Delhi High Court
Shri C. Ramesh vs Director, Vallabhabai Patel Chest … on 28 April, 2026
Author: Sanjeev Narula
Bench: Sanjeev Narula
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 08th April, 2026.
Pronounced on: 28th April, 2026.
Uploaded on: 28th April, 2026.
+ W.P.(C) 10595/2018
SHRI C. RAMESH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Padma Kumar S. and Mr.
Gurpreet Singh, Advocates with
Petitioner-in-person.
versus
DIRECTOR, VALLABHABAI PATEL CHEST INSTITUTE AND
ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. M. K. Singh, Advocate for R-
1/V.P. Chest Institute.
Mr. Santosh Kumar and Mr. Devansh
Malhotra, Advocates for R-3.
Mr. Syed Abdul Haseeb, CGSC with
Mr. Syed Abdur Rahman and Mr.
Muhammad Aamir Khan, Advocates
for UOI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J.:
1. This writ petition assails order dated 2nd May, 2017, whereby the
services of the Petitioner with Vallabhbhai Patel Chest Institute1 have once
again been terminated. The impugned order does not arise in isolation; it is
the culmination of a long and chequered procedural history. The challenge
in the present round rests on a narrow yet substantial ground: the Petitioner
contends that the defect which had earlier persuaded this Court to set asideSignature Not Verified
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the initial dismissal was never cured, and that the Respondents have sought
to rectify the same ex post facto by invoking the Executive Council of the
University of Delhi. The Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the
requisite authority always vested in the Governing Body and, in any event,
stood affirmed by the Executive Council, thereby sustaining the impugned
action.
Factual Background
2.1. The Petitioner joined VPCI as Assistant Registrar (Group A) in terms
of offer of appointment dated 09th June, 2001. In terms of this appointment,
his service conditions were governed by the University Non-Teaching
Employees (Terms & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1971,2 as amended from
time to time, and other rules applicable to the Institute.
2.2. The Governing Body of VPCI, in their meeting on 21st January, 2011,
took a decision to initiate major penalty proceedings against the Petitioner,
leading to the issuance of charge memorandum dated 28th March, 2011
comprising nine articles of charge. They related, broadly, to delays and
irregularities in the accounts branch, non-implementation of administrative
directions, use of objectionable language in correspondence, direct
representation to the Vice-Chancellor, and remarks made in response to
adverse entries.
2.3. The Petitioner submitted his defence, addressing the charges on
merits. He also objected to the competence of the Governing Body and of
the Director to initiate and continue the proceedings; however, the said
objection was not accepted. An Inquiry Officer was thereafter appointed,
1
“VPCI”
2
“1971 Rules”
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and the inquiry culminated in findings adverse to the Petitioner. A show
cause notice proposing the penalty of dismissal was issued, and on 8 th
January, 2013, the Governing Body resolved to dismiss the Petitioner from
service. The formal order of dismissal dated 18th February, 2013 was passed
by the Governing Body of VPCI.
2.4. The Petitioner assailed the aforesaid dismissal in W.P.(C) 2110/2013.
By judgment dated 29th January, 2014, this Court set aside the order of
dismissal, on one issue alone. The Court held that the Petitioner, being
governed by the 1971 Rules, was subject to Rule 69, which mandated that
disciplinary proceedings be instituted by the Executive Council or by an
authority duly empowered by it through a general or special order. It was
noted that no explicit resolution of the Executive Council delegating such
power to the Governing Body had been placed on record. The Court also
declined to accept the Respondents’ contention that the status of the
Governing Body as the appointing authority conferred disciplinary authority
upon it. It was observed that such a contention might have had relevance in
the absence of governing rules, but could not be sustained where the
appointment itself was regulated by the 1971 Rules. On this limited ground,
the dismissal was set aside. At the same time, liberty was reserved to the
Respondents to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, if otherwise
permissible in law, subject to the requisite authority being conferred by the
Executive Council through an appropriate general or special resolution. The
relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
“5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute
that the petitioner falls in the category of non teaching staff /
administrative staff. He had joined the services of the VPCI on
10.07.2001, as an Assistant Registrar. Major penalty proceedings were
initiated against the petitioner on 21.01.2011 by the Governing Body ofSignature Not Verified
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VPCI under Rule 70. The petitioner was charge-sheeted and, thereafter
terminated from service. As indicated above, the challenge is based on a
singular ground. No other ground is pressed before me, by the counsel for
the petitioner.
6. The question which arises for consideration is, whether the power
exercised by the Governing Body to terminate the services of the
petitioner, who is admittedly, a non-teaching staff / administrative staff, is
legally sustainable.
7. On perusal of clauses 2(1) and 2(1)(2)(f) of the said Ordinance, it
emerges that the said clauses would provide for the following:-
7.1 Clause 2(1), provides the manner in which the Governing Body has to
be constituted for management and administration of VPCI. The Director
of VPCI, under clause 2(1)(3), is the ex-officio Member Secretary of the
Governing Body. Clause 2(1)(2), confers the power on the Governing
Body to manage the affairs of VPCI in respect of the functions detailed out
in sub clauses (a) to (h) subject to general control and supervision of the
Executive Council.
