ADVERTISEMENT
Karnataka High Court
Ranganatha Gowda H vs State Of Karnataka on 29 July, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 22.04.2026
Pronounced on : 29.07.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No. 588 OF 2026 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
RANGANATHA GOWDA H,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
S/O HALAPPA,
R/A RANGANATHAPURA,
HUYIL DORE POST, BUKKAPATTANA HOBLI,
SIRA TALUK, TUMKUR DISTRICT,
KARNATAKA 572 115.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI MAYUR D BHANU, ADVOCATE A/W
Digitally signed SRI SHAMANTH GOWDA J., AND
by
PADMAVATHI SRI CHARAN N.S, ADVOCATES)
BK
Location: High AND:
Court of
Karnataka
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY THE SHO,
VIDYARANYAPURA POLICE STATION,
REPRESENTED BY THE HCGP,
HIGH COURT BUILDINGS,
AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
2
BENGALURU 560 001.
2 . XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXX
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI CHANNAPPA ERAPPA, HCGP FOR R-1;
SMT. XXXXX, PARTY-IN-PERSON/R-2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF THE BNNS,
2023 PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET AND ALL FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IN S.C.NO.1727/2025 (ARISING OUT OF CRIME
NO.244/2025) PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED LIII ADDL.
CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BENGALURU (CCH-54)
REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS
69, 79, 115(2), 318(2), 351(3), 352 OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA
SANHITA, 2023 IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONER IS CONCERNED;
(ANNEXURE 'C' AND 'D').
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 22.04.2026 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before the Court calling in question
proceedings in S.C.No.1727/2025, pending before the LIII
Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-54),
3
registered for offences punishable under Sections 69, 79, 115(2),
318(2), 351(3) and 352 of the BNS.
2. Heard Sri Mayur D.Bhanu, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner, Sri Channappa Earappa, learned High Court
Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and
xxxxx, respondent No.2 - party in person.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -
The 2nd respondent is the complainant. The complainant and
the petitioner met on social media i.e., Facebook. The meeting
results in friendship; friendship blossomed into relationship and the
relationship led the petitioner and the 2nd respondent to reside
together in a rented establishment within the jurisdiction of the 1st
respondent/Police. Five years passed by of such live-in relationship.
The petitioner is said to have gained knowledge of the 2nd
respondent being already married to one Rudreshaiah and on some
squabble, the petitioner vacates the rented establishment and goes
away to his home town. On the score that the petitioner has had
sexual relationship with the complainant for over five years, the 2nd
4
respondent seeks to register a complaint on 27-03-2025 before the
North East Women Police Station, Bangalore. Upon receipt of the
information from the 2nd respondent, the Police register a Lower
Petition ('LPT') in LPT No.112 of 2025. Statements of both the
petitioner and the 2nd respondent/complainant were recorded and
the concerned Police Station closes LPT No.112 of 2025 on
23.06.2025. The complainant then approaches Vidyaranyapura
Police Station and registers a complaint on 24-07-2025, which now
becomes a crime in Crime No.244 of 2025. The police conduct
investigation, file a charge sheet for the afore-quoted offences and
the concerned Court takes cognizance of the offences. Taking of
cognizance of the offences and committal of the matter to the Court
of Sessions, is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the
subject petition.
4. The learned counsel Sri Mayur D.Bhanu appearing for the
petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner and the 2nd
respondent were in live-in relationship for over 5 years. The
petitioner then gains knowledge of the fact that the complainant
was already married to the aforesaid Rudreshaiah and was living
5
with him at the same time, when the petitioner had a relationship
with the complainant. The learned counsel would submit that
during the period of five years, the petitioner had innumerable
times enquired about the family members of the complainant only
to be informed that she is a single woman with two siblings and her
parents had expired long ago. Therefore, the petitioner was given
to understand that the complainant was not married at all. The
learned counsel further submits that when he comes to know that
the complainant is married to one Rudreshaiah long ago and she
had initiated crimes against several individuals on identical
circumstances, started distancing himself from her. The learned
counsel submits that it is then the complainant begins the act of
blackmailing the petitioner. He would submit that the complainant
contradicts herself in one breath when she says that the petitioner
has tied her a thali/mangalya chain in a temple but seeks to
register a crime for the offence under Section 69 of the BNS, which
deals with having sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage.
The learned counsel would submit that five years of live-in
relationship cannot be alleged to become the ingredients of Section
69 or 79 of the BNS.
6
5. Per contra, the 2nd respondent/complainant appears in
person and vehemently refutes the submissions by contending that
for 5 years she has taken care of the petitioner who came to her
with nothing and all the years he has promised that he would marry
the complainant and has had sexual relationship with the
complainant for over 5 years. He has now breached the said
promise of marriage. Police have filed a charge sheet against the
petitioner and, therefore, the trial must be permitted to be
continued, failing which, it would amount to permitting the
petitioner exploiting the complainant and walking away from her
life.
