Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of H.P vs Arjun Singh on 7 July, 2026
2026:HHC:26988
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 495 of 2011
Reserved on: 20.06.2026
.
Date of Decision: 07.7.2026.
State of H.P. ...Appellant
Versus
of
Arjun Singh ...Respondent
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
For the respondent : Mr Kulwant Chauhan, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 23.03.2011, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi,
District Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the
judgment of conviction dated 21.12.2006 and order of sentence
dated 27.12.2006, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate,
First Class, Court No. II, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (learned
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
2
2026:HHC:26988
Trial Court) were set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to
in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial
.
Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned
Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences
of
punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Udham
rt
Singh (PW-1) was posted as a conductor and Karam Chand (PW-
5) was posted as a driver with HRTC. Both of them were deputed
with the bus bearing registration No. HP-33-5410 on 24th
September, 2001. When the bus reached Pull Gharat, a tanker
bearing registration No. HR-37A-2035 came from the opposite
side at high speed. The tanker hit the bus on the wrong side. 10-
12 persons travelling in the bus were injured, and two persons
died in the accident. The bus was badly damaged in the accident.
The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of
the tanker. The matter was reported to the police, and the police
recorded an entry in the daily diary. K.D. Sharma (PW-18) went
to the spot and took the photographs (Ext.PW-18/A1 to Ext.PW-
18/A11), whose negatives are Ext.PW-18/A12 to Ext.PW-18/A22.
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
3
2026:HHC:26988
K.D. Sharma recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW-1/A)
and sent it to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-10/A) was
.
registered. K.D. Sharma (PW-18) investigated the matter. He
prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-18/B). He found the total width
of the metalled road to be 22 feet and 8 inches. The tanker
bearing registration No. HR-37A-2035 had hit the bus bearing
of
registration No. HP33-5410 on the wrong side of the road. K.D.
Sharma seized the bus and tanker vide memos (Ext. PW-3/A and
rt
Ext.PW-18/C). Mohan Singh (PW-7) mechanically examined the
vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in them
that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports
(Ext.PW-7/A and Ext.PW-7/B). Dr Sunil Thakur (PW-8)
examined Dharam Pal and Meena Devi and found that they had
sustained injuries that could have been caused in a motor
vehicle accident. He issued MLCs (Ext.PW-8/A and Ext.PW-8/B).
Dr Harish Behl (PW-9) examined Karam Singh, Arjun Singh,
Jaswant, Khem and Kushal. He found that they had sustained
simple and grievous injuries. He issued MLCs (Ext.PW-9/A to
Ext.PW-9/C and Ext.PW-9/E). Harish Kumar also examined
Kushal Kumar and found that he had sustained simple injuries
that could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
4
2026:HHC:26988
issued the MLC (Ext.PW-9/D). Dr Anuradha Sharma (PW-10)
examined Sita and found that she had sustained injuries that
.
could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. She issued
MLC (Ext.PW-10/A). Dr Jiwa Nand (PW-11), examined Kehar
Singh and found that he had sustained simple and grievous
injuries. He issued MLC (Ext.PW-11/A). Dr K.S. Malhotra (PW-
of
15) conducted the post-mortem examination of Rudar Mani and
found that he had died due to poly-trauma to internal organs,
rt
which could have been caused within 5 to 6 hours in a motor
vehicle accident. He issued a post-mortem report (Ext.PW-8/A).
He also conducted a post-mortem examination of Punn Ram
and found that he had died due to multiple injuries leading to
shock. He issued the post-mortem report (Ext.PW-8/B). Rakesh
Sharma (PW-9) went through the X-rays of Meena Devi, Karam
Chand, Arjun Singh, Sita, Jaswant Singh, Kushal Kumar, Khem
Singh, Kehar Singh and the CT scan of Arjun Singh. The
statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and
after the completion of the investigation, the challan was
prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
5
2026:HHC:26988
accusation was put to him for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the IPC, to
.