7.2 Clause 2(1)(2)(f) provides for the following :-
“(f). to appoint, suspend or terminate the services of the administrative
and other non-academic staff of the Institute in respect of whom such
powers may have been delegated by the Executive Council and to
determine the emoluments and conditions of service..”
(emphasis is mine)
7.3 A bare perusal of the said clause would show that in so far as the
administrative and non academic staff is concerned, the Executive Council
is empowered to delegate the power to appoint, suspend or terminate their
services.
7.4 The additional affidavit filed by respondent no.2 clearly indicates that
no such ‘explicit / specific’ resolution was passed by the Executive
Council delegating such power to the Governing Body of VPCI. The
learned counsels for the respondents have submitted before me that in the
absence of a specific resolution, normal principle should apply, which is
that, the appointing authority, should have the power to terminate the
services of an employee.
7.5 As indicated above, their argument is that having not questioned the
power of appointment of the Governing Body, surely, the petitioner cannot
now be heard on the question of power of termination. Perhaps, this
argument may have been accepted by me, in the absence of rules, to
which, the petitioner has been made subject to, at the stage of appointment
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itself. A perusal of the appointment letter dated 09.06.2001 would show
that one of the terms and conditions of his appointment was that, he will
be governed by the aforementioned rules as amended from time to time
and other rules, as applicable to the institute. Clearly, Rule 69 provides
that only the Executive Council or any other authority empowered by it by
general or special order may institute disciplinary proceedings against the
employee. The relevant provisions of the said rule are extracted
hereinafter :-
“…69. Authority to institute proceedings :-
1. The Executive Council or any other authority empowered by it by
general or special order may :-
(a). institute disciplinary proceedings against any employee;
(b). direct a disciplinary authority to institute disciplinary proceedings
against an employee on whom that disciplinary authority is competent to
impose under these rules any of the penalties specified in rule 67.”
(emphasis is mine)
7.6 Therefore, it is quite clear that the appointment was governed by Rule
69. The learned counsel for the respondents have argued that the
expression “as applicable to institute” would mean that it would have to
go back to Ordinance XX clause 2(1)(2)(f). I have read that clause. It does
not improve the case of the respondents.
7.7 In the middle of the dictation, counsels for the respondents again got
up to argue the matter and attempted to draw my attention to page 231 of
the paper book. Mr. Rupal at this stage referred me to page 202 of the
paper book, which is an extract of the minutes of the meeting held by the
Governing Body on 27.05.2000. Mr. Rupal says that in that meeting, the
Chairman of the Governing Body put a proposal that the appointing
authority, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority for the
non teaching staff, under the aforementioned rules, should be the
Governing Body. This proposal based on the said extract, I am told, was
approved. According to me, this argument begs the question : quite
clearly, the Governing Body on its own cannot hold a meeting and,
thereby, confer a power upon itself, which the Executive Council, has not
conferred on it.
8. In view of the above, the writ petition has to be allowed on this short
ground. The order of termination has to be set aside. It is ordered
accordingly. The respondents, however, shall be empowered to continue
the disciplinary proceedings, if so permissible in law, subject to necessary
powers being conferred upon it by either a specific or general resolution
of the Executive Council. There shall, however, be no orders as to costs.
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9. With the aforesaid observations in place, the writ petition and the
pending applications are disposed of.
10. Dasti.”
2.5. The Respondents sought review [Review Petition 106/2014], which
was dismissed on 20th January, 2015. The order records the submission
made on behalf of the Review Petitioner, based on the affidavit filed by
Delhi University, that there was “no resolution by Executive Council of
University of Delhi, in place, delegating power of dismissal in its favour”.
2.6. The Respondents carried the matter in appeal [LPA No. 106/2015].
The Division Bench took note of Annexure R-2, stated to indicate that the
Executive Council had delegated the requisite powers to the Governing
Body. However, observing that the said document had not been placed
before the Single Judge, the Division Bench declined to interfere with the
judgment setting aside the dismissal. It observed that, since disciplinary
power was vested in the Executive Council of the University of Delhi, the
issue of disciplinary action against the Petitioner could be placed before the
Executive Council for its decision. The Bench described this as an
alternative to the curative route charted in Paragraph No. 8 of the judgment
dated 29th January, 2014. The appeal was disposed of in those terms on 25 th
February, 2015, to the following effect:
“1. Challenge in the appeal is to the order dated January 29, 2014
allowing W.P.(C) 2110/2013, filed by the first respondent, which was laying
a challenge to a memorandum issued by the Governing Body of the
appellant terminating his service.
2. The case of the first respondent was that his service was regulated
by the University Non-teaching Employees (Terms and Conditions of
Service) Rules, 1971 as per which the Disciplinary Authority was the
Executive Council of the University of Delhi.
3. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant it was pleaded that
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the disciplinary power had been delegated to the Governing Body of the
institute, and for which reliance was placed upon clause 2(f) of Ordinance
XX of the University of Delhi.
4. The learned Single Judge noted the relevant clause of the
Ordinance and found that the power to terminate could be exercised by the
Governing Body of the institute only if it was delegated to it by the
Executive Council. The learned Single Judge noted that under Rule 69 of the
University Non-teaching Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service)
Rules, 1971, the power to take a disciplinary action was with the Executive
Council of the University.
5. To put it pithily, the learned Single Judge found that under Clause
2(f) of Ordinance XX of the University of Delhi was an enabling provision
to delegate its power by the Executive Council to the Governing Body of the
institute. The learned Single Judge found that there was no document shown
by the institute showing delegation having been made.
6. The order of termination was accordingly set aside for the reason
the authority which took the decision was held not to be empowered to do
so. In paragraph 8 of the decision dated January 29, 2014, the learned
Single Judge held that it would be open for the respondents to take action as
per law. The learned Single Judge clarified that if the Executive Council of
the University of Delhi delegated the power to the Governing Body of the
institute it could proceed, empowered by law, to take disciplinary action.
7. Seeking review of the decision dated January 29, 2014, a prolix
review petition was filed in which it was conceded that in the pleadings in
the counter affidavit, the institute failed to show that the Executive Council
had, as a matter of fact, delegated the power to the Governing Body of the
institute to take disciplinary action against the first respondent.
8. So stating, pleadings were made regarding constitution of the ad-
hoc Governing Body. Pleadings were made to various resolutions.
Somewhere mid-way of the prolix pleadings a reference was made to
Annexure R-2 to bring home a point that the Executive Council had
delegated the necessary power to the Governing Body.
9. But regretfully, in the review petition it has not been pleaded as to
why documents now being relied upon as Annexure R-2 could not be
brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge when the counter affidavit
was filed. Regretfully further, there are no pleadings as to in what manner
the statutory rules relied upon by the respondent required the matter to be
reconsidered vis-a-vis the Executive Council Resolution annexed as
Annexure R-2 filed along with the review petition. The learned Single Judge
dismissed the review petition on January 20, 2015 noting that learned
senior counsel who appeared for the review petitioner accepts that there is,
in fact, no resolution by the Executive Council of the University of Delhi in
place delegating disciplinary power upon the Governing Body of the
appellant institute.
10. The learned Single Judge therefore held that there was no error
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apparent in the face of his judgment dated January 29, 2014.
11. Suffice it to state that the order under review notices that the
counsel for the appellant failed to bring home the point before the learned
Single Judge, and accepted as a matter of fact, that there was no resolution
by the Executive Council in place delegating disciplinary power on the
Governing Body of the appellant.
12. The reason is obvious, the prolix pleadings in the review petition.
13. Be that as it may, learned counsel for the appellant states that the
appeal may be disposed of clarifying with respect to paragraph 8 of the
decision dated January 29, 2014. The clarification being in consonance
with the reasoning of the decision dated January 29, 2014 passed by the
learned Single Judge; since the disciplinary power is vested in the Executive
Council of the University of Delhi, it may be observed that the issue of
disciplinary action against the respondent could be placed before the
Executive Council of the University of Delhi for its decision. The reason
being, the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the power as per the
rule to take disciplinary action is with the Executive Council; which power
was capable of being delegated but no delegation was shown.
14. We accordingly dispose of the appeal observing that in alternative
to the curative route which could be chartered as per para 8 of the
impugned decision, the matter of disciplinary action could be considered by
the Executive Council of the University of Delhi.
15. No costs.
16. Dasti.”
2.7. The SLP [No. 2329/2016] filed against the aforesaid order was
dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Petitioner then initiated contempt
proceedings, contending that, despite the judgment dated 29th January, 2014,
he had not been reinstated in service. By order dated 6 th April, 2015, the
Contempt Court recorded that the Executive Council had not yet taken any
decision in the matter, and accordingly directed the University to convene a
meeting of the Executive Council within six weeks and to communicate its
decision to the Petitioner within a further period of two weeks thereafter.
2.8. The University thereafter passed Executive Council Resolution No.
19(3) dated 28th May, 2015. That resolution stated that, pursuant to the order
dated 25th February, 2015 in W.P.(C) 2110/2013 and LPA No. 106/2015, the
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powers to initiate disciplinary action against employees are delegated to the
Governing Body of VPCI in terms of the Non-Teaching Employees (Terms
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2013. The same resolution also noted that
such powers were already vested with the Governing Bodies of constituent
and affiliated colleges, including VPCI, in terms of the 2013 Rules.
