Kerala High Court
Shanavas Khan vs State Of Kerala on 3 August, 2026
CNR : KLHC010476362026
2026:KER:58629
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
MONDAY, THE 3RD DAY OF AUGUST 2026 / 12TH SRAVANA, 1948
CRL.MC NO. 5367 OF 2026
CRIME NO.196/2026 OF VARKALA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
PETITIONER/ACCUSED:
SHANAVAS KHAN
AGED 32 YEARS
S/O BADARUDHEEN, MANKUZHI CHARUVILA VEEDU, PULIYOORKONAM,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 695573
BY ADV SRI.LATHEESH SEBASTIAN
SMT.SHAJNA M., LEGAL AID COUNSEL
RESPONDENTS/STATE & COMPLAINANT:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682031
2 DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
VARKALA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695141
3 STATION HOUSE OFFICER
VARKALA POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 695141
4 XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
BY ADV SMT.M.SHAJNA, HCLSC PANEL ADVOCATE
SRI. V.R. RAMLAL, P. P.
THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING
ON 30.07.2026, THE COURT ON 03.08.2026 PASSED THE
FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case has been filed under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNSS”), by the sole
accused in Crime No. 196/2026 of Varkala Police Station, registered alleging
commission of offences punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC, Sections
3(a), 4(1), 6(1), 5(l) of the POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Attorocities) Act. The petitioner seeks
to quash the said FIR on the ground that, prior to its registration, another FIR
has been registered on the very same allegations, as Crime No. 125/2026 at
Pallikal Police Station alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections
313, 366, 376(2)(n) r/w 34 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(v) of the
SC/ST(POA) Act on the strength of a statement given by the same de facto
complainant.
2. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is as follows:
The petitioner is the sole accused in Crime No.196/2026 of Varkala Police
Station, registered alleging commission of offences punishable under Section
376(2)(n) of IPC, Sections 3(a), 4(1), 6(1), 5(l) of the POCSO Act and Section
3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Attorocities)
Act. According to the petitioner, in respect of the very same incident narrated in
the First Information Statement (FIS) leading to the registration of the said
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crime, the de facto complainant had earlier approached the SHO, Pallikal Police
Station and pursuant to which Crime No. 125/2026 at Pallikal Police Station
alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 313, 366, 376(2)(n)
r/w 34 of IPC and Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST(POA) Act was
registered. It is further averred that the allegations contained in the FIR
registered at Pallikal Police Station and those contained in the subsequent FIR
registered at Varkala Police Station arise out of the very same transaction and
are identical. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the registration of a second
FIR in respect of the same occurrence is legally impermissible. Hence, the FIR in
Crime No. 196/2026 of Varkala Police Station and all further proceedings
pursuant thereto are liable to be quashed.
3. Heard Sri Latheesh Sebastian, the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, Smt. Shajna M., the learned legal aid counsel appearing for the de
facto complainant and Sri. V. R. Ramlal, the learned Public Prosecutor.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised arguments reiterating the
averments contained in the petition. Placing reliance on the decision in T.T
Antony v. State of Kerala and others [(2001) 6 SCC 181], it was contended
that the registration of a second FIR on the same set of facts, after an earlier
FIR had already been registered at Pallikal Police Station, is legally
unsustainable. It was further submitted that, although the subsequent First
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Information Statement (FIS) furnishes a more elaborate narration of the incident
disclosed in the earlier FIS, the substratum of the allegations in both proceedings
remains one and the same. It was, therefore, argued that the impugned FIR is
liable to be quashed.
5. Per contra, the learned legal aid counsel appearing for the de facto
complainant submitted that the second FIR does not relate to the incidents
referred to in the earlier FIR. According to the learned legal aid counsel, the
transactions narrated in the earlier FIR and those forming the subject matter of
the subsequent FIR are distinct and independent. Placing reliance on the
decision in State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore [2025 SCC
OnLine SC 358], the learned legal aid counsel submitted that a second FIR may
be maintainable where, though arising from the same factual background, it
encompasses a distinct transaction or a larger and different scope of
investigation. According to the learned legal aid counsel, the ambit of the two
FIRs in the present case is entirely different and, therefore, the second FIR is
legally sustainable.
6. The learned Public Prosecutor also supported the stand taken by the
4th respondent/the de facto complainant.
7. While considering the rival submissions, it must first be noted that it is
no longer res integra that the registration of a second FIR in respect of the same
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incident or transaction is impermissible in law. Therefore, the question that
arises for consideration is whether the allegations contained in the earlier FIS,
which culminated in the registration of Crime No. 125/2026 of Pallikal Police
Station, are identical or substantially similar to those contained in the
subsequent FIS, which resulted in the registration of Crime No. 196/2026 of
Varkala Police Station.
8. In an attempt to answer the said question, this Court has carefully gone
through the averments contained in both the FIS. A comparative reading of both
documents makes it evident that, in substance, the de facto complainant alleges
in both that she was induced to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused
on the false representation that he would marry her. In the earlier FIS itself, the
de facto complainant disclosed that she and the accused were in a love affair
while she was studying in Plus One. Likewise, in the said FIS, it is stated that in
the years 2016 and 2017, on two occasions, the accused had taken her to a
lodge near a bus stand at Varkala and had sexual intercourse with her.