which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined nineteen witnesses to
prove its case. Udham Singh (PW1), the informant, was a
conductor in the HRTC bus. Dharam Pal (PW-2) did not support
of
the prosecution’s case. Suresh Chand (PW-3) and Kehar Singh
(PW-14) witnessed the recoveries. Kehar Singh (PW-4), Chattar
rt
Singh (PW-6), and Khem Singh (PW-12) were travelling in the
bus. Karam Chand (PW-5) was driving the bus. Mohan Singh
Thakur (PW-7) mechanically examined the vehicles. Dr Sunil
Thakur (PW-8), Dr Harish Behl (PW-9), Dr Anuradha Sharma
(PW-10) and Dr Jiwa Nand (PW-11) examined the injured. Om
Parkash (PW-13) filed an application for the post-mortem
examination of Rudar Mani and Punn Ram. Dr. K.S.Malhotra
(PW-15) conducted the post-mortem examination. Dr Rakesh
Sharma (PW-9) went through the X-rays. ASI Ghanshyam (PW-
16) signed the F.I.R. Bhikem Singh (PW-10), sic, proved the entry
in the daily diary. K.D. Sharma (PW-18) investigated the matter.
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
6
2026:HHC:26988
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the
.
prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that one car was
moving behind the HRTC bus, which overtook the bus. He
turned the tanker towards the right side to avoid the accident.
He could not turn the tanker towards the left because there was
of
a hill on the left side of the tanker. He examined Paramjeet
Singh (DW-1) to prove his defence.
6.
rt
Learned Trial Court held that the accused had not
disputed that he was driving a tanker, which had met with an
accident. His defence was that he had turned the tanker to avoid
a collision with the Maruti car overtaking the bus. This defence
was not proved on record. There was no Maruti car on the spot,
which falsified the defence taken by the accused. The tanker was
taken towards the right side without any justification, and the
accused was negligent. Hence, the Learned Trial Court convicted
and sentenced the accused as under: –
Section(s) Sentences
279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo
simple imprisonment for two months, pay a
fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
7
2026:HHC:26988
the fine, to further undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of 15 days.
337 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo
.
simple imprisonment for three months, pay
a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of
fine, to further undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of 15 days.
338 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo
simple imprisonment for three months, pay
a fine of ₹1000/- and, in default of payment
of
of the fine, to further undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of 30 days.
304-A rt The accused was sentenced to undergo
simple imprisonment for six months, pay a
fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of
fine, to further undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of 30 days.
It was ordered that all the aforesaid substantive sentences shall run
concurrently.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was
decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi,
H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court held that the
plea taken by the accused that he had turned the tanker to avoid
the collision with the Maruti car appeared to be highly probable.
There were skid marks behind the bus, suggesting that the bus
was being driven at a high speed. The tanker was loaded and
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
8
2026:HHC:26988
could not have been driven at a high speed. When two versions
appeared on record, the version in favour of the accused had to
.
be preferred to the version in favour of the prosecution. Hence,
the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the
judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the
of
learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal
asserting that the learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate
rt
the prosecution evidence in its proper perspective. The
testimonies of prosecution witnesses were discarded for
untenable reasons. The eyewitnesses clearly proved that the
accused was driving the tanker in a rash and negligent manner
at a high speed, which led to the accident. The bus was towards
its extreme left side, and the accused had taken the tanker
towards his right side, which led to the accident. The defence
version that a Maruti car had tried to overtake an HRTC bus was
not proved on record, and the Learned Appellate Court erred in
accepting this version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the Learned
Appellate Court be set aside.
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
9
2026:HHC:26988
9. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy
Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Kulwant
.
Chauhan, and learned counsel for the respondent/accused.
10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate
Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by
of
the learned Trial Court. It was duly proved on record that the
accused had taken the tanker towards the right side of the road.
rt
Even if the version of the accused is accepted to be correct, that
he was trying to save the Maruti Car, he could have applied the
brakes and could not have put the passengers of the bus in
danger by swerving the tanker. The tanker was taken towards
the right side of the road, which is a violation of the Rules of the
Road Regulations. The Appellate Court failed to advert to the
Rules of Road Regulations and erred in acquitting the accused.
Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the
judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.
11. Mr Kulwant Chauhan, learned counsel for the
respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Appellate Court
had rightly held that when two versions are appearing on record,
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
10
2026:HHC:26988
the version in favour of the accused has to be preferred. The
defence version was duly proved by the testimony of Paramjeet
.
