Jharkhand High Court
Ravi Ranjan Kumar vs Deepika Roy on 23 July, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2026:JHHC:21868-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No.135 of 2022
----- -
Ravi Ranjan Kumar, aged about 34 years, S/o Rajeshwar
Roy, R/o village - Nawadih, Near Pani Tanki, P.O. - Nawadih,
B - Polytechnic, P.S. - Dhanbad, District - Dhanbad.
... ... Appellant
Versus
Deepika Roy, aged about 25 years, W/o Ravi Ranjan Kumar,
D/o Jagdish Prasad Roy, R/o village - Bhuli, 'C' Block,
Quarter No.509, P.O. - Bhuli Nagar, P.S. - Bhuli, District -
Dhanbad. ... ... Respondent
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
.....
For the Appellant : Mr. Mukesh Bihari Lal, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Anuj Kumar Trivedi, Advocate
: Ms. Soniya Hansda, Advocate
.....
C.A.V. on 03.07.2026 Pronounced on 23/07/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer:
1. The instant appeal has been filed challenging the
legality and propriety of impugned judgment passed on
28.06.2022 and decree signed on 07.07.2022 by learned
Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad whereby and
whereunder the Original Suit No.328 of 2019 filed by the
appellant-husband under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce against his wife,
has been dismissed.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case of the appellant-husband
as narrated in the plaint, is that both parties are legally
married couple whose marriage was solemnized on
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16.04.2016 according to the Hindu Rites and Customs at
the parental address of the defendant within the District of
Dhanbad, (Jharkhand) and after their marriage both parties
resided at Nawadih, Dhanbad, Jharkhand for only two
months. Thereafter the respondent went to her Maika at
Bhuli Nagar and stayed there for a long time for about two
years.
3. It has further been stated that when he went to take
her Bidai, she abused him and his parents used
unparliamentary language and threatened him to implicate
in false criminal case and also to commit suicide.
4. It has been stated that the respondent disobeyed her
in-laws and she did not pay any respect to them. In March
2019, the respondent reached her matrimonial house with
her relatives and started reviling and assaulting his parents
and she left the house and since then they have been living
separately.
5. The cause of action arose on 16.04.2016 when the
marriage of the parties was performed and it also arose in
the month of March 2019.
6. The appellant has prayed that by dissolving his
marriage a decree of divorce may be granted in his favour
against the respondent-wife.
7. After service of notice, the defendant-wife appeared
in the court and filed her show-cause stating therein that
she stayed for a long period and lastly, she lived there on
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20.04.2019.
8. On 21.04.2019, when the respondent tried to
motivate her husband/the plaintiff to leave illicit relation
with another lady then he became furious and brutally
assaulted her and her father-in-law and mother-in-law had
also beaten her by dashing her on the earth and assaulted
by stone on several parts of the body and snatched all her
ornaments, and ousted her from her matrimonial house.
9. Thereafter she called her father and reported the
matter to Dhanbad P.S and she was treated in PMCH,
Dhanbad and since then she has been living separately in
her Maika.
10. On the aforesaid grounds, the respondent has
prayed to dismiss this suit.
11. The case proceeded for evidence during which the
petitioner/appellant has produced and examined three
witnesses including himself.
12. The respondent-wife has produced and examined
altogether two witnesses including herself.
13. The learned Principal Judge, after hearing learned
counsel for the parties, framed four issues for adjudication
of the lis, which are as follows: –
(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present
form?
(ii) Whether the plaintiff has got a valid cause of
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(iii) Whether the marriage of plaintiff and defendant
is fit to be dissolved on the ground of cruelty,
allegedly administered by the respondent?
(iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief
claimed?
14. All the aforesaid issues were decided against the
appellant-husband and in favour of respondent-wife and
decreed the suit on contest.
15. The appellant-husband, being aggrieved with the
judgment passed on 28.06.2022, has approached this Court
by filing the present appeal.
Submission made on behalf of the appellant-husband
16. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband
has taken following grounds in assailing the impugned
judgment: –
(i) The impugned judgment dismissing the petition U/s 13
(1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act is not sustainable in
the eye of law or in the facts and circumstances
involved in this case and are, thus, liable to be set
aside.
