Telangana High Court
Smt. Mudigonda Madhavi vs M. Phanidhara Prasad on 24 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN
APPEAL SUIT No. 83 OF 2021
DATE: 24.07.2026
Between:
Smt.Mudigonda Madhavi
....Appellant
And
M.Phanidhara Prasad
....Respondents
JUDGMENT
Heard Sri Vijay B. Paropakari, learned counsel for the
appellant and Sri W.B.Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel
representing Sri K.Ramalingeswara Sarma, learned counsel for the
respondent and perused the record.
2. This appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC‘), is directed
against the judgment and decree dated 18.02.2021 passed by the
learned XIV Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.
Nagar (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial court’) in O.S.No.224 of
2013. By the said Judgment and Decree, the trial court decreed the
suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff seeking specific performance
of Agreement of Sale dated 22.10.2011.
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3. The respondent/plaintiff is the younger brother of the
appellant’s late husband, M. Mahanandeeshwara Rao, who passed
away on 25.04.2000. The appellant/defendant is the widow of the
said M. Mahanandeeshwara Rao and is, therefore, the elder sister-
in-law of the respondent. The appellant has two daughters. The
close familial relationship between the parties constitutes the
foundation of the appellant’s defence. According to her, following
the demise of her husband, the respondent, being her brother-in-
law, actively assisted her in her family affairs and occupied a
position of trust and confidence, which, according to the appellant,
was subsequently misused by him.
4. The subject matter of the litigation is a residential house
bearing Municipal No.1-12-169/172, situated on Plot No.172,
Sy.No.5, Block No.1, Ward No.12, admeasuring 97 Sq yards,
consisting of a ground floor and first floor, located at Sri Sai
Narayana Enclave, Fathullaguda Village, Uppal Mandal, Ranga
Reddy District (hereinafter referred to as “the suit schedule
property”). It is not in dispute that the appellant is the absolute
owner of the suit schedule property, having acquired title thereto
under a registered sale deed dated 23.08.2007, and the said
ownership forms the basis of the present dispute.
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Plaint Averments (Respondent/Plaintiff’s case)
5. The case of the respondent/plaintiff, as set out in the plaint,
in substance, is as follows:
i. The respondent/plaintiff instituted O.S.No.224 of 2013
before the learned XIV Additional District Judge, Ranga
Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, seeking the relief of specific
performance of the Agreement of Sale dated 22.10.2011 in
respect of the suit schedule property.
ii. According to the plaintiff, the appellant/defendant, being in
dire financial necessity to maintain her family, offered to sell
the suit schedule property to him for a total sale
consideration of Rs.20,00,000/-. The plaintiff accepted the
offer, and on 22.10.2011, the appellant executed an
Agreement of Sale (Ex.A1) in his favour, acknowledging
receipt of Rs.19,00,000/- in cash towards part sale
consideration. The balance sale consideration of
Rs.1,00,000/- was agreed to be paid at the time of execution
and registration of the sale deed. It was further pleaded that
the appellant simultaneously handed over the original title
deed relating to the suit schedule property to the plaintiff.
iii. The plaintiff pleaded that, in the month of February, 2012,
he called upon the appellant to receive the balance sale
consideration and execute the registered sale deed. However,
4the appellant postponed the execution of the sale deed on
one pretext or another. According to the plaintiff, he
subsequently came to know on 03.02.2013 that real estate
brokers were frequently visiting the suit schedule property
and that the appellant was attempting to alienate the
property to third parties by suppressing the earlier
Agreement of Sale.
iv. Consequently, the plaintiff caused a legal notice dated
05.02.2013 (Ex.A2) to be issued through registered post
calling upon the appellant to perform her contractual
obligations. Despite receipt of the said notice, the appellant
neither complied with the demand nor sent any reply.
v. The plaintiff asserted that he had always been ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract by paying the
balance sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- and obtaining a
registered sale deed. Alleging that the appellant had failed to
honour the terms of the Agreement of Sale and that he had
no other efficacious remedy, the plaintiff instituted
O.S.No.224 of 2013 on 27.02.2013, seeking a decree for
specific performance of the Agreement of Sale dated
22.10.2011.
vi. In support of his case, the plaintiff examined himself as PW.1
and examined Kummari Srinivas, one of the attesting
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witnesses to the Agreement of Sale, as PW.2. He also marked
Exs.A1 to A9, namely:
a) Ex.A1 - Original Agreement of Sale dated
22.10.2011;
b) Ex.A2 – Office copy of the legal notice dated
05.02.2013;
c) Ex.A3 – Original Registered Postal Receipt;
d) Ex.A4 – Original sale deed of the suit schedule
property standing in the name of the appellant;
e) Exs.A5 to A8 – Certified copies of registered sale
deeds relating to the plaintiff’s properties, relied upon
by him to establish the source of the amount of
Rs.19,00,000/- allegedly paid as advance sale
consideration; and
f) Ex.A9 – Bank statement of the plaintiff.