2.9. The matter did not conclude there. By order dated 5 th November,
2015, the Contempt Court directed reinstatement of the Petitioner. This, in
turn, led to a further challenge in LPA No. 155/2016, which was dismissed
by the Division Bench on 22nd August, 2016. The Bench clarified that the
judgment of the Single Judge dated 29th January, 2014, to the extent it set
aside the first termination, remained undisturbed by the Division Bench
order dated 25th February, 2015. It further observed that, although the
Executive Council’s resolution dated 28th May, 2015 may have enabled
VPCI to proceed with disciplinary action from that date, there was no
material on record to demonstrate that such authority vested in the
Governing Body as on the date of the original termination, i.e., 18 th
February, 2013. In that view, the Division Bench upheld the direction to
reinstate the Petitioner. The review petition [No. 450/2016] against this
judgment was also dismissed on 4th October, 2016.
2.10. The Petitioner was eventually reinstated on 5th December, 2016;
however, he was placed under suspension. The Respondents thereafter
approached the University, seeking approval of the Executive Council for
the disciplinary action taken by the Governing Body. The correspondence
dated 5th December, 2016 reveals that the Respondents sought an explicit
and specific approval of the Executive Council to the decision taken by the
Governing Body, stating that such approval was necessitated in view of the
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observations of the Division Bench in LPA No. 106/2015.
2.11. The Executive Council then passed Resolution No. 32 in the meeting
held on 28th February, 2017 and resumed on 7th March, 2017.3 The
resolution, inter alia, states:
“The Executive Council, for removal of any doubt whatsoever, affirms
that the competent appointing and disciplinary authority of the non-
teaching employees of the Vallabhbhai Patel Chest Institute (VPCI) since
21.01.1955 is its Governing Body, vide EC Resolution No. 13(266) dated
21.01.1955. Further, in view of the orders passed by the Hon’ble High
Court in LPA No. 106/2015 dated 25.02.2015, the Executive Council
endorses the decision taken by the Governing Body of VPCI, dated
08.01.2013 being the appointing and disciplinary authority, to terminate
the services of Sh. C. Ramesh.”
2.12. On the strength of that resolution, the impugned order dated 2 nd May,
2017 was issued. That order states, in substance, that the Executive Council,
by the aforesaid resolution, has endorsed the disciplinary action taken by the
Governing Body on 8th January, 2013; that the Petitioner’s services
accordingly stand terminated with immediate effect; that the earlier proposal
regarding 25% back wages stands withdrawn; that the period from 18 th
February, 2013 to 4th December, 2016 shall be treated as deemed
suspension; and that 75% of pay and allowances of the last pay drawn would
be paid for that period by way of subsistence allowance.
2.13. Aggrieved, the Petitioner has approached this Court, assailing his
termination. He further seeks a direction for reinstatement with effect from
2nd May, 2017 along with back wages and consequential benefits from 19 th
February, 2013.
Petitioner’s Case
3.1. The Petitioner submits that, from the inception, he has consistently
3
“2017 Resolution”
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objected to the authority of the Governing Body to act as the disciplinary
authority. He contends that his appointment and service conditions were
governed by the 1971 Rules, under which the Executive Council was the
competent authority to initiate and conclude proceedings for imposition of a
major penalty. It is contended that no valid delegation, whether by general
or special order, was ever made in favour of the Governing Body, which fact
was affirmed by the judgment of the Single Judge dated 29th January, 2014,
and has remained undisturbed through review, appellate, and subsequent
proceedings, including the challenge carried to the Supreme Court.
3.2. It is further contended that the order of the Division Bench dated 25 th
February, 2015 did not interfere with the setting aside of the initial dismissal
by the Single Judge. The Division Bench merely observed that the issue of
disciplinary action could be placed before the Executive Council for its
consideration. This position was clarified in subsequent judgment dated 22 nd
August, 2016 in LPA No. 155/2016, wherein the Division Bench held that
the resolution of 2015 could, at the highest, enable continuation of
disciplinary proceedings thereafter, but could not cure the original
termination dated 18th February, 2013.
3.3. The Petitioner further submits that the Respondents have not
proceeded by issuing any fresh charge memorandum through the competent
authority. Instead, they have sought to validate the earlier action. The
impugned order dated 2nd May, 2017 does not constitute a fresh disciplinary
determination; rather, it affirms the Governing Body’s earlier decision dated
8th January, 2013 and, by that, attempts to revive the effect of the original
dismissal. Such a course, it is contended, is impermissible.
3.4. Considerable reliance is placed on the Circular dated 2 nd February,Signature Not Verified
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1981, which clarifies that the 1971 Rules had attained finality. It is urged
that, once the applicability of the 1971 Rules stood clarified, the
Respondents could not revert to the arrangements of 1955 and 1959 as
though the 1971 regime did not govern the field. The Petitioner further
submits that, although the said circular formed part of the official record, it
was not placed before the Court in the earlier round of litigation and came to
light only subsequently.
3.5. It is also contended that the Executive Council Resolution No.
13(266) dated 21st January, 19554 does not advance the Respondents’ case in
the manner suggested. While the said resolution constituted the Governing
Body and conferred certain administrative powers, including the authority to
appoint administrative, clerical and other staff, it did not designate the
Governing Body as the disciplinary authority under the subsequently framed
1971 Rules. Nor can such authority be conferred retrospectively by way of
an ex post facto resolution in 2017. Therefore, what the Executive Council
purported to do in 2017 was not to clarify a pre-existing and consistent legal
position, but to cure a defect that had already been identified and declared
by this Court.
