Patna High Court – Orders
Ratan Deo Kumar Patel @ Ratandeo Kumar … vs The State Of Bihar on 6 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.9560 of 2026
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Ratan Deo Kumar Patel @ Ratandeo Kumar Patel Son of Sulo Mandal,
Resident of village- Rajdhan Tola, P.O- Harinmar, P.S- Harinmar, District-
Munger. ... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Govt.
of Bihar, Patna.
2. The Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna.
3. The Director General of Police, Patna, Bihar.
4. The Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Patna, Bihar.
5. The Inspector General of Police, District- Munger.
6. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, District- Munger.
7. The Superintendent of Police, District- Munger.
8. The Chairman, Selection Board, District Munger, Police Force.
... ... Respondent/s
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Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Pankaj Kumar Jha, Adv
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Government Pleader (24)
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
2 06-07-2026
Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for the
following reliefs:-
“i. For issuance of an appropriate writ/s,
order/s, order/s, direction/s, in nature of
mandamus for commanding the respondent
concern to appoint the petitioner on the post
of Police Constable in Bihar Police by
virtue of advertisement 82 2004 No.1/2004
dated 8.02.2004 in which the petitioner has
been qualified and got 14 marks in physical
examination.
ii. For issuance of an appropriate writ/s,
order/s, order/s, direction/s, to direct the
respondent concern to appoint the petitioner
on the post of police constable as directed
Patna High Court CWJC No.9560 of 2026(2) dt.06-07-2026
2/15by this Hon’ble Court in L.P.A No.
831/2009.
iii. To pass such other order/orders as your
Lordships my deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case.
3. The learned for the petitioner submits that an
advertisement bearing Advertisement no. 01 of 2004 was issued
whereby application was invited for the post of constable in
different districts in the State of Bihar. The total number of
vacancy which was advertised was 5742 in the Bihar Police and
3972 in the Bihar Military Police. The petitioner being eligible,
submitted his application for being appointed as a constable in
the Bihar Police and participated in the selection process. The
petitioner obtained 14 marks, however, he was not appointed on
the post of constable, despite the fact that vacancies still exists.
He further submits that although the name of the petitioner
figures in the merit-list, despite that he has not been appointed.
Similarly situated persons, who were denied appointment filed
different writ petitions bearing C.W.J.C. No. 19 of 2010,
C.W.J.C. No. 499 of 2009, C.W.J.C. No. 10698 of 2010,
C.W.J.C. No. 498 of 2011, C.W.J.C. No. 7084 of 2011, C.W.J.C.
No. 8845 of 2011 and C.W.J.C. No. 9838 of 2011. The said writ
petitions were heard along with L.P.A. No. 831 of 2009 and
L.P.A. No. 1214 of 2009. The Hon’ble Division Bench after
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hearing the parties vide order dated 28.06.2011 disposed of the
petitions with a direction to the respondent authorities to prepare
a merit-list and to then appoint the petitioners/appellants of the
said cases, against the vacant post within six weeks. Some other
similarly situated persons also moved before this Court by filing
different writ petitions. Some of the similarly situated persons
filed writ petition (Civil) No. 1133 of 2019 before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India vide order
dated 11.09.2019 granted liberty to the petitioners of the said
civil writ to make an appropriate representation to the concerned
respondent authorities within one week from the date of the
order and upon receipt of representation the matter was to be
considered by the authorities within two weeks thereafter.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
in terms of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India on 11.09.2019, the petitioner filed his representation
before the Chairman, Constable Selection Board on 22.10.2019,
however, his representation has been kept pending and the
petitioner has been denied appointment. He submits that the
petitioner is similarly situated to the persons, who moved before
this Hon’ble Court by filing writ petition and L.P.A. No. 831 of
2009. He submits that the case of the petitioner is covered by
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the cases of the persons who filed L.P.A. No. 831 of 2009. He
submits that despite the petitioner being eligible and obtaining
14 marks in the test, has been deprived of his employment, for
which he is otherwise entitled.
5. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents submits that the matter relates to
appointment of constables in 2004 and after that advertisement
was issued for appointment of constables in 2009 as well as
2014 and subsequent thereto also. The matter with regard to
appointment of constables relating to 2009 and 2014 has been
set at rest by this Hon’ble Court, therefore the case of the
petitioner does not deserves consideration at this stage.
CONSIDERATION
6. Having considered the rival submissions and after
going through the records, it appears that admittedly the
petitioner was an applicant for appointment to the post of
constable, pursuant to Advertisement no. 01 of 2004, however,
somehow or other he was not selected/appointed and thereafter
he kept on waiting for his turn. Pursuant to an order passed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in writ petition (Civil No.
1133 of 2019) (Mangesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. The State of
Bihar & Anr), he filed a representation before the Chairman,
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Constable Selection board on 22.10.2019. When no action was
taken on his representation, he filed the present writ petition.
The petitioner after examination in 2004 slept on his right for
almost 15 years and then filed a representation in 2019 and
again slept over his right and now after seven years, has filed
the present writ petition.