Written Statement (Appellant/Defendant’s case)
6. The appellant/defendant filed her written statement resisting
the suit, and has contended as under:
i. The appellant categorically denied the execution of the
Agreement of Sale dated 22.10.2011 (Ex.A1) and disputed
the receipt of Rs.19,00,000/- or any part of the alleged sale
consideration from the plaintiff. Appellant asserted that
Ex.A1 is a forged and fabricated document brought into
6existence by the plaintiff for his wrongful gain and that there
was neither any agreement to sell the suit schedule property
nor any concluded contract between the parties.
ii. The appellant pleaded that, after the demise of her husband
on 25.04.2000, the respondent/plaintiff, being brother of her
late husband, actively assisted her in family affairs,
including the construction of the suit schedule house, and
thereby occupied a position of trust and confidence.
According to appellant, taking advantage of such fiduciary
relationship, the respondent/plaintiff obtained her
signatures on certain blank papers and took custody of the
original title deed of the suit schedule property on the pretext
of securing a bank loan for construction of the house. It was
her specific case that those signatures were subsequently
misused for creating the alleged Agreement of Sale.
iii. The appellant further contended that the plaintiff, being a
Government employee, lacked the financial capacity to pay
Rs.19,00,000/- in cash. According to appellant, if such a
transaction had in fact taken place, the plaintiff ought to
have obtained the requisite permission from his higher
authorities and disclosed the transaction in accordance with
the applicable service rules. The absence of any such
7disclosure, according to the appellant, rendered the plaintiff’s
version inherently improbable.
iv. The appellant further pleaded that the respondent/plaintiff
had even attested the registered sale deed executed by her in
favour of his own sister. Appellant asserted that she had
purchased Plot No.172 under a registered sale deed dated
23.08.2007 and had subsequently sold a portion thereof
measuring 40 Sq yards to the plaintiff’s sister under a
registered sale deed dated 29.08.2011, wherein the plaintiff
figured as an attesting witness. These circumstances,
according to the appellant, demonstrated the confidence
reposed in the plaintiff, which he later misused.
v. The appellant denied that she was in financial distress or
under any compulsion to sell the suit schedule property.
According to appellant, she had no necessity to alienate the
property, and pleaded that she had contracted a second
marriage on 08.12.2012 and that, owing to personal
differences arising therefrom, the plaintiff bore a grudge
against her and instituted the present suit only to harass
her.
vi. A substantial part of the defence centred around the stage of
construction of the suit schedule property. The appellant
asserted that, as on 22.10.2011, only the ground floor
8
existed and that the first floor had not been constructed.
According to appellant, the first floor was completed only in
April, 2012 by availing a gold loan through Manappuram
Finance with the assistance of her father, and the loan was
later discharged by selling her gold ornaments. Appellant
further pleaded that she had paid Rs.64,000/- to the plaintiff
by cheque dated 16.11.2011 towards purchase of
construction material and another sum of Rs.4,400/- by
cheque dated 13.06.2012 towards patchwork in the first
floor. Therefore, it was contended that the recital in Ex.A1
describing the suit schedule property as consisting of a
“ground floor and first floor” clearly established that the
document was fabricated.
vii. The appellant also disputed the admissibility and
genuineness of Ex.A1 by contending that it was not duly
stamped, was hit by Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration
Act, contained several corrections and interpolations, and
that the stamp papers used therein were not genuine.
Appellant further denied having received the legal notice
allegedly issued by the plaintiff and asserted that she had
never met the alleged scribe or attesting witnesses to Ex.A1.
On the aforesaid grounds, the appellant prayed for dismissal
of the suit with exemplary costs.