6. The learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for
respondent No. 1 would toe the line of respondent No. 2 in
submitting that the trial should be permitted to continue against the
petitioner, as the charge sheet filed makes out a prima facie case
against the petitioner.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would refute the
submissions of the 2nd respondent, by placing a memo appending to
7
it a statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS / Section
164 of the Cr.P.C., rendered by the complainant, not in the present
proceedings but in a criminal case - C.C.No.19282 of 2016, which
arose out of Crime No.446 of 2015 registered against one
Thammanna Vittal Badiger, to demonstrate that the complainant is
in the habit of registering criminal cases against several persons on
the same kind of allegations.
8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the 2nd
respondent, party-in-person.
9. The afore-narrated facts and link in the chain of events are
all a matter of record. The petitioner is a man of 37 years of age
and the complainant, a woman is 54 years of age. The two appear
to have met on Facebook, started messaging, messaging results in
friendship, friendship blossomed into relationship and the
relationship blossomed into sexual intercourse. The petitioner and
the 2nd respondent/complainant began to live together in a rented
accommodation on the belief that the complainant was single. The
live-in relationship between the two goes on for five long years. In
8
2024, it is the averment in the petition, that the petitioner learns
that the complainant is already married. When the petitioner comes
to know of this, he begins to distance himself from the complainant.
This results in registering a complaint on 27-03-2025 before the
North East Women Police Station. The Police register an LPT in LPT
No.112 of 2025 and they tried to settle the matter between the
parties. When consensus could not be reached, the complainant on
23.06.2025 withdraws the complaint to explore other possibilities.
The closure endorsement issued by the Police on 23-06-2025 reads
as follows:
" ಂಬರಹ
ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ಮ ೆ ಯಪ ಸುವ ೇ ೆಂದ ೆ ೕವ ಾಂಕ:27/03/2025
ಾಂಕ
ರಂದು ೕ ದ ದೂ ನ !ೕ ೆ ೆ "ಾ#ಾ ಎ%.&
ಎ% &.'
' ಅ)* ಸಂ+ೆ,. ರ-.
ಸಂ+ೆ, 112/2025ರ-.
ಾಖ0ಾ1ರುತ3 ೆ.ೆ ಈ ಸಂಬಂದ ಮ4 ದೂ ೆ ಸಂಬಂ 5ದಂ6ೆ ಹಲವ 7ಾ ಅಪ3
ಸ8ಾ0ೋಚ ೆಯನು: 8ಾ ;<ಾರ#ೆಯನು: 8ಾ ದರು ಸಹ ಮ4 ಸಮ=ೆ,
ಇ6ಾ,ಥ*@ಾಗದ
ಇ6ಾ,ಥ*@ಾಗದ Bಾರಣ Dಾಗೂ ೕವ ಮ4 Bಾನೂನು ಸಲDೆ ಾರರನು: ಸಂಪE*5 ಮುಂ ನ
ನಗಳ-. ಈ ಬ ೆG -Hತ ದೂರನು: ಾಖ-5ರುವ ಾ1 5,
5 ೕವ ೕ ರುವ ದೂರು
ಅ)*ಯನು: ಮುBಾ3ಯ 8ಾಡುವಂ6ೆ Dೇ Bೆಯನು: ೕ ರುವ ದ ಂದ ಮ4 ದೂರು
ಅ)*ಯನು: ಮುBಾ3ಯ 8ಾ ರುತ3 ೆ."
ೆ
(Emphasis added)
9
The complainant then files a complaint before the Vidyaranyapura
Police Station. This becomes the subject crime in Crime No.244 of
2025. The complaint so registered reads as follows:
"Bengaluru,
Dated: 24-07-2025
From:
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
To
The Station House Officer,
Vidyaranyapura Police,
Bengaluru.
Subject: Mr. Ranganath Gowda. H, S/o Halappa,
"Topline Integrated Services", 1st Floor, PSR
Marvel, Vinayaka Nagar, Bellary Road,
Hebbal, Bengaluru-560024 cheating and
playing fraud is concerned.
Sir,
1) I have been living in the above-mentioned address since
5 years. I am a single lady staying in a rented house.
Through Facebook Mr. Ranganath Gowda contacted me
and intimated that he is working and staying in a room
but finding it difficult to manage the food. The said Mr.
Ranganath Gowda expressed his intention to be a paying
guest with me and for which he has agreed to pay a sum
of ₹12,000/- (Rupees twelve thousand only) per month.
Since I am alone excepting support, I have allowed him
as the paying guest in my rented house. From the
beginning he was pretending to be a gentleman and
behaved like a gentleman. Taking me being single, has
promised to support me morally and promised to marry
10
me, when I told him about the age gap between me and
him, he said it will not be an issue as older woman having
relationship with young man. By deceiving me, virtually
raped me by committing an offence under Section 375 of
the old Act and Section 63 in the present Act which is
punishable under Section 376 of the old Act and Section
64 of the new Act, committing an offence under Section
393, 394 of the old Act and Section 81 and 82 of the new
Act and those intimate scenes have been videographed by
him without my knowledge and consent by playing fraud
upon me. By showing the video he was harassing for sex
and when I refused, I have been physically assaulted. The
said person started harassing me for sex and insisted me
to perform like the blue films and did not allow me to
sleep at nights as he is a sex maniac, used to attack me
and was doing unrealistic acts in sex and played and
cheated me.
