Chattisgarh High Court
Shri Krishna Shukla vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 7 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:15866-DB
AFR
ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally signed
by ROHIT
KUMAR
WPPIL No. 113 of 2021
Shri Krishna Shukla S/o Late Jagannath Prasad Shukla Aged About 79
CHANDRA
Years Retired Forest Officer Resident of HIG Dx - 32, Mahismati West
Arvind Vihar Bagmugaliya, Bhopal Madhya Pradesh Pin 462043.
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh, through the Chief Secretary, Govt. of
Chhattisgarh Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhavan, New Raipur, District
Raipur Chhattisgarh.
2 - Secretary Department of Forest, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal
Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
3 - Principal Chief Conservator of Forest Aranya Bhavan, North Block,
Sector - 19, Kotara Bhantha, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh.
4 - Managing Director Chhattisgarh Rajya Laghu Vanopaj (Vyapar Evam
Vikas) Sahkari Sangh Maryadit, Van Dhan Bhavan, Sector - 24, Nava
Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
_________________________________________________________
For Petitioner : Mr. Rohit Sharma, Advocate
For State/Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri,
Deputy Advocate General
For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Animesh Tiwari, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
07.04.2026
1. Heard Mr. Rohit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also
heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General,
2
appearing for the State / respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Mr. Animesh
Tiwari, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No.4.
2. The petitioner who happens to be a retired Indian Forest Service
officer has approached this Court in public interest seeking the
following reliefs :
"10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue direction to the Respondents to fix purchase
price of tendupatta in accordance with the provisions
of Tendupatta Adhiniyam 1964, and pay the same to
tendupatta SANGRAHAK, at the time of purchase.
10.2 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue direction to Respondents to fix Notional
purchase price for the year 2007 to 2021 and
calculate the payable amount for tendu leaves sold
by each individual Sangrahak separately for each
year and compare it with the amount actually paid in
cash, and the amount of short payment if any may be
paid with interest to the beneficiary within a stipulated
fixed period under the supervision of Hon'ble Court.
10.3 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
annul/quash the impugned missive dated 03-11-2009
(Annexure P-2), in the interest of justice.
10.4 That, the Hon'ble Court may be kindly pleased
to call for the entire records in the possession of the
respondents in respect of subject matter, for its kind
perusal.
10.5 This Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to
issue any other order/direction writ as it deem fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the case,
including cost of the petition."
3
3. The brief facts of the case are that the then State Government of
Madhya Pradesh enacted the Tendupatta (Vyapar Viniyaman)
Adhiniyam, 1964 to protect growers of tendupatta (other than the
State Government) from the clutches of middlemen. After the
creation of the State of Chhattisgarh, the new State Government
adopted this Adhiniyam and renamed it as the Chhattisgarh
Tendupatta (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter
referred to as the "Adhiniyam, 1964 ").
4. As per Section 2(d)(ii) of the Adhiniyam, 1964 a "grower" is a
person on whose private land tendu leaves are grown. Section 4
provides for the appointment of an agent by the State
Government. Section 5 of the Adhiniyam, 1964 stipulates that no
one other than the State Government or its authorized agent can
purchase or transport tendupatta within the State. Section 6 of
the Adhiniyam, 1964 provides that the State Government shall
appoint a Committee (मंत्रणा समिति) to recommend the "purchase
price" every year.
5. Under Section 7 of the Adhiniyam, 1964, the State Government is
obliged to fix the purchase price after considering the
recommendations of the Committee, or otherwise, while taking
into account the specified guidelines for fixing the purchase price
of tendu leaves presented for sale by growers for each year.
According to Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, 1964, the State
Government or its authorized agent is bound to purchase tendu
leaves presented at the Collection Centre by growers (other than
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the State Government) after paying the purchase price fixed
under Section 7 of the Adhiniyam, 1964. Section 12 of the
Adhiniyam, 1964 provides that the State Government is at liberty
to dispose of tendu leaves purchased under the provisions of the
Adhiniyam, 1964.