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Consideration by the trial Court
7. The Trial Court, upon consideration of the averments in the
pleadings and contents of the documents produced by the rival
parties has framed the following issues for determination:
I. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific
performance of the Agreement of Sale dated 22.10.2011 in
against the defendant in respect of the suit schedule
property as prayed for?
II. To what relief?
By judgment and decree dated 18.02.2021, the learned trial Court
answered Issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit
with costs.
The trial Court held that the due execution of the Agreement
of Sale dated 22.10.2011 (Ex.A1) stood established through the
oral evidence of PW.1, the plaintiff, and PW.2, one of the attesting
witnesses to the document. The Court observed that, although the
appellant/defendant alleged that Ex.A1 was forged and fabricated,
she had not specifically disputed the signatures appearing thereon
and had failed to adduce any oral or documentary evidence in
support of her plea of forgery or fabrication. The trial Court further
held that the evidence of PW.2 corroborated the plaintiff’s version
regarding the execution of Ex.A1, payment of Rs.19,00,000/- as
10advance sale consideration, and handing over of the original title
deeds by the appellant.
With regard to the appellant’s contention that the plaintiff
lacked the financial capacity to pay Rs.19,00,000/-, the trial Court
held that the plaintiff had satisfactorily explained the source of
funds by producing Exs.A5 to A8, namely, certified copies of
contemporaneous registered sale deeds relating to the sale of his
own properties. The Court, therefore, rejected the contention that
the plaintiff lacked the financial means to pay the advance sale
consideration.
The trial Court held that the plaintiff had established his
continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract by paying the balance sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-
and seeking execution of the registered sale deed. As regards the
appellant’s contention that the plaintiff, being a Government
servant, had not obtained prior permission from his higher
authorities before entering into the transaction, the Court held that
any violation of service rules, if at all, was a matter between the
plaintiff and his employer and did not affect the validity or
enforceability of Ex.A1.
The trial Court rejected the defence set up by the
appellant/defendant on the ground that she had neither entered
11the witness box nor adduced any documentary evidence in support
of her allegations that Ex.A1 had been fabricated by misusing her
signatures obtained on blank papers; that the plaintiff lacked
financial capacity; or that the Agreement of Sale was otherwise not
genuine. The Court further held that the mere fact that the
attesting witnesses were known to the plaintiff or were working
under him was insufficient to discredit Ex.A1 in the absence of any
evidence to substantiate the appellant’s allegations.
Accordingly, the trial Court decreed the suit with costs and
directed the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration of
Rs.1,00,000/- to the credit of the suit within the stipulated time,
whereupon the appellant was directed to execute and register the
sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within two weeks, with liberty to
withdraw the amount so deposited.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant (Defendant)
8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant
assailed the impugned judgment and decree dated 18.02.2021
passed in O.S.No.224 of 2013 and advanced his submissions as
under:
i. That the respondent/plaintiff is the natural brother of the
appellant’s deceased husband and, following the death of her
husband, actively managed the appellant’s family affairs,
12including the construction of the suit schedule house.
Taking advantage of the confidence reposed in him, the
respondent allegedly obtained the appellant’s signatures on
certain blank papers and also secured possession of the
original title deed under the pretext of arranging a bank loan
for construction of the house. It is submitted that the said
documents were subsequently misused for fabricating the
Agreement of Sale dated 22.10.2011 (Ex.A1).
ii. That the appellant has consistently denied the execution of
Ex.A1 as well as the receipt of Rs.19,00,000/- towards
advance sale consideration. It is submitted that Ex.A1 is a
forged and fabricated document, containing several
corrections, insertions and interlineations, which render its
genuineness highly doubtful. It is argued that the learned
trial Court has failed to subject the document to the degree
of scrutiny warranted in the facts of the case.
iii. That the respondent, being a Government servant, failed to
establish his financial capacity to pay Rs.19,00,000/- in
cash. According to the learned counsel, the respondent
neither obtained the requisite permission from his competent
authority under the applicable service rules nor disclosed the
alleged cash transaction in the prescribed service records. It
is contended that these circumstances cast serious doubt
13upon the respondent’s claim of having paid such a
substantial amount in cash and render the transaction
inherently improbable.
iv. That the burden squarely rested upon the
respondent/plaintiff to establish the due execution of Ex.A1
and his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his
part of the contract. It is argued that the learned trial Court
erroneously shifted the burden onto the appellant and was
carried away merely because she did not adduce oral
evidence.
v. That the evidence of PW.2, being a subordinate employee
working under the respondent, ought not to have been
accepted without independent corroboration, and that the
trial Court failed to appreciate the interested nature of the
evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff.
vi. That the decree for specific performance is inequitable and
ought to have been refused in the exercise of equitable
discretion. Learned counsel submits that the appellant is a
widow having two daughters and that the suit schedule
property constitutes her only residential house. It is argued
that enforcement of the alleged Agreement of Sale would
deprive the appellant and her daughters of their only shelter.