(ii) It has been submitted by referring to the evidence of
the appellant/petitioner that the ground of desertion
has not been taken in the plaint but if the evidence of
appellant-PW-1 will be taken into consideration, the
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2026:JHHC:21868-DBground of desertion has been taken by taking the
specific plea that the paternal house of the respondent
wife is only at the distance of two kilometers but since
the month of June, 2016 she was residing in the
parental house and as such, the respondent is living
separately.
(iii) Thus, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Dhanbad committed grave error in not taking into
consideration that the wife (respondent) has deserted
the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than 2
years.
(iv) The learned family court also erred in not taking into
consideration that the behaviour of the respondent was
cruel to the petitioner.
(v) The learned family court has committed grave error in
not considering the fact that the respondent herself
deserted the petitioner which was proved by the
evidence brought on record.
(vi) The learned family court has also not considered that
although the suit was filed in the year 2019 and
judgment was passed in the month of June, 2022 and
between that period also the respondent deserted the
petitioner which also comes under the purview of
cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act.
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(vii) The learned Family Court ought to have appreciate the
evidence on record that the respondent has committed
cruelty against the petitioner.
(viii) The impugned judgment suffers from the vices of non-
consideration of materials on record and thus the same
is vitiated in law.
(ix) The learned Family Court has also failed to take into
consideration that admittedly the parties are living
separately since long and there is no chance of
restoration of their matrimonial life.
(x) The learned Family Court has committed serious
illegality in not considering the fact that there is no
chance of compromise amongst the parties, as such in
the interest of justice, learned court below ought to
have passed a judgment allowing the suit for
declaration of the marriage of the appellant to be
dissolved.
(xi) The learned Family Court has committed serious
illegality in not considering the fact that the allegation
made by the respondent in her written statement that
the appellant has illegal relationship with another lady
has not been backed by any sort of evidence by the
respondent.
(xii) It has been submitted that the learned Trial Court has
failed to appreciate the evidence produced on behalf of
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petitioner / appellant and, thus, came to wrong
conclusion.
(xiii) The learned court below has also failed to take into
consideration that admittedly the parties are living
separately since long and the conduct of the
respondent shows that the respondent does not want
to join the appellant and hence there is no chance of
restoration of their matrimonial life.
17. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, on the
basis of aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment
passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, is
perverse and requires interference.
Submission made on behalf of respondent-wife
18. Learned counsel for the respondent has taken the
following grounds in defending the impugned judgment: –
(i) Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has
submitted that learned Family Court has rightly held
that the appellant is not entitled for the decree of
divorce on the ground of cruelty because the appellant
has failed to prove the allegation of cruelty against her.
(ii) Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, defending the
impugned order, has submitted that as per the plaint
the appellant has sought divorce on the ground of
cruelty and desertion but the learned Family Court,
after taking into consideration the evidences, has held
that the entire allegations levelled in the plaint are not
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(iii) Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted in
rebuttal of the argument advanced on behalf of the
appellant that even accepting the fact that the suit has
been filed for dissolution of marriage for committing
cruelty but the consideration has also been made by
taking the element of desertion and even if
consideration so made on the issue of desertion will be
ignored, then also it cannot be said that the entire
judgment will be vitiated in the eye of law.
(iv) It has been submitted that the element of cruelty has
not been proved as per the evident so recorded, as
available in the trial court record and after taking into
consideration the same, the learned Family Judge has
found no element of cruelty and as such, it cannot be
said that there is any infirmity in the impugned
judgment.
(v) It has been argued on behalf of respondent that she
has never treated the appellant with cruelty rather
evidences on record depict that it is the respondent
who is sufferer.
(vi) The appellant-husband has no valid cause of action
and he is not entitled to get any relief as claimed by
him.
19. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife on the
aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned
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judgment requires no interference by this Court.
Analysis
20. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant-
husband as also learned counsel for the respondent-wife and
perused the material available on record and the finding
recorded in the impugned order.
21. It stands admitted upon the record that the petition for
dissolution of marriage was instituted on the ground of
cruelty, by way of an application under Section 13(1)(i-a) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In the course of deposition,
the issue of desertion was also adverted to, and evidence was
accordingly adduced thereon. Learned counsel for both
parties advanced arguments before the Family Court. Upon
consideration, however, the suit came to be dismissed, and
the decision was rendered adverse to the
petitioner/appellant-husband, against the said order the
instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant/husband.