3.6. In support of his contentions, the Petitioner relies on the judgements
of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath5 and Marathwada
University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan,6 and of this Court in Union of
India v. S.K. Jasra.7 The submission is that where the rule or statutory
framework requires a particular authority to act, later approval or ratification4
“1955 Resolution”
5
(2014) 1 SCC 351.
6
(1989) 3 SCC 132.
7
W.P.(C) 2742/2024, decided on 10th October, 2025.
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cannot validate a foundational act that was without authority. He also relies
on those authorities to submit that where the initial action is non-est,
principles of estoppel, finality or technical bar cannot breathe life into the
same.
Respondent Nos. 1 and 2’s Case
4.1. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 contend that the Petitioner was appointed by
the Governing Body itself and that, at all material times, the Governing
Body possessed the requisite disciplinary authority. According to them, the
present controversy has arisen only because the 1955 Resolution was not
properly placed before the Single Judge in the earlier round of litigation.
This resolution constituted the Governing Body and vested in it the powers
of both appointing and disciplinary authority in respect of administrative and
non-academic staff. Reliance is also placed on the subsequent developments,
including the 1959 Rules and Bye-laws, the approval communicated by the
Ministry, the Executive Council resolution dated 19th February, 1966, and
the later amendment to Ordinance XX. According to the Respondents, this
entire sequence evidences a consistent and continuing conferment of
disciplinary powers upon the Governing Body.
4.2. The Respondents also rely upon the order of the Division Bench in
LPA No. 106/2015, submitting that the Bench had taken note of the 1955
Resolution (referred to as Annexure R-2) and had accepted that the
Executive Council had, through that resolution, delegated the requisite
powers to the Governing Body. It is urged that the curative course indicated
by the Division Bench must be understood in that backdrop, particularly in
light of the fact that the said material had not been properly presented in the
earlier proceedings.
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4.3. It is further submitted that the 2017 Resolution did not create any
power retrospectively, but merely clarified and reaffirmed what was always
the true legal position. The said resolution removed any doubt and endorsed
the action of the Governing Body.
4.4. It is also contended that the power to appoint ordinarily carries with it
the power to remove; therefore, a proper construction of the 1955
Resolution, read with the subsequent materials, establishes that the
Governing Body possessed the disciplinary authority, and the 2017
Resolution only places the matter beyond controversy.
4.5. On merits, the Respondents submit that all nine charges against the
Petitioner stood duly established in the course of the inquiry; that the
Petitioner was afforded full and fair opportunity of defence; and that the
earlier interference with the order dated 8th January, 2013 was confined to a
technical issue of competence. Reliance is placed on the judgements of the
Supreme Court in National Institute of Technology v. Pannalal
Choudhury8 and High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh9 to
contend that a competent authority can validate or ratify an action taken at
an earlier stage, and that not every procedural irregularity renders the entire
proceeding void in administrative law.
Respondent No. 3’s Case
5. Respondent No. 3, the University of Delhi, broadly supports the stand
taken by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It asserts that it has consistently
maintained the position that the powers to appoint, suspend, and terminate
non-teaching staff of VPCI vest in the Governing Body. In support, reliance
8
(2015) 11 SCC 669.
9
(2003) 4 SCC 239.
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is placed on the 1955 Resolution, 1959 Bye-laws, and the subsequent
amendment to Ordinance XX.
6. In response, the Petitioner contends that this position is difficult to
reconcile with the University’s own earlier inquiry report dated 25 th May,
2014, wherein the powers of the Governing Body were described as
“assumed, derived and deemed”. Reliance is also placed on the submission
recorded in the review order dated 20th January, 2015, to the effect that no
resolution of the Executive Council of the University of Delhi existed
delegating the power of dismissal to VPCI. It is further urged that the
counter affidavit filed by the University is belated and, in substance, merely
reiterates positions that have not found favour in earlier rounds of litigation.
Issues
7. The principal issues that arise for consideration are as follows:
7.1. Whether the Executive Council resolution dated 21 st January, 1955
vested the Governing Body with disciplinary authority over the Petitioner
during the relevant period.
7.2. Whether, despite the earlier judgments of this Court, Executive
Council Resolution No. 32 dated 28th February, 2017/7th March, 2017
validly cured the defect earlier noticed, or whether it merely attempted
retrospectively to validate action that was without authority when taken.
7.3. Whether the impugned order dated 2nd May, 2017 represents a fresh
lawful exercise, or whether it rests on the same old disciplinary foundation
which had already been set aside.