Singh (DW-1), and the learned Appellate Court had rightly
accepted his testimony. Learned Appellate Court had taken the
reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the
reasonable view of the Court while deciding an appeal against
of
acquittal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be
dismissed.
12. I
rt
have given a considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment
of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of
acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of
evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no
reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on
the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed
on page 438:
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
11
2026:HHC:26988
“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position
that the interference with the finding of acquittal
recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by
the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers.
from patent perversity; that the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material evidence on
record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is
possible from the evidence available on record.
14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v.
of
Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was
observed:
rt
21. We may note that the present appeal is one against
acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgmentsof this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless
the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the
record and the only possible view based on the evidence is
consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such anevent, should the appellate Court interfere with a
judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e.,
one consistent with the acquittal and the other holdingthe accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to
interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in thisregard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the
cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of
Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State ofKarnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of
Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471.
15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
16. Learned Trial court had rightly pointed out that the
facts in the present case were not in dispute. The accused did not
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
12
2026:HHC:26988
dispute in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the
Cr.P.C, that he was driving the tanker at the time of the accident
.
and that the tanker had left its side and swerved towards the
right side. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon
of
the statement of the accused recorded under section 313 of the
Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742:
rt
“51. That brings us to the question of whether such a
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code canconstitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is
administered to the accused, the statements made by the
accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why
sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not renderhimself liable to punishment if he gives false answers.
Then comes sub-section (4), which reads:
“313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken
into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in
evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, ortrial for, any other offence which such answers may tend
to show he has committed.”
Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his
examination under Section 313 can be taken into
consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is
clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section.
Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4)
permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said
inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari
(1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This Court,
in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. 1951
SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
13
2026:HHC:26988
answer given by an accused under Section 313
examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as
the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain
Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730,
.
this Court held that if the accused confesses to the
commission of the offence with which he is charged, the
Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to
convict him. To state the exact language in which the
three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be
advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at
pages 684-685:
of
“Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by
the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court
may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the
witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and
rt
before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put
questions to the accused person for the purpose ofenabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in
the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342
is primarily to be directed to those matters on which
evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertainfrom the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the
incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge
and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given bythe accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the
enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examinationunder Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence
charged against him the court may, relying upon that
confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does notconfess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the
evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to
explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no
offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken
into consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied)
Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section
(1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now
stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added
thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
14
2026:HHC:26988presence of the accused is dispensed with, his
examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with.
Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-
section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds
.
to the old sub-section (2) except for the change
necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury
system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are
concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-
section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply
with equal force.”
17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
of
Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri)
1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the
rt
accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to
the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot
form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244:
27. The statement made in defence by the accused under
Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend
credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only apart of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of hisconviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the
statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either
be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible torely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the
exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the
evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State
of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58,
para 23)
“23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in
Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is
contradicted by the other evidence. According to this::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
15
2026:HHC:26988statement, the injury that the appellant received was
caused by the appellant’s attempt to catch hold of the hand
of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim.
This was contradicted by the statement of the accused
.
himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had
received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury
found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on
13-10-1961, negatives of both these versions. Neither of
these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led
to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro,
the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains
of
being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram
Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause
thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one as his clothes all
got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book,
rt
his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was
discovered on his person was found to have been stained
with blood according to the report of the Chemical
Examiner. According to the post-mortem report, this knife
could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In
circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject
the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit
6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory
part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to
the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible
for the crime.” (emphasis supplied)
18. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh,
(2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213,
that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so
far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him
for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: –
“52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to
put material evidence to the accused under Section 313
CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
16
2026:HHC:26988recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is
to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the
circumstances appearing against him as well as to put
forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he.
does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law
must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this
opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313
CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution,can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even
under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.”
19. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v.
of
State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC
OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused
rt
recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend
corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was
held at page 761: –
24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement,
if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various
witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuriesby the firing by the accused and his associates, that
admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot bebrushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v.
Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held
that since no oath is administered to the accused, the
statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC
will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of
course, shall not render himself liable to punishment
merely on the basis of answers given while he was being
examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4)
says that the answers given by the accused in response to
his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into
consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court in
Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
17
2026:HHC:26988
SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933 held that the
answers given by the accused under Section 313
examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as
the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain
.
Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678,
this Court held that when the accused confesses to the
commission of the offence with which he is charged, the
court may rely upon the confession and proceed to
convict him.
25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC
236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27)
of
“27. The statement made in defence by the accused
under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of
to lend credence to the evidence led by the
prosecution, but only a part of such statement
rt under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole
basis of his conviction.”
In this connection, reference may also be made to the
judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v.
Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185
and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467:
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions
would indicate that the statement of the accused under
Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt orconfession as such cannot be made the sole basis for
finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is notmaking the statement on oath, but all the same the
confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of
evidence since the same lends credence to the evidenceled by the prosecution.
26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by
the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully
corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence
the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved,
and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found
him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and
302 read with Section 34 IPC.”
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
18
2026:HHC:26988
20. Therefore, the statement of the accused recorded
under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C corroborates the testimonies of
.
the prosecution witnesses that the accused was driving the
tanker and the tanker was taken towards the right side.
21. Paramjeet Singh (DW-1) stated that he was going to
Sunder Nagar on 24.09.2001. A car tried to overtake an HRTC
of
bus. There was a slight gap between the bus and the tanker.
When the car tried to overtake the HRTC bus, the driver of the
rt
tanker swerved the tanker towards its right side. The bus and the
tanker collided with each other. The tanker would have hit the
car had it not swerved. There was a deep gorge towards the left
side, and it was not possible to take the tanker towards the left
side. The tanker was being driven at a slow speed. He stated in
his cross-examination that he could not produce any document
to show that he was going towards Sunder Nagar. The police had
arrived in his presence. He admitted that the road was wide and
the accident occurred on a National Highway.
22. He claimed that the police had reached the spot in
his presence; however, he did not make any statement to the
police describing the accident, which is highly unusual. Learned
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
19
2026:HHC:26988
Trial Court had rightly noticed that the car would have been
present on the spot had the car tried to overtake the HRTC bus.
.
However, no car was found on the spot, which falsifies the
defence version that the car had tried to overtake the HRTC bus.
23. The defence version shows that the accused had
tried to take the benefit of Section 81 of the IPC. This benefit is
of
not available to the accused. It was laid down by the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Kutcharlapati Krishnam Raju vs. State of
rt
H.P. 2003(2) APLJ 469 (HC) that Section 81 of IPC applies where a
smaller harm is caused while trying to protect a major harm. It
was observed:
“10. Now, coming to the contention of the learned
counsel that the facts and circumstances attract the
provisions under Section 81 of the IPC, it is necessary tohave a look at the above provisions, which read thus:
Section 81: Act likely to cause harm but done
without criminal intent and to prevent other harm-
Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being
done with the knowledge that it is likely to causeharm, if it be done without any criminal intention
to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of
preventing or avoiding other harm to person or
property. Explanation – It is a question of fact in
such a case whether the harm to be prevented or
avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to
justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the
knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
20
2026:HHC:26988
Illustrations (a) A, the captain of a steam vessel,
suddenly and without any fault or negligence o his
part, finds himself in such a position that, before he
can stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down a.
boat B, with twenty or thirty passengers onboard,
unless he changes the course of his vessel, and that,
by changing his course, he must incur risk of
running down a boat (c) with only two passengerson board, which he may possible clear. Here, if A
alters his course without any intention to run down
the boat C and in good faith for the purpose ofof
avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B,
he is not guilty of an offence, though he may
rundown the boat C by doing an act which he knew
rt was likely to cause that effect, if it be sound as a
matter of fact that the danger which he intended to
a void was such as to excuse him in incurring the
risk of running down C.B) A, in a great fire, pulls down houses in order to
prevent the conflagration from spreading. He does
this with the intention in good faith of savinghuman life or property. Here, if it be found that the
harm to be prevented was of such nature and so
imminent as to excuse A’s act, A is not guilty of theoffence.
