Karnataka High Court
Sri Jawahar Gopal vs Sri Vishal Baliga D on 23 July, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
WRIT PETITION NO.6857 OF 2026 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. JAWAHAR GOPAL
SON OF LATE GOPAL RAMANARAYAN,
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS,
RAMKRUPA, 6TH MAIN ROAD,
GANDHINAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 009
2. SMT. SHEELA GOPAL
WIFE OF GOPAL RAMANARAYAN,
AGED ABOUT 88 YEARS,
RAMKRUPA, 6TH MAIN ROAD,
GANDHINAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 009
REPRESENTED BY GPA HOLDER,
Digitally signed
by SUVARNA T MR. JAWAHAR GOPAL,
Location: HIGH
COURT OF AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
KARNATAKA
SENIOR CITIZEN BENEFITS NOT CLAIMED BY
BOTH PETITIONERS,
AT NO.21, 3RD FLOOR,
RAMAKRIPA, BENSON CROSS,
OPPOSITE MILLERS ROAD,
BENSON TOWN,
BENGALURU - 560 046
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. DHANANJAY JOSHI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. VACHAN H U., ADVOCATE)
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AND:
SRI. VISHAL BALIGA D
SON OF DINESH BALIGA,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.56/3,
MADHURI, BOREWELL ROAD,
BANGALORE NORTH, WHITEFIELD,
BANGALORE - 560 006
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. D.R.RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SMT. SWAMINI GANESH MOHANAMBAL, ADVOCATE)
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER DATED 26.02.2026 IN SUIT OS NO.1708 OF 2024
PASSED BY THE HON'BLE II ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE
AND JMFC, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT AT ANEKAL
ALLOWING I.A NO.VIII FILED BY THE RESPONDENT UNDER
SECTION 151 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
SEEKING DIRECTION TO THE WHITEFIELD POLICE TO ASSIST
THE RESPONDENT IN IMPLEMENTING THE INJUNCTION ORDER
PASSED BY THE TRIAL COURT (ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 17.07.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, THE COURT
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
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CAV ORDER
The present writ petition is filed being aggrieved by the
order dated 26.02.2026 passed on I.A.No.VIII in
O.S.No.1708/2024 by the II Additional Senior Civil Judge and
JMFC, Anekal, the petitioners/defendants are before this Court.
2. I.A. No.VIII was filed by the plaintiff under Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as
'CPC') praying for directions to the Station House Officer (SHO)
of Whitefield Police Station to assist the plaintiff in
implementing the injunction order passed by the trial Court on
I.A.Nos.I and II, which were subsequently affirmed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
3. The trial Court, by the impugned order, allowed the
application. While allowing the application, the trial Court
observed that the plaintiff, along with the application, produced
photographs disclosing that unauthorized persons had entered
the plaint 'B' schedule property and manhandled the plaintiff
and his family members. In the said photographs, it is seen
that the police also joined those elements. In many pictures,
police are seen moving inside the suit schedule property along
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with them. The trial Court clearly held that the plaintiff is in
possession of the 'B' schedule property and that the defendants
tried to encroach upon it. The learned counsel for the
defendants repeatedly submitted that the defendants are in
possession of the suit 'B' schedule property. This submission is
contrary to the clear findings of the Court. The learned counsel
further argued that the instant application is hit by the
principles of res judicata. However, the instant application is
filed for the implementation of an existing judicial order. If
Court orders are not implemented, the Court can direct the
jurisdictional police to ensure implementation. The trial Court,
while passing orders on I.A. Nos.I and II, made clear
observations regarding the police report, the conduct of the
police, and the illegal acts of the defendants and their goonda
elements. The trial Court noted that the defendants, without
respecting the rule of law or the orders of the Court, are
repeatedly interfering, and their behaviour is not condonable.
The points urged by the counsel for the defendants in his
arguments have no force and holds no water. Orders of the
Court cannot merely remain on paper; it is the duty of the
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Court to enforce them. Consequently, the trial Court issued
directions to the SHO of Whitefield Police Station to implement
the orders passed on 02.06.2025, to remove any obstruction
placed by the defendants in the plaint 'B' schedule property and
held that the office is directed to issue further directions to the
SHO. If SHO failed to implement the orders, strict and stringent
actions will be recommended.