22. It needs to refer herein that since appellate jurisdiction
has been invoked herein, therefore, before entering into merit
of the case, at this juncture it would be purposeful to discuss
the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court.
23. It needs to refer herein that under section 7 of the
Family Courts Act, the Family Court shall have and exercise
all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any
Sub- ordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in
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force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature which
are described in the explanation to section 7(1).
24. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts Act
provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order
not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to the High
Court “both on facts and on law”. Therefore, section 19 of the
Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the scope of which has been dealt with by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in series of judgments.
25. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First
Appeal can examine every question of law and fact which
arises in the facts of the case and has powers to affirm,
reverse or modify the judgment under question. In “Jagdish
Singh v. Madhuri Devi” (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court
acting as the First Appellate Court to enter into not only
questions of law but questions of fact as well and the
appellate Court therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and
review the entire evidence and can come to its own
conclusion. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the
said judgment is being quoted as under:
“It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising
power as the first appellate court and hence it was open
to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but
questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is
a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of
the main matter and the appellate court can reappraise,10
2026:JHHC:21868-DBreappreciate and review the entire evidence–oral as well
as documentary–and can come to its own conclusion.”
26. This Court, being the appellate court, thought it proper
to consider the testimonies of the witnesses as available on
record to appreciate as to whether the grounds of cruelty and
desertion are available or not.
27. The appellant, in support of his case, has adduced three
witnesses including himself. The relevant portion of the
testimonies of the witnesses are mentioned as under :-
PW-1 Ravi Ranjan Kumar is appellant himself. He has
deposed in his examination-in-chief that after his marriage
on 14.04.2016 his wife lived with him only for two months.
After two months she left his house and without his
permission she came to Bhuli at Quarters No. 509 along with
her parents.
He has further deposed that the respondent-wife is a
quarrelsome lady and she misbehaved with his parents and
on some occasions, she threatened him to commit suicide.
He has further stated that the distance is only two
kilometers between the houses of his father-in-law and the
father-in-law of the respondent nevertheless, she has been
living separately from the last two years, therefore, in future
also there is no possibility of restoration of congenial and
harmonious relation between them.
He has further deposed that in the month of March
2019 the respondent reached his house with a relative and
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2026:JHHC:21868-DBstarted reviling and assaulting his parents and also put
pressure on him to make a demand of partition of house from
his father on his denial she left his house and went away and
lodged some false criminal case against him with the
allegation of unlawful demand of dowry etc.
He has deposed that he has filed this case for divorcing
his wife on the ground of cruelty and desertion for more than
a period of two years.
PW 2 Gayatri Rachna and PW 3 Rajeshwar Roy who
are mother and father of the plaintiff/appellant have stated
alike the plaintiff by deposing in their examination-in-chief
that their son was married to the respondent Deepika Roy on
16.04.2016 and they lived together only for two months,
thereafter she went to her Maika at Bhuli Nagar with her
parents without giving information to in- laws house.
They have further deposed that the respondent reached
their house with her relatives and threatened them to
implicate them in a false criminal case. The distance is two
kilometers between their house and the house of
respondent’s father.
They have further stated that they have been living
separately from two years.
28. The respondent-wife has also adduced two witnesses,
including herself, in support of her case which are being
dealt hereunder as :-
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DW-1 Deepika Roy is respondent herself. She has
deposed in her examination-in-chief that at the time of her
marriage ceremony dated 16.04.2016 her father gave Rs. 5
lac in cash, Rs. 3 lac in kind and 2.4 lac in the shape of
ornaments. After her marriage she went to her Sasural, but
after some days of her marriage, she came to know that her
husband is not a technician. He was a simple gym trainer.
She also came to know that her husband has illicit affair with
another lady Anuja Mehta. On her protest her husband
started inflicting mental and physical torture and finally
snatched her Stridhan and banished her from his house. He
never paid her respect of wife and never paid any penny for
her maintenance, though, he has monthly income of
Rs.1,20,000/-,
She has lastly stated that her husband has illicit
relation with another lady, therefore, there is no iota of truth
in the petition of divorce filed by her husband.
