Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. vs Ram Sajeevan And 2 Ors. on 7 July, 2026
Author: Abdul Moin
Bench: Abdul Moin, Pramod Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:44980-DB HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW APPLICATION U/s 378 DEFECTIVE No. - 81 of 2020 State of U.P. ..Applicant(s) Versus Ram Sajeevan and 2 Ors. ..Opposite Party(s) Counsel for Applicant(s) : G.A., Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Court No. - 11 HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.
HON’BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
RE: Criminal Misc. Delay Condonation Application No. IA/1 of 2026 1. Heard Sri Anurag Verma, learned AGA appearing for the State and perused the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application.
2. There is delay of 41 days in filing the appeal.
3. Cause shown in affidavit is sufficient. Delay in filing the appeal is condoned. Delay condonation application stands allowed.
4. Office is directed to allot regular number to this appeal.
Re: Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal)
1. Heard Sri Anurag Verma, learned AGA appearing for the appellant-State of UP and perused the record.
2. The present government appeal has been preferred by the State against the judgment and order dated 20.02.2020 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act), Faizabad in Special Sessions Trial No. 271 of 2013 and 409 of 2013, arising out of Case Crime No. 41 of 2013, under Sections 363, 366, 376 I.P.C., Section POCSO Act and Section 3(2) (v) of SC/ST Act, Police Station Haiderganj, District Faizabad (Now Ayodhya).
3. By the impugned judgment dated 20.02.2020 passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 271 of 2013, the accused, Ram Sajeewan, was acquitted of the charges under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the I.P.C., Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act, and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. By the same judgment, the accused, Pramod Kumar Singh @ Pappu, was acquitted of the charges under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the I.P.C. and Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 409 of 2013.
4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order of acquittal, the State has filed this appeal alongwith application under Section 378(3) of Cr.P.C. for grant of leave to appeal against the said judgment.
5. Prosecution story, in brief, is that the accused, Ram Sajeewan, enticed away the daughter of the informant (the victim), aged about 17 years, and took her on 06.04.2013 in the evening.
6. On the basis of written Tehrir, First Information Report (herein after referred to as FIR) against Ram Sajeewan under Sections 363 and 366 IPC was lodged.
7. After concluding the investigation, the Investigating Officer filed charge-sheet against accused Ram Sajeewan under Sections 363, 366, 376 I.P.C., Section POCSO Act, 3 (1) (xii) and Section 3(2) (v) of SC/ST Act.
8. After compliance of mandatory provision of Section 207 of Code of Criminal Procedure (herein after referred to as CrPC), the said case was committed to the Court of Session Judge from where it is made over to the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act), Faizabad for trial, who framed the charges against the accused Ram Sajeewan under Sections 363, 366, 376 I.P.C., Section 3(2) (v) of SC/ST Act and Section of POCSO Act and against accused Pramod Kumar @ Pappu Singh charge was framed under Sections 363, 366, 376 I.P.C. and Section of POCSO Act for which the accused persons denied and claimed to be tried.
9. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has adduced ocular evidence of Bittan Devi PW-1, victim PW-2, Inspector Rajesh Yadav PW-3, Additional Superintendent of Police, Gramin, Azamgarh Sri Narenda Pratap Singh PW-4, Dr. Vibha Singh PW-5, Dr. Vineeta Rai PW-6, Constable Srinath Yadav PW-7, Dr. Lal Mani, Retired Joint Director PW-8, Head Constable Shyam Babu Agarhari PW-9.
10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material available on record, the learned trial court concluded that prosecution has failed to prove the charge levelled against accused persons, consequently acquitted them.
11. The judgment of acquittal was passed on the ground that the victim was major at the time of alleged incident in view of the medical report. It was further found that as per SR Register of the School her date of birth was mentioned as 11.03.1996, was not duly proved. It was further found that the victim has admitted that under the influence and pressure of police she had given statement to the Investigating Officer under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., while before the Court the victim has admitted in her testimony that several times she went with the accused Ram Sajeewan and lastly she has stated that accused Ram Sajeewan has not committed any wrong with her. Accused Ram Sajeewan neither enticed her nor took her away and she had also admitted that to get the financial assistance from the Government she had given a statement against accused persons while accused Ram Sajeewan had given Rs. 35,000/- to her also. Dr. Vineeta Rai PW-6, who had medically examined the victim has stated that no evidence with regard to commission of rape was found. Hymen was old and torn, therefore, no definite opinion regarding commission of rape was given.
12. Learned trial Court also found that there was major discrepancies and shifting of stand in the testimony of the victim, so her statement was not wroth belief. Under such circumstances, the trial Court found that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the accused persons were given benefit of doubt and judgment of acquittal was passed.