7.4. What relief should follow.
Discussion and reasons
8. The principal contention advanced by the Petitioner is that the
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Governing Body of VPCI was never vested with the authority to act as the
disciplinary authority in respect of the Petitioner. The Respondents seek to
meet this contention by placing reliance on the 1955 Resolution, asserting
that the said resolution conferred the requisite powers upon the Governing
Body. In order to appreciate this submission, it is necessary to extract the
relevant portion of the said resolution:
“2. Subject to the general control and supervision of the Executive
Council, the Governing Body will manage the affairs of the Institute and
shall have the following powers and functions:-
(a) to organize the teaching and research in the Institute and to
determine the staff and other requirements for the same. The Governing
Body may constitute and Advisory Committee to advise it on matters of
special interest which the Institute wishes to investigate. The Advisory
Committee may include persons who are not connected with the
University,
(b) Subject to the control of the Academic Council, to prescribe the rules
for admission of the students, resident and non-resident, and the fees to
be paid by them,
(c) to frame the Budget of the Institute and submit the same for approval
to the Executive Council, and to incur expenditure within the limits fixed
in the budget approved by the Executive Council,
(d) To appoint Administrative, clerical and other staff of the Institute
including those to whom academic and teaching functions are assigned,
provided that the appointment of persons with teaching functions will be
subject to their recognition by the University,
(e) to make such rules as the Governing Body may think essential for the
regulation of the business of the Institute, and
(f) To exercise such other powers and functions, as may be assigned to
them by the Executive Council.”
9. The submission advanced on behalf of the Respondents cannot be
brushed aside as insubstantial. The 1955 Resolution is a foundational
document: it constitutes the Governing Body, places it under the general
control and supervision of the Executive Council, and vests in it, inter alia,
the authority to appoint administrative, clerical and other staff. It also
enables the Governing Body to exercise such further powers as may be
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assigned to it by the Executive Council. However, the resolution does not, in
express terms, designate the Governing Body as the disciplinary authority.
Nor does it expressly empower the Governing Body to institute disciplinary
proceedings for imposition of major penalties or to dismiss employees who
are governed by a subsequent statutory regime, namely, the 1971 Rules,
which themselves prescribe the authority competent to initiate such
proceedings.
10. The Respondents have also emphasised the principle that the power to
appoint ordinarily carries with it the power to remove. In a general
administrative law context, that submission is not without force. However,
the present case does not arise in a field governed merely by implication.
The Petitioner’s appointment was expressly subject to the 1971 Rules. The
earlier judgment of this Court in W.P.(C) 2110/2013 proceeded on that very
footing: it examined Rule 69 of the 1971 Rules, adverted to the relevant
provisions of Ordinance XX, and specifically rejected the contention that the
status of the Governing Body as appointing authority, by itself, conferred
disciplinary jurisdiction. The Court observed, in substance, that such an
argument might have had relevance in the absence of governing rules, but
could not prevail where the service conditions were expressly regulated by
the 1971 Rules.
11. Viewed in this light, the central difficulty in the Respondents’ case
becomes evident. While the 1955 Resolution undoubtedly confers upon the
Governing Body the power to appoint, the material placed on record does
not demonstrate a corresponding conferment of authority to act as the
disciplinary authority for the purposes of imposing major penalties under the
1971 regime.
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12. Rule 69 of the 1971 Rules provides that disciplinary proceedings may
be instituted by the Executive Council or by any other authority empowered
by it through a general or special order. The language employed is deliberate
and significant. It places the authority to institute proceedings in the
Executive Council, subject to delegation. The aforesaid judgment of the
Single Judge construed the provision in precisely these terms. This was
further reinforced in the review order dated 20th January, 2015, wherein it
was recorded, on the basis of an affidavit filed by the University of Delhi,
that no resolution of the Executive Council existed delegating the power of
dismissal in favour of VPCI. If the reliance now placed on the 1955
Resolution were sufficient to conclusively establish such delegation, it
would have been difficult for such a statement to be made before the Court.
13. Considerable reliance has also been placed by the Respondents on the
observations of the Division Bench in LPA No. 106/2015. It is correct that
the Division Bench took note of the reliance placed on the 1955 Resolution
(Annexure R-2) and indicated a possible curative course by observing that
the issue of disciplinary action could be placed before the Executive
Council. However, the structure and effect of the order are of crucial
importance. The Division Bench did not restore the original dismissal, nor
did it disturb the finding of the Single Judge that no valid delegation had
been demonstrated. It expressly said that the clarification being given was in
consonance with the reasoning of the Single Judge. The order left the setting
aside of the first termination untouched.
14. This position stands further reinforced by the subsequent judgment of
the Division Bench in LPA No. 155/2016. The Court there stated, in
unequivocal terms that the order dated 29th January, 2014, to the extent it set
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aside the termination, had not been disturbed by the Division Bench. It
further observed that that while the Executive Council Resolution dated 28th
May, 2015 may have enabled the Governing Body to continue the
disciplinary proceedings with prospective effect, there was no material to
demonstrate that such authority vested in the Governing Body as on 18 th
February, 2013. These observations bear directly on the controversy at hand
and militate against the Respondents’ attempt to trace the requisite authority
to an earlier point in time.
