Patna High Court
Ranjeet Kumar Rai @ Bablu Rai vs State Of Bihar And Anr on 31 July, 2026
Author: Sunil Dutta Mishra
Bench: Sunil Dutta Mishra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.25243 of 2018
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-118 Year-2016 Thana- VIDYAPATINAGAR District-
Samastipur
======================================================
Ranjeet Kumar Rai @ Bablu Rai Son of Kamal Kant Rai, Resident of Village-
Dadupur Wrongly Written as Dadapur in F.I.R. Tole Samastipur, P.S.
Bachhwara, District-Begusarai.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar
2. Anil Kumar Chaudhary, S/o Lakshman Chaudhary, R/o Village-Sherpur,
P.S.-Vidyapati Nagar, District-Samastipur.
... ... Opposite Party/s
======================================================
with
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No. 68794 of 2018
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-118 Year-2016 Thana- VIDYAPATINAGAR District-
Samastipur
======================================================
Ranjeet Kumar Rai @ Bablu Rai @ Ranjeet Kumar Son of Kamal Kant Rai,
Resident of Village Dadupur wrongly Written as Dadapur in F.I.R. Tole
Samasipur, P.S.- Bachhwara, District- Begusarai.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar
2. Anil Kumar Chaudhary, S/o Lakshman Chaudhary, R/o Village- Sherpur,
P.S.- Vidyapatinagar, District- Samastipur.
... ... Opposite Party/s
======================================================
Appearance :
(In CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No. 25243 of 2018)
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Suraj Narain Yadav, Advocate
For the Opposite Party/s : Mr. Binod Kumar 3, APP
(In CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No. 68794 of 2018)
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Umesh Kumar, Advocate
For the Opposite Party/s : Mr. Nitya Nand, APP
Mr. Sushil Kr. Jha, Advocate
Mr. Santosh Kr. Jha, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL DUTTA MISHRA
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
Date : 31-07-2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and learned
A.P.Ps. for the State.
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.25243 of 2018 dt.31-07-2026
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2. Since both Criminal Miscellaneous No. 25243 of
2018 and Criminal Miscellaneous No. 68794 of 2018 arise out of
the same F.I.R, namely, V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No.
118 of 2016, involve the same parties, challenging different orders
passed in the very same criminal proceeding, and raise
substantially identical questions of fact and law, both have been
heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
3. The present applications have been preferred under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter
referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') seeking quashing of the orders dated
05.03.2018
and 10.09.2018 passed by the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Magistrate’)in G.R. No. 739 of 2016, arising out of
V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016, whereby
vide order dated 05.03.2018, cognizance for the offences
punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 has been taken against the petitioner and vide order
dated 10.09.2018, the discharge application preferred by the
petitioner has been rejected.
4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that O.P. No.2
(informant), being the registered owner of a Bolero Pick-up Van
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.25243 of 2018 dt.31-07-2026
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bearing Registration No. BR-09M-4666, alleged that on
01.08.2016 the petitioner approached him with a proposal to
purchase the said vehicle. The sale consideration was settled at
Rs.4,21,000/-, whereupon the petitioner allegedly issued a cheque
of Rs.2,50,000/- towards part payment and agreed to pay the
remaining Rs.1,71,000/- within two weeks, whereafter possession
of the vehicle was delivered to him. It is further alleged that when
the cheque was presented for encashment on 30.09.2016, the same
was dishonoured. Thereafter, on 05.10.2016, when O.P. No.2
approached the petitioner demanding either payment of the amount
or return of the vehicle, the petitioner allegedly abused and
threatened him with dire consequences and refused either to return
the vehicle or to make payment, further stating that he would
dispose of the vehicle as scrap. On the basis of the aforesaid
allegations, a written report was submitted by O.P. No.2 before the
SHO, Vidyapatinagar Police Station, Samastipur, pursuant to
which F.I.R bearing V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118
of 2016 was registered against the petitioner for the offences
punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
5. Upon completion of investigation, the Investigating
Officer submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner under
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Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Thereafter, upon
perusal of materials on record including F.I.R, case diary and
charge-sheet learned Magistrate found sufficient materials and
vide order dated 05.03.2018 took cognizance of the offences under
Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the
petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred an application
seeking discharge. The said application came to be rejected by the
learned Magistrate vide order dated 10.09.2018. Aggrieved by the
order dated 05.03.2018 taking cognizance, the petitioner has
preferred Cr. Misc. No. 25243 of 2018, whereas, being further
aggrieved by the subsequent order dated 10.09.2018 rejecting his
discharge application, the petitioner has preferred Cr. Misc. No.
