Gujarat High Court
State Of Gujarat vs Mepabhai @ Nepabhai Bhimabhai Bharwad on 9 July, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/2222/2010 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2222 of 2010
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
No
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STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
MEPABHAI @ NEPABHAI BHIMABHAI BHARWAD & ORS.
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Appearance:
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Appellant(s) No. 1
MR DEEPAK VIGORE FOR MR MM TIRMIZI(1117) for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2
NOTICE SERVED for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 09/07/2026
JUDGMENT
1. At the outset it is required to be noted that respondent No.
1, Mepabhai @ Nepabhai Bhimabhai Bharwad, expired on or
about 16.09.2020. The notice issued to respondent No. 1 was
returned with an endorsement stating that the respondent
had expired and, therefore, the notice could not be served.
Accordingly, the proceedings qua respondent No. 1 stand
abated. As regards respondent No. 3, the original
complainant, although notice was duly issued and served,
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respondent No. 3 has chosen not to remain present before this
Court.
2. The appellant- State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal
under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 against the judgment and order of acquittal dated
24.09.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Special Judge, Anand (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial
Court”) in Special Atrocity Case No.14 of 2008 whereby the
learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondents accused
from the charges under Sections 504, 506(2) and Section 114
of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as the
“IPC“) r/w the provision of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 (hereinafter be referred to as the “Atrocity Act”)
and under Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. However,
accused No.2 was convicted for the offence punishable under
Section 135 of Gujarat Police Act vis a vis accused Nos. 1 and
2 both were convicted for the offence punishable under
Section 323 and 114 of IPC.
3. As per the prosecution case, on 24.01.2006 at about 2:00
p.m., the complainant, Fulabhai Valabhai Parmar, who
belongs to a Scheduled Caste, stated that his nephew,
Pravinbhai Karsanbhai, owned an agricultural field situated in
the Gegadiya area of Rohini village. At the time of the
incident, a wheat crop was standing in the field. It is alleged
that the accused had allowed their cows and buffaloes to
graze in the said field. When Pravinbhai Karsanbhai objected
and asked them to remove the cattle, accused No.1 became
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enraged, abused him in filthy language.
3.1 It is further alleged that accused No.2, acting at the
instigation of accused No.1, came armed with a wooden stick
fitted with an iron ring and struck Pravinbhai below his right
knee. Thereafter, accused No.1 exhorted accused No.2 by
saying, “Hit him on the head.” Acting on such instigation,
accused No.2 attempted to strike Pravinbhai on the head.
However, Pravinbhai raised his hand to protect himself, as a
result of which the blow landed near the elbow of his right
hand.
3.2 On hearing the commotion, the complainant and another
witness rushed to the spot and intervened, separating the
parties.
3.3 The complainant thereafter lodged a complaint against the
accused for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 504,
506(2) read with Section 114 of the IPC, Section 3(1)(x) of the
Atrocity Act, and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. The
PSO registered the offence, made the necessary entry in the
Station Diary, and issued a medical memo for the injured
Pravinbhai, who was sent to the hospital for treatment. The
superior officers were informed through a VHF message, and
the requisite report regarding the offence was submitted.
3.4 Since the offence was punishable under the Atrocities Act,
the investigation was entrusted to Shri Ramsingh
Dalsinghbhai Chaudhary, Deputy Superintendent of Police
(Dy.S.P.). He took over the investigation, visited the place of
occurrence, and prepared the scene of offence panchnama in
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the presence of two panch witnesses. He recorded the
supplementary statement of the complainant and the
statements of the relevant witnesses.
3.5 Upon completion of the investigation and finding sufficient
evidence against the accused, a charge-sheet was filed before
the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Khambhat.
Thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions
and was registered as Special (Atrocity) Case No. 14 of 2008.
To proved its case the prosecution examined 10 witnesses and
produced 15 documentary evidences.
3.6 After closure of prosecution evidence the statement of the
accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. were recorded. The
accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Upon
conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, passed the
judgment and order dated 24.09.2010 in Special Atrocity Case
No.14 of 2006 whereby the trial Court has acquitted the
respondents accused from the charges under Sections 504,
506(2) and Section 114 of the IPC r/w the provision of
Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act and under Section 135 of
the G.P. Act. However, accused No.2 was convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 135 of Gujarat Police Act vis
a vis accused Nos. 1 and 2 both were convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 323 and 114 of IPC.