15. It is in this backdrop that the 2017 Resolution falls for consideration.
The resolution states, “for removal of any doubt whatsoever,” the competent
appointing and disciplinary authority since 21st January, 1955 has been the
Governing Body. It proceeds further to expressly endorse the Governing
Body’s earlier decision dated 8th January, 2013 terminating the services of
the Petitioner.
16. There are two possible ways of reading the 2017 Resolution. The
Respondents contend that it is merely clarificatory in nature, whereas the
Petitioner urges that it amounts to a retrospective validation of an otherwise
invalid exercise of power. On the material presently available, the latter
construction appears more persuasive, for several reasons.
17. First, the resolution does not confine itself to stating an abstract
position of law. It expressly endorses the specific decision of the Governing
Body dated 8th January, 2013. Such language is not ordinarily employed
where the position is already settled and unambiguous; rather, it bears the
imprint of an attempt to cure a defect in an earlier action.
18. Secondly, the correspondence preceding the resolution sheds light on
the Respondents’ own understanding of the position. VPCI’s request to the
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University dated 5th December, 2016 does not proceed on the footing that
the competence of the Governing Body stood conclusively established. On
the contrary, it seeks “explicit/specific approval” of the Executive Council
for the decision taken by the Governing Body, and states that such approval
is necessitated in view of the observations of the Division Bench.
19. Thirdly, if the 1955 Resolution were, by itself, sufficient to vest the
Governing Body with disciplinary authority, and if that position stood
accepted in the earlier round of litigation, the Respondents could have
promptly initiated a fresh, legally compliant course. Instead, the course
adopted was otherwise: the Petitioner was reinstated, simultaneously placed
under suspension, and the earlier disciplinary action was forwarded to the
University for approval. The 2017 Resolution thereafter proceeded to affirm,
in broad and retrospective terms, that the Governing Body had, since 1955,
always been the competent appointing and disciplinary authority.
20. These features, read cumulatively, lend considerable weight to the
Petitioner’s submission that the 2017 Resolution is not merely clarificatory,
but is in substance an attempt at retrospective validation of an action earlier
found to be lacking in authority.
21. The Circular dated 2nd February, 1981, relied upon by the Petitioner,
also assumes significance in this context. It proceeds on the basis that the
adoption of the 1971 Rules governing non-academic staff had attained
finality. This circumstance further undermines the Respondents’ attempt to
revert to the 1955 and 1959 framework as the primary source of disciplinary
authority, without demonstrating how such framework coexisted with, or
prevailed over, the subsequently applicable 1971 Rules.
22. This brings the matter to the case law cited by the parties. In B.V.
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Gopinath, relied upon by the Petitioner, the Supreme Court drew a clear
distinction between approval to initiate disciplinary proceedings and
approval of the charge memorandum itself. It held that where the governing
rules require the disciplinary authority to frame, or cause to be framed, the
charge-sheet, the articles of charge attain validity only upon approval by the
competent disciplinary authority; in the absence of such approval, the charge
memorandum is rendered non est in law. Although this judgement was
rendered in a different factual context, yet the principle applies with equal
force to the present case, where the foundational action, namely, the
initiation and culmination of disciplinary proceedings, was not undertaken
by the authority mandated under the governing rules, and is sought to be
validated only at a subsequent stage.
23. S.K. Jasra, a recent Division Bench decision of this Court, applies the
same principle in a clear and direct way. The Court held that where a
charge-sheet is issued without the approval of the competent disciplinary
authority, it is non est in law and cannot be validated by subsequent steps or
ratification. This reasoning squarely applies to the present case, where an
action initiated without competence is sought to be sustained through post
facto approval.
24. The decision of the Supreme Court in Marathwada University is also
apposite, and enunciates a broader principle of administrative law: where a
statute or governing rules require a particular authority to act, that authority
alone must exercise the power, unless delegation is expressly permitted. An
action taken by an authority lacking such statutory competence is void ab
initio, and cannot be cured by subsequent ratification. Ratification, in such
circumstances, cannot travel beyond the source of power. The same
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principle governs the present case, where the initial exercise of disciplinary
power is traced to an authority not shown to have been duly empowered
under the governing framework.
25. The Respondents have placed reliance on the judgments of the
Supreme Court in Pannalal Choudhury and P.P. Singh. However, these
decisions do not advance their case on the facts at hand. In Pannalal
Choudhury, an employee was dismissed pursuant to disciplinary
proceedings initiated and continued by the Principal and Secretary, whose
competence was under challenge. However, the material on record showed
that the Board of Governors (the competent authority) had, through a series
of resolutions, monitored and authorised the Principal and Secretary to take
necessary action and had subsequently approved and ratified the dismissal.
The Court held that, on those facts, the dismissal order stood ratified by the
competent authority and thereby stood validated retrospectively.