It recognises the doctrine of self-preservation. It gives
legislative sanction to the doctrine of salvage common in
the law of all nations. In fact, it is a doctrine of necessity
which has, since the sacrifice of Iphigenia, found ready
recognition in all mundane transactions. It sanctions
doing evil so that good may come. It permits the infliction
of a lesser evil to avert a greater evil. The only thing that is
required is that the act done should be without criminal
intention. The Supreme Court in BASDEO v. STATE OF
PEPSU made a distinction between intention and
knowledge and observed that motive is something which
prompts a man to form an intention. Intention is a state
of mind consisting of the desire that certain consequences
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
21
2026:HHC:26988
shall follow from the party’s physical act. The distinction
between motive, intention and knowledge can be stated in
the language of the Supreme Court in Baseo’s case (supra
3) as follows. Motive is something which prompts a man
.
to form an intention, and knowledge is an awareness of
the consequences of the act. In many cases, intention and
knowledge merge into each other and mean the same
thing more or less, and intention can be presumed from
knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and
intention is no doubt thin, but it is not difficult to perceive
that they connote different things.
of
11. In Dr Hari Singh Gour’s Penal Law of India, 11th Edition
Volume No. 1, at note 9, page No. 606, it was stated as
under:
As has already been remarked, this section is
rt grounded on the wide doctrine of necessity. It is the
universal law that all good involves someexpectancy of an abundant harvest, which is
probably appealing to the same law of necessity
that led Agamemnon to make the sacrifice of
Iphigenia. The captain who capsizes a boat to savehis own, a person who dismantles houses to arrest
the progress of fire, appeals to the same law of
necessity as those who deal blow for blow, or eventake away another’s life to save their own.
Necessity vincit legem. How far the IndianLegislature has thought fit to sanction this doctrine
will be manifested from this section. It places no
limit on the extent of the injury that may be caused,and the question may be whether this injury may
extend to the slaughter of a fellow being to assuage
hunger. Such a question arose in England, and it
forms the leading case on the point. It laid down
that the law does not recognise in man the absolute
necessity of preserving his life and that, as regards
morality, it recognises the duty of sacrificing it for
the sake of saving another life. It is further
admitted that there was in this case no such excuse::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
22
2026:HHC:26988unless the killing was justified by what has been
called necessity. But the temptation to the act
which existed there was not what the law has ever
called necessity, nor is it to be regretted. It was also.
observed in the said case that to preserve one’s life
is generally speaking a duty, but it may be the
plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it. War is full
of instances in which it is a man’s duty not to livebut to die. The duty in the case of a shipwreck, of a
captain to his crew, of the crew to the passengers,
of soldiers to women and children. These dutiesof
impose on men the moral necessity not of the
preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for
others.
12. The illustrations under Section 81 IPC also make it
rt
clear that to avoid major harm, a minor harm can be
caused without any intention. The accused is entitled to
invoke the principle laid down under the maxim ‘vincit
legem’, which has been met with approval under Section
81 IPC. This aspect has not been considered or adverted to
by both the Courts below. In that view of the matter, this
Court is inclined to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for
consideration of the above aspect. In the instant case, the
petitioner-accused gave dash to the stationary vehicle
while preventing a head-on collision between his vehicle
and the vehicle coming in the opposite direction. Had
there been a collision, it would have caused more damage
and loss of lives. Further, nobody expects a vehicle to be
stationed on the road itself. As already stated, there may
be an error of judgment as he has been driving the vehicle
at speed, which is not prohibited on a national highway,
and the speed of the vehicle is not specified or limited
under any statute.”
24. In the present case, even if the plea of the accused is
accepted as correct that he was trying to save the occupants of
the car, he put the occupants of the bus in danger, who were
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
23
2026:HHC:26988
more in number than the occupants of the car. Therefore, the
accused cannot claim the benefit of Section 81 of the IPC.
.
25. The site plan shows that the tanker was being driven
towards the right side of the road. 3 feet 2 inches of space was
available towards the left side of the bus, and 15 feet of space was
available towards the left side of the tanker. The photographs
of
(Ext.PW-18/A1 and Ext.PW-18/A9) show that a huge space is
available towards the left side of the tanker. Thus, the
rt
prosecution’s version that the accused had left its side and had
driven the tanker towards the right side of the road was duly
proved.
26. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the
Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic.
Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle
as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall
allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction
to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs.
State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side
of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed:
“The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space
of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:26988on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10
feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car
was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was
coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side.
.
The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there
was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus
could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled
on the left side of the road.”
27. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar
2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right
of
side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed:
“The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point ‘A
rt
on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks
and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point ‘E’ is theplace where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of
the accident, and point ‘G’ is the place where P.W. 3 Anil
Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur
to Nadaun. The point ‘A’ in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A isalmost on the extreme right side of the road.”
28. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti
Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held:
“16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined
in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court.
In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. Thewidth of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches.
On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there
was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was
an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was
about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the
Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road.
This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-
6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he
was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
25
2026:HHC:26988always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions
Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that
nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong
side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the.
witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left
side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the
opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to
conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme rightside of the road and therefore on the wrong side.”
29. In the present case, the accused had breached the
of
Rules of the Road Regulations, which led to the accident, and the
learned trial court had rightly held that the accused was
rt
negligently driving the tanker.
30. The site plan shows 17 feet of skid marks behind the
tanker, which shows that the tanker was being driven at a high
speed and the accused was unable to bring it to a halt even after
applying the brakes. It was laid down by this Court in State of
H.P. versus Dinesh Kumar, 2008 Cr. L.J 2024, the skid marks of 74
feet on the road indicated that the vehicle was being driven at a
high speed, and the accused could not control it, which amounts
to the negligence of the accused. It was observed:
10. Once again reverting to the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A,
the skid marks on the road were 74 feet in length. For the
vehicle going from Hamirpur to the Nadaun side point ‘A’
shown in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is on the extreme
right side. It is not the case that the accident took place on
the left side of the road for a vehicle going from Hamirpur::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
26
2026:HHC:26988to Nadaun, or even in the middle of the road. The skid
marks of 74 feet on the road are clear to show that the
jeep was being driven at high speed. The respondent could
not control the jeep due to his rash or negligent driving.
and high speed, and the jeep went from the left side to the
right side and crushed the girl at point ‘A’.”
31. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held
that the accused was negligently driving the tanker, which led to
the accident.
of
32. Learned Appellate Court had also held that the bus
had the skid marks of 72 feet, which showed that the bus was
rt
being driven at a high speed. This finding will not help the
accused. The high speed of the bus did not contribute to the
accident. Had the tanker been driven towards its own side, the
accident would not have occurred. Thus, the proximate cause of
the accident was driving the tanker towards the right side and
not driving the bus at a high speed. The judgment cited by the
learned Appellate Court in State of H.P. vs. Kalam Singh 1994(2)
S.L.J. 1254 will not help the accused because the high speed was
not the proximate cause of the accident in the present case.
33. Learned Appellate court held that when two versions
appear on record, the version in favour of the accused has to be
preferred to the version in favour of the prosecution. There can
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
27
2026:HHC:26988
be no dispute with this proposition of law. However, in the
present case, even if the version propounded by the accused is
.
accepted as correct, it is not in favour of the accused because it
does not provide any defence to the accused. Learned Appellate
Court had not even noticed the Rules of the Road Regulations,
1989, and provisions of Section 81 of IPC and erred in recording
of
the acquittal. Had the provisions of Section 81 of the IPC and
Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, been followed, it would not
rt
have fallen into the error of acquitting the accused.
34. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court erred in
reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned
Trial Court, and the judgment of the Appellate Court cannot be
sustained.
35. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the convict to
undergo simple imprisonment for two months for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC,
three months for the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 337 of IPC and 338 of IPC each and six months for
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A
of IPC. Learned Trial Court had taken a very lenient view
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
28
2026:HHC:26988
considering the number of persons injured, the injuries
sustained by them, and the number of dead persons.
.
36. Therefore, in view of the above, the present appeal is
allowed. Judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court in
Criminal appeal No.1 of 2007, decided on 23.03.2011, is ordered
to be set aside, while the judgment and order passed by the
of
learned Trial Court in Police Challan No. 3-I/2002/3-II/2002,
passed on 21.12.2006 and 27.12.2026, respectively, are ordered to
rt
be restored. The respondent shall surrender before the Learned
Trial Court within a period of 30 days in case no stay order is
granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and in case of appeal, the
same shall be dealt with as per the order passed by the Learned
Supreme Court.
37. The present appeal stands disposed of in the
aforesaid terms, and so also the pending applications, if any.
38. The records of the learned Courts below be returned
forthwith along with a copy of this judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
07th July, 2026
(ravinder)
::: Downloaded on – 07/07/2026 20:41:15 :::CIS
