found.
28. Dr. R.K. Singh, PW-5, who had conducted postmortem of the dead body of the deceased has also stated that after getting the FSL report, it was found that in the Viscera of the deceased, the poison was present, therefore, it has ascertained that the death of deceased was caused due to poison.
29. Thus, from the medical and the FSL evidence, it is evident that death of the deceased was not happened in normal circumstances. Now question arises that if death of the deceased was not occurred in normal circumstances, then whether it was homicidal or suicidal? And if it is suicidal, then who is responsible for that? The if it is homicidal, then whether the accused-respondents are responsible for it?
30. It is not a case of either party that deceassed himself had consumed the poisonous substance to commit suicide. No evidence is led in this regard and no plea has been taken by defence as well. Thus, it is established that this is not a case of suicide and the death of deceased was homicidal. Now the question arises that whether for this homicidal death, the accused persons are responsible?
31. Now in above prospects, we have to see that what evidence has been adduced by the prosecution to prove the charge levelled against the respondent-accused person. Before entering into the testimony of the witnesses, it is to be notable that the person who was earlier named in First Information Report, namely, Kishan Lal @ Lallu has been exonerated during the course of investigation but during trial, he was examined as prosecution witness, since he was also sufferer of the incident, therefore, his testimony has much significance than the other witnesses.
32. PW-1 Tribhuwan, who is the father of the deceased-Surendra Kumar has deposed that he was in Punjab at the time of alleged incident and Aman Kumar S/o his brother-in-law (sadhu) had intimated him about the incident on phone. After getting information of his son’s death, he got information from others regarding indulgence of the accused persons named in the FIR. Then the FIR was lodged. In cross-examination he has admitted that witness Amar Kumar is his brother-in-law’s son, who had intimated him regarding death of Surendra Kumar and on the behest of Amar Kumar, he had lodged the FIR. One thing is also important to note that in FIR only suspicion against the named accused persons was expressed. There was no averment of illicit relation of his wife with Rama Shankar Singh @ Sakru. Thus, evidence of this witness for not being an eye witness has no significance, as he has given the testimony only on information given by Amar Kumar, therefore, he has deposed as a hearsay, which has no evidentiary value.
33. Now, we moved ahead to consider the statement of Amar Kumar PW-3 who is the son of informant’s brother-in-law who has deposed that he met with the deceased-Surendra Kumar at 6:00 PM on the date of the incident. The deceased was called by Lallu in the gas agency. He further stated that the illicit relationship between Lallu and the deceased’s wife came into his knowledge after the happening of the alleged incident and this fact was told by Sakaru and some other persons. He further stated that when the meal in the night was ordered, he was not present on the spot, therefore he could not specify who brought the meal. He also deposed that he did not see the occurrence, therefore he has no knowledge that how the incident took place.
34. Thus, from the evidence of the witness PW-3, it reveals that he was not an eye witness of the incident. He had only given a statement with regard to meeting with the deceased on the date of the occurrence at 6:00 PM. Other remaining facts which were stated by him in his testimony are based on the information given by others, therefore, the testimony of this witness is also not very much significant with regard to the culpability of the accused persons in the alleged incident.
35. Now the testimony of Lallu @ Kishan Lal is to be discussed, who is most important witness, as his presence was stated with the deceased in the night and in the FIR he was made an accused but his name was dropped out during the investigation and the prosecution has produced him to prove its case.
36. Lallu @ Kishan PW-2 as a star witness of the prosecution has deposed that at the time of the incident, he was working as a computer operator in Sunny Gas Service, Katehari. At that time, Rama Shankar Verma, Rama Shankar Singh alias Sakru, Rama Ramesh Rajbhar and Surendra were also serving there. The Sunny Gas Agency was owned by the brother of this witness. He further stated that on the date of the incident, he was present in the showroom of the agency and Surendra had gone to his home after completing his work. Then he received a phone call from Jay Ma Gayathri Agency, who had communicated that some senior officers are coming to check and inspect the work of the Sunny gas agency. He further stated that, on this phone call, Surendra also returned from the home. Thereafter this witness alongwith Surendra stayed in the showroom in the night. He also clarified that when he used to stay in the Gas Agency then oftenly Ramesh Rajbhar used to cook the food and sometimes he cooked the food himself. He also deposed that Ramesh Kumar and Rakesh Kumar Jaiswal were close friends. On the date of incident at about 6:30 PM, Ramesh Kumar came to his showroom and stated that his thatch has collapsed, therefore, he is going to his house and he is unable to cook the food. Rama Shankar @ Sakaru was also on leave since 03.07.2008 in sequence to marriage in his family. He also stated that house of Rama Shankar alias Sakru was situated nearby Godown, therefore, sometimes he used to bring the meals from his house, but on the date of incident Rakesh Kumar Jaiswal and Vinod carried the meal from dhaba and after taking meal they slept over the mat, while the generator was running. Further states that he and deceased Surendra Kumar had become unconscious, in the night at about 01:55 A.M., on mobile call, deceased Surendra instructed him to receive phone call, but from other side, it was asked to give the call to Surendra but Surendra said that he will talk in the morning. This witness also clarified that he when he regained conscious, then he came to know that Surendra has died. He also stated that deceased was referred to Faizabad Hospital from Akbarpur Hospital.