26. Thus, in Pannalal Choudhury, the competent had clearly authorised
and remained involved in the decision-making process, and later expressly
approved the action in continuation of that process. The ratification was in
the nature of affirmation of an already authorised chain of action, rather than
an attempt to cure a foundational lack of jurisdiction. In the present case, by
contrast, there is no contemporaneous material demonstrating delegation or
authorisation by the Executive Council at the time of initiation or
culmination of the disciplinary proceedings. The 2017 Resolution is not a
continuation of an existing authorised process, but an ex post facto attempt
to confer validity upon an action already held to be without authority. That
is why Pannalal Choudhury does not advance the Respondent’s case.
27. The decision in P.P. Singh also arose in a materially different context.
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The case concerned grant of selection scale to members of the Rajasthan
Higher Judicial Service, where a two-Judge Committee, constituted by the
Chief Justice, made recommendations that were subsequently placed before
and approved by the Full Court. The challenge was to the Committee’s
authority The Supreme Court upheld the process, holding that the Rules
empowered the Chief Justice to constitute such a Committee, and that its
recommendations attained finality only upon approval by the Full Court.
That position is also clearly distinguishable. In P.P. Singh, the Rules
expressly permitted such delegation, and the ultimate decision always rested
with the competent authority, i.e., the Full Court. In the present case,
however, the disciplinary proceedings were both initiated and concluded by
an authority not shown to be empowered under the governing rules. The
Executive Council, i.e., the competent authority under Rule 69, did not itself
take the decision, but endorsed a concluded action. This is not a case of a
preparatory act being approved, but of an entire proceeding conducted
without authority and thereafter sought to be validated.
Conclusions and Findings
28. Viewed in the aforesaid light, the central issue admits of little doubt.
The impugned order dated 2nd May, 2017 is not the outcome of a fresh and
independent disciplinary exercise undertaken by a duly competent authority
on the basis of a fresh charge memorandum. For the foregoing reasons, this
Court is unable to accept the Respondents’ contention that the 2017
Resolution validly cured the earlier defect. The more tenable view is that the
resolution seeks, in effect, to retrospectively validate the competence of the
Governing Body and to affirm its earlier decision dated 8 th January, 2013.
Such a course is impermissible in the facts of the present case.
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29. The Respondents’ submission that the challenge is belated, or that the
matter ought to be brought to a quietus in view of repeated rounds of
litigation, also does not commend acceptance. While it is true that the
Petitioner has approached the Court on multiple occasions, much of that
history is attributable to the manner in which the earlier judgment was not
given effect to, leading to successive proceedings in review, appeal,
clarification, and contempt. In any event, where the challenge goes to the
very competence and jurisdiction underlying the impugned action,
considerations of delay or multiplicity cannot operate to validate what is
otherwise unsustainable in law.
30. It is equally true that the Court in the first round did not examine the
charges on merits. That is why care is needed in crafting the final relief. The
Court is not called upon, in the present writ petition, to pronounce on the
factual truth or otherwise of the nine articles. The case turns on authority,
structure, and legal source of power.
Relief
31. The writ petition is accordingly allowed in the following terms:
31.1. The order dated 2nd May, 2017 terminating the services of the
Petitioner is set aside. Consequently, the Petitioner shall be reinstated in
service.
31.2. Executive Council Resolution No. 32 dated 28th February, 2017/7th
March, 2017, insofar as it declares the Governing Body as the competent
appointing and disciplinary authority for the Petitioner since 21 st January,
1955; and insofar as it endorses the Governing Body’s decision dated 8 th
January, 2013, shall not operate against the Petitioner.
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proceedings, including issuance of a fresh charge memorandum by the
competent authority in accordance with the 1971 Rules, subject to
conferment of the requisite powers by a general or special resolution of the
Executive Council, read along with the directions contained in judgement
dated 29th January, 2014 in W.P.(C) 2110/2013 and the judgment dated 25 th
February, 2015 in LPA 106/2015.
31.4. The Respondents shall, within a period of four weeks from the date of
this order, take a considered decision as to whether disciplinary proceedings
are required to be initiated against the Petitioner and communicate the same
to the Petitioner.
31.5. In the event the Respondents decide to initiate disciplinary
proceedings, the same shall be conducted strictly in accordance with the
applicable Rules, and concluded as expeditiously as possible, preferably
within a period of six months from the date of initiation.
31.6. Since the Court has not examined the merits of the charges and the
impugned order is set aside on the technical ground of lack of authority, it is
directed that, in the event the Respondents decide to initiate disciplinary
proceedings, it shall be open to them to place the Petitioner under
suspension in accordance with the applicable service rules, in which event
he shall be entitled to subsistence allowance as per law. The question of
back wages and other consequential benefits shall be determined by the
disciplinary authority in accordance with law upon conclusion of the fresh
inquiry, if initiated.10
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appropriate order regarding back wages and continuity of service, in
accordance with law.
32. It is clarified that this judgment does not adjudicate upon the merits of
the nine articles of charge. All right and contentions of the parties to that
extent are reserved.
33. In view of the foregoing, the petition is disposed of.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
APRIL 28, 2026/hc
10
See: Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha, (2011) 5 SCC 142; ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727.
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