68794 of 2018.
6. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the
entire criminal prosecution is manifestly mala fide and has been
instituted only with a view to pressurize the petitioner and to
wrongfully retain the amount already paid by him towards the
proposed purchase of the vehicle. Learned counsel further
submitted that prior to issuance of the cheque, the petitioner had
already paid a sum of Rs.1,51,000/- to the son of O.P. No.2
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through different banking transactions, which fact has been
deliberately suppressed in the F.I.R. Learned counsel further
submitted that O.P. No.2 and his son had represented that the
vehicle was free from encumbrance, whereas, upon verification,
the petitioner discovered that the vehicle was hypothecated with
the State Bank of India and substantial loan dues were outstanding
and the insurance documents supplied by O.P. No.2 were also
found to be forged. Learned counsel further submitted that
immediately upon learning about the outstanding loan liability and
other discrepancies, the petitioner requested O.P. No.2 either to
furnish a ‘No Due Certificate’ from the financing bank or to refund
the amount already received. Since O.P. No.2 failed to do so, the
petitioner instructed his bank to stop payment of the cheque on
18.08.2016, much prior to its presentation for encashment. It is
further submitted that several attempts were also made to amicably
resolve the dispute through village Panchayati, but O.P. No.2
declined to abide by the decision of the Panchas and, instead,
lodged the present criminal case.
7. Learned counsel further submitted that even if the
allegations contained in the F.I.R. are accepted in their entirety, no
offence under Sections 406 or 420 IPC is made out, inasmuch as
the dispute arises purely out of a contractual transaction relating to
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sale of a vehicle. Learned counsel further submitted that there was
neither any dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction
nor any entrustment attributable to the petitioner. Learned counsel
further submitted that the essential ingredients of the offences
punishable under Sections 504 and 506 IPC are also conspicuously
absent from the allegations made in the F.I.R. It is further
submitted that so far as the offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, the cheque in question
was in the name of son of O.P. No.2, whereas the F.I.R. has been
lodged by O.P. No.2 himself and further, prosecution under said
section can only be initiated by filing complaint not by lodging
F.I.R. Learned counsel for petitioner put reliance on Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Lalan Kumar v. The State of Bihar (Cr.
Misc No. 37503 of 2023), wherein it was held that prosecution
under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act can only be
initiated by filing complaint. It is further submitted that no
statutory demand notice, as mandated under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, was ever issued and, therefore, the
very institution of criminal proceedings under the said provision is
legally unsustainable. He further submitted that the learned
Magistrate mechanically took cognizance without due application
of judicial mind and that the subsequent rejection of the discharge
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application also suffers from the same infirmity. It is, thus,
submitted that both the impugned orders dated 05.03.2018 and
10.09.2018 be quashed along with the entire criminal proceeding.
8. Learned counsel for O.P. No. 2 submitted that the
present application is wholly devoid of merit and is liable to be
dismissed. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner
purchased the vehicle in question for a total consideration of Rs.
4,21,000/-, paid only a part of the consideration by issuing a
cheque of Rs. 2,50,000/- while assuring payment of the balance
amount within two weeks, but the said cheque was dishonoured on
account of insufficiency of funds. Despite repeated demands, the
petitioner neither paid the agreed consideration nor returned the
vehicle and, instead, allegedly abused and threatened the informant
with dire consequences. It is further submitted that, upon
completion of investigation, the police found sufficient materials
and submitted charge-sheet, whereafter the learned Magistrate
rightly took cognizance and subsequently rejected the petitioner’s
discharge application. Refuting the petitioner’s contention
regarding subsisting hypothecation of the vehicle, learned counsel
submits that although the vehicle was financed by the State Bank
of India, the entire loan liability has since been discharged by O.P.
No.2 and a No Dues Certificate has been issued by the Bank,
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thereby falsifying the petitioner’s allegations. He further submitted
that the trial has substantially progressed and prosecution evidence
is being recorded, with the petitioner actively participating in the
proceedings by cross-examining the witnesses. It is, thus,
submitted that no ground for interference under the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court is made out and both the applications
deserve to be dismissed.
9. Learned A.P.Ps. for the State submitted that on the
basis of the allegations made in the F.I.R. and the materials
collected during investigation, the learned Magistrate has passed
the impugned orders. However, it is submitted that appropriate
order may be passed in view of facts and circumstances of the
case.