4. When the matter came up for preliminary hearing
before a Co-ordinate bench of this Court on 27.02.2026,
emergent notice was issued to the respondent, returnable by
02.04.2026. The parties were directed to maintain status quo in
relation to the petition schedule 'A' and 'B' properties, with
liberty reserved to the respondent to seek vacation or
modification of the order.
5. Learned Senior Counsel representing the learned
counsel for the petitioners/defendants submits that the plaintiff
had previously sought police protection and had also
approached this Court by filing a writ petition. It is argued that
in light of the two earlier petitions seeking police protection, the
present application is barred by res judicata, and the trial Court
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had failed to consider the same. It is further argued that the
defendant is in actual possession of the property, and police aid
cannot be utilized as a means to dispossess him or deliver
possession to the plaintiff. The learned Senior counsel contends
that if the plaintiff alleges dispossession, the only remedy
available is to institute a suit under Section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, rather than invoking police machinery. It is
submitted that the plaintiff's grandmother purchased the suit
Schedule 'B' property, measuring 2 acres 6 guntas in
Sy.No.56/3, Nelluruhalli, K.R.Pura Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk
and executed an Agreement of Sale dated 19.01.1995 to sell
the property to defendant No.2 by executing a General Power
of Attorney in his favour. The plaintiff's father and mother
signed as witnesses in the General Power of Attorney. The
plaintiff's uncle had filed O.S.No.10195/1995 contending that
the said property was a joint family property and that his
mother had no authority to sell it. The plaintiff's grandmother,
as well as the plaintiff's father, filed their respective written
statements stating that the said property was an absolute
property and she was entitled to deal with it.
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6. It is submitted that on 25.06.2012, the trial court
decreed the suit O.S.No.10195/1995, holding that the property
was a joint family property and each of the three children of
Smt.Sharada Baliga, including the plaintiff's father, had a share
in it. Aggrieved by the said order, defendant No.2, along with
his brother, filed RFA No.1664/2012 to set aside the judgment
in O.S.No.10195/1995. The RFA judgment and decree was
passed on 16.04.2024, setting aside the judgment in
O.S.No.10195/1995. It is stated that the said matter was
carried up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and the Hon'ble
Supreme Court dismissed SLP(C) No.17347/2024 filed by the
plaintiff's father seeking to challenge the order passed in the
RFA. It is the case that when defendant No.2 deployed men and
material to clean up the said property, to provide a wider gate,
and to erect a fence around the said property, the plaintiff and
his family members sought to interfere with the defendants'
possession and prevented the erection of the fence around the
property. Then, complaints were lodged by both of them. The
plaintiff's father has filed W.P.No.33134/2024 seeking
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directions to the police to evict the defendants from the
property.
7. It is submitted that, suppressing all these facts, the
plaintiff filed the present suit O.S.No.1708/2024, claiming that
his grandmother, Smt.Sharada Baliga, had left an unregistered
Will dated 10.01.1994 bequeathing the property to him, and for
seeking a declaration that he is the owner of the said property.
Though the said property is situated in Bangalore, that is,
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court, Anekal,
the plaintiff filed the suit at Anekal, contending that the
property was intended to be purchased by his grandmother. On
19.12.2024, the plaintiff filed an I.A. for the grant of an order
of temporary injunction and on the same day, the trial Court
granted an ex-parte order restraining the defendants from
interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule 'B' property. Then, on
10.01.2025, the plaintiff filed I.A.No.III seeking directions to
the police to implement the order of temporary injunction dated
19.12.2024. The trial Court granted an order directing the
police to visit the spot and implement the interim order dated
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19.12.2024. It is submitted that the police visited the said
property and observed that the plaintiff was in possession of
the property and was residing along with his wife and parents
in a house located in the north-western corner of the said
property, and that the rest of the said property is in the
possession of the defendants. Accordingly, the police submitted
the report to the trial Court.