13. Challenging to this impugned judgment, Sri Anurag Verma, learned AGA submits that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence on record. He further submits that as per Transfer Certificate and SR Register of the victim, the date of birth of the victim was 11.03.1996, therefore she was minor and below the age of 18 years. She has supported the prosecution case in her statement given before the Court, but learned trial Court wrongly ignored the prosecution evidence. He further submits that the witnesses are intact and corroborate the prosecution case and the findings recorded by the learned trial Court is not one of the possible view. Submission, therefore, is that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court requires serious consideration and reversal and the accused persons herein are liable to be convicted.
14. We have considered the submissions and have perused the record.
15. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of law on the appeal against acquittal.
16. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, in paragraph 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that “the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities”
17. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words:
“The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court was a ”possible view’. The judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact.”
18. In a judgment of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as under:
“10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-
“12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under:
“…the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.”
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
“(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an “order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.”
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes:
i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”
11. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it is wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal.
12. The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166, Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka (2021) 5 SCC 222, and Babu (supra) in Achhar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543.”
19. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.
20. In Jafarudheen vs State Of Kerala; (2022) 8 SCC 440, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations:
“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC, the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the Trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”
21. In Manoj Rameshlal Chhabriya v. Mahesh Prakash Ahuja & Another; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 451 the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations regarding the parameters that must be considered while dealing with the applications seeking leave to appeal under Section 378 of CrPC:
“7. The question as to how the application for grant of leave to appeal filed under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C. should be decided by the High Court and what are the parameters which the High Court should keep in mind remains no longer res integra. This issue was examined by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar reported in (2008) 9 SCC 475. C.K. Thakker, J. speaking for the Bench held in paras 19, 20, 21 and 24 respectively as under:
“19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of appeal by the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3) declares that no appeal “shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court”. It is, therefore, necessary for the State where it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court of Session to file an application for leave to appeal as required by subsection (3) of Section 378 of the Code. It is also true that an appeal can be registered and heard on merits by the High Court only after the High Court grants leave by allowing the application filed under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code.
20. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question whether requisite leave should or should not be granted, the High Court must apply its mind, consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or arguable points have been raised and not whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside.
21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of law of universal application that each and every petition seeking leave to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal recorded by a trial court must be allowed by the appellate court and every appeal must be admitted and decided on merits. But it also cannot be overlooked that at that stage, the court would not enter into minute details of the prosecution evidence and refuse leave observing that the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court could not be said to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave should be granted.
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24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not be understood to have laid down an inviolable rule that no leave should be refused by the appellate court against an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We only state that in such cases, the appellate court must consider the relevant material, sworn testimonies of prosecution witnesses and record reasons why leave sought by the State should not be granted and the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court should not be disturbed. Where there is application of mind by the appellate court and reasons (may be in brief) in support of such view are recorded, the order of the court may not be said to be illegal or objectionable. At the same time, however, if arguable points have been raised, if the material on record discloses deeper scrutiny and reappreciation, review or reconsideration of evidence, the appellate court must grant leave as sought and decide the appeal on merits. In the case on hand, the High Court, with respect, did neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the case did not require grant of leave. But it also failed to record reasons for refusal of such leave.
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12. We are of the view that at the stage of considering grant of leave under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., a prima facie case should be looked into by the High Court, of course, not ignoring the materials on record.”
22. On perusal of record we find that the learned trial Court has clearly discussed the educational documents of the victim in the shape of SR Register and found that the same were not worth belief and as per radiological report she was found major on the date of incident. We further find that the victim in her cross-examination has clearly stated that at the time of statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. police personnel has mounted pressure on her and on the behest of police officer he had recorded her statement. Before the trial court the victim had stated that accused Ram Sajeewan has done nothing wrong against her. She also admitted that to take the financial assistance from the Government she had given statement against the accused persons and accused also helped her by giving Rs. 35,000/-. Dr. Vineeta Rai PW-6 has stated that no sign of sexual violence was found on the person of the victim. Hymen was old, torn and healed. At the time of medical examination victim did not complain regarding commission of rape. There was delay in lodging of the FIR and no explanation was given. On close scrutiny, we also find that there is material change in the statement of the victim at different stages, therefore, the victim is not a sterling witness. In such view of the matter, we, therefore, find that the trail Court has taken possible view of the matter on appreciation of entire evidence on record, which cannot be substituted by this Court taking a different view as per the law discussed above.
23. Accordingly, it is not a case worth granting leave to appeal. The application for granting leave to appeal is rejected.
Re: Government Appeal
1. Consequently, since the Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal) has been rejected by order of date, the present government appeal is also dismissed.
(Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.) (Abdul Moin,J.)
July 07, 2026
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