Smt.Gopi Bai vs State on 29 July, 2026

July 30, 2026

Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur

Smt.Gopi Bai vs State on 29 July, 2026

[2026:RJ-JP:27583]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12/1987
URN: CW / 250U / 1987

1. Sohan Lal (since deceased) represented by his legal
representatives :
1/1. Roop Chand Jain, son
1/2. Dinesh Kumar Jain, son
1/3. Suresh Kumar, son
1/4. Smt. Nirmala Jain wife of Bhanu Kumar Jain, daughter
1/5. Smt. Urmila Jain wife of Ravi Kant Jain, daughter
2. Dharam Chand since deceased through his legal
representatives :-
2/1. Suman Jain Wife of Dharam Chand Jain, R/o Lakheri
Kalan, Tehsil Indargarh, District Bundi.
2/2. Manish Jain Son of Dharam Chand Jain, R/o Lakheri
Kalan, Tehsil Indargarh, District Bundi.
2/3. Akshita Jain Daughter of Dharam Chand Jain, R/o 2-
KH-13, Dadabadi, Kota.
3. Ashok Kumar resident of Lakheri Kalan, tehsil Indergarh,
District Bundi
4. Narendra Kumar son of Nemi Chand resident of Lakheri Kalan,
tehsil Indergarh, district Bundi.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan.
2. Land Acquisition Officer cum SDO, Bundi.
3. Municipal Board, Lakheri, district Bundi.
----Respondents

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, Senior Counsel
with Mr. Madhusudan Singh
Rajpurohit, Adv.,
Mr. Yogesh Kalla, Adv. &
Ms. Alankrita Sharma, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. G. S. Gill, AAG with
Mr. Manoj Choudhary, Adv.,
Mr. Yadvendra Patel, Adv.
Ms. Pooja Dixit, Adv.

(D.B. SAW/269/2000 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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[2026:RJ-JP:27583] (2 of 22) [CW-12/1987]

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
Reportable

Date of conclusion of arguments :: 17.07.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved :: 17.07.2026
Whether the full judgment or only
the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement :: 29.07.2026

1. By way of filing this writ petition, the petitioners have

challenged legality, validity and proprietary of notification dated

21.11.1978 issued under Section 4, notification dated 08.02.1984

issued under Section 6, notification dated 28.02.1984 issued

under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for

short 'the Act of 1953') and award dated 24.09.1986 passed under

Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Although, by way of

making amendment in the writ petition prayer No.IV was inserted

by the petitioners for seeking a declaration that the entire land

acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of Section 24 (2) of

the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency In Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short

'the Act of 2013'), however, during the pendency of the writ

petition, in the light of Constitutional Bench Judgment delivered by

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development

Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors.; AIR 2020 SC 1496, prayer

No.IV with regard to lapsing of the acquisition proceedings in view

of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 has not been pressed.

2. The facts in brief are that land bearing Khasra No.1687,

1688, 1689, 1690, 1691, 1694, 1696, 1697, 1698, 1699 situated

at village Lakheri Kalan, Tehsil Keshoraipatan, Bundi was recorded

in the name of late Shri Bajrang Lal. Petitioners have come out

with the case that Bajrang Lal expired on 13.01.1974. It is further

stated that Bajrang Lal had three sons namely Gop Chand, Sohan

Lal and Nemi Chand, Gop Chand had already pre-deceased

Bajrang Lal leaving his wife Smt. Gopi Bai, who also adopted

Ashok Kumar son of Nemi Chand. Thus, after death of Bajrang Lal

mutation was sanctioned and opened in favour of Gopi Bai, Sohan

Lal and Nemi Chand vide mutation order dated 21.04.1978.

3. The petitioners in the writ petition have contended that

notification dated 21.11.1978 under Section 4(1) of the Act of

1953 was issued by the respondent-Government for public

purposes namely expansion of residential area of Municipal Board,

Lakheri Kalan, Tehsil Keshoraipatan, District Bundi. Petitioners

have further stated that although, much earlier to issuance of

notification dated 21.11.1978, Bajrang Lal had already expired on

13.01.1974 and thereafter, vide mutation entry dated 21.04.1978,

the aforesaid land was recorded in the name of Gopi Bai, Sohan

Lal and Nemi Chand in the revenue record, yet in notification

dated 21.11.1978, deceased Bajrang Lal was shown as Khatedar

of the above land. The aforesaid notification dated 21.11.1978

was further published in official gazette on 22.02.1979, thereafter,

one notice under Form No.4 as prescribed under Rule 13 of

Rajasthan Land Acquisition Rules, 1956 (for short 'the Rules of

1956') was issued on 15.01.1979. As per petitioners, Form No.4

appended to the Rules of 1956 was recorded to be issued for

service of notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1953.