3.7 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order, so far as it relates to acquittal of the
accused persons, the State has preferred the present appeal.
4. Heard Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the appellant and
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Mr.Deepak Vigore, learned counsel for Mr. Tirmizi, learned
counsel for the respondents accused.
5. Learned APP for the appellant has submitted that the
judgment and order of acquittal dated 24.09.2010 is contrary
to law, the evidence on record, and the settled principles
governing criminal trials. She has submitted that the learned
Trial Court failed to appreciate that the prosecution proved its
case beyond reasonable doubt through reliable oral and
documentary evidence.
5.1 Learned APP for the appellant has submitted the
prosecution examined 10 witnesses and produced 15
documentary exhibits however, the learned Trial Court failed
to properly appreciate this evidence in its true perspective.
She has submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in
holding that the prosecution failed to prove the offences under
Sections 504, 506(2) and Section 114 of the IPC and under
Section 135 of the G.P. Act, despite consistent evidence of
assault, abuse and criminal intimidation.
5.2 Learned APP for the appellant has submitted learned Trial
Court further erred in acquitting the accused of the offence
under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act, despite clear
evidence that the accused intentionally insulted the
complainant by referring to his caste in public view.
5.3 Learned APP for the appellant has submitted the evidence
of the complainant (Exh.16), injured witness (Exh.29),
eyewitnesses, the doctor (Exh.35), and the Investigating
Officer, along with the FIR (Exh.17), medical certificate, caste
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certificate, panchnamas and other documentary evidence,
fully corroborated the prosecution case, however, the learned
Trial Court wrongly discarded this evidence. She has
submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to apply the
settled principles of law and misapplied the judgments relied
upon, resulting in a perverse and illegal acquittal.
5.4 Learned APP for the appellant has submitted the learned
Trial Court ignored material documentary evidence, including
the complaint, panchnamas, station diary, medical records
and caste certificate, all of which supported the prosecution
case. She has submitted that the recovery of the muddamal
weapon and the medical evidence clearly established the
prosecution case, yet the learned Trial Court failed to give due
weight to these circumstances.
5.5 Learned APP for the appellant has submitted the acquittal
has resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice and therefore,
the impugned judgment and order is illegal, improper and
contrary to the evidence on record, and therefore deserves to
be quashed and set aside
6. On the other hand learned advocate for the respondents
accused has supported the judgment and order of the Trial
Court. The learned advocate appearing for the respondents-
accused submitted that the impugned judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is just, legal, and
proper and does not call for any interference by this Hon’ble
Court. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court has
rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence
available on record and has recorded findings based on
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proper appreciation of facts and settled principles of law.
6.1 Learned advocate for the respondents accused has further
submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish its case
beyond reasonable doubt.
6.2 Learned advocate for the respondents accused has
submitted that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt as mere examination of witnesses and
production of documentary evidence do not establish the guilt
of the accused unless the evidence is reliable and inspires
confidence.
6.3 Learned advocate for the respondents accused has
submitted that the evidence of the complainant, injured
witness and other prosecution witnesses suffers from material
omissions, contradictions and inconsistencies. The learned
Trial Court has rightly found their testimony unreliable.
6.4 Learned advocate for the respondents accused has
submitted that the medical evidence, documentary evidence
and alleged recovery do not conclusively connect the
respondents-accused with the alleged offences and do not
sufficiently corroborate the prosecution case and therefore,
the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence in
the light of the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence
and has rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the
respondents-accused. He has submitted that an order of
acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence in favour
of the accused and unless the findings of the learned Trial
Court are perverse or wholly unreasonable, the appellate
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court should not interfere with the acquittal.
6.5 Learned advocate for the respondents accused has
submitted that the prosecution has failed to point out any
perversity, illegality or misreading of evidence in the
impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court and the appeal
is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.
7. I have perused the relevant documents and material
placed on record. I have also gone through the judgment and
order passed by the Trial Court as well as the record and
proceedings.
8. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order, as
well as the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for
both sides, the issues that arises for consideration before this
Court are as under:-
Whether the learned Trial Court committed any error in
believing the case of the prosecution insofar as the
offence punishable under Section 323 and 114 of the IPC
is concerned, while disbelieving the prosecution case
with respect to the remaining charges?
Whether the learned Trial Court, while appreciating the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, has committed
any error of law or fact?
Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
suffers from any illegality or perversity?
9. Before dealing with the aforesaid issues, it would be
appropriate to examine the facts of the case as they emerged
before the learned Trial Court.
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10. That on 24.01.2006, at about 14:00 hours, the
complainant, along with one Rameshbhai, had gone to his
agricultural field for the purpose of irrigating the wheat crop.
At that time, the cattle belonging to the respondents-accused
entered the complainant’s field, which led to an altercation
between the parties. At that time, one witness, namely
Pravinbhai, intervened in an attempt to rescue the
complainant. That accused No.2, acting at the instigation of
accused No.1, came armed with a wooden stick fitted with an
iron ring and struck Pravinbhai below his right knee.
Thereafter, accused No.1 exhorted accused No.2 by saying,
“Hit him on the head.” Acting on such instigation, accused
No.2 attempted to strike Pravinbhai on the head. However,
Pravinbhai raised his hand to protect himself, as a result of
which the blow landed near the elbow of his right hand. The
complainant thereafter lodged the First Information Report
with Kambhat Rural Police Station.
11. Upon completion of the investigation, the Investigating
Officer filed a charge-sheet against the respondent-accused
for the aforesaid offences.
12. After considering the submissions advanced by the
learned advocates for both sides and upon appreciation of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned Trial Court
passed the impugned judgment and order, whereby
Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were convicted for the offences
punishable under Sections 323 and 114 of the Indian Penal
Code and respondent No.2 was convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. The
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learned Trial Court sentenced each of the respondents to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of four months and
to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of fine, each of
them was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a
further period of 10 days. However, the respondent-accused
were acquitted of the remaining charges.
13. It appears that the respondent-accused were convicted for
the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 114 of the
Indian Penal Code. However, it is not borne out from the
record whether the said order of conviction has been
challenged by the respondent-accused.
14. Now, adverting to the facts as borne out from the record,
and more particularly from the evidence of PW-1, Fulabhai
Valabhai Parmar (Exhibit 16), the complainant has deposed
that the injured, Praveenbhai, is his nephew. According to the
complainant, when he reached his agricultural field, his
nephew, Praveenbhai, along with one Rameshbhai, had also
come to the field for the purpose of irrigating the wheat crop.
At that time, the respondent-accused, along with their cattle,
entered the complainant’s field, which led to a quarrel
between the parties. During the course of the incident,
Respondent No. 2 is alleged to have inflicted a stick blow on
the hand of the injured, Praveenbhai.
15. From his evidence, it emerges that the complainant was
carrying a dhariya in his hand and was attempting to drive the
cattle out of his agricultural field. During the course of doing
so, he is stated to have struck a calf with the dhariya, as a
result of which the calf sustained injuries and fell down at the
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spot. It further appears that, during this period, a scuffle
ensued between the respondent-accused and the injured,
Praveenbhai.
16. The complainant has also attempted to improve his
version by deposing that the respondent-accused inflicted a
blow on the leg of Praveenbhai, resulting in a fracture.
However, this version is wholly inconsistent with the medical
evidence on record. The prosecution examined Dr. Kiranbhai
Patel as PW-7 (Exhibit 35). In his deposition, the Medical
Officer has categorically stated that, upon examination of the
injured, he found only one injury (CLW) measuring 1 cm × 1
cm on the right elbow. Except for the said injury, no other
external injury was found on the body of Praveenbhai.
Significantly, no fracture injury was detected.
17. The Medical Officer has further deposed that he examined
the injured at about 3:00 p.m. and that the injured was
brought to the hospital by his relatives. It is also evident from
his testimony that, while recording the history, the injured did
not disclose the names of any of the assailants.