6. In 2006, the Central Government enacted the Forest Rights Act,
2006 (for short, the Act, 2006'). As per Section 3(1)(c) of this Act,
forest rights in respect of Non-Wood Forest Produce (NWFP),
which includes tendu patta, are defined as the right of ownership,
access to collect, use, and sell. These rights are vested in
Scheduled Tribes and other forest dwellers as per Section 4(1)(a)
and (b) of the Act, 2006.
7. In 1984, the State Government of Madhya Pradesh established
the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Laghu Vanopaj (Vyapar Evam Vikas)
Sahkari Sangh Maryadit, a cooperative organization, and
appointed it as an agent to carry out tendu patta trade on behalf of
the State Government. The primary objective of its creation was to
obtain working capital for the tendu patta trade by borrowing funds
from banks, thereby allowing the State budget to be used for other
developmental works. Every year, the Vanopaj Sangh borrowed
funds from banks to procure tendu patta and meet administrative
expenses. After the disposal of tendu leaves, the bank loans were
repaid from the sale proceeds, and the net savings were
deposited in the Government exchequer as royalty. The Vanopaj
Sangh received a nominal amount of Re. 1 per year and had no
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other source of income. Subsequently, in 1989, Zila Unions were
created at the Territorial Forest Division level, and Primary
Vanopaj Samitis were established at the tendupatta unit level. All
Sangrahaks of the unit were made members of these Samitis.
The Territorial Divisional Forest Officer was appointed as the
Managing Director of the Zila Union, and the Territorial
Conservator was appointed as the ex-officio Regional General
Manager of the Vanopaj Sangh.
8. In the year 2000, after the reorganization of States, the State of
Chhattisgarh was created. The Madhya Pradesh Vanopaj Sangh
was also divided, and the Chhattisgarh Rajya Laghu Vanopaj
(Vyapar Evam Vikas) Sahkari Sangh Maryadit (hereinafter
referred to as the "Vanopaj Sangh") came into existence. The
new State Government directed that 70% of the net profit from the
tendupatta trade be distributed to the Sangrahaks, and the
remaining 30% be utilized for developmental works, as was the
practice in the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh. The Vanopaj
Sangh also began using profits from tendu leaves as working
capital instead of borrowing funds from banks.
9. The respondent State Government, vide order No. 13-37/2009/10-
2 dated 03-11-2009, directed that 80% of the net profit be
distributed to Sangrahaks, 15% be utilized for the purchase of
other minor forest produce, and the remaining 5% be used to
compensate for losses in the tendupatta trade.
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10. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner, through a letter
dated 16-03-2017, requested the Chief Secretary of the State to
direct the authorities to purchase tendu leaves by paying the
"purchase price" (क्रय मूल्य) instead of the "collection rate" (संग्रहण
दर). The Secretary, Forest Department, replied vide letter No.
2317 dated 03-06-2017 with the remark :
"तेंद ू पत्ता का व्यापार लघु वनोज संघ राज्य शासन के मात्र अभिकर्ता के रूप में करता
है, नीतियों का निर्धारण नहीं करता। संघ/विभाग से परामर्श उपरान्त नीति का
निर्धारण राज्य शासन द्वारा किया जाता है।"
11. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a representation to the
Hon'ble Forest Minister through a letter dated 14-01-2019,
requesting appropriate action to ensure that tendu leaves are
purchased by paying the purchase price (क्रय मूल्य) instead of the
collection rate (संग्रहण दर). The petitioner also submitted
representations to the Secretary (Forest), the PCCF, and the
Managing Director of the Vanopaj Sangh through a joint email
dated 13-08-2020, followed by additional suggestions via email
dated 04-09-2020, requesting that tendu leaves be purchased at
the prescribed purchase price. However, no response was
received from the authorities. Further, the petitioner addressed a
request to the Principal Secretary (Forest) through an email dated
25-08-2020, seeking to stop the alleged illegal practice of
purchasing tendu leaves at the collection rate and to ensure that
all purchases are made only at the purchase price ( क्रय मूल्य). As
no response was received, the petitioner has filed the present
7
petition styled as Public Interest Litigation, seeking the
aforementioned reliefs.