4. Further, it is submitted that after receiving notice dated

15.01.1979, Nemi Chand, who was son of late Shri Bajrang Lal

submitted objections in writing before Land Acquisition Officer,

Bundi highlighting therein that the notification under Section 4 has

been issued in the name of dead person Bajrang Lal, whereas

after death of Bajrang Lal, mutation has also been opened in

favour of Gopi Bai, Sohan Lal and Nemi Chand. It was also stated

that the purpose shown in the notification cannot be said to be a

public purpose. Sufficient land is already available with the

respondents, therefore, land of the petitioners was not required. It

was also mentioned that no proceedings against a dead person

can be continued by the respondents.

5. It is submitted that on the basis of such objections

raised by Nemi Chand, it was recorded by the Land Acquisition

Officer in its report that Bajrang Lal had already expired prior to

initiation of land acquisition proceedings. Thereafter, patwari of

the concerned area confirmed mutation in favour of legal heirs of

deceased Bajrang Lal, namely Gopi Bai, Sohan Lal and Nemi

Chand by replacing name of erstwhile Khatedar Bajrang Lal in

revenue record. Petitioners have further submitted that despite

specifically pointing out that after death of Bajrang Lal much prior

to initiation of acquisition proceedings, names of Gopi Bai, Sohan

Lal and Nemi Chand have been entered in the revenue records, no

corrective measures were taken by the respondents and

declaration under Section 6 dated 08.02.1984 was issued again in

the name of deceased Bajrang Lal, which is clear cut non

application of mind on the part of the respondents. The aforesaid

declaration under Section 6 was followed by notice under Section

9 dated 28.02.1984, which was also issued by the respondents in

the name of deceased Bajrang Lal. The aforesaid notice under

Section 9 was responded by the petitioners while submitting reply

to the notice in which again it was pointed out that the

proceedings have initiated against a dead person.

6. It is further submitted that the above objections raised

by the petitioners were never adjudicated and ignoring the fact

that the proceedings were initiated and proceeded in the name of

dead person, award dated 24.09.1986 was passed by the Land

Acquisition Officer.

7. Feeling aggrieved by notification under Section 4,

declaration under Section 6, notice under Section 9 and award

under Section 11, writ petition was filed by the petitioners.

However, during the pendency of the writ petition, Smt. Gopi Bai

and Sohan Lal passed away, therefore, legal representatives of

Sohan Lal were brought on record and name of Smt. Gopi Bai was

deleted from the array of the parties. Adopted son of Gopi Bai was

already on record as petitioner No.3. Since, Nemi Chand had

already passed away prior to filing of the writ petition, therefore,

writ was filed by his legal representatives namely Kamla Devi (wife

of deceased Nemi Chand), Ashok Kumar, Dharam Chand and

Narendra Kumar, who all are the sons of Nemi Chand.

8. It is a matter of fact that writ petition filed by the

petitioners was earlier dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide

order dated 19.09.1997. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed

D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.269/2000. The aforesaid appeal was

allowed by the Division Bench vide order dated 13.05.2008,

whereby order dated 19.09.1997 passed by the learned Single

Judge for dismissing the writ petition was quashed and the matter

was remanded back to the learned Single Bench for deciding the

matter afresh on merits after considering the ground taken by the

petitioners that the proceedings were initiated against the dead

person namely Bajrang Lal. Both the parties were given liberty to

raise other points also.

9. Petitioners have stated that they have never been paid

compensation as awarded vide award dated 24.09.1986 and the

same has been deposited with the Government Treasury and by

virtue of interim order passed in this case, they are still in

possession of land in question.

10. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioners have

prayed for quashing the aforesaid proceedings and sought a

direction to de-acquire the land of the petitioners.