8. It is submitted that the plaintiff filed
W.P.No.10462/2025 seeking directions from the Court to
provide police protection to implement the orders of the trial
Court. The trial Court passed an order confirming the ex-parte
order of temporary injunction granted in favour of the
respondent herein. Then, the defendant carried this matter by
filing MFA No.3947/2025. The Appellate Court refused to
interfere with the trial Court's order and the appeal was
dismissed by an order dated 11.07.2025. Then, the petitioner
carried this to the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing SLP (C)
No.20606/2025. But the Hon'ble Apex Court did not interfere
with the order of the trial Court dated 01.08.2025; however, it
directed the Court to expedite the hearing of the case.
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9. It is further submitted by the learned Senior
Counsel that by virtue of this order, the Court has asked the
police to put the plaintiff in possession of the property, which is
contrary to settled law. It is submitted that even a trespasser in
a settled possession cannot be evicted by the true owner
except through due process of law. As the law protects
possession itself and prohibits forcible self-help remedies,
reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRs Vs. M. Varadappa
Naidu (Dead) by LRs and another1. He relied on paragraphs
Nos.6 to 8, which read as follows:
"6. The law in India, as it has developed,
accords with the jurisprudential thought as
propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur
Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh
Narayan Roy and Ors. 1924 PC 144, Sir John
Edge summed up the Indian law by stating
that in India persons are not permitted to
take forcible possession; they must obtain
such possession as they are entitled to
through a Court.
7. The thought has prevailed incessantly,
till date, the last and latest one in the chain
of decisions being Ramesh Chand
Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani (2003) 7 SCC
350. In-between, to quote a few out of
several, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by
his legal representative Vs. Rao Jagdish
Singh and others (1968) 2 SCR 203, this
1
(2004) 1 SCC 769
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Court has held that a landlord did commit
trespass when he forcibly entered his own
land in the possession of a tenant whose
tenancy has expired. The Court turned down
the submission that under the general law
applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was
no rule or principle which made it obligatory
for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain
an order for possession before he could eject
the lessee. The court quoted with approval
the law as stated by a Full Bench of
Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohammad Vs.
Lakshmi Das (AIR 1959 All. 1,4),
"Law respects possession even if there
is no title to support it. It will not permit
any person to take the law in his own
hands and to dispossess a person in
actual possession without having
recourse to a court. No person can be
allowed to become a judge in his own
cause."
In the oft- quoted case of Nair Service
Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and Ors.
(1968) 3 SCR 163, this Court held that a
person in possession of land in assumed
character of owner and exercising peaceably
the ordinary rights of ownership has a
perfectly good title against all the world but
the rightful owner. When the facts disclose
no title in either party, possession alone
decides. The court quoted Loft's maxim
'Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur
cui ius sit possession is (He that hath
possession hath right against all but him
that hath the very right)' and said,
"A defendant in such a case must show
in himself or his predecessor a valid legal
title, or probably a possession prior to
the plaintiff's and thus be able to raise a
presumption prior in time".
In M.C. Chockalingam and Ors. Vs. V.
Manickavasagam and Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 48,
this Court held that the law forbids forcible
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dispossession, even with the best of title. In
Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his Lrs. Vs.
Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao (1989) 4 SCC 131,
it was held that where a person is in settled
possession of property, even on the
assumption that he had no right to remain
on the property, he cannot be dispossessed
by the owner of the property except by
recourse to law. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs.
Jagat Singh, Advocate (1995) 3 SCC 426,
this Court held that disputed questions of
title are to be decided by due process of law,
but the peaceful possession is to be
protected from the trespasser without
regard to the question of the origin of the
possession. When the defendant fails in
proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff
can succeed in securing a decree for
possession on the basis of his prior
possession against the defendant who has
dispossessed him. Such a suit will be
founded on the averment of previous
possession of the plaintiff and dispossession
by the defendant.