10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, learned
A.P.Ps. for the State, and upon perusal of the materials available
on record, the principal question which arises for consideration is
whether the impugned order dated 05.03.2018 taking cognizance
of the offences under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as
well as the subsequent order dated 10.09.2018 rejecting the
petitioner’s discharge application, suffer from any legal infirmity
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.25243 of 2018 dt.31-07-2026
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warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
11. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it is
appropriate to discuss the scope and ambit of the inherent power
preserved under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court is of wide amplitude, though it is required to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Such power
is intended to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and to
secure the ends of justice. While exercising such jurisdiction, the
Court is not expected to conduct a meticulous appreciation of
evidence; however, it is duty-bound to examine whether the
uncontroverted allegations contained in the complaint and the
materials collected in support thereof, even if accepted on their
face value, disclose the commission of any cognizable offence.
Where the allegations are inherently improbable, fail to satisfy the
essential ingredients of the alleged offences, or where a purely
civil dispute has been given the colour of criminality with an
oblique motive, interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not only
permissible but necessary to prevent misuse of the criminal
process.
12. In the present case, the F.I.R itself alleges that the
cheque issued by the petitioner was dishonoured upon
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presentation. However, there is not even a whisper in the F.I.R. or
in the materials collected during investigation that the mandatory
statutory notice demanding payment of the cheque amount, as
contemplated under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, was ever issued to the petitioner.
Issuance of such notice within the prescribed period and failure of
the drawer to make payment within fifteen days thereof are
statutory preconditions for constituting an offence under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the absence of
compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 138 the
Negotiable Instruments Act, no offence under the said provision
can be said to have been made out.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics v.
Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine 2019 has delineated the requirement for demand notice of
cheque amount in prosecution of offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instrument Act and reiterated that the specific demand
for the payment of the sum covered by the dishonoured cheque is
required to be made in notice. Service of notice is imperative in
character for maintaining a complaint.
14. This Court also finds that the statutory scheme itself
does not permit prosecution for the offence under Section 138 of
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the Negotiable Instruments Act on the basis of a police case.
Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act expressly provides
that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under
Section 138 except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee
or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that the offence
under Section 138 is a special statutory offence and cognizance
thereof can be taken only in the manner prescribed under Section
142 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. [See: Sangeetaben
Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in
(2012) 7 SCC 621; A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra &
Anr., reported in (2014) 11 SCC 790].
15. Equally untenable is the prosecution under Sections
406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. It is well settled that
criminal breach of trust and cheating operate in distinct and
mutually exclusive fields. An offence under Section 406 IPC
presupposes entrustment of property followed by dishonest
misappropriation, whereas Section 420 IPC contemplates
deception and dishonest inducement at the very inception of the
transaction. Both offences cannot be invoked simultaneously in
respect of the same transaction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
repeatedly observed that the offences of cheating and criminal
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.25243 of 2018 dt.31-07-2026
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breach of trust are distinct in their essential ingredients and
ordinarily cannot go together, inasmuch as cheating involves
dishonest intention from the inception, whereas criminal breach of
trust contemplates subsequent dishonest misappropriation of
property entrusted to the accused.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Race Club
(1940) & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2024)
10 SCC 690 has distinguished between criminal breach of trust
and cheating and held as under:
“36. What can be discerned from the above is
that the offences of criminal breach of trust
(Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420
IPC) have specific ingredients:
In order to constitute a criminal breach
of trust (Section 406 IPC)
(1) There must be entrustment with
person for property or dominion over
the property, and
(2) The person entrusted
(a)Dishonestly misappropriated or
converted property to his own use, or
(b) Dishonestly used or disposed
of the property or wilfully suffers
any other person so to do in
violation of:
(i) Any direction of law
prescribing the method in which
the trust is discharged; or
(ii) Legal contract touching
the discharge of trust (see : S.W.
Palanitkar [S.W. Palanitkar v.
State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC
241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] ).