2) The said person used to take me to his native and
insisted me to intimate his family members; she is the
manager of the company where he was working. Further
in public places as well as in the neighbourhood forced
me to lie that I should tell public including the land lord
that I am his maternal aunt (father's sister). He was
using criminal force by showing the video and assaulting
me by confining me wrongfully at house thereby
committed an offence under Section 348 of the old Act
and Section 127 under the new Act, 349, 350 & 351
under the old Act and Section 128, 129 and 130 of the
new Act and the accused needs to be punished under
Section 352, 353, 354, 354/A & 355/B of the old Act and
Sections 131, 132, 74, 75 & 76 under the new Act and
made me as his sex slave and to obey his instructions.
3) I further bring it to your notice that slowly started
discontinuing in paying the P.G. charges of ₹12,000/-
(Rupees twelve thousand only) from June 2021.
Whenever I insisted the P.G. charges, he was assaulting
me by using criminal force, which attracts Section 354 of
the Old Act and Section 74 of the new Act. After lot of
persuasion he has agreed to pay a sum of ₹5,04,000/-
(Rupees five lakhs four thousand only) being the arrears
of P.G. charges, promising to pay interest @ 2% per
11
month. Similarly, by using force, made me to transfer a
sum of ₹30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) to buy a
two-wheeler electric bike and forcibly made me to pay
₹30,000/-(Rupees thirty thousand only) with a promise to
arrange the registration in my name but he got it to his
name thereby cheated me under Section 415 of the old
Act and Section 318 of the new Act. Added to it, he
induced me to buy a Maruti Ritz, a pre-owned car by
using criminal force, made me to release a sum of
₹2,40,000/- (Rupees two lakhs forty thousand only) with
a promise to arrange the registration in my name but
again by cheating under Section 415 of the old Act and
Section 318 of the present Act he got the vehicle
registered in his name by cheating me. As such the
accused is to be punished under old Section 417 and
under Section 318 of the new Act but so far the amount
paid towards the vehicle had not been paid. Further by
using criminal force and blackmailing me, my golden
ornaments have been pledged at his Catholic Syrian Bank
and availed a loan of ₹3,20,000/- (Rupees three lakhs
twenty thousand only) and at Muthoot Finance by
pleading my gold has raised a loan of ₹80,000/- (Rupees
eighty thousand only) but did not discharge it and
committed the offence of extraction under Section 383 of
the old Act and Section 308 of the new Act which is
punishable under Section 384 of the old Act and 308 of
the new Act.
4) The accused further by using criminal force had borrowed
in all a sum of ₹7,24,850/- (Rupees seven lakhs twenty
four thousand eight hundred and fifty only) from 2019 to
27-12-2024 promising to clear but did not choose to do
so and cheated me for not returning the amount by
committing the offence of cheating under the 415 of the
old Act and 318 of the new Act and punishable under
Section 417 of the old Act and 318 under the new Act and
also further under compelling circumstances and also by
using criminal force and also made me to release a sum
of 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to him to the
names suggested by him. In all he has to pay a sum of
₹35,17,902/- (Rupees thirty-five lakhs seventeen
thousand nine hundred and two only). It has become
impossible for me to stay with him as he is inhuman,
12
barbaric and a psycho. After prolonged domestic violence,
left me on 27-12-2024 even after when I insisted my
money was posing threat to my life and started
blackmailing me. When he posed threat to my life, I had
to prefer a police complaint on 28-03-2025 at Mahila
Police Station, North-East Division, Bengaluru. However,
the said police yet to register a complaint against the
accused.
5) After the complaint and conciliation on 24-06-2025 the
accused by calculating the outstanding payable to me has
issued a cheque for the afore said outstanding and
cheated me as he has not arranged any funds in his
account and played fraud upon me by issuing the cheque
in the account no money is available and accordingly
played a fraud punishable under Section 419 under the
old Act and Section 318 under the new Act, committing
criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 491 of
the old Act and Section 357 under the new Act. Thus, the
accused has committed the afore said offences against
me and for which he is liable to be prosecuted. I hope
your good office be pleased to take necessary strict action
against the accused and oblige.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
XXXXX."
The gist of the complaint is that, for five years the petitioner has
been living with the complainant. He came to the doors of the
complainant on the score that he had no food to eat and, therefore,
the complainant has given him shelter and has also indulged in
sexual activities with the petitioner on the pretext of marriage.