8. It is thus clear that so far as the
Indian law is concerned the person in
peaceful possession is entitled to retain his
possession and in order to protect such
possession he may even use reasonable
force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful
owner who has been wrongfully
dispossessed of land may retake possession
if he can do so peacefully and without the
use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser
is in settled possession of the property
belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful
owner shall have to take recourse to law; he
cannot take the law in his own hands and
evict the trespasser or interfere with his
possession. The law will come to the aid of a
person in peaceful and settled possession by
injuncting even a rightful owner from using
force or taking law in his own hands, and
also by restoring him in possession even
from the rightful owner (of course subject to
the law of limitation), if the latter has
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dispossessed the prior possessor by use of
force. In the absence of proof of better title,
possession or prior peaceful settled
possession is itself evidence of title. Law
presumes the possession to go with the title
unless rebutted. The owner of any property
may prevent even by using reasonable force
a trespasser from an attempted trespass,
when it is in the process of being committed,
or is of a flimsy character, or recurring,
intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has
just been committed, while the rightful
owner did not have enough time to have
recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the
possession of the trespasser, just entered
into would not be called as one acquiesced
to by the true owner."
10. He submits that in view of the earlier applications
for police protection, the principle of res judicata applies, and in
that regard, he relied on the judgment in the case of Citizen
Aster Co-operative Housing Society Ltd and others Vs.
Fredrick. J. D'Souza & others2. He relied on paragraphs 10 to
18, which read as follows:
"10. It is well settled principles of law that
the principles of res judicata can be invoked
not only in separate subsequent proceedings
but it is also attracted at subsequent stage of
the same proceedings, and once an order
made in the course of a proceeding becomes
final, it would be binding at the subsequent
stage of the same proceeding. This is very
clear from the ruling of the Apex Court in Y.B.
Patil and Ors. v. Y.L. Patil, reported in A.I.R.
1977 S.C. 392. The Apex Court has also ruled
2
(2005) 2 Bom CR 647
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in Prahlad Singh v. Col Sukhdev Singh,
reported in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1145 that it is
well settled that the decision given by a Court
at an earlier stage of a case is binding at a
later stage though interlocutory judgments
are open for adjudication by an appellate
authority in an appeal against the final
judgment.
11. In the case in hand, undisputedly, the
plaintiffs for their benefit and for other
members of the proposed society which
included the appellants herein had filed the
application for temporary injunction which
was dismissed by the lower Court by order
dated 31st August, 2000 and no appeal was
filed against the said order and therefore the
same has attained finality for all purposes
during the pendency of the suit. Undisputedly,
while dismissing the said application for
temporary injunction the trial Court had held
that "at this stage it is very difficult to hold
that defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are not at all
authorised to sell the part of the suit land to
the defendant No. 4". Apparently, therefore,
the trial Court had dismissed the application
holding that there was no material to disclose
that the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 had no right to
sell the part of the suit land to the defendant
No. 4. The said finding for all purposes in the
absence of an appeal against the said order
had attained finality. However, it is sought to
be contended on behalf of the appellants that
while arriving at the said finding the trial
Court had also observed that the said finding
was "at this stage" thereby to mean that the
said finding was arrived at on the basis of
whatever materials which were available a
prior to the passing of the said order and the
appellants have now produced some
documents which disclose that the defendant
Nos. 1 to 3 are not entitled to sell part of the
suit land to the defendant No. 4.
12. As already observed above, the
appellants cannot justify the claim solely on
the basis of the alleged documents as no such
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plea was raised in the application itself and
the plea in that regard has been sought to be
raised only in the rejoinder. Secondly, even
assuming that the said documents can be said
to be relevant for the matter in issue, they
were in existence much prior to the filing of
the suit itself. One of the documents is an
advertisement dated 24th October, 1992.
Some are the letters dated 28th October,
1988 and 4th April, 1989, and the brochure
dated 7th January, 1989 and power of
Attorney dated 13th September, 1989,
besides, some other documents which were
already referred to in the earlier order. Once
it is clear that all these documents relate to
the date prior to the filing of the earlier
application and there being no disclosure by
the appellants as to the point of the when the
appellants came to know about the said
documents as well as the source of
knowledge about the said documents, not
only in the application for temporary
injunction but even in the rejoinder itself,
there can be no justification to grant any
relief in the second application for temporary
injunction based on such documents.