12. Shri Rohit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, has
contended that the impugned order dated 03-11-2009 completely
abrogates the legislative mandate of the Adhiniyam, 1964. He has
further submitted that the State Government is not fixing the rates
in accordance with Section 7 of the Adhiniyam, 1964. He has also
contended, placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Orissa Mining Corporation Limited vs. Ministry of
Environment and Forests and Others , reported in (2013) 6
SCC 476, that after the coming into force of the Act, 2006 and in
light of the aforesaid judgment, a forest dweller is recognized as
the owner of the "forest produce." Therefore, the sale of
tendupatta cannot be carried out by the Government through the
creation of cooperative societies under Respondent No. 4, the
Minor Forest Produce Cooperative Society. As such, with the
enactment of the Forest Rights Act, 2006, the entire Adhiniyam,
1964 has been rendered repugnant in terms of Article 254 of the
Constitution of India.
13. Shri Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, has also
contended that the State, in its Return, has failed to explain the
inconsistency created by the impugned order dated 03-11-2009,
which renders the provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1964 redundant.
He has specifically referred to paragraph 17 of the State's Return
8
to submit that the State has not been able to satisfy the Court on
the issue of overreach committed by the impugned order dated
03-11-2009 over the provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1964, and the
apparent repugnancy between the Adhiniyam, 1964 and the Act,
2006. Accordingly, Shri Sharma has submitted that the order
dated 03-11-2009 deserves to be quashed, and that a writ of
mandamus be issued directing the respondents to implement the
mandate of the Act, 2006, thereby permitting forest dwellers to
directly conduct the sale and purchase of tendupatta, with the
consideration being transferred to them directly.
14. Per contra, Shri Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate
General has opposed to submissions advanced by Shri Sharma,
learned counsel for the petitioner. In his submissions, Shri
Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, has made two
principle arguments; firstly, the Adhniyam, 1964 is neither
redundant nor is overreached by the order dated 03-11-2009 and
secondly; there is no compelling public interest reflected form the
writ petition and therefore, the writ petition deserves to be
dismissed.
15. While elaborating his submissions Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy
Advocate General has referred to the legislative scheme of the
Adhiniyam, 1964. He has referred to Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Adhiniyam which creates a monopoly in the trade
of tendupatta in favour of the State. He has referred to Section 2
9
(a) definition of "agent", Section 2 (c) definition of "dealer",
wherein a cooperative society is also included, he has referred to
Section 4 which deals with "Appointment of agents" and to
Section 5 which relates to Restriction on purchase and
transportation of tendu leaves. He has specifically referred to sub-
section (1), clause (c) of Section 5 to submit that under the said
sub-section (1), clause (c), an agent is authorised to purchase
and transport tendu leaves. In support of this submission, he has
referred to pleadings made in paragraph 2 of the Return of the
State wherein it has been submitted that the Respondent No. 4
Cooperative Society is agent under terms of the Section 4 of the
Adhiniyam, 1964 and therefore, it is not the case, that the
Government has been conducting purchase and sale of tendu
leaves by a method unknown to law.
16. It has been submitted and argued by Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy
Advocate General referring to paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Return
of the State that, the Cooperative Society is functioning not only
for purchase and sale of tendupatta, but it has an overall function
to support economy of forest and persons whose livelihood is
dependent upon forest produce. He has copiously referred to the
fact in paragraph 12 of the Return at page 08 of the Return, that
the State government charges only a mere sum of Rupees 01/- as
commission from Respondent No. 4 Society and that the entire
earnings are transferred directly to the collectors.
10
17. Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, has also
contended that since 2008 season onwards the proceeds are
shared on the following basis -
a). 80% of profit as incentive wages to the collectors
of the tendu leaves.
b). 15% of profit for purchasing, processing and
storage of non-nationalized MFPs by primary societies.
c). 05% of the profit for the funds created to
temporarily meet the loss from trade of the societies.
He has adverted to paragraph 13 of the Return at pp. 11-12
of the Return of the State in this regard.
18. Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, has submitted
that, the petitioner has failed to point out and plead any kind of
serious loss to public exchequer caused due to prevailing
purchase model of tendupatta by cooperative societies, the
petitioner has failed to point out any kind of grievous and glaring
lapses in management of its affairs and trading by the respondent
no. 4 society, that the petitioner has failed to make out a case that
any forest dweller's fundamental or legal right is violated by
following the prevailing model for sale purchase of tendupatta and
he has also contended that the issues raised in the writ petition
are not in public interest but are hypothetical in nature.
