Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Sachin Yadav vs State (Nct Of Delhi) on 29 April, 2026
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.2168-2169/2026
[Arising out of SLP (CRL) No. 3961-3962 OF 2026]
SACHIN YADAV …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE (NCT of DELHI) & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
ORDER
1. The High Court of Delhi by a common impugned judgment and
order dated 02nd May, 2026 disposed of Bail Application
No.1345/2025 & Crl. M.A. No.13482/2025. A part of the said
order is under challenge in these appeals at the instance of the
appellant-accused.
2. While granting the appellant’s prayer for release on bail with
certain conditions, the High Court imposed the following
condition:
“22. …
d. The applicant shall not reside in the same building as the
complainant. The applicant shall provide the address where he
would be residing after his release and shall not change the address
without informing the concerned IO/SHO.
…”.
This condition is challenged by the appellant as violative of his
Signature Not VerifiedDigitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
rights guaranteed by Articles 21 and 19 of the Constitution.
Date: 2026.05.02
13:27:28 IST
Reason:
3. Appellant figures as an accused in FIR No. 109 dated 18 th
February, 2025 registered at Police Station Hauz Khas. The FIR,
registered at the instance of the complainant/respondent no.
2/Savita Yadav1, accuses the appellant and the co-accused of
offences under Sections 110(3) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 20232 (corresponding to Sections 308 and 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, respectively).
4. Appellant was arrested on 18 th February 2025 and enlarged on
bail by the aforesaid order dated 2nd May, 2025.
5. It is not in dispute that the complainant and the appellant are
relatives. They are residing in the same building. An alleged
violent altercation resulted in registration of the FIR. The High
Court, while granting bail to the appellant has imposed several
conditions apart from the condition that restricts his right of
residence during the pendency of the trial, noted above.
Furthermore, the appellant is also restricted from changing his
address without informing the concerned Investigating
Officer/Station House Officer. This condition has left the
appellant aggrieved.
1 Complainant
2 BNS
2
6. It has been argued by learned counsel on behalf of the appellant
that such a condition amounts to his eviction from his own
home without following due process and also adversely affects
his income considering that he is running a shop, located in the
same building. It has been almost a year that the appellant has
been forced to reside elsewhere and not run his shop at the said
building; and, since termination of the trial is nowhere in sight,
the impugned condition ought to be set aside by this Court.
7. Per contra, it is the pleaded case of the State in its counter
affidavit that the condition restraining the appellant from
residing in the same building is preventive and situational. The
condition, not amounting to displacement, is a reasonable
restriction imposed in view of the long-standing history of
violent altercations between the related parties who are
residing in the same building to prevent breach of peace,
ensure safety of the complainant and facilitate a fair trial.
8. Learned counsel on behalf of the complainant has supported the
impugned condition. According to him, the impugned condition
has resulted in peace in the locality. There have been no
altercations between the family members of the complainant
and the appellant ever since he has been forced to reside
elsewhere and declining interference with such condition would
be in the best interests of the society.
3
9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and
considered the materials on record.
10. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet has been filed
under Section 193 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
20233 on 18th April 2025. Appellant, as well as the co-accused, is
alleged to have committed offence punishable under Sections
110 and 3(5), BNS. Prosecution proposes to examine 10 (ten)
witnesses to drive home the charges against the appellant.
However, despite lapse of more than a year, the charges are yet
to be framed; thus, trial is yet to begin. The counter affidavit of
the State reveals that a supplementary chargesheet is also
proposed to be filed, since the weapon of offence is yet to be
recovered.
11. It appears from the medical reports, which are on record, that
the injuries suffered by the complainant and her son are simple
in nature. Despite the chargesheet having been filed on 18 th
April 2025, the same has not been placed on record for our
perusal. It is only general allegations that are levelled in the FIR
of the appellant having been part of the altercations. Curiously,
it is seen that the appellant’s mother and sister, who are alleged
to have dealt severe blows on the complainant and her son,
3 BNSS
4
have already been granted the concession of pre-arrest bail by
the Trial Court.
12. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that a cross FIR bearing FIR
110 dated 18th February, 2025 under Sections 110 and 3(5),
BNS has also been registered at the instance of the appellant’s
mother in respect of the same incident. As per the allegations in
the cross-FIR, prima facie, it seems that the complainant and
her family members as well as tenants had inflicted much more
severe injuries to the appellant and his family members using
weapons such as baseball bats, axes and knives.
13. Be that as it may, more than a year has passed since the
appellant was arrested. The charges are yet to be framed;
obviously, conclusion of the trial is nowhere in sight.
14. Thus, we need to test the impugned condition imposed by the
High Court bearing in mind the above facts and circumstances.
15. Grant of bail to an accused, with conditions, is a discretionary
relief. The impugned condition, which the High Court imposed in
the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, seems to be
preventive in nature which came to be imposed considering the
situational aspect of multiple FIRs and cross FIR having been
registered against the appellant as well as the members of the
complainant’s family, respectively, arising out of long-standing
5
property disputes. It is not uncommon that courts do impose
conditions which impinge on the fundamental rights of the
accused (of right of locomotion within the country, right of
residence, right to travel abroad, etc.).