7. The law in this regard is very much settled. The
Hon’bel Supreme Court of India in the case of (State of U.P.
Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava) reported in 2015 (1) SCC 347
in paragraph nos. 20, 21, 22.2 and 23 has held as follows:-
“20. The Court also quoted the following
passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England
(para 911, p. 395): (Jaswant Singh case, SCC
pp. 470-71, para 12)“12. …’In determining whether there has
been such delay as to amount to laches, the
chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred
on the defendant’s part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean
standing by while the violation of a right is in
progress, but assent after the violation has
been completed and the claimant has become
aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a
remedy where, by his conduct, he has done
that which might fairly be regarded as
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equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his
conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a
position in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards to
be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and
delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’ ”
21. Holding that the respondents had also
acquiesced in accepting the retirements, the
appeal of U.P. Jal Nigam was allowed with
the following reasons: (Jaswant Singh case,
SCC p. 471, para 13)“13. In view of the statement of law as
summarised above, the respondents are guilty
since the respondents have acquiesced in
accepting the retirement and did not
challenge the same in time. If they would
have been vigilant enough, they could have
filed writ petitions as others did in the matter.
Therefore, whenever it appears that the
claimants lost time or whiled it away and did
not rise to the occasion in time for filing the
writ petitions, then in such cases, the court
should be very slow in granting the relief to
the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be
taken into consideration the question of
acquiescence or waiver on the part of the
incumbent whether other parties are going to
be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the
present case, if the respondents would have
challenged their retirement being violative of
the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam
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funds so as to meet the liability but by not
asserting their rights the respondents have
allowed time to pass and after a lapse of
couple of years, they have filed writ petitions
claiming the benefit for two years. That will
definitely require the Nigam to raise funds
which is going to have serious financial
repercussions on the financial management of
the Nigam. Why should the court come to the
rescue of such persons when they themselves
are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?”
22.2. However, this principle is subject to
well-recognised exceptions in the form of
laches and delays as well as acquiescence.
Those persons who did not challenge the
wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced
into the same and woke up after long delay
only because of the reason that their
counterparts who had approached the court
earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then
such employees cannot claim that the benefit
of the judgment rendered in the case of
similarly situated persons be extended to
them. They would be treated as fence-sitters
and laches and delays, and/or the
acquiescence, would be a valid ground to
dismiss their claim.
23. Viewed from this angle, in the present
case, we find that the selection process took
place in the year 1986. Appointment orders
were issued in the year 1987, but were also
cancelled vide orders dated 22-6-1987. The
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respondents before us did not challenge these
cancellation orders till the year 1996 i.e. for
a period of 9 years. It means that they had
accepted the cancellation of their
appointments. They woke up in the year 1996
only after finding that some other persons
whose appointment orders were also
cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine
years had passed. The earlier judgment had
granted the relief to the parties before the
Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight
that these respondents have not joined service
nor working like the employees who
succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal.
As of today, 27 years have passed after the
issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore,
not only was there unexplained delay and
laches in filing the claim petition after a
period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to
direct the appellants to give them
appointment as of today i.e. after a period of
27 years when most of these respondents
would be almost 50 years of age or above.”
8. Similarly, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide
oral judgment dated 25.02.2020 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2276 of
2020 (Arun Kumar Mehta Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.) in
paragraph nos. 04 to 08 has held as follows:-
“4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and gone through the materials on record.
Apparently, there is a delay of about 07 years in
filing the present writ petition, even if the appellate
Patna High Court CWJC No.9560 of 2026(2) dt.06-07-2026
9/15order dated 15.12.2012 is taken into account, for
which no plausible explanation whatsoever has been
furnished, hence the writ petition is fit to be
dismissed on the ground of principles of delay and
laches, alone.
5. It is a well settled principle of law
that stale claims should not be adjudicated by the
writ courts. In this connection, reference be had to a
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court,
reported (2015) 15 SCC 602 (State of Jammu and
Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri & Others), paragraph
nos. 26 to 28 whereof are reproduced herein below:-
“26. In the case at hand, the
employee was dismissed from service in the
year 1999, but he close not to avail any
departmental remedy. He woke up from his
slumber to knock at the doors of the High
Court after a lapse of five years. The
staleness of the claim remained stale and it
could not have been allowed to rise like a
phoenix by the writ court.
27. The grievance agitated by
the respondent did not deserve to be
addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay
and laches had already visited his claim like
the chill of death which does not spare
anyone even the one who fosters the idea
and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to
avoid death and eventually proclaim “deo
gratias” – ‘thanks to God’.
28. Another aspect needs to be
stated. A writ court while deciding a writ
petition is required to remain alive to the
nature of the claim and the unexplained
delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale
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10/15claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-
interference would cause grave injustice.
The present case, needless to emphasise, did
not justify adjudication. It deserved to be
thrown overboard at the very threshold, for
the writ petitioner had accepted the order of
dismissal for half a decade and cultivated
the feeling that he could freeze time and
forever remain in the realm of constant
present.”