19. Lastly, Shri Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General has
contended that, not only is the sale and purchase of tendupatta by
Cooperative Society a decision in the realm of economic policy,
11
but owing to the fact that tendupatta is the major forest produce of
Chhattisgarh which sustains forest economy and livelihood of the
forest dwellers it is a question of socio-economic policy as well
and in such situations the Courts are cautious not to interfere, he
has relied on Supreme Court decision of Akola Municipal
Corporation and another vs. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain
and another [2025 SCC Online SC 2279] . He has vehemently
urged that any indulgence shown in this case would revert the
forest dwellers at mercy of scrupulous forest contractors and
tendupatta traders who are economically powerful and have better
bargaining power, thus rendering the forest dwellers with unequal
bargaining power reducing to them to a state of misery, poverty
and exploitation.
20. Shri Animesh Tiwari, learned counsel, appering for the respondent
No.4 Society has adopted the submisisons advanced by Shri
Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General.
21. Shri Rohit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, in rejoinder
has argued that, the case law cited at Bar by Shri Bhaduri,
learned Deputy Advocate General is not applicable to the case as
it relates to issue of property tax, whereas, the case law cited by
him is directly covering the issue. He has contended that in view
of the fact that he has made out a clear case of compelling public
interest involved the writ deserves to be allowed.
12
22. We have heard the learned counsels for the appearing parties,
perused the record with utmost circumspection and caution.
23. After having given our anxious thought and considerations to the
submissions advanced at the Bar as also pleadings of the case,
we find that in order to proceed the first step is to satisfy ourselves
regarding any public interest being really involved in the writ
petition. The Supreme Court in the case of Guruvayoor
Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, (2003) 7 SCC
546: at paragraph 50 has summarized 11 principles governing
interference in public interest litigation cases, paragraph 50 reads
as sunder -
"50. The principles evolved by this Court in this behalf may
be suitably summarized as under:
(i) The Court in exercise of powers under Article 32 and
Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a
petition filed by any interested person in the welfare of the
people who is in a disadvantaged position and, thus, not
in a position to knock the doors of the Court.
The Court is constitutionally bound to protect the
fundamental rights of such disadvantaged people so as to
direct the State to fulfil its constitutional promises.
(See S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC
87] , People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of
India [(1982) 2 SCC 494 : 1982 SCC (L&S)
262] , Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [AIR 1963
SC 1638 : (1964) 1 SCR 561] and Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] .)
13
(ii) Issues of public importance, enforcement of
fundamental rights of a large number of the public vis-à-
vis the constitutional duties and functions of the State, if
raised, the Court treats a letter or a telegram as a public
interest litigation upon relaxing procedural laws as also
the law relating to pleadings. (See Charles
Sobraj v. Supdt., Central Jail [(1978) 4 SCC 104 : 1978
SCC (Cri) 542] and Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home
Secy., State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri)
23] .)
(iii) Whenever injustice is meted out to a large number of
people, the Court will not hesitate in stepping in. Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as well as the
International Conventions on Human Rights provide for
reasonable and fair trial.
In Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Rani Jethmalani [(1979) 4 SCC 167 :
1979 SCC (Cri) 934 : AIR 1979 SC 468] it was held: (SCC p. 169,
para 2)
"2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the
dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the
court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is
not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party
or easy availability of legal services or like mini-
grievances. Something more substantial, more
compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of
public justice and its attendant environment, is
necessitous if the court is to exercise its power of transfer.
This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances
may be myriad and vary from case to case. We have to
test the petitioner's grounds on this touchstone bearing in
mind the rule that normally the complainant has the right
to choose any court having jurisdiction and the accused
14
cannot dictate where the case against him should be
tried. Even so, the process of justice should not harass
the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the
circumstances."
(See also Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B.D. Agarwal [(2003) 6 SCC
230 :(2003) 5 Scale 138] .)