16. However, it needs no emphasis that only in exceptional cases
should such a condition be imposed. It is trite that a condition
like the one under challenge takes in its train serious curtailment
of rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and must,
therefore, satisfy the tests of reasonableness, proportionality
and necessity. The objects for imposing conditions to enjoy the
concession of bail need no elucidation; but a condition that
amounts to effective ouster from residence could be susceptible
to an invalidation unless there is clear and cogent material to
show that a lesser restrictive measure would not suffice. In the
absence of such satisfaction, the condition would become
punitive rather than preventive.
17. Section 168 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 149 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 4) assumes importance in the
factual milieu. It reads:
168. Police to prevent cognizable offences.
Every police officer may interpose for the purpose of preventing,
and shall, to the best of his ability, prevent, the commission of
any cognizable offence.
4 Cr. PC
6
18. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it evident that
the duty to prevent the commission of offences rests squarely
upon the police, and by extension, the State. This position is
reinforced in State of NCT of Delhi vs. Sanjay5.
19. Section 168, BNSS (earlier Section 149, Cr. PC) casts a vital duty
on the police to prevent the commission of cognisable offence
and empowers them to take preventive action. Courts ought to
remind the police of this statutory obligation and ensure that it is
duly performed. A condition of bail such as the one imposed
here, however, shifts the burden to the accused and thereby
weakens the State’s obligation to prevent crime. This is not to
suggest that an accused on bail is free to commit offences. He
remains bound by the conditions of bail and by the law. Yet, any
condition that curtails fundamental rights must be justified by
circumstances that necessitate such restriction.
20. In light of Section 168, BNSS, the High Court ought to have
impressed upon the police of discharging the duty to ensure that
none breaches peace and takes the law in his/her own hands,
and remind them of the duty to appropriately deal with the
wrongdoer. The order dated 2 nd May, 2025 appears to be silent
in this regard.
5 (2014) 9 SCC 772
7
21. There is one other aspect which needs to be touched upon; that
is, delay in commencement of the trial, not to speak of
conclusion, having its own consequences. While fairness of the
trial remains the overriding consideration, a speedy trial is a
facet of Article 21. If the right to speedy trial is breached, a
simultaneous restriction on the right to residence becomes
unjustified.
22. Although learned counsel for the complainant would urge that
altercations at the instance of the appellant and his family
members are a regular feature and that the complainant was at
the receiving end upon one of such altercations between the
parties having turned violent, we prima facie view them as mere
skirmishes. Indeed, the number of skirmishes between the
appellant and the complainant and their family members were,
perhaps, thought to be too many by the High Court to be
ignored.
23. In any event, it cannot be overlooked that although the charge-
sheet alleges attempt to commit culpable homicide by the
appellant and his family members, the medical reports describe
the injuries as ‘simple’. We say no more on this to avoid any
prejudice to the trial, except to recall the adage “it takes two to
make a quarrel”. Even if the High Court felt compelled to impose
the condition in question, it was equally necessary for the
8
judicial system to ensure that the trial proceeds with reasonable
expedition, if not an early conclusion, having regard to the
direction that the appellant has to stay away from his own home.
Since a speedy trial in this case appears to be a mirage having
regard to the progress made till date, a restraint on residence
becomes disproportionately harsh.
24. Without doubt, the impugned condition to keep the appellant out
of his own home till the conclusion of the trial amounts to an
ouster and is, therefore, unreasonable and uncalled for.
25. Taking an overall view of the matter, we are of the considered
opinion that the condition of restricting the appellant’s right to
reside in the same building as the complainant pending trial
ought to be interdicted; and, since the appeals deserve
acceptance, the appellant may be allowed the concession of bail
without being required to abide by the aforesaid condition.
26. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned condition extracted
above in paragraph 2.
27. Appellant, it is needless to observe, shall continue to abide by
such other terms and conditions as have been imposed by the
High Court by the judgment and order dated 2nd May, 2025.
9
28. Apart from the conditions imposed by the High Court, we also
deem it fit that the appellant gives an undertaking to the trial
court that while on bail, he would maintain peace and good
behaviour. Ordered accordingly.
29. In the event there is any breach of the terms and conditions for
grant of bail, the trial court shall be at liberty to cancel the bail of
the appellant.
30. We clarify that the observations made in this order will not be
treated as findings on the merits of the case.
31. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed on the aforesaid terms.
32. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………..…………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…………………………..………….J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
New Delhi;
April 29, 2026.
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ITEM NO.117 COURT NO.8 SECTION II-D
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s).2168-2169/2026
SACHIN YADAV Appellant
VERSUS
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. RespondentS
I.A. No.105394/2026-INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT
Date : 29-04-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ameet Siingh, Adv.
Mr. Ankit Ambasta, AOR
Ms. Ritu Bala Puri, Adv.
Ms. Simran Vinayak, Adv.
Ms. Niti Tiwari, Adv.
Ms. Deepinder Singh Bhari, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :Mr. Davinder Pal Singh, A.S.G.
Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR
Mr. Amit Sharma-b, Adv.
Mr. Praneet Parnav, Adv.
Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Adv.
Mr. R R Bag, Adv.
Mr. Alok Singh, Adv.
Mr. Rajbeer, Adv.
Mr. Venkate Md Muppna, Adv.
Mr. Shailendra Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Ankit Borker, Adv.
Ms. Shivangi Singh, Adv.
Mr. Raj Shekhar Sharma, Adv.
Ms. Alpana Sharma, AOR
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UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed order.
2. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(RASHMI DHYANI PANT) (SUDHIR KUMAR SHARMA)
ASST. REGISTRAR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
(signed order is placed on the file)
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