18. The evidence of the PSO, examined as PW-8 at Exhibit 42,
also assumes significance. The said witness has specifically
deposed that the First Information Report was registered at
about 6:00 p.m. and that, after registration of the FIR, the
injured was referred to the hospital along with the police yadi
at about 20:30 hours, i.e., 8:30 p.m. This evidence stands in
direct contradiction to the testimony of the Medical Officer,
who has stated that he examined the injured at about 3:00
p.m.
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19. Thus, a material contradiction emerges between the
ocular and medical evidence, as well as between the evidence
of the Medical Officer and that of the PSO regarding the time
at which the injured was medically examined. These
inconsistencies go to the root of the prosecution case and cast
a serious doubt on its credibility. In such circumstances, this
Court is of the considered opinion that even the conviction of
the respondent-accused for the offence punishable under
Section 323 of the IPC cannot be sustained, as the same is not
supported by reliable and cogent evidence and is, therefore,
legally unsustainable.
20. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not inspire
confidence and cannot be said to be wholly reliable or
trustworthy. The prosecution case rests primarily upon the
testimony of interested witnesses, and no independent witness
has come forward to support the prosecution version. In such
circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
learned Trial Court was justified in disbelieving the
prosecution case with regard to the charges of which the
respondent-accused were acquitted.
21. However, the learned Trial Court partly accepted the
prosecution case and convicted the respondent-accused for
the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 114 of the
Indian Penal Code on the basis of the alleged injury sustained
by Praveenbhai. As discussed hereinabove, the prosecution
version regarding the alleged injuries stands falsified by the
evidence of the Medical Officer as well as that of the PSO. The
material contradictions between the ocular and medical
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evidence, coupled with the inconsistencies in the prosecution
case, render the conviction unsustainable.
22. So far as the charge under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities
Act is concerned, the learned Trial Court has rightly
disbelieved the prosecution case and recorded an order of
acquittal, and no infirmity or perversity is found in the said
finding.
23. It is appropriate to refer the decision of this Court in
case of State of Gujarat vs. Dajabhai Keshabhai Makwana
Thakore reported in 2024 GUJHC 68164 wherein this
Court has observed as under:-
“17. At this stage, it is also appropriate to take in to account the
observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shajan
Skaria vs. State of Kerala and another reported in AIR 2024
SC 4557 which read as under:-
“56. It is relevant to note that Section 3(1)(r) of the Act,
1989 is similarly worded as the erstwhile Section 3(1)(x) of
the Act, 1989 which was in force prior to its substitution
with effect from 26.01.2016.
58. We say so for the reason that all insults or intimidations
to a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe will
not amount to an offence under the Act, 1989 unless such
insult or intimidation is on the ground that the victim
belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. There is
nothing in the transcript of the uploaded video to indicate
even prime facie that those allegations were made by the
appellant only on account of the fact that the complainant
belongs to a Scheduled Caste. From the nature of the
allegations made by the appellant, it appears that he is at
inimical terms with the complainant. His intention may be to
malign or defame him but not on the ground or for the
reason that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste.
59. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a
three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hitesh
Verma (supra). The relevant observations are reproduced
below:
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“13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would
indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation
with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person
will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or
intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve
the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil
rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out
when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is
subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The
assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not
due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment.
Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in
accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family
members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that
Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court,
then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance
with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for
the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled
Caste.
xxx xxx xxx
17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State
of M.P. [Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763 :
2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104] , this Court held that in a case
for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that
the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be
enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that
there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed
by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to
Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under:
“15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such
so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act.
The offence must have been committed against the person
on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that
the deceased was belonging to “Khangar” Scheduled Caste
is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the
offence was committed only on the ground that the victim
was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the
conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.”
18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established
merely on the fact that the informant is a member of
Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a
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member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the
reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present
case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land.