It is further submitted that the suit came to be instituted
14after an inordinate delay of more than one and a half years
from the alleged cause of action, and that, during the
intervening period, the market value of the property has
increased substantially. Thus, compelling the appellant to
execute the sale deed for the consideration allegedly agreed
upon in the year 2011 would result in grave hardship and
manifest injustice.
9. Learned counsel for appellant has placed reliance on the
following decisions in support of his case:
a) U.N.Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) through Legal
Representatives v. A.M. Krishnamurthy 1 (at paras 38 and
42.3.)
b) Nanjappan v. Ramasamy and another 2 (at para 15)
c) Rajinder Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh and others 3 (at paras 37
and 45)
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent (Plaintiff)
10. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
respondent/plaintiff supported the impugned judgment and decree
and advanced the following submissions:
1 (2023) 11 SCC 775
2 2015 (4) ALD 135 (SC)
3 2014 (3) ALD 100 (SC)
15i. That the due execution of the Agreement of Sale dated
22.10.2011 (Ex.A1) stands conclusively established through
the oral evidence of PW.1, the plaintiff, and PW.2, one of the
attesting witnesses to the document. It is contended that the
appellant never specifically disputed her signatures
appearing on Ex.A1 and, despite alleging forgery and
fabrication in the written statement, failed to adduce any oral
or documentary evidence in support of such allegations.
Therefore, it is submitted that a mere plea of denial,
unsupported by evidence, cannot discredit a duly proved
document.
ii. That the respondent continuously remained ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract. In support of the
said contention, reliance is placed upon the legal notice
dated 05.02.2013 (Ex.A2) issued to the appellant calling
upon her to receive the balance sale consideration and
execute the registered sale deed. It is further submitted that,
pursuant to the decree passed by the learned trial Court, the
respondent deposited the balance sale consideration of
Rs.1,00,000/- to the credit of the suit within the time
stipulated, thereby demonstrating his bona fides and
continuous readiness and willingness to perform the
contract.
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iii. That the respondent satisfactorily established his financial
capacity to pay the advance sale consideration of
Rs.19,00,000/- by producing Exs.A5 to A8, being certified
copies of registered sale deeds evidencing the sale of his own
properties, coupled with Ex.A9, his bank statement.
According to the learned Senior Counsel, the said documents
sufficiently establish the legitimate source of funds utilised
by the respondent for payment of the advance sale
consideration.
iv. That, notwithstanding the serious allegations of forgery,
fabrication and misuse of trust levelled in the written
statement, the appellant neither entered the witness box nor
adduced any oral or documentary evidence in support of her
defence. It is, therefore, contended that the learned trial
Court rightly rejected the appellant’s pleas and was justified
in drawing an adverse inference against her for withholding
the best available evidence.
v. That no equitable consideration arises in favour of the
appellant so as to deny the relief of specific performance.
According to the learned Senior Counsel, the appellant
voluntarily entered into the Agreement of Sale, received
Rs.19,00,000/-, constituting 95% of the total sale
consideration, and also handed over the original title deeds
17
to the respondent. Having accepted the substantial portion of
the consideration, the appellant cannot be permitted to
retain both the advance amount and the property by resiling
from her contractual obligations. It is contended that the
appellant’s status as a widow, the existence of two
daughters, or the subsequent appreciation in the market
value of the property cannot, by themselves, constitute valid
grounds for refusing enforcement of an otherwise valid
contract.
vi. With regard to the plea of delay, learned Senior Counsel
submitted that the respondent issued the legal notice within
the period of limitation immediately upon learning of the
appellant’s attempts to alienate the suit schedule property to
third parties and thereafter instituted O.S.No.224 of 2013
without undue delay. It is, therefore, contended that the plea
of delay or hardship raised by the appellant does not
constitute a legally sustainable ground for denying the
equitable relief of specific performance.