(iv) The common rule of locus standi is relaxed so as to enable
the Court to look into the grievances complained on behalf of the
poor, the depraved (sic), the illiterate and the disabled who
cannot vindicate the legal wrong or legal injury caused to them for
any violation of any constitutional or legal right. [See Fertilizer
Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC
568 : AIR 1981 SC 344] , S.P. Gupta [1981 Supp SCC
87] , People's Union for Democratic Rights [(1982) 2 SCC 494 :
1982 SCC (L&S) 262] , D.C. Wadhwa (Dr) v. State of
Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 378] and BALCO Employees' Union
(Regd.) v. Union of India [(2002) 2 SCC 333] .]
(v) When the Court is prima facie satisfied about variation of
any constitutional right of a group of people belonging to the
disadvantaged category, it may not allow the State or the
Government from raising the question as to the maintainability of
the petition. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha [(1984) 3 SCC 161 :
1984 SCC (L&S) 389 : (1984) 2 SCR 67] .)
(vi) Although procedural laws apply to PIL cases but the question
as to whether the principles of res judicata or principles
analogous thereto would apply depends on the nature of the
petition as also facts and circumstances of the case. [See Rural
Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1)
SCC 504] and Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal
(Regd.) [(1986) 1 SCC 100] .]
15
(vii) The dispute between two warring groups purely in the realm
of private law would not be allowed to be agitated as a public
interest litigation. (See Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of
India [1989 Supp (1) SCC 251] .)
(viii) However, in an appropriate case, although the petitioner
might have moved a court in his private interest and for redressal
of personal grievances, the Court in furtherance of the public
interest may treat it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs
of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice. (See Shivajirao
Nilangekar Patil v. Dr Mahesh Madhav Gosavi [(1987) 1 SCC
227] .)
(ix) The Court in special situations may appoint a Commission,
or other bodies for the purpose of investigating into the
allegations and finding out facts. It may also direct management
of a public institution taken over by such Committee.
(See Bandhua Mukti Morcha [(1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC
(L&S) 389 : (1984) 2 SCR 67] , Rakesh Chandra
Narayan v. State of Bihar [1989 Supp (1) SCC 644] and A.P.
Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu [(1999) 2 SCC
718] .)
In Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B. [(1987) 2 SCC 295] this
Court held: (SCC pp. 334-35, para 61)
"61. It is only when courts are apprised of gross violation
of fundamental rights by a group or a class action on
when basic human rights are invaded or when there are
complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience
that the courts, especially this Court, should leave aside
procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend
its jurisdiction under all available provisions for
remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the
underdog and the neglected. I will be second to none in
extending help when such help is required. But this does
16
not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for
anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self-
imposed restraint on public interest litigants."
In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC
(Cri) 36] this Court opined: (SCC p. 348, para 109)
"109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide
and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL
will alone have a locus standi and can approach the
court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy,
suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but
not a person for personal gain or private profit or political
motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly, a
vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before
the court for vindicating any personal grievance,
deserves rejection at the threshold."
The Court will not ordinarily transgress into a policy. It
shall also take utmost care not to transgress its
jurisdiction while purporting to protect the rights of the
people from being violated.
In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India [(2000) 10 SCC
664] it was held: (SCC pp. 762-63, paras 229 & 232)
"229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the
exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the
field of policy decision. Whether to have an
infrastructural project or not and what is the type of
project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed,
are part of policy-making process and the courts are ill-
equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so
undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that
in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and
people's fundamental rights are not transgressed upon
17
except to the extent permissible under the Constitution.
Even then any challenge to such a policy decision must
be before the execution of the project is undertaken. Any
delay in the execution of the project means overrun in
costs and the decision to undertake a project, if
challenged after its execution has commenced, should
be thrown out at the very threshold on the ground of
laches if the petitioner had the knowledge of such a
decision and could have approached the court at that
time. Just because a petition is termed as a PIL does
not mean that ordinary principles applicable to litigation
will not apply. Laches is one of them.
***
232. While protecting the rights of the people from being
violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that
the court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in
our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation
of powers. The court has come down heavily whenever
the executive has sought to impinge upon the court’s
jurisdiction.”
(x) The Court would ordinarily not step out of the known
areas of judicial review. The High Courts although may pass an
order for doing complete justice to the parties, they do not have
a power akin to Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
(xi) Ordinarily, the High Court should not entertain a writ
petition by way of public interest litigation questioning the
constitutionality or validity of a statute or a statutory rule.”