Moreover, it is specifically stated that the accused also took her to ‘Kappil beach’
as well as to Ponmudi. Likewise, in the second FIS, which resulted in the
registration of the subsequent FIR at Varkala Police Station, she stated that it
was while she was studying in Plus One that the accused and she got acquainted
with each other, and both of them fell in love. Thereafter, the accused had
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taken her to Kappil beach in a car. Likewise, she stated that subsequently, on
another day, the accused took her to a lodge situated on the opposite side of
Varkala private bus stand and engaged in sexu al intercourse with her. On
another occasion also, the accused repeated the same. Likewise, it is stated
that while she was studying for the Plus One course, on several occasions she
was taken to Ponmudi and the accused had sexual intercourse with her near a
rocky area. Thus, the foundational allegation that the accused had sexual
intercourse with the de facto complainant on the basis of a false promise of
marriage while she was studying at Higher Secondary School, Madavoor, is
clearly discernible in both the FIS. In the earlier statement itself, she stated that
she as well as the accused fell in love with each other while she was studying in
Plus One. It is true that the subsequent FIS contains a little more elaborate
narration of the events leading to the alleged occurrence. However, that by itself
cannot obscure the fact that the essential factual ingredients constituting the
offences alleged against the accused had already been disclosed in the earlier
FIS.
9. It is true that, while specifying the penal provisions in the earlier FIR,
the offences under the POCSO Act are not mentioned. Merely because the
investigating officer omitted to mention a particular penal provision, it cannot be
held that the factual allegations constituting that offence ceased to exist. The
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applicability of a penal provision depends upon the factual allegations disclosed.
It is the duty of the investigating agency to examine the factual allegations
contained in the FIS and determine the offences that are prima facie disclosed.
An omission on the part of the investigating officer to mention a particular penal
provision cannot absolve the investigating agency of its obligation to invoke the
appropriate provisions of law if it emerges from the investigation and to
investigate with respect to the said offence as well where the factual allegations
so warrant.
10. Therefore, if the investigating agency omitted to incorporate relevant
sections of the POCSO Act while registering the FIR, such omission cannot
confer upon the de facto complainant the liberty to initiate a fresh criminal
proceeding by lodging another FIR in respect of the very same transaction. The
investigating agency was under a legal obligation to examine whether the facts
disclosed in the first FIR constituted an offence punishable under the POCSO Act.
11. If the investigating agency failed to invoke any relevant provisions of
law or omitted to investigate that aspect adequately, the proper course available
to the de facto complainant was to bring such omission to the notice of the
jurisdictional Magistrate, who exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the
investigation. Likewise, after the filing of the final report, if the de facto
complainant was of the view that the investigation was incomplete or that any
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relevant penal provision had been omitted, it was always open to her to seek
further investigation in accordance with law. Such omissions cannot justify the
registration of a fresh FIR in respect of the very same transaction.
12. While dealing with the issue of registration of multiple FIRs in respect
of the same occurrence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Antony v. State of Kerala
[cited supra] observed as follows:
“A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Art.19 and
21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a
cognizable offence has to be struck by the Court. There cannot be any
controversy that sub-s. (8) of S.173 Cr.P.C. empowers the police to make further
investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a
further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang’s case (supra), it was,
however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation
with the permission of the Court. However, the sweeping power of investigation
does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police
in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences,
consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final
report under S.173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the purview of S.154
and 156 Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a
given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or
successive FIRs, not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or
connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of
the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either
investigation is underway or final report under S.173(2) has been forwarded to
the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under S.482 Cr.P.C. or
under Art.226/227 of the Constitution.”
13. In the said decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that the
requirements of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. are satisfied only by the earliest or
first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence. In
respect of every subsequent information in respect of the same occurrence
or incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, no second FIR
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can be there, and consequently there cannot be any fresh investigation.
14. The correctness of the law laid down in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala
(supra) was subsequently considered by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and Others [(2004) 13 SCC
292]. In the said decision, the Supreme Court did not dilute the ratio laid down
in T.T. Antony‘s case. However, clarified that the decision in T.T.Antony‘s case
will not preclude an aggrieved person from filing a counter case. But, what the
Supreme Court held in T.T.Antony‘s case is that any further complaint by the
same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the
registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in
this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same
accused will amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original
complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code.
15. Moreover, the Supreme Court clarified that the prohibition of registration
of a second FIR does not apply to a counter complaint by the accused in the first
complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident. The
same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v.
Surendra Singh Rathore [supra]. Shortly, the registration of a second FIR is
permissible when the second FIR is a counter-complaint or presents a rival
version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already stands
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registered. Keeping in mind the above settled principles while reverting to the
case at hand, it can be seen that even the 4th respondent does not have a case
that the subsequent FIR registered in this case is a counter case instituted at the
instance of the aggrieved person. Therefore, the challenge raised on the
registration of the subsequent FIR is legally sustainable.
16. In the light of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view
that the second FIR registered as Crime No. 196/2026 of Varkala Police Station
is legally unsustainable, as it relates to the very same transaction that had
already culminated in the registration of Crime No. 125/2026 of Pallikal Police
Station.
Accordingly, this Criminal Miscellaneous Case is allowed. The FIR in
Crime No. 196/2026 of Varkala Police Station and all further proceedings
pursuant thereto are hereby quashed.
Sd/-
JOBIN SEBASTIAN
JUDGE
vdv
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APPENDIX OF CRL.MC NO. 5367 OF 2026
PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure 4 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR TRIAL OF OFFENCES UNDER THE
SC/ST (POA) ACT, NEDUMANGAD IN CRL.MC
NO.9/2026 DATED 23.03.2026