13. Besides, the rule of constructive res
judicata will also be attracted in such cases
and more particularly the one comprised
under the Explanation IV to Section 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which states that "any
matter which might and ought to have been
made ground of defence or attack in such
former suit shall be deemed to have been a
matter directly and substantially in issue in
such suit." In other words, any matter which
might or ought to have been made a ground
of attack in the former application shall be
deemed to have been a matter directly and
substantially in issue in such application and
failure in that regard on the part of the
plaintiffs in the earlier application would
disentitle others for whose benefits
representative suit is filed to reagitate the
same issue in the form of second application
for temporary injunction.
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14. The Apex Court in Forward
Construction Co. and Ors. v. Prabhat Mandal
(Regd.), Andheri and Ors., reported in A.I.R.
1986 S.C. 391 has held that "an adjudication
is conclusive and final not only as to the
actual matter determined but as to every
other matter which the parties might and
ought to have litigated and have had it
decided as incidental to or essentially
connected with the subject-matter of the
litigation and every matter coming within the
legitimate purview of the ordinal action in
both in respect of the matters of claim or
defence. The principle underlying Explanation
IV is that where the parties have had an
opportunity of controverting a matter that
should be taken to be the same thing as if the
matter had been actually controverted and
decided. It is true that where a matter has
been constructively in use it cannot be said to
have been actually heard and decided".
15. The Apex Court in Gulam Abbas and
Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in
A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2198 had clearly on the
principle of res judicata ruled that "It is in the
interest of the public at large that finality
should attach to the binding decisions
pronounced by courts of competent
jurisdiction, and it is also in the public
interest that individuals should not be vexed
twice over with the same kind of litigation".
16. In Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v.
State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1153 and
in Union of India v. Nanak Singh, A.I.R. 1968
S.C. 1370, it was held that "it is thus clear
that Technical aspects of Section 11 of C.P.C.
as for instance, pecuniary or subject-wise
competence of the earlier forum to adjudicate
the subject-matter or grant reliefs sought in
the subsequent litigation would be immaterial
when the general doctrine of res judicata is to
be invoked".
17. In Gulab Abbas's case (supra), it was
held by the Apex Court that"...... the
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provisions of Section 11 of C.P.C. are not
exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision
operating as res judicata between the same
parties on the same matter in controversy in a
subsequent regular suit and that on the
general principle of res judicata, any previous
decision on a matter in controversy, decided
after full contest or after affording fair
opportunity to the parties to prove their case
by a Court competent to decide it, will operate
as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit."
18. Applying the law on the point of res
judicata, and considering the fact that the
application for temporary injunction filed by
the appellants is on the same grounds which
were disclosed in earlier application, and
further that the application of the appellants,
apart from making a bare claim of change in
circumstances, does not disclose any change
as such after disposal of the earlier
application, the second application was liable
to be dismissed and was rightly dismissed by
the trial Court."
11. Then, for the proposition that police protection
cannot be used as means to dispossess the parties in
possession or to alter the nature of the suit property, he relied
on a judgment in the case of MR. Srinivas Adhikeshavulu
Dalvoi Vs. Anushka Constructions Pvt. Ltd3. He relied on
paragraphs 7 and 8, which read as follows:
"7. The only grievance of the petitioner is
that in the guise of implementing the
injunction order passed by the Trial Court,
the police are trying to dispossess the
3
W.P.No.4740/2025
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petitioner-defendant from the suit schedule
properties.
8. In that view of the matter, this court
is of the opinion that the only direction that
can be issued at this stage is to direct the
Inspector of Police, Kadugodi Police, not to
dispossess the parties, who are in
possession of the suit schedule properties
and not to alter the nature of the suit
schedule properties. Accordingly, the
following order is passed:
ORDER
a) Writ petition is disposed of.
b) Inspector of Police, Kadugodi Police
Station, shall ensure that the order dated
01.02.2025 passed by the Trial Court on
I.A.No.3, be complied with. However, in the
guise of implementing the said order, he
shall not dispossess the parties, who are in
possession of the suit schedule properties
and shall not alter the nature of the suit
schedule properties.”