11. The writ petition filed by the petitioners have been

opposed by the respondents. It has been stated by the respondent

Nos.1 and 2 in their reply that the land in question has been

acquired for public purposes. It was further submitted that date of

death of Bajrang Lal was never communicated by the petitioners

to the respondents, nor were they aware of any acquisition

proceedings drawn in favour of Gopi Bai, Sohan Lal and Nemi

Chand after death of Bajrang Lal. It was submitted that in

ignorance of factum of death of Bajrang Lal, notification under

Section 4 was rightly issued against erstwhile Khatedar Bajrang

Lal. It was submitted that merely the fact that Bajrang Lal had

expired much before initiation of acquisition proceedings is

irrelevant at this stage, when the notification under Section 4 was

objected by Nemi Chand son of Bajrang Lal, which shows that the

petitioners had knowledge of acquisition proceedings. It is also

submitted that after following the due process, award has already

been passed on 24.09.1986. The allegation with regard to lack of

opportunity of hearing in respect of land acquisition proceedings

has also been denied by the respondents. It was submitted that

notices under Section 9 were also issued and served upon the

petitioners, who also filed response to notices under Section 9.

Hence, at this belated stage, no such plea can be raised by the

petitioners. The respondents prayed for dismissing the writ

petition.

12. Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the petitioners submitted that in the instant case,

where part of the land in question has already been used by the

petitioners for residential and other purposes, under these

circumstances, the purpose of acquiring the land in question i.e.

expansion of residential area of Lakheri cannot be said to be a

public purpose.

13. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that right from

the inception, proceedings have been initiated by the respondents

against a dead person Bajrang Lal, who had died way back in the

year 1974 and even mutation in favour of his legal heirs was also

opened on 21.04.1978. Thus, despite there being complete

information with regard to death of Bajrang Lal and ignoring the

fact that names of Gopi Bai, Sohan Lal and Nemi Chand had

already been entered as Khatedar of the land in question, in quite

malicious manner, just to deprive the petitioners of their right to

be heard against the proposed acquisition proceedings, instead of

issuing notification in the name of recorded Khatedars, at the

relevant time on record, the notification under Section 4 was

issued showing Bajrang Lal as Khatedar of the land. Learned

Senior Counsel submitted that it is a settled proposition of law

that acquisition proceedings initiated against a dead person is a

nullity and all the proceedings drawn pursuant to initiation of

notification against a dead person were also meaningless and

void. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the

proceedings have also been conducted against the scheme of the

Act by the respondents. Notices under Section 4 (5) (i) and (ii) of

the Act of 1953 were never issued which is violation of mandatory

provisions of law.

14. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that much prior

to that issuance of declaration under Section 6 one notice under

Form No.4 dated 15.01.1979 was issued by the respondents,

which is meant to be issued for service of notices under Section 9

of the Act of 1953 for the purpose of inviting the persons

interested to claim compensation. Thus, mere issuance of notice

under Section 9 before issuance of declaration under Section 6, in

itself makes the proceedings in utter violation of the scheme of

the act. Hence, such proceedings cannot be permitted to be

sustained in the eye of law.

15. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners

also emphasized that while responding to aforesaid notice issued

under Form No.4, it was specifically pointed out that the

SPONSORED

notification had been issued in the name of dead person, hence,

the proceedings cannot be allowed to be continued and such fact

has also been taken on record by the Land Acquisition Officer, yet

the respondents have utterly failed to rectify their mistakes

committed earlier and again declaration under Section 6 was

issued in the name of dead person Bajrang Lal. Learned Senior

Counsel submits that thus, in the circumstances, where quite

consciously and willingly the declaration under Section 6 has been

issued again in the name of dead person, only on this point, the

entire proceedings have vitiated and land of the petitioners is

liable to be de-acquired.

16. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that under

Section 6, while issuing declaration the appropriate Government is

required to record its satisfaction with regard to validity of the

proceedings and public purpose attached to it. In the

circumstances, where despite highlighting the grave error of

continuing the proceedings against a dead person, in quite

mechanical manner, declaration under Section 6 was again issued

in the name of Bajrang Lal, a dead person, which shows clear cut

non application of mind on the part of the respondent-Government

and it also reflects that satisfaction qua the validity of proceedings

has been recorded in declaration under Section 6 in quite cursory

and casual manner. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that

declaration under Section 6 is considered to be conclusive

evidence for all purposes, hence, such a significant notification is

required to be issued strictly in accordance with law and any such

discrepancy, as pointed hereinabove, would make it a meaningless

and ineffective document.

17. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that

thereafter, the respondents proceeded further and passed award

dated 24.09.1986. However, till this date, the compensation has

not been paid to the petitioners and possession of the land in

question, by virtue of stay order granted in this case, is still with

the petitioners. Hence, it is clear that when proceedings under

Section 16 have not been drawn in the present case, it is clear

that land in question has not vested with the State Government

free from all encumbrances. As the petitioners are still having

possession over the land in question, which was intended to be

acquired by way of issuing notification in the year 1978, after

lapse of more than 47 years, no fruitful purpose is likely to be

achieved by upholding the acquisition proceedings.

18. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that while

allowing SAW No.269/2000 filed by the petitioners, Division Bench

of this Court has also found that the issue with regard to initiation

of proceedings against dead person is a significant factor.

19. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners relied upon

the judgments delivered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of

Lajja Ram Vs. UT Chandigarh & Ors. reported in 2013 (11)

SCC 235; I.I.S. Employees House Building Cooperative

Society Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in (2005)

12 SCC 483; Collector Vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal reported in 1985

(3) SCC 1; judgment of this Court in Baga Ram Vs. State of

Rajasthan reported in 1992 (2) RLW 432; Bishambhar Dayal

Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1991 (1) WLC 686; Dr.

Laxmi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in AIR 1986

Raj. 149; UIT Vs. Balveer Singh reported in AIR 1985 Raj 71;

M/s Rajasthan Udhyog Vs. State of Raj. reported in 1976

WLN 835 and judgment of Delhi High Court in Savita Kapila Vs.

Assistant Commissioner of I.T. Delhi decided on

16.09.2020.

20. Per contra, Mr. G. S. Gill, learned Additional Advocate

General for the State while opposing the writ petition submitted

that the petition is totally baseless, unfounded and misconceived.

Learned AAG submitted that admittedly, notification under Section

4 in the present case was issued on 21.11.1978, whereas the

present writ petition was filed by the petitioners on 18.12.1986

i.e. with a delay of more than 8 years from the date of issuance of

notification under Section 4. Learned AAG further pointed out that

the petitioners were aware of land acquisition proceedings as

Nemi Chand one of the son of late Shri Bajrang Lal and

predecessor in rights/interest of original petitioners No.3, 4, 5 and

6 objected to the acquisition proceedings by way of filing

objections way back on 15.01.1979. Further, after obtaining report

of Land Acquisition Officer, on recording satisfaction declaration

under Section 6 was issued on 08.02.1984 and the grounds raised

in the instant writ petition were very much available to the

petitioners on the date when objections were raised by Late Shri

Nemi Chand in the year 1979 and thereafter, when declaration

under Section 6 was issued on 28.02.1984. However, no reason

whatsoever, much less than justified reason, has been mentioned

by the petitioners in the memo of writ petition, for not

approaching this Court within reasonable time. Even if, issuance of

declaration under Section 6 is taken to be cause of action of filing

the writ petition, even then, there was admitted delay of more

than one year and nine months in filing the present writ petition.

Learned AAG submitted that it is settled proposition of law that in

the matters of land acquisition delay of only a few days can be

said to be fatal and in the present case, where there is substantial

long delay, the writ petition filed by the petitioners is liable to be

rejected on the ground of delay and laches.

21. Learned Additional Advocate General while responding

to ground raised by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that

the proceedings have been although initiated and proceeded

against a dead person, submitted that it is not a case where on

account of showing wrong name or name of dead person in

notification under Sections 4 and 6, the petitioners were deprived

of any right of hearing. Learned AAG further submits that may be

the name of Khatedar was wrongly entered in notification under

Section 4, yet the facts on record would reveal that the petitioners

were well aware of land acquisition proceedings, for the reason

that son of late Shri Bajrang Lal admittedly raised objections

against validity and proprietary of the proceedings as against a

public purpose of the acquisition. Thus, in the obtaining

circumstances, where the petitioners have already availed the

opportunity of hearing as prescribed under law, merely a clerical

error occurred in notification under Sections 4 and 6, the

proceedings cannot be held to be invalid, nor can they be

quashed.

22. Learned AAG further argued that on receiving notices

under Section 9 of the Act all the petitioners filed their claim

petition claiming compensation and the moment they filed their

claim for receiving monetary compensation, they acquiesced their

right to challenge the land acquisition proceedings.