11. Learned Senior Counsel for respondent has placed reliance
on the following decisions in support of his case:
a) Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao and another 4
b) Sardar Gurubaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and another 5
4 (1999) 3 SCC 573
18
12. I have taken note of the rival submissions advanced by the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings, oral and
documentary evidence and the material available on record.
Consideration by this Court
13. The principal contention urged by the appellant is that the
Agreement of Sale dated 22.10.2011 (Ex.A1) is a forged and
fabricated document brought into existence by misusing the trust
reposed in the respondent, who is admittedly the natural brother of
the appellant’s deceased husband. According to the appellant, the
respondent obtained her signatures on certain blank papers and
secured possession of the original title deed under the pretext of
arranging a bank loan, which were subsequently misused for
fabricating Ex.A1.
14. It is trite that, in a suit for specific performance, the initial
burden lies upon the plaintiff to establish the due execution of the
agreement sought to be enforced, together with his continuous
readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Once
such initial burden is discharged by leading acceptable evidence,
the onus shifts to the defendant to substantiate the specific pleas
5 (1927) 29 Bom. L.R. 1392
6 AIR 1974 P&H 7
19
raised in defence, including allegations of fraud, fabrication or
forgery.
15. In the present case, the respondent examined himself as
PW.1 and one of the attesting witnesses to Ex.A1, namely PW.2,
who deposed to the execution of the Agreement of Sale, payment of
Rs.19,00,000/- towards advance sale consideration, and delivery of
the original title deeds by the appellant. The respondent also
produced the original Agreement of Sale as Ex.A1 along with the
connected documentary evidence.
16. Significantly, although the appellant alleged that Ex.A1 was
forged and fabricated, she did not adduce any oral or documentary
evidence in support of such plea. The record further discloses that,
while disputing the execution of the agreement, the appellant did
not specifically dispute the signatures appearing on Ex.A1.
Therefore, the defence remains unsupported by any evidence.
17. The appellant has also questioned the credibility of PW.2 on
the ground that he was working under the respondent.
Undoubtedly, the relationship between a witness and a party is a
relevant circumstance while appreciating evidence. However, such
relationship, by itself, does not render the testimony inadmissible
or unreliable. The evidence of PW.2 has to be assessed on its own
merits in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the other
evidence available on record. The learned trial Court noticed that
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the mere fact that PW.2 and the other attesting witness were
known to the respondent or were employed in the same
establishment did not, in the absence of any contrary evidence,
justify an inference that Ex.A1 was fabricated.
18. It is well settled that allegations of fraud or forgery are
required to be specifically pleaded and strictly proved by the party
asserting them. Mere allegations, however serious, cannot take the
place of proof. Whether the respondent has satisfactorily
discharged the burden of proving the execution of Ex.A1 and
whether the appellant has succeeded in probabilising her defence
are, therefore, required to be examined on the basis of the evidence
available on record.
19. In this regard, it is apposite to note that the respondent has
discharged the initial burden of proving the due execution of Ex.A1
by examining himself as PW.1 and one of the attesting witnesses as
PW.2 and by producing the original Agreement of Sale. Once such
burden stood discharged, the appellant, who alleged fraud and
fabrication, was required to substantiate the same by acceptable
evidence. Having failed to do so, the findings recorded by the
learned trial Court on the due execution of Ex.A1 do not warrant
interference.
20. The appellant contends that the respondent, being a
Government servant, lacked the financial capacity to pay
21
Rs.19,00,000/- in cash under Ex.A1 and had failed to comply with
the applicable service rules governing acquisition of immovable
property. However, the record demonstrates that the respondent
sought to establish the source of the advance sale consideration by
producing Exs.A5 to A8, being certified copies of registered sale
deeds relating to the sale of his own properties, along with Ex.A9,
his bank statement. The learned trial Court accepted the said
documentary evidence as sufficient to establish the respondent’s
financial capacity to pay the advance sale consideration under
Ex.A1.