DW-2, Asha Roy, the mother of the respondent, has
deposed in terms consistent with the testimony of DW-1.
29. From the testimony, as referred hereinabove, it is
evident that the appellant-husband has been examined as
P.W.1 before the Family Court, who in his deposition has
mainly taken the ground of bad behaviour of his wife
toward him and his family members. He has deposed that
the respondent-wife used to quarreling and pressurizing him
for partition of house from his father.
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30. From the aforesaid testimony of the appellant-husband
it is evident that though cruelty has been pleaded by him in
his petition, but no cogent evidence has been produced by
him to prove the allegations.
31. The respondent-wife has been examined as DW-1 who
has stated that after marriage, she came to know that her
husband has illicit affair with another lady and on her
protest her husband started inflicting mental and physical
torture and finally snatched her Stridhan and banished her
from his house.
She has stated that the case has been filed by her
husband against her is not true and her husband made false
and concocted allegations against her.
She has stated that the allegation levelled against her in
the petition is false, concocted and are baseless.
32. The learned Principal Judge, from the statements of
the witnesses so produced on behalf of the parties, has come
to the conclusion that appellant has failed to prove the
grounds of alleged cruelty and desertion pleaded by him in
his petition.
33. From the testimony so recorded of the appellant-
husband, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court has
come to the conclusion that in the instant case, the
petitioner/appellant has completely failed in proving the
alleged cruelty and desertion.
34. In the context of the aforesaid factual aspect only
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seminal issue has to be decide herein that “Whether the
plaintiff is entitled to get divorce dissolving the marriage of the
petitioner/appellant with OP/wife on ground of cruelty as
also in the ground desertion which is testified in the
deposition?”.
35. This Court is now adverting to the contention of
learned counsel for the appellant wherein it has been
contended that the evidence of cruelty and desertion has not
properly been considered and as such, the judgment suffers
from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
36. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced
on behalf of learned counsel on the issue of perversity, needs
to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as
has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court which
means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration
of the evidence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and
Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor]
and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing
the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a
finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant
material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material
or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from
the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being
perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.
Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the
said judgment reads as under:
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“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a
number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1
SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse”
means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not
supported by the evidence brought on record or they are
against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural
irregularity.
25. In Parry’s (Calcutta) Employees’ Union v. Parry & Co.
Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse
finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight
of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself.
In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 :
AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case
where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are
based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no
reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58]
the Court observed that any order made in conscious
violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.
In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed
that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one
that is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106
NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong
way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or
deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current
English, 6th Edn.
“Perverse.–Showing deliberate determination to behave
in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or
unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,
International Edn.
Perverse.–Deliberately departing from what is normal
and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.–Law (of a verdict) against the weight of
evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe EncyclopedicEdn.)
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Perverse.–Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or
petulant.
5. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th
Edn.
“Perverse.–A perverse verdict may probably be defined as
one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence.”
Issue of Cruelty
37. Herein, submission has also been made on behalf of the
appellant-husband that the respondent-wife committed
cruelty against him.
38. Now this Court is adverting to the issue of cruelty. It
needs to refer herein the definition of ‘cruelty’ as has been
defined by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in
Dr. N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326],
wherein it has been held that the Court is to enquire as to
whether the charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to
cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable
apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to
live with the respondent.
39. The cruelty has also been defined in the case of
Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi [(1988) 1 SCC 105],
wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents
demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that
“cruelty” can have no fixed definition.
40. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the
“conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct
in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the
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conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty
can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or
unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your
spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty;
intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be
present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a
question of fact and degree.”
41. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein
that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty that it is
important for the Court to not search for a standard in life,
since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case.
What must be considered include the kind of life the parties
are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the
“culture and human values to which they attach
importance.”
42. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal
conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations
against the spouse in the written statement filed before the
court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute
cruelty.
43. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337,
the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband
was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid
disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of
“lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family
while he was conducting cross-examination. The Hon’ble
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Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to
constitute “cruelty”.