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.25243 of 2018 dt.31-07-2026
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Similarly, in respect of an offence
under Section 420IPC, the essential
ingredients are:
(1) Deception of any person, either
by making a false or misleading
representation or by other action or by
omission;
(2) Fraudulently or dishonestly
inducing any person to deliver any
property, or
(3) The consent that any person shall
retain any property and finally
intentionally inducing that person to do
or omit to do anything which he would
not do or omit (see : Harmanpreet Singh
Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab
[Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State
of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) 3
SCC (Cri) 620] ).
xxxx xxxx
39. Every act of breach of trust may not result
in a penal offence of criminal breach of trust
unless there is evidence of manipulating act of
fraudulent misappropriation. An act of breach
of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of
which the person may seek his remedy for
damages in civil courts but, any breach of trust
with a mens rea, gives rise to a criminal
prosecution as well. It has been held in Hari
Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha
[Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar
Surekha, (1973) 2 SCC 823 : 1973 SCC (Cri)
1082] as under : (SCC p. 824, para 4)
“4. We have heard Mr Maheshwari on
behalf of the appellant and are of the opinion
that no case has been made out against the
respondents under Section 420 of the Penal
Code, 1860. For the purpose of the present
appeal, we would assume that the various
allegations of fact which have been made in
the complaint by the appellant are correct.
Even after making that allowance, we find that
the complaint does not disclose the
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.25243 of 2018 dt.31-07-2026
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commission of any offence on the part of the
respondents under Section 420 of the Penal
Code, 1860. There is nothing in the complaint
to show that the respondent had dishonest or
fraudulent intention at the time the appellant
parted with Rs 35,000. There is also nothing to
indicate that the respondents induced the
appellant to pay them Rs 35,000 by deceiving
him. It is further not the case of the appellant
that a representation was made by the
respondents to him at or before the time he
paid the money to them and that at the time the
representation was made, the respondents
knew the same to be false. The fact that the
respondents subsequently did not abide by
their commitment that they would show the
appellant to be the proprietor of Drang
Transport Corporation and would also render
accounts to him in the month of December
might create civil liability for them, but this
fact would not be sufficient to fasten criminal
liability on the respondents for the offence of
cheating.”
xxxx xxxx
41. The distinction between mere breach of
contract and the offence of criminal breach of
trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of
cheating, the intention of the accused at the
time of inducement should be looked into
which may be judged by a subsequent conduct,
but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the
sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give
rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating
unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is
shown right from the beginning of the
transaction i.e. the time when the offence is
said to have been committed. Therefore, it is
this intention, which is the gist of the offence.
42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust,
the property must have been entrusted to the
accused or he must have dominion over it. The
property in respect of which the offence of
breach of trust has been committed must be
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either the property of some person other than
the accused or the beneficial interest in or
ownership of it must be of some other person.
The accused must hold that property on trust
of such other person. Although the offence i.e.
the offence of breach of trust and cheating
involve dishonest intention, yet they are
mutually exclusive and different in basic
concept.”
17. In the present case, neither entrustment of property
nor dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction is
discernible from the allegations made in the F.I.R. The dispute, at
best, arises out of an alleged breach of contractual obligations
relating to sale of a motor vehicle and does not disclose the
commission of either offence.
18. Likewise, a plain reading of the First Information
Report does not disclose the essential ingredients of Sections 503
and 504 Indian Penal Code. Except for a bald allegation of abuse
and threat, there is no material to indicate intentional insult with
intent to provoke breach of the peace as required under Section
504 Indian Penal Code, nor are the allegations sufficient to
constitute criminal intimidation within the meaning of Section 503
Indian Penal Code punishable under Section 506 Indian Penal
Code.
19. In the considered opinion of this Court, even if the
allegations contained in the F.I.R are accepted in their entirety,
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they do not prima facie constitute the offences alleged against the
petitioner. The dispute, at its core, is essentially contractual and
civil in nature, which has been sought to be given the colour of a
criminal prosecution. The present case, therefore, squarely falls
within the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly the categories where the
allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not constitute any
offence and where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fides and instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance or exerting pressure. Continuation of the criminal
proceeding, in the facts of the present case, would amount to an
abuse of the process of the Court and would warrant interference
in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.
20. Accordingly, the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by
the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai,
Samastipur in G.R. No. 739 of 2016 arising out of V. Nagar
(Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016 and the subsequent
order dated 10.09.2018 passed by the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur in Trial No.
1019 of 2018/G.R. No. 739 of 2016 are hereby set aside.
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Consequently, the entire criminal proceeding arising therefrom,
stands quashed.
21. Both the Criminal Miscellaneous Applications are,
accordingly, allowed.
22. Interim Order(s), if any, stands vacated.
23. Let a copy of this Judgment be transmitted forthwith
to the Court concerned for needful and compliance.
(Sunil Dutta Mishra, J)
Utkarsh/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR CAV DATE 29.06.2026 Uploading Date 31.07.2026 Transmission Date 31.07.2026