21. It is pertinent to note that the objection founded upon the
respondent’s alleged non-compliance with the applicable service
rules does not materially affect the enforceability of Ex.A1. The
appellant contends that the respondent neither obtained prior
permission from his competent authority nor disclosed the
transaction in the manner required under the relevant service
regulations. The learned trial Court was of the view that any such
omission, if established, would constitute a matter between the
respondent and his employer and would not, by itself, affect the
validity or enforceability of the Agreement of Sale executed between
the parties. Therefore, the documentary evidence produced by the
respondent sufficiently establishes the source of the advance sale
consideration. The objection regarding violation of service rules
22
cannot invalidate an otherwise enforceable civil contract between
the parties.
22. In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff is required to
establish his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his
part of the contract from the date of the agreement until the
passing of the decree. In the present case, the respondent
consistently pleaded that he was ready and willing to perform his
contractual obligations and, in support thereof, relied upon the
legal notice dated 05.02.2013 (Ex.A2) calling upon the appellant to
receive the balance sale consideration and execute the registered
sale deed.
23. The record further discloses that, pursuant to the decree
passed by the learned trial Court, the respondent deposited the
balance sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- within the stipulated
time. Though the deposit was made subsequent to the decree, it
nevertheless lends credence to the respondent’s plea of readiness
and willingness. The issuance of Ex.A2 coupled with the
subsequent deposit of the balance sale consideration pursuant to
the decree lends weightage to the respondent’s plea of continuous
readiness and willingness. This Court finds no reason to differ from
the conclusion reached by the learned trial Court on this aspect.
24. It is to be noted that despite specifically pleading fraud,
fabrication and misuse of her signatures, the appellant neither
23
entered the witness box nor adduced any oral or documentary
evidence in support of such pleas. It is well settled that allegations
of fraud or forgery must be established by cogent and convincing
evidence and cannot rest on mere pleadings. The absence of any
evidence in support of the defence is, therefore, a relevant
circumstance while appreciating the rival claims of the parties.
25. In Sardar Gurubaksh Singh (supra 5), the Privy Council
has held as under:
“The true object to be achieved by a Court of justice can only be
furthered with propriety by the testimony of the party who
personally knowing the whole circumstances of the case can
dispel the suspicious attaching to it. The story can then be
subjected in all its particulars to cross-examination.”
26. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that
the relief of specific performance deserves to be declined on
equitable considerations, for the reason that the appellant is a
widow having two daughters; that the suit schedule property
constitutes her only residential house; and that its market value
has appreciated substantially since the execution of the Agreement
of Sale dated 22.10.2011, are to be noted only to be rejected. The
personal hardships of the appellant may arise sympathetic
considerations but do not constitute legally sustainable grounds to
deny specific performance. The alleged hardships were not caused
by the respondent/plaintiff and do not directly guise of the
contract and cannot invalidate a binding common commitment.
24
27. It is well settled that the relief of specific performance is
discretionary and governed by equitable principles. While
exercising such discretion, the Court is required to balance the
equities between the parties and consider whether enforcement of
the contract would result in such hardship to the defendant as
would render the grant of the relief inequitable. At the same time,
hardship pleaded by the defendant must be weighed against the
rights acquired by the plaintiff under the contract and the conduct
of the respective parties.
28. The respondent/plaintiff has paid (substantial portion) 95%
of the entire consideration. The vendor has enjoyed the purchaser’s
money since 2011. In such circumstances, equity must operate to
prevent unjust enrichment. Equity cannot be invoked to sanction a
breach of faith against an innocent purchaser who has acted bona
fide under a lawful agreement. It is well settled that equity follows
the law; it cannot be employed to defeat a valid contract, nor can
equitable principles be applied in a manner that is entirely one-
sided.
29. The appellant has also sought to invoke the fiduciary
relationship between the parties, contending that the respondent,
being the brother of her deceased husband, abused the confidence
reposed in him and procured Ex.A1 by obtaining her signatures on
blank papers. However, the mere existence of a close familial
25
relationship does not, by itself, establish undue influence or abuse
of confidence in relation to a commercial transaction evidenced by
a written agreement. Whether such plea is sustainable necessarily
depends upon the evidence adduced in support thereof. The
absence of any evidence to establish undue influence or abuse of
the alleged fiduciary relationship renders the plea wholly
unsubstantiated.
30. Further, the appellant has relied upon her personal
circumstances, namely that she is a widow having two daughters
and that the suit schedule property is her only residential house.