13
The Police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the
petitioner. The summary of the charge sheet is as follows:
"17. Bೇ5ನ ಸಂJಪ3 =ಾ ಾಂಶ
ಸದ ಪLಕರಣದ Bಾಲಂ-12
Bಾಲಂ ರ-., ನಮೂ 5ರುವ ಆ ೋ&ಯು 2019 ೇ =ಾ-ನ-., =ಾJ-1
=ಾJ
ರವ ೆ ಪ Nತ ಾ1ದುO ನಂತರ ಆ ೋ&ಯು =ಾJ-1
=ಾJ ರವರನು: &Lೕ 5,
5
ಾಂಕ:30.08.2019
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=ಾJ-1
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=ಾJ ರವರನು: ತನ: ಅ6ೆ3 ಎಂದು
ಮ ೆಯ 8ಾ-ೕಕ ೆ Dೇ Bೊಂ ದುO =ಾJ-1
=ಾJ ರವರೂ ಸDಾ ಆ ೋ&ಯನು: ತನ: ಅಣ`ನ ಮಗ
ಎಂದು ಪ ಚa5ರು6ಾ3 ೆ.ೆ ಅಲ. ೆ ಆ ೋ&ಯು =ಾJ-1
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& iೕಗಳನು:
iೕಗಳನು: =ಾJ-1
=ಾJ ರವ ೆ 6ೋ 5 ಅ ೇ ೕ ತ ೊ:ಂ ೆ 0ೈಂ1ಕ ಸುಖ ೕ
ಸಹಕ ಸುವಂ6ೆ ಒ6ಾ3ಯ 8ಾಡು ದ
3 ುO, ಮತು3 ಸಣ` ಪ ಟT ;<ಾರಗ ೆ =ಾJ-1
=ಾJ ರವರ !ೕ0ೆ
ಜಗಳ 8ಾ Dೊ^ೆದು,
Dೊ^ೆದು 7ೈದು,
7ೈದು 8ಾನ5ಕ ಮತು3 ೈ ಕ Eರುಕುಳವನು: ೕ ರು6ಾ3 ೆ ಮತು3
ಆ ೋ&ಯು ತನ: @ೈಯುE3ಕ ಖN* ೆ =ಾJ-1
=ಾJ ರವರ ಎZ X ಐ +ಾ6ೆ ನಂ.20028355385
ಂದ ಆ ೋ&ಯ 7ಾ,ಂm +ಾ6ೆ ನಂ.2727118000367
ನಂ ೆ ಾಂಕ::01/01/2019
ಾಂಕ
ಂದ ಾಂಕ:27.12.2024
ಾಂಕ ರ ಅವoಯ-. ಹಂತ ಹಂತ@ಾ1 ಒಟುT 8,80,778/- ರೂಗಳನು:
ಪ^ೆದು Bೊಂ ದುO, ನಂತರ =ಾJ-1
=ಾJ ರವರನು: 6ೊ ೆದು Dೊರಟು Dೋ1 =ಾJ-1
=ಾJ ರವ ಂದ
ಪ^ೆದುBೊಂ ದO ಹಣವನು: @ಾpಾZ ೕಡ ೇ Dಾಗೂ 6ಾನು ಈ ಂ ೆ ೕ ದ ಭರಸ@ೆಯಂ6ೆ
14
=ಾJ-1
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8ಾ ಸ ೇ ವಂN5ರುವ ದು ತ +ೆಯ-. ಸಂಗL 5ರುವ =ಾrಾsಾರ ಗ ಂದ !ೕ0ೊ:ೕಟಕ
ದೃಢ ಪ'Tರುತ3 ೆ.ೆ
ಆದO ಂದ ಆ ೋ&ಯು !ೕಲvಂಡ BಾwO ಮತು3 ಕಲಂ ಅನQಯ \rಾಹ* ಅಪ ಾದ
ಎಸ1ರು6ಾ3 ೆಂದು ೋxಾ ೋಪ#ಾ ಪ 'T."
(Emphasis added)
The summary of the charge sheet indicates that the petitioner and
the 2nd respondent have had relationship and also certain financial
transactions.
10. The issue now would be whether the live-in relationship
for over 5 years could become the ingredients of Section 69 of the
BNS. Section 69 is for the first time introduced in BNS, which was
not there in the earlier regime, IPC. Section 69 of the BNS reads as
follows:
"69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful
means, etc.--Whoever, by deceitful means or by making
promise to marry to a woman without any intention of
fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such
sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to
fine.
Explanation.--"deceitful means" shall include inducement
for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying
by suppressing identity."
(Emphasis supplied)
15
Section 69 of the BNS punishes a person who indulges in sexual
intercourse by employing deceitful means or by making false
promise of marriage to a woman. Deceitful means would include
inducement, false promise of employment or promotion or marrying
by suppressing identity. The petitioner and the 2nd respondent, as
observed hereinabove, have been in live-in relationship for about 5
years. In live-in relationship, it is ununderstandable as to how one
can project the accused having sexual intercourse with the
complainant on promise of marriage. It would not require 5 years
to know whether the accused is having sexual relationship with the
complainant on promise of marriage or on consensus with the
complainant.