23. Learned AAG further objected that in the present case,

admittedly the writ petition has been filed after passing of the

award. He submitted that as per settled proposition of law, the

writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot

be maintained after issuance of award under Section 11 of the

Act. Learned AAG submits that only on account of the fact that the

petitioners voluntarily did not receive the compensation as

awarded in the impugned award and the possession is lying with

them only on account of stay granted by this Court, it cannot be

said that by the lapse of time, proceedings have been rendered

fruitless or meaningless. Learned AAG also submitted that as the

notification under Sections 4 and 6 were published in official

gazette and the details of land were correctly mentioned in both

the notifications, therefore, there arises a presumption that all the

concerned persons must have knowledge of initiation and

continuation of land acquisition proceedings. Learned AAG also

raised question with regard to scope of judicial review in the

matters of land acquisition proceedings and submitted that in the

instant case, where there is no apparent illegality or violation of

procedure prescribed in Land Acquisition Act, no interference can

be made in the instant writ petition.

24. This Court carefully heard the rival submissions

advanced by learned counsel for the parties and meticulously

examined the record.

25. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival

submissions and upon a meticulous examination of the material

available on record, this Court finds that apart from other

grounds, challenge raised by the petitioners essentially rests on

the ground that the acquisition proceedings were initiated and

continued in the name of deceased Bajrang Lal and, therefore, the

entire acquisition proceedings stand vitiated.

26. At the outset, it deserves to be noticed that the

notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1953 was issued on

21.11.1978. It is also an admitted position that immediately upon

issuance of the notification, Nemi Chand, son of late Bajrang Lal

and one of the persons claiming interest in the acquired land,

submitted objections before the Land Acquisition Officer. The

objections were not confined merely to the factum of death of

Bajrang Lal, but also extended to the necessity of acquisition and

the public purpose sought to be achieved. Thus, from the very

inception of the proceedings, the persons claiming through

Bajrang Lal were fully aware of the acquisition proceedings and

actively participated therein.

27. The principal question, therefore, is whether the

mention of the name of deceased Bajrang Lal in the notifications

issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1953, by itself,

renders the entire acquisition proceedings void notwithstanding

the fact that his legal heirs had complete knowledge of the

proceedings and were afforded an opportunity of participation. In

the opinion of this Court, the answer has to be in the negative.

28. The object underlying the issuance of notification under

Section 4 and the subsequent proceedings is to ensure that

persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired are made

aware of the acquisition and are afforded an opportunity to raise

objections in accordance with law. In the present case, that object

stood substantially achieved. Not only were the legal heirs aware

of the acquisition proceedings, but they actively availed the

statutory opportunity by filing objections, placing relevant facts

before the Land Acquisition Officer and thereafter responding to

notices issued under Section 9. The petitioners have not been able

to demonstrate any prejudice whatsoever caused to them on

account of the name of Bajrang Lal being reflected in the

notifications.

29. It is a settled principle that every irregularity or

mistake occurring during acquisition proceedings does not

necessarily vitiate the acquisition. The Court is required to

examine whether the alleged defect goes to the root of jurisdiction

or whether it is merely a procedural irregularity which has not

occasioned any failure of justice. In the present case, the identity

of the land sought to be acquired was never in dispute. The khasra

numbers, area and location of the acquired land were correctly

mentioned in the notifications. The acquisition proceedings related

to a specific parcel of land and not merely to the individual whose

name happened to be recorded therein. Once the interested

persons were aware of the proceedings and participated therein,

the error relating to description of the khatedar cannot be

elevated to the status of a jurisdictional defect rendering the

entire acquisition void.

30. It would be relevant to refer that in the case of State

And Others v. Jaipur Nagar Graha Nirman Sahakari

Samitiya Association & 115 Others, (1996) 3 RLW 453,

Division Bench of this Court has held as under:

“Even for arguments sake, if it is taken that there have been
some irregularities in the publishing of the public notice or
the substance of the notification at convenient places in the
locality, no prejudice has been caused to the respondents
petitioners. This is evident from the fact that the detailed
objections have been filed u/s. 5A by them before the Land
Acquisition Officer. Therefore, on the concept of want of
prejudice the notification u/s. 4(1) of the Acquisition Act
cannot be held invalid merely because some irregularities in
the publishing of the public notice or the substance of
notification at convenient places in the locality has taken
place.”