These are undoubtedly relevant circumstances which merit due
consideration while exercising equitable jurisdiction. However,
equally relevant, is the respondent’s case that he had paid
Rs.19,00,000/-, constituting a substantial part of the agreed sale
consideration, and had consistently expressed his willingness to
pay the balance consideration. Therefore, this Court is required to
balance the competing equities in the light of the evidence available
on record.
31. It is a settled principle that subsequent appreciation in the
value of immovable property, in the absence of other compelling
circumstances, cannot ordinarily defeat an otherwise enforceable
contract. This principle was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme
26
Court in K. Prakash v. B.R. Sampath Kumar 7, has held that a
decree for specific performance cannot be reversed solely on the
ground of a rise in price, though the Court may consider imposing
conditions to compensate the other party. The said relevant para is
extracted hereunder:
18. Subsequent rise in the price will not be treated as a hardship
entailing refusal of the decree for specific performance. Rise in
price is a normal change of circumstances and, therefore, on that
ground a decree for specific performance cannot be reversed.
(Emphasis supplied)
32. Moreover, the contention regarding escalation in the market
value of the suit schedule property also does not furnish a ground
to decline the relief of specific performance. It is a settled principle
that subsequent appreciation in the value of immovable property,
in the absence of other compelling circumstances, cannot
ordinarily defeat an otherwise enforceable contract.
33. Further, the decisions relied upon by the appellant are
distinguishable on facts and law for the following reasons:
i. In U.N. Krishnamurthy (supra 1), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has observed that the execution and validity of the
agreement of sale were not in dispute; the controversy was
confined to the equitable exercise of discretion in granting
specific performance, particularly with reference to delay,
readiness and willingness, and escalation of property prices.
7 (2015) 1 SCC 597
27However, in the present case, the very execution and
genuineness of the Agreement of Sale (Ex.A1) are seriously
disputed. The appellant has consistently pleaded that Ex.A1
is a forged and fabricated document created by misusing her
signatures obtained on blank papers, and has denied receipt
of any sale consideration or the existence of a concluded
contract. Therefore, the question of applying equitable
considerations regarding readiness, willingness or payment
of substantial consideration does not arise unless the
plaintiff first establishes a valid and enforceable agreement.
ii. In Nanjappan (supra 2) it was observed that the execution
and validity of the agreement of sale were undisputed, and
the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined specific performance
solely on equitable considerations, having regard to the
hardship that would be caused to the defendant. However, in
the present case, the very execution and genuineness of
Ex.A1 are in dispute. The appellant has consistently pleaded
that Ex.A1 is a forged and fabricated document created by
misusing her signatures obtained in a fiduciary relationship.
Therefore, unless the plaintiff first establishes a valid and
enforceable agreement, the question of exercising equitable
discretion in granting specific performance does not arise.
28
iii. In Rajinder Kumar (supra 3) the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
has made observations regarding the principle of a fortiori,
namely that a vendor may be compensated for accretion in
the value of the property where execution of an undisputed
decree is delayed by the purchaser, were made in the context
of post-decree proceedings under Section 28 of the Specific
Relief Act, where the validity of the agreement and the decree
for specific performance had already attained finality.
However, in the present case, the very execution and
genuineness of Ex.A1 are in serious dispute, the appellant
having consistently alleged that it is a forged and fabricated
document created by misusing her signatures obtained in a
fiduciary relationship. Thus, the said decision does not
advance the case of the appellant.
34. Thus, the appellant has failed to establish that Ex.A1 was
fabricated or that the respondent lacked financial capacity or
readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.
Equally, no exceptional circumstance has been shown warranting
refusal of the equitable relief of specific performance. This Court,
therefore, finds no perversity, illegality or infirmity in the findings
recorded by the learned trial Court warranting interference in the
present appeal.
29
Conclusion
35. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered
view that the appellant has failed to demonstrate any factual or
legal infirmity warranting interference with the judgment and
decree dated 18.02.2021 passed in O.S.No.224 of 2013. The
findings recorded by the learned XIV Additional District Judge are
founded on a proper appreciation of the evidence and the settled
principles governing suits for specific performance.
36. Accordingly, the Appeal Suit No.83 of 2021 is dismissed. The
judgment and decree dated 18.02.2021 passed by the learned XIV
Additional District Judge, at L.B.Nagar in O.S.No.224 of 2013 is
confirmed.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any in the
appeal, shall stand closed. No costs.
_____________________
G.M.MOHIUDDIN, J
Date: 24.07.2026
szt