11. A perusal at the complaint would clearly indicate that the
acts between the two over 5 years were purely consensual. This
Court in the case of XXX v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA1, has
held as follows:
1
2026 SCC OnLine Kar 303
16
".... .... ....
11. A perusal at the complaint would indicate that even if
it is taken on its face value, they were consensual acts for two
years whether on the pretext of marriage or otherwise.
Jurisprudence is replete with the judgments rendered by the
Apex Court from time to time, which has intertwined the
concept of rape and consensual sex and how consensual sex on
the promise of marriage cannot amount to rape. I deem it
appropriate to notice the said judgments.
JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE:
12.1. The Apex Court in the case of DR. DHRUVARAM
MURLIDHAR SONAR v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA,
reported in (2019) 18 SCC 191 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
11. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [State
of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002
SCC (Cri) 539] , it was held that while exercising powers
under Section 482 CrPC, the court does not function as a
court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the
section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully
and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by
the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It was
further held as under : (SCC p. 94, para 6)
"6. ... It would be an abuse of process of the court
to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds
that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto."
... ... ...
23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between
rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases,
17
must very carefully examine whether the complainant
had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala
fide motives and had made a false promise to this
effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within
the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a
distinction between mere breach of a promise and not
fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made
the promise with the sole intention to seduce the
prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act
would not amount to rape. There may be a case
where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused and not solely on account of the
misconception created by accused, or where an
accused, on account of circumstances which he could
not have foreseen or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her despite having every
intention to do. Such cases must be treated
differently. If the complainant had any mala fide
intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a
clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual
physical relationship between the parties would not
constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC.
24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that
the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary
Health Centre and the complainant was working as an
Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that she is a
widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed
her that he is a married man and that he has differences
with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different
communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant
needed a month's time to get their marriage registered. The
complainant further states that she had fallen in love with
the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was
a widow. She has specifically stated that "as I was also a
widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to
his proposal and since then we were having love affair and
accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside
sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home".
Thus, they were living together, sometimes at her house
and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They
were in a relationship with each other for quite some
time and enjoyed each other's company. It is also
clear that they had been living as such for quite some
time together. When she came to know that the
appellant had married some other woman, she lodged
18
the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant
has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious
decision after active application of mind to the things
that had happened. It is not a case of a passive
submission in the face of any psychological pressure
exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit
consent given by her was not the result of a
misconception created in her mind. We are of the
view that, even if the allegations made in the
complaint are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety, they do not make out a case against
the appellant. We are also of the view that since the
complainant has failed to prima facie show the
commission of rape, the complaint registered under
Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained."
(Emphasis supplied)
12.2. Later, the Apex Court in the case of SHAMBHU
KHARWAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH reported in
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 1032 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
9. In Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of
Maharashtra [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] a two-Judge
Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part (D.Y.
Chandrachud, J.), held in Sonu v. State of U.P. [Sonu v. State
of U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 517] observed that: (Pramod
SuryabhanPawar case [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of
Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] ,
SCC pp. 616-18 & 620, paras 12, 14, 16 & 18)
"12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with
respect to Section 375IPC involves an active understanding of
the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed
act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after
evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as
the various possible consequences flowing from such action or
inaction, consents to such action. ...
***
14. ... Specifically in the context of a promise to
marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction
between a false promise given on the understanding by
the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a
19
promise which is made in good faith but subsequently
not fulfilled. ...
***
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the
intention of the maker at the time of making the
promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the
woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations,
there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the
woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a
promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To
establish a false promise, the maker of the promise
should have had no intention of upholding his word at
the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under
Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
"misconception of fact" where such misconception was
the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. ...
***
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from
the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to
Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation
towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent"
was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a
promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The
promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in
bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time
it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate
relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to
engage in the sexual act."
(emphasis supplied)
... ... ...
11. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in
the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the
FIR or in the charge-sheet, the essential ingredients of
an offence under Section 376IPC. The crucial issue which
is to be considered is whether the allegations indicate
that the appellant had given a promise to the second
respondent to marry which at the inception was false
and on the basis of which the second respondent was
induced into a sexual relationship. Taking the allegations
in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial
ingredients of the offence under Section 375IPC are
absent. The relationship between the parties was purely
of a consensual nature. The relationship, as noted above,
was in existence prior to the marriage of the second
respondent and continued to subsist during the term of
the marriage and after the second respondent was
granted a divorce by mutual consent.
20
12. The High Court, in the course of its judgment, has
merely observed that the dispute raises a question of fact which
cannot be considered in an application under Section 482CrPC.
As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they stand,
which are not in dispute, would indicate that the ingredients of
the offence under Section 376IPC were not established. The
High Court has, therefore, proceeded to dismiss the application
under Section 482CrPC on a completely misconceived basis."
(Emphasis supplied)
12.3. In XXXX v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
reported in (2024) 3 SCC 496 the Apex Court holds as follows:
".... .... ....