31. Much emphasis has been laid by learned Senior Counsel

for the petitioners on the fact that even after the authorities

became aware of the death of Bajrang Lal, the declaration under

Section 6 was issued in his name. However, merely because the

authorities did not substitute the names of the legal heirs in the

declaration, it cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the

declaration itself is non est. The petitioners have failed to establish

that by reason of such omission they were deprived of any

substantive right available under the statute. On the contrary, the

record unequivocally establishes that they continued to participate

in the proceedings and were fully conscious of the acquisition at

every stage.

32. The judgment of Baga Ram (supra) relied upon the

by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners was delivered by the

Coordinate Bench of this Court on entire different facts where on

account of entering name of dead person in the notification under

Section 4, his legal heirs were deprived of opportunity of hearing

and could not file objections against the proposed acquisition

proceedings. Whereas in the present case, admittedly Nemi Chand

who was son of deceased Bajrang Lal participated in the

proceedings and filed his objections against Notification under

Section 4. Judgment in the case of Bishambhar Dayal (supra)

was also delivered in altogether different context and it is not

clear that in that case as to whether publication of name of dead

person deprived his heirs from opportunity of hearing or not. In

the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, where on

account of participation of legal heirs of Bajrang Lal, there cannot

be any possible ground of not affording an opportunity of hearing

prior to proceeding further in the acquisition proceedings, the

aforesaid judgment cannot be made applicable. In the case of

Savita Kapila (supra), the Delhi High Court was dealing with a

case arising out of taxing statute namely Income Tax Act, 1961

and plea of issuing notices to a dead person was dealt with in the

light of non-compliance of principles of providing hearing and the

Court has rendered the judgment where the legal heirs of the

deceased had not submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the

Assessment Officer. Hence, such judgment also does not have any

application in the instant case.

33. Similarly in the case of In the case of I.I.S.

Employees House Building Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra)

also, where notification reflected name of dead person, land

acquisition proceedings were quashed on the ground of denial of

opportunity of hearing under Section 5-A of the Act to the legal

heirs, which admittedly are not the facts of the present case,

hence, the aforesaid judgment is also not attracted in the present

case.

34. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the legal

representatives had actual notice of the acquisition proceedings,

actively participated in the statutory enquiry and their objections

were duly considered, they cannot subsequently contend that the

entire acquisition proceedings stand vitiated merely because the

preliminary notification mentioned the name of the deceased

recorded khatedar. Such a contention, in the absence of any

demonstrable prejudice or denial of opportunity, is wholly devoid

of merit and cannot be accepted.

35. The submission regarding alleged non-application of

mind while issuing the declaration under Section 6 also does not

merit acceptance. The declaration under Section 6 records the

satisfaction of the Government regarding the public purpose for

which the land was acquired. The petitioners have not produced

any material to demonstrate that such satisfaction was either mala

fide or based on irrelevant considerations. Merely because the

declaration mentioned the name of Bajrang Lal instead of his legal

heirs cannot lead to an inference that the statutory satisfaction

itself was absent.

36. Equally untenable is the argument that the purpose of

acquisition was not a public purpose. The acquisition was

undertaken for expansion of the residential area of Municipal

Board, Lakheri. Planned urban development and expansion of

residential infrastructure have consistently been recognized as

public purposes within the meaning of the land acquisition laws.

The Court, while exercising power of judicial review, does not sit in

appeal over the subjective satisfaction of the Government

regarding the necessity of acquisition unless the same is shown to

be arbitrary, mala fide or wholly without foundation. No such

material has been placed on record in the present case.

37. The contention founded upon issuance of Form No.4 on

15.01.1979 also does not advance the case of the petitioners. On

bare perusal of such notice would make it clear that it was in fact

a notice under Section 4 inviting objections against proposed

acquisition and by no stretch of imagination, it can be considered

as a notice under Section 9 to invite the claims for compensation.

Even assuming that some clerical error has occurred in using the

incorrect form number over the notice, otherwise sent with the

specific language of notice under Section 4, any such irregularity

occurred at an intermediate stage of the proceedings, the same

would not be sufficient to invalidate the entire acquisition in the

absence of proof of prejudice. It is settled preposition of law that

instead of form, substance would prevail. The petitioners were

admittedly aware of the proceedings, filed objections and

participated therein. Therefore, no prejudice can be said to have

been occasioned on account of the alleged irregularity.