44. In Vijay Kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay
Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court
has observed by taking into consideration the allegations
levelled by the husband in his written statement that his
wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a
person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an
extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an
educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty”
itself.
45. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v.
Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been
pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is
cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct,
which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of
the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make
one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of
abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and
anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained
of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and
normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute
mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
46. “Cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human
conduct and is always dependent on social strata or milieu to
which parties belong, their ways of life, relationship,
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temperaments and emotions that are conditioned by their
social status, reference be made to the judgment rendered by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Vishwanath
Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC
288.
47. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivas
Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 has observed that
cruelty is evident where one spouse so treats other and
manifests such feelings in other, as to cause reasonable
apprehension in mind of other that it would be harmful or
injurious to reside with other spouse and cruelty may be
physical or mental. It has further been observed that staying
together under the same roof is not a precondition for mental
cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty by his or her
conduct even while he or she is not staying under the same
roof.
48. In matrimonial relationship cruelty mean absence of
mutual respect and understanding between spouses which
embitters relationship. Sometimes it may take form of
violence, or at times may just be an attitude or approach.
Silence in some situations may also amount to cruelty
reference be made to the case of Ravi
Kumar v. Julmidevi, (2010) 4 SCC 476.
49. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vidhya
Viswanathan v. Kartik Balakrishnan, (2014) 15 SCC 21
has specifically held that cruelty is to be determined on
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whole facts of the case and the matrimonial relations
between the spouses and the word ‘cruelty’ has not been
defined and it has been used in relation to human conduct
or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in
respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course
of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the other.
50. For considering dissolution of marriage at instance of a
spouse who alleges mental cruelty, result of such mental
cruelty must be such that it is not possible to continue with
matrimonial relationship reference may be taken from the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021)
3 SCC 742.
51. Further the word ‘cruelty’ is used relation to human
conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to
or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a
course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the
other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or
unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct
complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or
illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other
spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such
cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is
proved or admitted, reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778.
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52. Further, in the case of Manish Tyagi v. Deepak
Kumar, (2010) 4 SCC 339 the Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically observed that to constitute ‘cruelty’, it is
enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and
below accepted norm that other spouse could not reasonable
be expected to put up with it. Conduct is no longer required
to be so atrociously abominable which would cause
reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful of
injurious to continue cohabitation with another spouse.
Hence, it is not necessary to establish physical violence.
Continued ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse,
studied neglect, indifference may lead to inference of
cruelty.
53. Thus, the word “cruelty” under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the
Act has got no static connotation, and therefore, gives a very
wide discretion to the Court to apply it liberally and
contextually. What is cruelty in one case may not be the
same for another and has to be applied from person to
person while taking note of the attending circumstances.
Harm or injury to health, reputation, the working-career or
the like, would be important considerations in determining
whether the conduct of the defending spouse amounts to
cruelty. It has to be shown that the defending spouse has
treated him with cruelty to cause reasonable apprehension
in his/her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live
with the contesting spouse.
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54. Now reverting to the fact of the case it has been stated
by the appellant/husband that the respondent/wife used to
quarrel and the respondent never tried to live together and
improve the relation as the distance between the houses of
his father-in-law and the father-in-law of the respondent is
only two kilometers nevertheless, she has been living
separately from the last two years, therefore, in future also
there is no possibility of restoration of congenial and
harmonious relation between them. It has been further
alleged that the respondent-wife is a quarrelsome lady and
she misbehaved with his parents and on some occasions,
she threatened him to commit suicide and as such, has
committed mental cruelty upon him and his parents by
giving threatening to implicate in false case and despite of
his efforts not ready to live with him and depriving him for
pleasure of conjugal life.
55. He has further deposed that in the month of March
2019 the respondent reached his house with a relative and
started reviling and assaulting his parents and also put
pressure on him to make a demand of partition of house
from his father on his denial she left his house and went
away and lodged some false criminal case against him with
the allegation of unlawful demand of dowry etc.
56. He has deposed that he has filed this case for divorcing
his wife on the ground of cruelty and desertion for more
than a period of two years
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57. Per contra the respondent/wife had stated in her
testimony before the learned Family Court that after
marriage, she came to know that her husband has illicit
affair with another lady and on her protest her husband
started inflicting mental and physical torture and finally
snatched her Stridhan and banished her from his house.