6. In a judgment reported in 1986(4)
SCC 566 (State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Nandlal
Jaiswal & Ors.), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as
follows:-
“That the High Court in exercise
of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent
and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay
on the part of the petitioner, the Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief
inasmuch as entertaining s uch a belated
claim would have not only the effect of
inflicting hardship and inconvenience
butalso injustice on third parties and
creation of third party rights during the
interregnum period, is a matter to be
considered while exercising discretionary
writ jurisdiction.”
7. In Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T.
Murali Babu, it has been ruled thus:
“Thus, the doctrine of delay and
laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A
writ court is re-quired to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of
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it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional
court it has a duty to protect the rights of the
citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself
alive to the pri-mary principle that when an
aggrieved person, without adequate reason,
approaches the court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a
belated stage should be entertained or not.
Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity.
In certain circumstances delay and laches
may not be fatal but in most circumstances
inordinate delay would only invite disaster
for the litigant who knocks at the doors of
the court. Delay re- flects inactivity and
inaction on the part of a liti- gant – a litigant
who has forgotten the basic norms, namely,
“procrastination is the greatest thief of
time” and second, law does not permit one
to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does
bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis”.
Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd.
Through its Chairman & Managing Director
& Anr Vs. K. Thangappan and Anr would be
apposite:- “Delay or laches is one of the
factors which is to be borne in mind by the
High Court when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution. In an appropriate case the
High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordi- nary powers if there is such
negligence or omis- sion on the part of the
applicant to asert his right as taken in
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conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party”. It was, therefore, contended
that the appellant itself had agreed with
respondent 2 to pay bonus for 1953, 1954,
1955 and 1956 according to the terms of the
bonus agreement. It was also pointed out
that the appellant ahd not pressed its
objection with regard to jurisdiction before
the labour court or the industrial court. But
it appears that the decision of this Court in
Prakash Cotton Mills case 1962 (1) LLJ
108] (vide supra) was given on February 16,
1961 after the decision of K. K. Desai, J., on
July 1, 1960 and before the decision of the
Letters Patent Bench on February 6, 1962.
In the circumstances of this case, we do not
consider that there is such acquiescence on
the part of the appellant as to disentitle it to
a grant of writ under Art. 226 of the
Constitution. It is true that the issue of a writ
certiorari is largely a matter of sound
discretion. It is also true that the writ will
not be granted if there is such negligence or
omission on the part of the applicant to
assert his right as, taken in conjunction with
the lapse of time and other circumstance,
cause prejudice to the adverse party. The
principle is to a great extent, though not
identical with, similar to the exercise of
discretion in the Court of Chancery. The
principle has been clearly stated by Sri
Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum
Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd,
Abram Farewell and John Kemp [Law
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Reports 5 P.C., 221 at 239] as follows:”
Now the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving
that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in whih it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards to
be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of
time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitation, the validity of that defence must
be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are the length of the
delay and the nature of the acts done during
the interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as
relates to the remedy.”
8. Having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, considering the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the
parties as also taking into account the law
enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases
referred to hereinabove, regarding the principles of
delay and laches, this Court finds that as far as the
present case is concerned, no plausible explanation
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has been furnished by the petitioner so as to
convincingly explain the delay in question of about
07 years in approaching this Court, hence the
present writ petition is fit to be dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches. Accordingly, the writ
petition stands dismissed.”
9. Further the matter with regard to advertisement and
selection of constables vide Advertisement no. 02 of 2009 was
also subject to challenge before this Hon’ble Court and finally
the matter has been set at rest by the Hon’ble Division Bench in
C.W.J.C. No. 6995 of 2019 and its analogues cased vide
judgment dated 19.07.2024 and same has been affirmed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
10. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a
recent judgment passed in SLP (C) No. 35896 of 2025 (State of
Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Santosh Kumar C) in paragraph no. 9
has held as follows:-
“09. The above understanding also accords
with the settled principle that inclusion of a
candidate’s name in a select list does not by
itself confer an indefeasible right to
appointment. A select list makes a candidate
eligible for consideration in accordance with
the governing rules. It does not create a
vested right to claim appointment dehors the
statutory framework. In Shankarsan Dash v.
Union of India1, this Court held that even
Patna High Court CWJC No.9560 of 2026(2) dt.06-07-2026
15/15where vacancies exist, a candidate whose
name appears in the select list does not
acquire an indefeasible right to appointment,
unless the relevant rules so indicate.
Similarly, in Rakhi Ray v. High Court of
Delhi2, and State of Orissa V. Rajkishore
Nanda3, this Court has held that
appointments must conform to the notified
vacancies and the governing rules, and that
a select list cannot be operated in a manner
not contemplated by the statutory scheme.”
11. Having regard to facts and circumstances of the
case and considering the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties and also taking into account, the law
enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the cases
referred to hereinabove, with regard to principles of delay and
laches, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ
petition filed by the petitioner is thoroughly misconceived and is
fit to be dismissed at the stage of Admissions itself.
12. Accordingly, the present writ petition filed by the
petitioner is dismissed.
(Ritesh Kumar, J)
krishnakant/-
U