38. Another significant circumstance which cannot be

ignored is that the petitioners, after receiving notices under

Section 9 of the Act, submitted their claims relating to

compensation. By participating in the award proceedings and

asserting their entitlement to compensation, the petitioners

accepted the acquisition proceedings at least to the extent of

claiming benefits thereunder. Having participated in the statutory

process and pursued their claims for compensation, it does not lie

in their mouth to contend at a later stage that the entire

proceedings were void ab initio.

39. This Court also finds considerable force in the objection

raised by the respondents regarding delay and laches. The

notification under Section 4 was issued on 21.11.1978. The

petitioners admittedly acquired knowledge of the proceedings

immediately thereafter and raised objections in January, 1979.

Even the declaration under Section 6 was issued on 08.02.1984.

However, the writ petition came to be instituted only on

18.12.1986 after the award had already been passed on

24.09.1986. No satisfactory explanation has been offered for not

approaching this Court at the appropriate stage. It is trite law that

challenges to acquisition proceedings must be made promptly and

with utmost diligence. In the case of Lajja Ram (supra), Hon’ble

Supreme Court, while dealing with the plea of delay and latches,

considered that since there were different and contradictory

recommendations of LAO, taken from time to time, it gave a

reasonable cause to the petitioner in that case to approach the

court with delay. Petitioners in the present case have not come out

with any such similar circumstances to justify the delay.

40. Interference after completion of the acquisition process

and after passing of the award, although permissible to some

extent only in the cases of manifest illegal and void proceedings,

yet in absence of any such established facts and grounds,

ordinarily ought not to be made by the writ court exercising

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

41. The contention that compensation has not been paid

and possession remains with the petitioners also does not assist

them. The prayer based upon lapsing of acquisition proceedings

under Section 24 of the Act of 2013 has admittedly not been

pressed in view of the Constitution Bench judgment in Indore

Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal (supra). Therefore,

the consequences flowing from non-payment of compensation or

retention of possession only by virtue of interim order granted by

this Court, cannot now be invoked to invalidate acquisition

proceedings which otherwise attained finality decades ago.

42. There cannot be any quarrel with the ratio laid down in

the cases of Collector Vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal (supra), Dr.

Laxmi (supra), UIT Vs. Balveer Singh (supra), M/s

Rajasthan Udhyog (supra) that the provisions of Land

Acquisition Act are mandatory in nature and are to be construed

strictly, yet this court finds that the petitioners have not

succeeded in establishing any manifest violation of any provision

so as to warrant any interference in the instant writ petition.

43. The argument that the acquisition has become

meaningless because of passage of time is equally misconceived.

The delay in culmination of the proceedings is substantially

attributable to the pendency of litigation before this Court. The

petitioners cannot be permitted to take advantage of the passage

of time occasioned by pendency of proceedings initiated at their

own instance and thereafter contend that the public purpose has

ceased to exist.

44. The scope of judicial review in matters of land

acquisition is well settled. Unless there exists a patent illegality,

violation of a mandatory statutory provision causing prejudice,

lack of jurisdiction or demonstrable mala fides, the Court ought

not to interfere with acquisition proceedings undertaken for a

public purpose. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to

establish any such ground. The record instead demonstrates that

they had complete knowledge of the acquisition proceedings,

participated in the statutory process, submitted objections,

responded to notices under Section 9 and claimed compensation.

No prejudice has been shown to have been caused merely

because the name of deceased Bajrang Lal continued to be

reflected in the notifications.

45. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is

satisfied that the defect pointed out by the petitioners was, at

best, an irregularity which neither deprived them of an

opportunity of hearing nor resulted in any failure of justice. The

acquisition proceedings cannot be invalidated on such hyper-

technical grounds, particularly after passing of the award and

completion of the statutory process.

46. Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the writ

petition. The challenge laid to the notification dated 21.11.1978

issued under Section 4, declaration dated 08.02.1984 issued

under Section 6, notice dated 28.02.1984 issued under Section 9

and the award dated 24.09.1986 passed under Section 11 fails

and is hereby rejected.

47. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

48. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) dismissed.

(ANAND SHARMA),J

1/Jatin

(D.B. SAW/269/2000 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders)
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Smt.Gopi Bai vs State on 29 July, 2026

Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur