Delhi High Court – Orders
National Healthcare Institute And … vs Max Healthcare Institute Limited on 23 April, 2026
Author: Tushar Rao Gedela
Bench: Tushar Rao Gedela
$~35
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CM(M)-IPD 22/2026, CM 104/2026 & CM 105/2026
NATIONAL HEALTHCARE INSTITUTE AND MEDICAL
RESEARCH CENTRE .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Arnav Goyal, Advocate.
versus
MAX HEALTHCARE INSTITUTE LIMITED .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Raunaq Kamath, Mr. Siddharth
Varshney and Mr. Yash Raj,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
ORDER
% 23.04.2026
1. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950,
challenging the impugned order dated 25.03.2026, passed by the learned
District Judge (Commercial Court-02), South District, Saket, New Delhi in
CS(COMM.) 127/2026 whereby the learned Trial Court dismissed the
application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as “CPC“).
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/defendant states
that the learned Trial Court has erred in exercising jurisdiction by issuing
summons to the petitioner/defendant in the suit for the reason that there is no
territorial jurisdiction available with the Delhi Courts as the
petitioner/defendant is located in Jaipur and offers its services only in Jaipur.
3. So far as the issue of interactive website is concerned, he states that the
website is not at all interactive and there is no way by which any individual or
a person can obtain any appointment of any doctor rendering services in the
defendant’s hospital at Jaipur and as such the basis on which the learned Trial
Court has dismissed the application, filed on behalf of the
petitioner/defendant itself is unfounded.
CM(M)-IPD 22/2026 Page 1 of 7
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4. Moreover, so far as the conferring of territorial jurisdiction under
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is concerned, learned counsel
brings attention of this Court to para 2.5 of the writ petition wherein the
petitioner has extracted the GST registration details as also the company
details available with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs pertaining to the
respondent/plaintiff. He states that while the company is incorporated and
registered at ROC Mumbai, the only reason on the basis of which the present
suit was filed, is the GST registration which is at Delhi. He states that in terms
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644 of
2010 titled “Indian Performing Rights Society vs. Sanjay Dalia” dated
01.07.2025, the suit would be maintained only in the place where it has its
registered or a principal place of business. He states that the
respondent/plaintiff has incorrectly stated Delhi to be the principal place of
business. He states in such view of the matter, the impugned order is
unsustainable and has to be set aside.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff states that so far
as the respondent/plaintiff is concerned, it is only the mere averment in the
plaint stating that a particular territorial jurisdiction conferred on a particular
place, should be enough for the Court to proceed to issuing summons of the
suit.
6. He relies upon the judgment of learned Division Bench of this Court in
“PUMA SE vs. DK ARORA” reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Delhi 4142.
7. Learned counsel states that in Puma SE (supra) the learned Division
Bench had relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in “Exphar SA vs.
Eupharma Laboratories Ltd.” dated 20.02.2024 wherein it was categorically
held that if the objection to jurisdiction is raised by way of a demurrer, the
trial must proceed on the basis that the facts pleaded by the plaintiff in the
impugned proceedings are true. He states that on the basis of the aforesaid
CM(M)-IPD 22/2026 Page 2 of 7
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observations, the impugned order is clearly sustainable in law.
8. That apart, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff had also handed
over to the Court the copies of the screenshots of the website maintained by
the petitioner/defendant to submit that the said website is an interactive
website whereby any individual can seek and obtain an appointment for
consultation with a doctor. He emphasizes that the said screenshot also
indicates that at least 300 appointments were booked via the interactive
website. Predicated on the above, learned counsel states that the law has
developed further from what the learned Division Bench in the case of
CS(OS) 894/2004 dated 23.11.2009 titled “Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited
vs. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr.” had held. He states that the judgment of
the learned Division bench of this Court in FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025 titled
“Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd vs. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd.”
dated 03.12.2025 also clearly observes that if there are any interactive
websites, wherever such websites are accessible, that place would have
jurisdiction to entertain a suit.
9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the petition of the petitioner/defendant must fail.
10. Clearly, at the stage of considering any application under Order VII
Rule 10 of CPC or for that matter under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the
Courts are to be only guided by the averments in the plaint and nothing else.
11. This Court has perused the judgment in Indian Performing Rights
Society (Supra), relevant portions are extracted hereunder:
“23. The provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the
Trade Marks Act are in pari materia. Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act is
applicable to clauses (a) and (b) of Section 134(1) of the Trade Marks Act. Thus,
a procedure to institute suit with respect to Section 134(1)(c) in respect of
“passing off” continues to be governed by Section 20 CPC.
24. If the interpretation suggested by the appellant is accepted, several mischiefs
may result, intention is that the plaintiff should not go to far-flung places than thatCM(M)-IPD 22/2026 Page 3 of 7
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of residence or where he carries on business or works for gain in order to deprive
the defendant a remedy and harass him by dragging to distant place. It is settled
proposition of law that the interpretation of the provisions has to be such which
prevents mischief. The said principle was explained in Heydon’s case¹¹.
According to the mischief rule, four points are required to be taken into
consideration. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the
statute was designed to remedy should first be identified and then a construction
that suppresses the problem and advances the remedy should be adopted.
Heydon’s¹¹ mischief rule has been referred to in Interpretation of Statutes by
Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edn., at pp. 124-25 thus:
“(b) Rule in Heydon’s case¹¹; purposive construction: mischief rule
When the material words are capable of bearing two or more
constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words
‘of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging
of the common law)’ is the rule laid down in Heydon’s case¹¹ which has now
attained the status of a classic (Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan²⁰).
The rule which is also known as “purposive construction” or “mischief rule”
(Anderton v. Ryan²¹), enables consideration of four matters in construing an
Act: (i) What was the law before the making of the Act; (ii) What was the
mischief or defect for which the law did not provide; (iii) What is the remedy
that the Act has provided; and (iv) What is the reason of the remedy. The rule
then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which “shall
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”. The rule was explained in
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar by S.R. Das, C.J. as follows: (AIR
p. 674, para 22)
22. It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in
England as far back as in 1584 when Heydon’s case was decided that: (ER
p. 638)
“…for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be
they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four
things are to be discerned and considered:
1st: What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd: What was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide.
3rd: What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth, and
4th: The true reason of the remedy;
and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy,
and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the
mischief, and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the
cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act,
pro bono publico.’ (Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar22).
47. The facts of the instant cases and the question posed is different which did not
come up for consideration in any of the aforesaid decisions rendered by the HighCM(M)-IPD 22/2026 Page 4 of 7
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Courts and even otherwise any observations in any of the aforesaid decisions
contrary to our decision cannot hold the field. Interpretation of provisions cannot
be so wide so as to open it to be misused, it has to be subject to object of the Act
as explained above.”
12. This Court has also perused the judgment of learned Division Bench in
Puma SE (supra) and it appears appropriate to extract the para 16 as also para
17 hereunder:
“16. As mentioned above, the law in relation to rejection of plaint at the initial
stage while considering application under Order VII Rule 10 is no longer res
integra. The Supreme Court in Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd.
observed as under: (SCC p. 692, para 9)
9. Besides, when an objection to jurisdiction is raised by way of
demurrer and not at the trial, the objection must proceed on the
basis that the facts as pleaded by the initiator of the impugned
proceedings are true. The submission in order to succeed must show
that granted those facts the court does not have jurisdiction as a
matter of law. In rejecting a plaint on the ground of jurisdiction, the
Division Bench should have taken the allegations contained in the
plaint to be correct. However, the Division bench examined the
written statement filed by the respondents in which it was claimed
that the goods were not at all sold within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Delhi high Court and also that Respondent 2 did not carry on
business within the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. Having
recorded the appellants’ objections to these factual statements by the
respondents, surprisingly the Division Bench said:
“Admittedly the goods are being traded outside India and not being
traded in India and as such there is no question of infringement of
trade mark within the territorial limits of any court in India what to
say of Delhi.”
17. The principle laid down was, thereafter, followed by this Court in RSPL Ltd.
case, and, thereafter, followed consistently by this Court in Allied Blenders &
Distillers (P) Ltd. v. Parag Distillery (P) Ltd., and various other judgments such
as Mann Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Singh Chandra Kishore Chaurasia v. R A
Perfumery Works (P) Ltd. and Dassault Systems SE vs. Automobile Corpn. of Goa
Ltd.”
13. Therefore, the law in this regard is trite. In that, this Court is to consider
the averments in the plaint as a whole without reference to the written
statement and the defendant is to show that granted those facts mentioned in
the plaint, the Court does not have jurisdiction as a matter of law. The
petitioner/defendant has failed in that endeavour.
CM(M)-IPD 22/2026 Page 5 of 7
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14. So far as the objections raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner,
on facts, is concerned, at this stage, the documents which have been filed
alongwith the plaint specially the website of the petitioner/defendant, appears
to be an interactive website, although whether the website is interactive or not
cannot be ascertained with conviction at this stage and may be considered at
the stage of trial.
15. At this stage, this Court is to prima facie see if territorial jurisdiction is
available with the Court at New Delhi on the basis of a website which appears
to be interactive. This Court has no reason, at this stage, to doubt that the
website is indeed interactive.
16. It is also on record that not only has the respondent-plaintiff asserted
that its carrying on business within the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi and that
its principal place of business is located in N-110, Panchsheel Park, New
Delhi-110017, but also has its GST registration at Delhi.
17. The plaintiff also has asserted that it has two multi specialty hospitals
running within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court apart from relying upon
the Section 20(C) of the CPC.
18. In view of the facts as obtaining in the present case, the ratio in Indian
Performing Rights Society (Supra) would not apply.
19. On an overall conspectus, this Court does not find any reason to
interfere with the impugned order dated 25.03.2026, passed by the learned
Trial Court.
20. This Court also does not find any illegality or impropriety or any
infirmity or an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon by the
learned District Court while passing the impugned order and as such the
petition is dismissed being bereft of any merits. However, no costs are
imposed on the said petition.
21. The aforesaid observations shall not tantamount to expression on merits
CM(M)-IPD 22/2026 Page 6 of 7
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of the matter and the parties are at liberty to take any and all objection as and
when the trial proceeds.
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J
APRIL 23, 2026
yrj
CM(M)-IPD 22/2026 Page 7 of 7
This is a digitally signed order.
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