37. In his detailed cross examination, he has stated that in the night of the alleged incident at about 01:30 AM, they were awake. He denied the statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., given to Investigating Officer to the effect that someone wants to kill him. He also denied to the fact that the wife of Ramashankar @ Sakru used to come to meet her deceased husband in the godown.
38. This witness categorically stated that he had no knowledge to the fact that Ramashankar @ Sakru, Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar and Ramesh Kumar Rajbhar had conspired and they mixed the poison in the meal with the object to kill the Surendra. Further stated that he alongwith Surendra had taken dinner together, after having dinner, he got conscious in the Faizabad Hospital. Then only fact of death of the deceased-Surendra was came to his knowledge. He specifically denied the role of the Ramashankar @ Sakru in mixing of the poison in the meal. He also deposed that he had given the statement to Investigating Officer that Rakesh had called to his known person who had carried the meal, thereafter, Rakesh brought the same meal for them. Thus, from testimony of this witness, it transpires that in the night this witness alongwith the deceased was present in the showroom but for dinner they did not cook themselves and this witness made order for food from somewhere else through Rakesh carried the food.
39. Ram Krishna Magan, PW-7 has stated that during investigation this fact came into light that Kishan Lal @ Lallu had illicit relation with the wife of Ramshankar @ Sakru and when this fact came into the knowledge of Ramshankar @ Sakru, then Sakru, Ramesh and Rakesh made a plan to kill the Lallu @ Kishan Lal. Therefore, they mixed the poison in the food. He further stated that in the furtherance of plan, Rakesh Jaiswal carried food for two persons and on the way, Ramesh, Sakru and Rakesh had mixed the poison in the pulse (dal) and after having dinner, the deceased Lallu @ Kishan Lal had fainted.
40. Conjoint reading of the testimony of Lallu @ Kishan PW-2 and Ram Krishna Magan PW-7, it reveals that the deceased as well as the witness Lallu @ Kishan PW-2 both had consumed the same food. The dinner was carried by Rakesh which was made available to him by some known person and after having dinner they become fainted. But surprisingly when they were got fainted and the generator was running, then how it was possible to receive the call by this witness and after receiving the call on asking of person who was on the another end of the call, this witness made available the phone to deceased but deceased said to him that he will call tomorrow to the person who is calling him and at that point of time it was 01:30 AM, while they had finished their dinner in the night at 10:30 PM and the phone call was received at 01:55 AM in the night. Therefore taking into account the timing of having dinner, sleeping and receiving the phone call, they all contradict to each other because if after taking dinner they got fainted then it was not possible to talk someone on the phone and if they were awake at that time then how this fact can be accepted that they had become faint immediate after taking dinner.
41. Here it is also to be notable that this witness Kishan Lal alias Lallu PW-2 did not state that accused Ramesh, Rakesh and Rama Shankar @ Sakaru were indulging in causing of the incident. One thing is also important that on one point of time this witness also resiled from the statement given to Investigating Officer.
42. Although, it is true that the defective investigation has not become fatal to the prosecution case but it is also true that the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation did not procure the witnesses or the employee of said dhaba from where food was brought, while Dhaba was operated by some Vinod Kumar but no statement of Vinod Kumar was recorded ever. Similarly, from which shop the poison was purchased, this fact was also not substantiated by producing any concerned witness. While during investigation, Ram Krishna Magan, PW-7 has stated that the poison was purchased from Verma Seed Bhandar.
43. Upon considering the facts and evidences, it demonstrates that the prosecution could not establish the motive to kill the deceased as against the accused persons, while this suggestion was given to witness Lallu @ Kishan Lal, PW-2 that he had illicit relation with the wife of accused-Ram Shanker @ Sakaru, therefore Sakru had motive against him but this was not substantiated by any evidence. If for the sake of an argument, it would be taken into account, then only on the basis of motive, the complicity of the accused persons in the crime cannot be established.
44. Here it is expedient to mention that as per the provision contained in Section 111 of the Indian Penal Code, it envisaged that when an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it: Proviso: Provided the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment. Illustration in this regard is given as below:
A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison for that purpose. The child, in consequence of the instigation, by mistake puts the poison into the food of Y, which is by the side of that of Z. Here, if the child was acting under the influence of As instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of the abetment. A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the child to put the poison into the food of Y.