12. It is submitted that police protection is confined to
ensuring compliance with the trial Court’s order and cannot be
used to aid either party in altering the suit property. He relied
on the judgment passed in the case of M/s Godrej Properties
Ltd. Vs. K. G. Anjaneya4. He relied on paragraphs 5, 6, and 7,
which read as follows:
“5. Insofar as the prayer sought in
respect of I.A.No.IV is concerned, the
application is filed under Section 151 of4
W.P.No.6401/2026 dated 04.03.2026
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instead of merely implementing the order,
the police are supporting the plaintiff in
altering the nature of the suit schedule
property.
6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the plaintiff- respondent submits that the
police protection has been sought only to
ensure that the order of the Trial Court
passed on I.A.No.I is not violated by any
party and that the plaintiff will not make
any alteration to the nature of the property
with the aid of the police.
7. In view of the above, no further
orders are required to be passed on
I.A.No.IV. However, it is clarified that the
police shall extend protection only for the
purpose of ensuring implementation of the
Trial Court’s order passed on I.A.No.I and
shall not support either of the parties in
making any alteration to the suit schedule
property. In the event of any violation of
the Trial Court’s order, the police shall
report the same to the concerned Court.”
13. Relying on these judgments, it is submitted that the
order passed by the Court is contrary to law and the same has
to be set aside.
14. Sri. D.R Ravishankar, learned Senior counsel
representing the learned counsel for the respondent, submits
that when the defendant has suffered an order of injunction
affirmed till the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the defendant cannot
come before this Court claiming possession of the property. He
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has drawn the Court’s attention to the order passed by the trial
Court. While passing the injunction, the Court observed the
manner in which the police behaved. He has drawn the Court’s
attention to paragraph No.16 of the order, in which the trial
Court observed that the video visuals clearly show that the
defendants, with the help of goondas, trespassed into the plaint
schedule ‘B’ property. The defendants also admitted that they
entered into an agreement with Karnataka Soaps and
Detergents Ltd., to cut and remove the trees in the plaint
schedule ‘B’ property. In that, the Court observed that if an
injunction is not granted, the plaintiff will be thrown out from
the ‘B’ schedule property and the defendants will change the
entire ‘B’ schedule property within no time. The acts of the
defendants cannot be condoned, and the acts of the police
should be viewed seriously. This is a classic case of illegal acts
by police and goondas. If an injunction is not granted, the
defendants will definitely dispossess the plaintiff from the suit
schedule ‘B’ property and will cut and remove trees in the ‘B’
schedule property. The Court has also observed that if at all the
defendants have any right, they have to take possession
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according to law; their behavior is not proper, and they cannot
enter into the suit ‘B’ schedule property with the help of
goondas, and the police visuals are shameful to the police
department.
15. The learned Senior Counsel submits that when this
order was carried in appeal in the MFA, this Court affirmed the
findings. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn the Court’s
attention to the order in the MFA. This Court also considered
the findings regarding the defendants’ high-handed action.
When the matter was taken further to the Hon’ble Apex Court,
the Hon’ble Apex Court affirmed the order and refused to
interfere with the orders passed by the Courts below. It is
submitted that, in blatant violation of the orders passed by the
trial Court, this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court, the
defendants, without any respect for the rule of law, in collusion
and hand-in-glove with the police, are repeatedly acting and
creating law-and-order problems. It is submitted that the
respondent/plaintiff is left with no alternative, no order was
passed by any of the Courts rejecting the plaintiff’s case for
police protection, and the principle of res judicata will not apply
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to the facts of the case. He relied on the judgment of the
Telangana High Court in the case of Gadeela Srinivas Reddy
Vs. State of Telangana5. He relied on paragraphs 27, 28, and
30, which read as follows:
“27. The stand that was taken by the
unofficial respondents with regard to the
structure being there in the schedule
mentioned property is that much prior to
filing of the suit way back in the year 2013
and about other documents in support of the
State were negatived by the Court below. It
is submitted that the unofficial respondents
have preferred C.M.A. and the same is
pending. Though the judgment and decree
dated 25.10.2019 passed in O.S. No. 11 of
2014, so far the appeal which was filed by
the respondents has not seen the light of the
day. On the face of it, it appears that having
suffered several orders, the
respondents/defendants were not vigilant in
pursuing the matters. When an injunction is
granted restraining them from interfering
with the property, the very same defendant
cannot come before this Court and submit
that if at all they have violated the injunction
orders, the remedy for plaintiff is to file an
execution petition.
28. A party who has no respect to the
rule of law, who has suffered the decree and
still consistently filing petition one after the
other, cannot afford to submit that remedy
of the petitioner/plaintiff is elsewhere. In
several judgments cited by the
petitioner/plaintiff, it has been observed
that the orders of the Courts have to be
upheld at all times. In this manner, if litigant
is permitted to take different stands and
blow hot and cold at the same time, it would5
W.P.No.271/2020 dated 30.06.2023
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be very difficult to maintain rule of law and
impossible to implement the orders of the
Court.
30. In the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, where both the
parties are before this Court by filing two
kinds of writ petitions by questioning the
action of the police, where the unofficial
respondents have suffered decree, all the
stands that were taken before this Court are
already negatived by the Court below and
the decree happens to be of the year 2019, it
is a fit case where the respondent police
shall provide police protection in respect of
the land admeasuring Ac.1-00 guntas in
Survey No. 435/1 part, situated at
Gundlapochampally Village, Medchal
Malkajgiri District as per the judgment and
decree in O.S. No. 11 of 2014 dated
29.10.2019.”
16. Relying on the above judgment, it is submitted that
unless and until police protection is granted, the order passed
by the trial Court, which has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court, will become a paper order.
17. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing
on either sides, perused the material on record. It is not in
dispute that an order of temporary injunction was granted.
Allegations were made of interference and obstruction in the
implementation of the temporary injunction. Earlier proceedings
culminated in the trial Court’s observations regarding the high-
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handed conduct of the police and the defendants. Those
observations were not interfered in the appeal and were also
affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The proceedings, as far as
the grant of the interim injunction to the plaintiff are
concerned, have attained finality. Judicial orders, once they
attain finality, cannot be rendered meaningless by subsequent
acts of obstruction. The authority of a judicial order does not
depend upon the willingness of a litigant to obey it. Equally, it
cannot be subjected to the convenience of the executive
machinery. The rule of law requires that orders of courts must
be implemented with the same seriousness with which they are
pronounced.
18. The contention that the subsequent application is
barred merely because an earlier application for police
protection was filed, and that it operates as res judicata, is a
submission this Court cannot accept. Police aid is not an
independent substantive remedy capable of being exhausted by
a single application; it is a procedural mechanism evolved by
Courts to secure the effective implementation of an existing
judicial order. Every fresh act of obstruction to an injunction
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constitutes a fresh cause requiring appropriate directions.
Unless the injunction itself has ceased to operate or has been
vacated, the Court retains complete jurisdiction to ensure its
effective implementation. The doctrine of res judicata is
founded on the principle that an issue finally adjudicated
between the parties should not be reopened. The present
application, however, does not invite the Court to re-adjudicate
any issue already decided. It proceeds on the allegation that,
notwithstanding the subsisting order of temporary injunction,
fresh acts of obstruction have rendered the earlier directions
ineffective. Every subsequent act of interference with the
implementation of an injunction gives rise to a fresh cause for
invoking the Court’s ancillary jurisdiction. Unless the injunction
itself has been vacated, modified, or set aside, the Court’s
power to secure its enforcement remains for the life of the
injunction.
19. If the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioners is accepted, the inevitable consequence would
be that once an application for police aid is disposed of, the
successful party would be left remediless against all future acts
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of obstruction during the pendency of the injunction. Such an
interpretation would enable an unscrupulous litigant to
repeatedly violate the Court’s order and thereafter shield
himself behind the technical plea of res judicata. The doctrine
intended to bring finality to adjudication cannot be converted
into a weapon to perpetuate disobedience of judicial orders.
The earlier proceedings, which culminated in observations
regarding the high-handed conduct of the police, have attained
finality upon the dismissal of the appeal as well as the SLP
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Those proceedings neither
extinguished the injunction nor exhausted the Court’s incidental
jurisdiction to secure its implementation. What has attained
finality is the legality of the earlier proceedings. What survives
is the continuing obligation of every person, including the
executive authorities, to ensure obedience to the subsisting
injunction. Consequently, the principle of res judicata has no
application to the facts of the present case and the said
submission is rejected.
