Calcutta High Court
Ashis Biswas vs Punjab National Bank on 8 April, 2026
Author: Debangsu Basak
Bench: Debangsu Basak
OD-14
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL SIDE
APO/8/2026
ASHIS BISWAS
-Vs-
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble JUSTICE DEBANGSU BASAK
-AND-
The Hon'ble JUSTICE MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI
For the Appellant : Mr. Pranit Bag, Adv.
Ms. Mandeep Kaur, Adv.
Mr. Gopal Pahari, Adv.
Ms. Anouska Das, Adv.
For the Respondent/Bank : Mr. Biswaroop Bhattacharya, Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Banerjee, Adv.
Ms. Parna Roy Chowdhury, Adv.
Ms. Trisa Chanda, Adv.
HEARD ON : 08.04.2026 DELIVERED ON : 08.04.2026 DEBANGSU BASAK, J.:-
1. Appeal is at the behest of the plaintiff and directed against an order
dated November 25, 2025 passed in IA No.GA/4/2024 in
CS/234/2019.
2. By the impugned order, learned Single Judge returned the plaint of
the appellant under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil
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Procedure, 1908 to be presented before the Commercial Court after
returning a finding that the disputes involved in the suit were
commercial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
3. Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant submits that, the
subject matter of the suit cannot be classified as a commercial
dispute within the meaning of the Act of 2015. In support of his
contention relies upon 2026: CHC-OS : 84-DB (Auto Fuels &
Services vs. Amalgamated Fuels Ltd. & Anr.). He submits that,
the suit is essentially a claim for damages for the period when the
respondent, as a defendant remained in possession of the suit
property after expiry of the initial lease.
4. Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant submits that, the
respondent entered into a lease with the appellant with regard to
the entire ground floor measuring about 2375 sq.ft. and the entire
mezzanine floor and the first floor of the building measuring about
1455 sq.ft and an ATM room with one generator room measuring
about 162 sq.ft. in the ground floor, west site of the building.
5. According to him, the lease came to an end on March 31, 2014.
Thereafter, negotiations took place between the parties with regard
to the renewal of the lease. He draws the attention of the Court to a
letter dated June 17, 2015 where the Bank, accepted an offer for a
lease. He submits that, ultimately the respondent, executed a lease
on December 21, 2017 in respect of a portion of the initially leased
premises. Possession of the balance portion was made over to the
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appellant on July 31, 2017. Therefore, the appellant became
entitled to damages for the period from March 1, 2014 being the
date when the initial lease expired till December 21, 2017 when
possession of the property was made over by the respondent.
6. The respondent is represented.
7. We find from the records that the suit filed by the appellant
contains a money claim. Appellant seeks a decree for a sum of
Rs.29,63,946/- as against the respondent as pleaded in paragraph
25 of the plaint. Paragraph 25 of the plaint gives the break up of
the claim of Rs.29,63,946/-. The break up is the claim of rent for
the period from April 1, 2014 till December 21, 2017 along with
interest from March 15, 2018 to October 15, 2019 and after
adjusting the two payments received by the appellant.
8. Entry of the respondent into the suit property was by virtue of a
lease deed. The claim of the appellant is that such lease deed
expired by efflux of time. Parties entered into negotiations by which
a portion of the initially leased property was retained by the
respondent by virtue of a subsequent lease deed dated December
21, 2017. The portion of the initially leased property , which the
respondent did not retain was made over to the appellant by the
respondent on July 31, 2017.
9. A lessee entering into the possession of an immovable property by
virtue of a lease, is liable to be evicted from the property on expiry of
the lease by a process known to law. Two processes known to law
are: the lessee being evicted through a decree of a Court, and the
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other is when the lessee makes over possession of the property
voluntarily. Till such time any of the two incidents occurs, the
lessee is held to be a tenant in occupation with the right of such
tenant in occupation being akin to a trespasser. Nonetheless, the
lessee is to be evicted by a process known to law as noted above. In
the facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondent as
lessee made over possession of the portion of the property for which
the respondent did not enter into a fresh lease on July 31, 2017 to
the appellant. Till such time, therefore, the respondent was in
occupation of such property.
10. Claim for the period as mentioned in the plaint, as against the
respondent, is on the basis of negotiations which took place
between the parties and the ultimate lease deed which was executed
between the parties.
11. Foundational basis of the claim of the appellant in the suit, is the
expiry of a lease. Therefore, there was an agreement between the
parties relating to the immovable property concerned. It is between
the parties to the suit. The property concerned was used
exclusively for commerce, as a branch of a Bank was being run from
such property.
12. We called upon the appellant to produce a copy of the initial lease
deed which the appellant did. The initial lease deed contain a
clause 4 regulating the tenancy. It prescribes that the lease was
initially for a period of 10/5 years with option on the part of the
lessee to continue or renew for a further period of 5 years.
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Therefore, a conclusive finding as to the expiry of the lease deed
cannot be made at this stage, in the manner as contended on behalf
of the appellant.
13. Auto Fuels & Service (supra) is the following view:
“24. Three ingredients have to be fulfilled under Section
2(1)(c)(vii) of the Act of 2015 for the dispute to assume the
character of a commercial dispute within the meaning of the Act
of 2015. The three ingredients are :-
i. the dispute must arise out of an Agreement
ii. relates to an immoveable property, and
iii. the immoveable property is exclusively used for trade or
commerce, presently.
25. In order for a dispute between the parties to fall within the
meaning of a commercial dispute as defined under Section 2(1)(c)
(vii) of the Act of 2015, such dispute must arise out of an
agreement concerning an immoveable property used presently
for trade or commerce.”
14. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, in our view all
ingredients as noted in Auto Fuels & Service (supra) stand
satisfied. The dispute in the suit arises out of an agreement relating
to an immovable property which was exclusively used for trade and
commerce.
15. Learned Single Judge, noted that the dispute fell within the
definition of Section 2(1)(c) of the Act of 2015.
16. In such circumstances, we find no ground to interfere with the
impugned judgment and order.
17. Accordingly, APO/8/2026 is dismissed without any order as to
costs.
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18. At this stage, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant seeks
extension of time for the appellant to obtain the plaint.
19. In such circumstances, the time to obtain the return of the plaint,
in terms of the impugned order, is extended for a period of a
fortnight from date. Needless to say, when the plaint is returned to
the appellant, the same will be done along with the Court-fees paid
in respect thereof.
(DEBANGSU BASAK, J.)
20. I agree
(MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, J.)
A/s.