24. Having adverted to the facts of the present case as also the
submissions advanced at the Bar, we have no hesitation in
holding that the present case is essentially in the domain of
18
economic policy of the State regarding sale and purchase of tendu
leaves. A focused study of the provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1964
puts it beyond any scintilla of doubt that the Respondent no. 4
society is an agent and as such is authorized in law to trade into
tendupatta. The order dated 03-11-2009 is a mere executive
instruction which in no manner overreaches the mandate of the
Adhiniyam, 1964. Thus, reverting to the 11 point test evolved by
the Supreme Court in the case of Guruvayoor Devaswom
Managing Committee (supra) wherein in point No. (ix) aspect of
policy decision has been dealt by referring the Narmada Bachao
Andolan case as follows – In Narmada Bachao Andolan vs.
Union of India [(2000) 10 SCC 664] it was held in para 229 as
under –
“229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of
their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy
decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not
and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it
has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and
the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision
so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in
the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and
people’s fundamental rights are not transgressed upon
except to the extent permissible under the Constitution.
Even then any challenge to such a policy decision must be
before the execution of the project is undertaken. Any delay
in the execution of the project means overrun in costs and
the decision to undertake a project, if challenged after its
execution has commenced, should be thrown out at the very
threshold on the ground of laches if the petitioner had the
19knowledge of such a decision and could have approached
the court at that time. Just because a petition is termed as a
PIL does not mean that ordinary principles applicable to
litigation will not apply. Laches is one of them.”
25. When the ratio of Guruvayoor Dewaswom Managing
Committee case (supra) as also Narmada Bachao Andolan
case (supra) is applied to the present case, we are also
confronted with issue of delay, undoubtedly, the order dated
03-11-2009 has been challenged after more than a decade in
2021 by way of this public interest litigation, in paragraph 07 of the
writ petition no explanation to that affect has been offered by the
petitioner, neither are any substantive pleadings made to that
affect. We thus, hold that, the petition suffers from delay and
laches and as it also questions a policy decision of the
government there is no compelling and overwhelming public
interest involved and therefore, the writ petition is devoid of merit.
26. On the aspect of economic policy and scope of judicial
interference we are bound by the view taken by the Supreme
Court in the case of Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of
India (1990) 3 SCC 223 in paragraph 57 observed thus –
“57. Judicial review is not concerned with matters of
economic policy. The court does not substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to
matters within the province of either. The court does not
supplant the “feel of the expert” by its own views. When
the legislature acts within the sphere of its authority and
delegates power to an agent, it may empower the agent to
make findings of fact which are conclusive provided such
20findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. In all such
cases, judicial inquiry is confined to the question whether the
findings of fact are reasonably based on evidence and whether
such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. As stated
by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in Gupta Sugar Works [1987 Supp
SCC 476, 481 : (1988) 68 STC 407]: (SCC p. 479, para 4)“… the court does not act like a chartered accountant nor acts
like an income tax officer. The court is not concerned with any
individual case or any particular problem. The court only
examines whether the price determined was with due regard to
considerations provided by the statute. And whether
extraneous matters have been excluded from determination.”
(Emphasis supplied).
27. In the case of Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of
India (2025) 1 SCC 695 the Apex Court held as below:–
“54. The doctrine of judicial restraint, which is central to this
discussion, emphasizes that courts should exercise caution
and avoid involvement in policy decisions, as these are
complex judgments that require a balancing of diverse and
often competing interests. Policies are crafted based on
thorough analysis of social, economic, and political factors,
considerations beyond the court’s purview. The court is
tasked with ensuring that policies do not breach
constitutional provisions or statutory limits; however,
they should not replace policymakers’ judgments with
their own unless absolutely necessary.
55. Policy decisions often require the expertise of
professionals and specialists in fields such as economics,
public health, national security, and environmental science.
These domains involve specialized knowledge that judges,
as generalists in legal matters, may lack. For instance, in
economic policy, the executive may decide on trade tariffs or
21subsidies based on extensive data and projections that aim
to balance domestic industry support with global trade
commitments. The courts, lacking the same level of
economic expertise and without the authority to make trade-
offs among competing policy objectives, is typically not
equipped to second-guess these kinds of decisions.