58. Admittedly, the plea of cruelty has been raised by the
appellant husband thus onus is upon him to prove the fact
of cruelty caused upon him by the respondent/wife but after
going through the material on record, it is evident that he
has not brought on record any material to show that the
respondent’s behaviour was cruel towards him and, thus,
whatever allegation has been made by the
appellant/petitioner regarding the alleged cruelty on behalf
of respondent/wife could not be proved.
59. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that the appellant
husband has not produced any cogent evidence in regard to
the cruelty which has been subjected to him by the
respondent/wife as also he had not lodged any complainant
regarding the alleged occurrence.
60. Further, the learned Family Court has finally observed
that the allegations made by the petitioner regarding cruelty
upon him by the respondent are too vague and general in
nature and neither in pleading nor in his evidence petitioner
has disclosed the date, time or the manner by which he was
subjected to cruelties or harassment by the respondent.
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61. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions on
the issue of cruelty, is of considered view that the issue of
cruelty as has been alleged by the appellant-husband
against his wife could not be proved because no cogent
evidence to that effect has been produced by the appellant
and further since, the learned Principal Family Judge after
appreciating the entire evidence had recorded its finding,
therefore, it is considered view of this Court that the
appellant/petitioner has failed to establish the element of
perversity in the aforesaid finding of the learned Family
Court.
62. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions on
the issue of cruelty, is of considered view that the issue of
cruelty as has been alleged by the appellant-husband
against his wife could not be proved because no concrete
evidence to that effect has been produced by the appellant.
63. Thus, as per the discussions made hereinabove and
law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court which has also been
referred herein above this Court has no reason to take
different view that has been taken by the learned Family
Court proving the ground of cruelty.
Issue of desertion
64. Now coming to the issue of desertion, which has been
taken note by the learned Family Court in the impugned
judgment, though it has not been pleaded in the plaint but
the appellant has raised this ground in his evidence.
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65. Learned Principal Judge, taking into consideration the
fact that since even otherwise there is no desertion on the
part of respondent-wife as she in her evidence also has
deposed that she is very keen and desirous to live and stay
with her husband all through her life and perform her wifely
duties. Thus, although the husband appellant had filed
petition under sub-section (i-b) of Section 13(1) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 but no cogent evidence was led in this
respect, as such the same was discarded by the learned
family court.
66. It needs to refer herein that the word ‘desertion’ has
been given in Explanation to Section 13 (1) wherein it has
been stated that “the expression desertion means the
desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage
without reasonable cause and without the consent or
against the wish of such party, and includes the willful
neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage,
and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions
shall be construed accordingly.”
67. It is pertinent to note that the word ‘desertion’, as has
been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the Act,
1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other
party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without
the consent or against the wishes of such party, and
includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other
party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and
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cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.
68. Rayden on Divorce, which is a standard work on the
subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-law
on the subject in these terms:
“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other,
with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of
bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without
reasonable cause and without the consent of the other
spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse
does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting
party.”
69. The legal position has been admirably summarised in
paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury’s Laws of
England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:
“In its essence desertion means the intentional
permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by
the other without that other’s consent, and without
reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the
obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of
circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court
has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there
being no general principle applicable to all cases.”
70. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a
state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the
recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the
married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for
short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous
cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having
been consummated. The person who actually withdraws
from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party.
71. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which
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exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for
divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or,
where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer.
72. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the
statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence
founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete,
but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a
continuing offence.
73. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of
meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one
of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from
wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in
a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust,
without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will
not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far
as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of
separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation
permanently to an end.
74. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the
deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent,
and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the
spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary
intention aforesaid.
75. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs.
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Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the
definition of ‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Lachman
Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which
has been consistently followed in several decisions of this
Court.
76. The law consistently has been laid down by the Court
that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one
spouse by the other without the consent of the other and
without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must
prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an
intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the
cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there
should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting
spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of
the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse
should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse
to leave the matrimonial home.