The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who
claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a
Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act
is not made out.” (Emphasis supplied)
60. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is that the offence
under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established
merely on the fact that the complainant is a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless there is an
intention to humiliate such a member for the reason that he
belongs to such community. In other words, it is not the
purport of the Act, 1989 that every act of intentional insult
or intimidation meted by a person who is not a member of a
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who
belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would
attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is
committed against a person who happens to be a member of
a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the
contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where
the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that
the person who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe. We say so because the object
behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide
stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are
targeted towards persons belonging to the SC/ST
communities for the reason of their caste status.
a. Meaning of the expression “intent to humiliate” appearing
in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989
61. The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in
the text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably
linked to the caste identity of the person who is subjected to
intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional insult
or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will
result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation. It is only in
those cases where the intentional insult or intimidation
takes place either due to the prevailing practice of
untouchability or to reinforce the historically entrenched
ideas like the superiority of the “upper castes” over the
“lower castes/untouchables”, the notions of ‘purity’ and
‘pollution’, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or
intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989.
62. We would like to refer to the observations of this Court
in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra) to further elaborate upon
the idea of “humiliation” as it has been used under the Act,
1989. It was observed in the said case that the offences
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enumerated under the Act, 1989 belong to a separate
category as they arise from the practice of ‘untouchability’
and thus the Parliament was competent to enact special laws
treating such offences and offenders as belonging to a
separate category. Referring to the Statements of Objects
and Purposes of the Act, 1989 it was observed by this Court
that the object behind the introduction of the Act, 1989 was
to afford statutory protection to the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes, who were terrorised and subjected to
humiliation and indignations upon assertion of their civil
rights and resistance to the practice of untouchability. For
this reason, mere fact that the person subjected to insult or
intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe would not attract the offence under Section 3(1)
(r) unless it was the intention of the accused to subject the
concerned person to caste-based humiliation.
70. In our considered view, it is in a similar vein that the
term ‘humiliation’ as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act,
1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates
the infliction of humiliation against members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such
humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of
such members.
73. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra
Vaishya (supra) explained that for an act of intentional insult
to attract the offence under erstwhile Section 3(1)(x) of the
Act, 1989 (which is identical to Section 3(1)(r) of the Act,
1989) it was necessary that the insult is laced with casteist
remarks. Relevant observations is extracted hereinbelow:
“18. […]The legislative intent seems to be clear that every
insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not
amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act
unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at
the victim because of he being a member of a particular
Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot
(bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place
within public view, this would obviously constitute an act
intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or
offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to
a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per
se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless
such words are laced with casteist remarks. […]”
24. So far as the offence under Section 3(1)(x) Atrocities Act is
concerned, the alleged incident is stated to have taken place
in the agricultural field. The place of occurrence cannot be
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said to be a public place, nor has the prosecution established
that the alleged caste-related abuses were uttered in the
presence of members of the public or within public view. In
the absence of these essential ingredients, the learned Trial
Court has rightly disbelieved the prosecution case with regard
to the said charge.
25. Insofar as the conviction recorded by the learned Trial
Court under Sections 323 and 114 of the IPC is concerned,
this Court is of the view that the same is also legally
unsustainable. The evidence of the Medical Officer and the
PSO itself reveals material inconsistencies and creates serious
doubt about the prosecution case. The prosecution has failed
to adduce reliable, cogent, and trustworthy evidence to
establish the guilt of the respondent-accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
26. Whether the respondent-accused have challenged the
order of conviction is an altogether different aspect and does
not arise for consideration in the present proceedings.
27. Further, on perusal of the record of the appeal, it
transpires that the respondents-accused established
innocence before the learned Trial Court and that, after due
appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and
other material placed on record, the learned Trial Court has
rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are just,
proper and in accordance with the settled principles of law
and, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court.
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28. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate
Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.
29. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal
against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not
ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the
approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at
by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which
would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below.
However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by
the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on
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record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a
just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find
out whether the accused are connected with the commission
of the crime with which he is charged.
30. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly
paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-
affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State
of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general
principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph
No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex
Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 =
(2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with
the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the trial Court.
31. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20
and 21 as under:-
“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general
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principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs.
State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court
while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The
principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High
Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and
weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the
Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of
guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal
against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High
Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses
and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly
finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their
testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the
jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the
brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal,
resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing
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the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial
Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
32. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly
appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the
present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on
record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore,
the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record.
33. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it
clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any
error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record
and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled
against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it
clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal
is liable to be dismissed.
34. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of
merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is
dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond
stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the
concerned Trial Court forthwith.
Sd/-
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
SURESH SOLANKI
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