56. While courts have the power of judicial review to
ensure that executive actions and legislative
enactments comply with the Constitution, this power is
not absolute. Judicial review is meant to act as a
safeguard against actions that overstep legal
boundaries or infringe on fundamental rights, but it
does not entail a comprehensive re-evaluation of the
policy’s wisdom. The judicial review of policy decisions
is limited to assessing the legality of the decision
making process rather than the substantive merits of
the policy itself. For example, if a government policy
infringes on fundamental rights or discriminates against a
particular group, the courts have a duty to strike down such
policies. However, in the absence of constitutional or
legal violations, the courts should respect the policy
choices made by the executive or legislature.
57. The duty of the court in policy-related cases is primarily
to determine whether the policy falls within the scope of
the authority granted to the relevant body. If the policy
decision is within the executive’s legal authority and
has been made following proper procedures, the courts
should defer to the expertise and discretion of the
policy-makers, even if the policy appears unwise or
imprudent. This restraint ensures that the courts do not
impose its own perspective on policy matters that are rightly
the responsibility of other branches.
22
58. Economic and social policies often involve significant
redistribution of resources, prioritization of interests, and
balancing of public needs, which requires careful
consideration by those with specialized knowledge and
broad perspectives. In the realm of economic policy, for
instance, questions regarding the allocation of
subsidies, fiscal deficits, or budget allocations are best
managed by the executive, which has access to
economic data and is accountable to the public for its
financial management. Judicial interference in such
areas risks creating disruptions in the economic
balance that policymakers are trying to achieve.
59. Courts should assume that policy-makers act in good
faith unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. As long
as the policy does not contravene the Constitution or
violate statutory provisions, it is not the role of the
courts to question the wisdom or fairness of such
policy.
60. While judicial restraint is essential in respecting the
boundaries of each branch of government, it does not mean
that courts abdicate their responsibility to protect
constitutional rights. The courts must still intervene if a
policy infringes on fundamental rights, discriminates unfairly,
or breaches statutory provisions. The role of the court in
such instances is to protect individuals and groups from
unlawful actions while maintaining the overall integrity of the
policy-making process. This balance ensures that while
courts do not interfere in matters of policy wisdom, they
remain vigilant guardians of constitutional rights.”
[Emphasis supplied]
28. We have also considered the fact that, no patent or apparent case
of exploitation caused by the prevailing policy of sale and
23
purchase of tendupatta could be brought on record by the
petitioner. The petitioner also failed to point out any serious issues
warranting our indulgence towards functioning and administration
of the Respondent No. 4 society.
29. We have considered the argument advanced by the State that the
present prevailing model of purchase and sale of tendupatta has
created a level playing field for those forest dwellers who have
unequal bargaining power and we also hold without hesitation that
it is in the interest of these persons that the Government created
monopoly in its favour as mentioned in the Statement and Objects
of the Adhiniyam, 1964.
30. Therefore, we hold that the action of the Respondent State in
issuing the order dated 03-11-2009 is in public interest and is not
in violation to the Adhiniyam, 1964 or any constitutional provision.
31. We also hold that, the present method of purchase and sale of
tendupatta is a valid economic policy for betterment of forest
dwellers, in fact, we find force in submissions of the learned State
counsel that it is more of a socio-economic policy decision than
economic and we uphold the said contention advanced by the
State.
32. As a result, considered in light of the authoritative
pronouncements of the Supreme Court this Court is of the firm
opinion that it would not be justified on our part in invoking powers
of judicial review in a public interest litigation so as to interfere in
24
the economic policy decision taken by the respondent State
regarding purchase and sale of tendupatta.
33. Thus, we hold that the writ petition lacks any public interest and is
also hopelessly delayed. We dismiss the writ petition.
34. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order
as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Chandra
25
Head - Note
Courts, in exercise of judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, will not ordinarily interfere in economic or socio-
economic policy decisions of the State, particularly in the absence of
violation of statutory or constitutional provisions, and a Public Interest
Litigation challenging such policy is liable to be dismissed on grounds of
delay, laches, and lack of genuine public interest.