45. But the case in hand does not fulfill the requirement of the above provision.
46. Thus, in view of the above facts, evidence and circumstances, we find that learned trial court after going through entire evidence adduced by the prosecution, has categorically analyses the veracity of the testimony of the witnesses and in view of the law propounded by Hon’ble Apex Court, cited in the judgment, learned trial court found that burden of proof which was rest upon prosecution, could not be discharged. The chain of the circumstantial evidence is broken. There are material contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, which does not inspire confidence and the witnesses are not of a sterling quality. On that basis, learned trial court found that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the accused persons.
47. It would be appropriate to take note of law on the appeal against acquittal.
48. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, in paragraph 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that “the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities”
49. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words:
“The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court was a ”possible view’. The judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact.”
50. In a judgement of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as under:
“10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-
“12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under:
“…the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses….”
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
“(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an “order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.”
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes:
i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”
51. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it is wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal.
52. The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166, Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka (2021) 5 SCC 222, and Babu (supra) in Achhar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543.”
53. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.
54. In Ramesh and Others v. State of Haryana; (2017) 1 SCC 529, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations:
“24. We have duly appreciated the submissions advanced by counsel for the parties on both sides. No doubt, the High Court was dealing with the appeal against the judgment of the trial court which had acquitted the appellants herein. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is undoubtedly narrower than the scope of appeal against conviction. Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 confers upon the State a right to prefer an appeal to the High Court against the order of acquittal. At the same time, sub-section (3) thereof mandates that such an appeal is not to be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. Thus, before an appeal is entertained on merits, leave of the High Court is to be obtained which means that normally judgment of acquittal of the trial court is attached a definite value which is not to be ignored by the High Court. In other words, presumption of innocence in favour of an accused gets further fortified or reinforced by an order of acquittal. At the same time, while exercising its appellate power, the High Court is empowered to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence before it. However, this exercise is to be undertaken in order to come to an independent conclusion and unless there are substantial and compelling reasons or very strong reasons to differ from the findings of acquittal recorded by the trial court, the High Court, as an appellate court in an appeal against the acquittal, is not supposed to substitute its findings in case the findings recorded by the trial court are equally plausible.
55. In Jafarudheen vs State Of Kerala; (2022) 8 SCC 440, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations:
“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”
56. In Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Another; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 451 the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations regarding the parameters that must be considered while dealing with the applications seeking leave to appeal under Section 378 of CrPC:
“7. The question as to how the application for grant of leave to appeal filed under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C. should be decided by the High Court and what are the parameters which the High Court should keep in mind remains no longer res integra. This issue was examined by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar reported in (2008) 9 SCC 475. C.K. Thakker, J. speaking for the Bench held in paras 19, 20, 21 and 24 respectively as under:
“19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of appeal by the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3) declares that no appeal “shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court”. It is, therefore, necessary for the State where it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court of Session to file an application for leave to appeal as required by subsection (3) of Section 378 of the Code. It is also true that an appeal can be registered and heard on merits by the High Court only after the High Court grants leave by allowing the application filed under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code.
20. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question whether requisite leave should or should not be granted, the High Court must apply its mind, consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or arguable points have been raised and not whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside.
21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of law of universal application that each and every petition seeking leave to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal recorded by a trial court must be allowed by the appellate court and every appeal must be admitted and decided on merits. But it also cannot be overlooked that at that stage, the court would not enter into minute details of the prosecution evidence and refuse leave observing that the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court could not be said to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave should be granted.
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24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not be understood to have laid down an inviolable rule that no leave should be refused by the appellate court against an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We only state that in such cases, the appellate court must consider the relevant material, sworn testimonies of prosecution witnesses and record reasons why leave sought by the State should not be granted and the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court should not be disturbed. Where there is application of mind by the appellate court and reasons (may be in brief) in support of such view are recorded, the order of the court may not be said to be illegal or objectionable. At the same time, however, if arguable points have been raised, if the material on record discloses deeper scrutiny and reappreciation, review or reconsideration of evidence, the appellate court must grant leave as sought and decide the appeal on merits. In the case on hand, the High Court, with respect, did neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the case did not require grant of leave. But it also failed to record reasons for refusal of such leave.
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12. We are of the view that at the stage of considering grant of leave under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., a prima facie case should be looked into by the High Court, of course, not ignoring the materials on record.”
57. In such view of the matter, we, therefore, find that the trial court has taken possible view of the matter, on appreciation of entire evidence on record which cannot be substituted by this court taking a different view as per the law discussed above.
58. Accordingly, it is not a case worth granting leave to appeal. The application for granting leave to appeal is rejected.
[Re: Government Appeal]
59. Consequently, since the Criminal Miscellaneous Application (Leave to appeal) has been rejected by order of the date, the present Government Appeal is also dismissed.
[Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.] [Abdul Moin,J.]
July 30, 2026
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