20. The second contention by the Senior Counsel is that
the defendants are in possession and that the police cannot be
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directed to place the plaintiff in possession. There can be no
quarrel with the settled principle that police aid cannot be used
as a substitute for the execution of a decree for possession, nor
can the police be directed to adjudicate disputed questions of
title or possession. However, that principle cannot be applied to
the facts and circumstances of the present case, where the
Court has already granted protection to the plaintiff’s
possession and the subsequent obstruction is found to violate
the subsisting injunction. The Court is not helpless merely
because the violator claims to have altered the factual situation
by force. No litigant can be permitted to plead his own unlawful
act as a defence against the implementation of a judicial order.
If the Senior Counsel’s submission is accepted, it would amount
to recognizing a doctrine that a litigant who successfully
violates an injunction acquires an advantage from his own
contemptuous conduct and thereafter compels a successful
party to institute fresh proceedings under Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act. Such a proposition would strike at the very
foundation of judicial authority and the rule of law.
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21. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act provides a
summary remedy to a person dispossessed otherwise than in
due course of law. The existence of this statutory remedy does
not deprive the Court of its inherent and incidental jurisdiction
to enforce its own orders. The remedy under Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act is an additional remedy available under the
statute. It cannot be construed as an exclusive remedy that
disables the Court from ensuring obedience to its own
injunctions. The Court cannot remain a mute spectator while its
orders are openly violated. Every Court possesses incidental
and ancillary powers necessary to preserve the efficacy of its
own orders. The power to direct police assistance is one such
recognized power intended to ensure that judicial orders are
not rendered incapable of implementation.
22. Equally unacceptable is the submission that the
impugned order directs delivery of possession. A meaningful
reading of the impugned order would show that the direction is
intended to remove the obstruction created in violation of the
injunction and to restore the efficacy of the judicial order. Such
restoration cannot be equated with the adjudication of title or
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the delivery of possession in the execution of a decree. The
police are not called upon to decide competing claims. They are
merely required to assist in implementing the Court’s order.
23. The Court cannot overlook the practical realities
confronting litigants. A litigant who secures an order after
undergoing the rigours of judicial proceedings legitimately
expects that such order will be implemented. If, despite
obtaining orders from the trial Court, surviving appellate
scrutiny, and even withstanding a challenge before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the successful party is still left without
enjoying the fruits of the order, the judicial process itself stands
seriously compromised. Orders incapable of implementation
become just paper declarations. The legitimacy of the judicial
system depends not only upon the correctness of judicial
pronouncements, but equally upon their enforceability. Public
confidence in the administration of justice is sustained when
judicial orders translate into practical reality. If a litigant begins
to perceive that Court orders can be ignored with impunity until
the successful party is driven into successive rounds of
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litigation, the inevitable consequence would be the erosion of
faith in the rule of law.
24. The judiciary commands neither the purse nor the
sword. Its strength lies in the confidence the people place in
the enforcement of its orders through the State’s constitutional
machinery. Looking at the earlier proceedings in which the
conduct of the police authorities was adversely noted and those
findings having attained finality before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the learned trial Judge was fully justified in issuing
appropriate directions to ensure that the subsisting order of
injunction does not remain a paper order incapable of
implementation.
25. The conduct of the petitioner throughout the
proceedings deserves serious notice. After suffering a decree of
permanent injunction, instead of abiding by the mandate of the
Court, the defendant has chosen to obstruct its implementation
by resorting to repeated acts of interference as recorded by the
trial Court in the order. It is a clear abuse of the process of law.
Hence, this is a fit case where costs have to be imposed.
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26. In the considered opinion of this Court, the trial
Court had rightly considered the matter and has passed an
order, and this Court finds no reason to interfere. Hence, this
Court is passing the following order:
ORDER
i. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed with costs
of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid to the respondent.
ii. All I.As. in this petition shall stand closed.
SD/-
(LALITHA KANNEGANTI)
JUDGEPKN