77. At the outset, it is an admitted position that the
plaintiff and the defendant are legally wedded spouses and
that their marriage was solemnized on 16.04.2016 according
to Hindu rites and customs. It is also not in dispute that the
parties have been living separately for a considerable period.
78. The plaintiff examined himself as PW-1. In his
examination-in-chief, he stated that after the marriage the
defendant resided in the matrimonial home for only about
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two months and thereafter left for her parental home
without his permission. According to him, the defendant was
quarrelsome in nature, misbehaved with his parents, and on
several occasions threatened to commit suicide.
79. He further deposed that in March 2019 the defendant,
accompanied by her relatives, came to the matrimonial
home, abused and assaulted his parents, and demanded
that he seek partition of the family property from his father.
On his refusal, she allegedly left the matrimonial home and
subsequently instituted false criminal proceedings alleging
dowry demand. He asserted that the defendant had treated
him with cruelty and had deserted him for more than two
years.
80. PW-2, Smt. Gayatri Rachna, and PW-3, Shri Rajeshwar
Roy, who are the mother and father of the plaintiff
respectively, substantially corroborated the version of PW-1.
They deposed that the defendant resided in the matrimonial
home only for a short period and thereafter stayed at her
parental house. They further stated that the defendant had
threatened to implicate them in false criminal cases.
81. On the other hand, the defendant examined herself as
DW-1. She deposed that at the time of marriage her parents
had given substantial cash, articles, and ornaments. She
further stated that after marriage she came to know that he
was allegedly maintaining an illicit relationship with another
woman. According to her, whenever she objected to such
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conduct, she was subjected to physical and mental cruelty.
She further deposed that she was assaulted by the plaintiff
and his parents, her ornaments were taken away, and she
was forcibly driven out of the matrimonial home. Thereafter,
she lodged a complaint before the police and underwent
medical treatment at PMCH, Dhanbad. She categorically
denied that she had deserted the plaintiff of her own accord
and stated that she was compelled to leave the matrimonial
home due to the conduct of the plaintiff and his family
members.
82. DW-2, Smt. Asha Roy, the mother of the defendant,
fully supported the testimony of DW-1.
83. Thus, the evidence on record does not establish that
the defendant voluntarily abandoned the matrimonial home
with the intention of permanently terminating cohabitation.
On the contrary, the defendant has consistently asserted
that she was compelled to leave after being assaulted and
driven out by the plaintiff/appellant and his parents. Her
version has remained substantially consistent throughout
the proceedings.
84. It is also evident from the impugned judgment wherein
learned Family Court has observed that the alleged
separation occurred in the year 2019 and the present suit
was instituted in the same year and therefore, the statutory
requirement of continuous desertion for a period of not less
than two years immediately preceding the presentation of
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the petition, as contemplated under Section 13(1)(ib) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, has not been satisfied.
85. Therefore, the withdrawal from the society of the
plaintiff-husband and the abandonment of the plaintiff-
appellant by the defendant-wife, the respondent herein is
not voluntarily rather in the compelling situation and ouster
from her matrimonial house. The criminal case instituted
by the defendant-wife against the plaintiff-husband further
speaks about the absence of willful abandonment of the
plaintiff by the defendant as claimed by the plaintiff.
86. Further it needs to refer herein that the burden to
prove cruelty and desertion squarely rested upon the
plaintiff. In the opinion of this Court, the plaintiff has failed
to discharge that burden by cogent, reliable, and convincing
evidence. Mere matrimonial discord, exchange of allegations,
or separate residence, without proof of the statutory
ingredients, cannot by themselves constitute grounds for
dissolution of marriage.
87. This Court, on the basis of discussions made
hereinabove, is of the view that the appellant husband has
not been able to prove the issue of desertion before the
learned Family Court. As such, we have no reason to take a
different view that has been taken by the learned Family
Court.
Conclusion.
88. This Court, on the basis of discussions made
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hereinabove, is of the view that the judgment dated
28.06.2022 and decree signed on 07.07.2022 by learned
Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad whereby and
whereunder the Original Suit No.328 of 2019 filed by the
appellant-husband for a decree of divorce has been
dismissed, requires no interference by this Court.
89. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
90. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands
disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I agree.
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Date : 23/07/2026
Birendra / A.F.R.
Uploaded on 24/07/2026
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