9. While getting her statement recorded under
Section 164CrPC, she admitted that she knew the
appellant since 2017. On account of dispute with her
husband, she was living with her parents. As she got
acquainted with the appellant, they fell in love. In 2018,
the appellant went to Maharashtra for job. However, he
used to visit her home and take care of the complainant
as well as her daughter. In 2019, the appellant assured
the complainant that he will marry her in case she takes
divorce from her husband who used to harass and beat
her. For this reason, she divorced her husband and
solemnised marriage with the appellant in a temple in
January 2019. Thereafter, they started living together
with her daughter born from the previous marriage.
Despite assurance, the appellant did not solemnise court
marriage. After marriage was solemnised in temple,
treating the appellant as her husband, they both started
leading a married life having physical relations from
January 2019 till June 2020. The appellant treated the
complainant as his wife. Thereafter, the appellant
refused to respond to her calls and even marry her.
... ... ...
11. Further, in the FIR the complainant stated
that she got divorce from her earlier husband on 10-12-
2018. In the statement under Section 164CrPC, she
stated that marriage between the appellant and the
complainant was solemnised in a temple in January
2019. However, the date of divorce as claimed by the
complainant is belied from the copy of the decree
annexed with the appeal as Annexure P-9, where
21
divorce by mutual consent was granted to the
complainant and her husband vide judgment dated 13-
1-2021. The aforesaid fact could not be disputed.
Meaning thereby, the complainant besides the facts in
the FIR and also in the statement under Section
164CrPC regarding her divorce from the earlier
marriage, sought to claim that she had remarried with
the appellant during subsistence of her earlier marriage.
12. From the contents of the complaint, on
the basis of which FIR was got registered and the
statement got recorded by the complainant, it is
evident that there was no promise to marry
initially when the relations between the parties
started in the year 2017. In any case, even on the
dates when the complainant alleges that the
parties had physical relations, she was already
married. She falsely claimed that divorce from her
earlier marriage took place on 10-12-2018.
However, the fact remains that decree of divorce
was passed only on 13-1-2021. It is not a case
where the complainant was of an immature age
who could not foresee her welfare and take right
decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years
elder to the appellant. She was matured and
intelligent enough to understand the
consequences of the moral and immoral acts for
which she consented during subsistence of her
earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case of betraying
her husband. It is the admitted case of the
prosecutrix that even after the appellant shifted to
Maharashtra for his job, he used to come and stay
with the family and they were living as husband
and wife. It was also the stand taken by the
appellant that he had advanced loan of Rs
1,00,000 to the prosecutrix through banking
channel which was not returned back."
(Emphasis supplied)
12.4. In JASPAL SINGH KAURAL v. STATE OF NCT OF
DELHI reported in (2025) 5 SCC 756 the Apex Court has held
as follows:
".... .... ....
22
13. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in Naim
Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Naim Ahamed v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] whereby this Hon'ble
Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly,
the prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual
relationship with the appellant-accused, upon an
assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a
married woman having three children, had continued to
have such relationship with the appellant-accused, at
least for about five years till she gave the complaint. In
the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this Court had
observed as under : (SCC pp. 398-99, paras 21-22)
"21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the
respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for
sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the
accused had given a false promise to marry her and
subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent
was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under
Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is
pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a
false promise and committing breach of promise by the
accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the
beginning would not have any intention to marry the
prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceived the
prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a
view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise,
one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have
given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and
subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances
unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control,
which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a
folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false
promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under
Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon
its proved facts before the court.
22. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who
herself was a married woman having three children,
could not be said to have acted under the alleged false
promise given by the appellant or under the
misconception of fact while giving the consent to have
sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly,
she continued to have such relationship with him at
least for about five years till she gave complaint in the
year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her
deposition before the court, are taken on their face
value, then also to construe such allegations as "rape"
by the appellant, would be stretching the case too
far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the
mother of three children was mature and intelligent
23
enough to understand the significance and the
consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she
was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct
during the course of such relationship with the accused,
is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her
husband and three children by having relationship with
the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him.
She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of
her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with
the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the
accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male
child through the loin of the accused, she did not have
any complaint against the accused of he having given
false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She
also visited the native place of the accused in the year
2012 and came to know that he was a married man
having children also, still she continued to live with the
accused at another premises without any grievance. She
even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual
consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her
husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some
disputes must have taken place between them, that she
filed the present complaint. The accused in his further
statement recorded under Section 313CrPC had stated
that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil
her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it
could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the
prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual
relationship with the appellant under the misconception
of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having
committed rape within the meaning of Section 375IPC."
(emphasis supplied)
14. The decision in Naim Ahamed [Naim Ahamed v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] is squarely applicable to
the conspectus of present case. It has been time and again
settled by this Hon'ble Court, that the mere fact that physical
relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will
not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section
375IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was
made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for
sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said
promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise
of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her
consent for sexual relations. [Mahesh DamuKhare v. State of
Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471]
24
15. Upon a bare perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet, the
following facts are clearly established:
15.1. The physical relationship between the appellant and
Respondent 2 was consensual from the very beginning and cannot be
said to be against the will or without the consent of the prosecutrix.
Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted, there is no material on
record to show that there was any dishonest inducement, or
incitement on part of the appellant."
15.2. There is also no material on record, to establish an
offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506IPC against the
appellant. In fact, it is apparent from the conduct of the appellant, that
he was acting in furtherance of the promise to marry. It is the own
observation of the High Court, that the appellant had made a promise
to marry Respondent 2 and was acting accordingly. The mangalsutra
being prepared with the initials of the name of Respondent 2
complainant does reflect his intention and promise to marry. However,
in the eventuality of a fall out or split between the parties, it cannot be
said that the promise to marry was false, and the corresponding
conduct dishonest.
15.3. There is also no element of criminality that can be
accrued to the appellant, insofar as it is the own case of the
prosecutrix, that she was in a relationship with the appellant,
while being in a subsisting marriage. It is also hard to believe
that the prosecutrix could have sustained a physical
relationship for a prolonged period of five years [Prashant v.
State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 5 SCC 764] , while being in a
subsisting marriage, and even subsequently obtaining divorce
to sustain the relationship. The prolonged period of the
relationship, during which the sexual relations continued
between the parties, is sufficient to conclude that there was
never an element of force or deceit in the relationship. [Mahesh
Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398 : 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3471] The prosecutrix was thus, conscious and
cognizant of the consequences of her actions, and had given
her consent after an active and reasoned deliberation. [Pramod
Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 :
(2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903]"
(Emphasis supplied)
12.5. In SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528, the Apex Court has
held as follows:
".... .... ....
25
28. We find that the present case is not a case
where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for
physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship
continued for a period of three long years, which is a
considerable period of time. They remained close and
emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy
that occurred during the course of a functioning
relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as
instances of offence of rape merely because the
relationship failed to culminate in marriage.
29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken
note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or
broken relationships are given the colour of criminality.
The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be
invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual
violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert
every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only
trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts
upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice.
Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal
discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in
this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for
condemnation.
30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC
764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.)
observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a
consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal
proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the
parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of
criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a
marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under:
"20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR
and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial
ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC
are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's
statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication
that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset
of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the
prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot
be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual
relationship with the appellant solely on account of any
assurance of marriage from the appellant. The
relationship between the parties was cordial and also
consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship
26
between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of
criminal proceedings. What was a consensual
relationship between the parties at the initial stages
cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said
relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship.
Further, both parties are now married to someone else
and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our
view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present
case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of
law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by
continuing the prosecution."
(underlining by us)
31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in
which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds
deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not
uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner
and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a
relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised
marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage
becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it
conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such
consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the
promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no
genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The
law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has
been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of
Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those
truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle
must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on
unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture.
... .... ...
33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that,
during the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or
allegation was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the
absence of consent in their physical relations. It was only upon
the appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the
sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings
came to be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are
stated to have occurred between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024;
however, the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly
three months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy.
34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific
allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or
compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor
does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or
27
inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her
presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that
emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited
and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out
from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the
subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the
proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent
No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was
premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is
devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.
35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of
this Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4
SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly
engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully
aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show
that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or
false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception,
the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of
the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as
under:
"33. There is no dispute that from the year
2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were
residing in different towns. The complainant is an
educated woman and there was no pressure
whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her
from filing a police complaint against the accused if
she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or
were being established under a false assurance of
marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed
herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby,
dispelling the allegation that the intention of the
appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of
the relationship.
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact
that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel
to meet the appellant at his place of posting.
Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship
between the complainant and the appellant was
consensual without the existence of any element of
deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the
complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-
2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a
consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006.
It is alleged in the complaint that when she had
proposed that they should marry and live together, the
28
appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at
all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the
FIR should have been registered immediately after this
incident. However, it is only when it came to the
knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was
getting married to another woman, in an attempt to
stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the
One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she
was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his
marriage must be stopped.
xxx
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused
is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has
wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court
has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to
have sexual intercourse on account of her love and
passion for the accused."
(underlining by us)
36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High
Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No.
2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was
made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of
consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed
by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ)
505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated
that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual
relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred.
37. The said finding of the High Court, however,
fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in
question itself reveals that the relationship between the
parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent
No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire
to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a
major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated
with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on
her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the
relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was
subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even
upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is
manifest that the relationship between the parties was
consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express
statement to that effect in the memo of application, as
emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held
29
against the appellant when the same can be otherwise
clearly discerned.
38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of
this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations
were made:
"29. It must also be clear that for a promise to
be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact
within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been
made from the very beginning with an intention to
deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical
relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such
consent was given under a misconception of fact, the
said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this
regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7
SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held
as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced
or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this,
the court must very carefully examine whether the
accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had
mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this
effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the
ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling
a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
involved was given after wholly understanding the nature
and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a
case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused on
account of circumstances which he could not have
foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable
to marry her, despite having every intention to do so.
Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can
be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a
conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala
fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
xxx
30
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e.
at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
'failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the
meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact
must have an immediate relevance'.
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the
accused had never really intended to marry her."
(underlining by us)"
(Emphasis supplied)
12.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR
ANURAG v. STATE OF TELANGANA, reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1258 the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
25. In the chats which have been placed on
record along with the additional documents, the de-
facto complainant, who is referred to by the name
'Muffin', has admitted that she was manipulative and
was trying to "get a green card holder". At one point of
time, she also stated that it would not be difficult for her
to trap the next one. In the very same breath, she
mentions that she would not waste time with the
accused appellant and needs to "invest on the next
victim". She also mentions that she would irritate her
victims to the extent that they dump her, and she could
happily start with the next one. She also stated that she
was using the accused appellant.
26. These chats depict the stark reality
about the behavioral pattern of the de-
facto complainant who appears to be having
manipulative and vindictive tendency.
31
27. Thus, in our opinion, the accused
appellant was absolutely justified in panicking and
backing out from the proposed marriage upon
coming to know of the aggressive sexual
behaviour and the obsessive nature of the de-
facto complainant.
28. Hence, even assuming that the accused
appellant retracted from his promise to marry the
complainant, it cannot be said that he indulged in
sexual intercourse with the de-facto complainant
under a false promise of marriage or that the
offence was committed by him with the de-
facto complainant on the ground that she
belonged to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes community.
29. It is also relevant to mention here that in FIR
No. 751 of 2021, the de-facto complainant has not even
made a whisper about the accused appellant dumping
her on the ground of her caste. Thus, apparently this
allegation which has been set out in the subsequent FIR
No. 103 of 2022 lodged almost after seven months is
nothing but a sheer exaggeration which must be
discarded.
30. Having considered the entirety of facts
and circumstances as available on record, we are
of the firm opinion that allowing prosecution of
the accused appellant to continue in the impugned
FIR No. 103 of 2022 would be nothing short of a
travesty of justice in addition to being a gross
abuse of the process of Court. The impugned FIR
No. 103 of 2022 is nothing but a bundle of lies full
of fabricated and malicious unsubstantiated
allegations levelled by the complainant. The facts
on record clearly establish the vindictive and
manipulative tendencies of the complainant and
these aspects have a great bearing on the
controversy."
(Emphasis supplied)
12.7. Again, in the case of AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC
1230 the Apex Court has held as follows:
32
".... .... ....
8. Having heard both sides in this case and after
carefully considering the material on record, the following
attributes come to the fore:
(a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and
correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear from the
record that the consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2
was obtained against her will and merely on an assurance to
marry. The Appellant and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2
were acquainted since 08.06.2022, and she herself admits that
they interacted frequently and fell in love. The
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in a physical
relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so without
her consent, however she not only sustained her relationship
for over 12 months, but continued to visit him in lodges on two
separate occasions. The narrative of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate with her
conduct.
(b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 as
defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said to have
been obtained under a misconception of fact. There is no
material to substantiate "inducement or
misrepresentation" on the part of the Appellant to
secure consent for sexual relations without having any
intention of fulfilling said promise. Investigation has
also revealed that the Khulanama, was executed on
29.12.2022 which the Complainant/Respondent no. 2
had obtained from her ex-husband. During this time, the
parties were already in a relationship and the alleged
incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable that
the Complainant had engaged in a physical relationship
with the Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while
she was already married to someone else. Even
otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and
unenforceable qua the Appellant.
(c) There is no evidence of coercion or threat of injury to
the Complainant/Respondent no. 2, to attract an offence
under section 506 IPC. It is improbable that there was
any threat caused to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2
by the Appellant when all along the relationship was
cordial, and it was only when the Appellant graduated
and left for his hometown to Ahmednagar, the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 became agitated. We
also cannot ignore the conduct of the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in visiting the native
village of the Appellant without any intimation, which is
also unacceptable and reflects the agitated and
33
unnerved state of mind of the Complainant/Respondent
no. 2. For the same reason, the criminal prosecution
against the Appellant herein is probably with an
underlying motive and disgruntled state of mind.
(d) There is also no reasonable possibility that the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 or any woman being
married before and having a child of four years, would
continue to be deceived by the Appellant or maintain a
prolonged association or physical relationship with an
individual who has sexually assaulted and exploited her.
9. In our considered view, this is also not a case
where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A
consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming
distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal
machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the
Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of
such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again
warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has
termed it a folly3 to treat each breach of promise to marry
as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence
under section 376 IPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
13.1. The Apex Court, in the case of Dr. DHRUVARAM
MURLIDHAR SONAR supra, draws with unmistakable clarity,
the doctrinal line that separates rape from consensual
intimacy, where two adults of their own volition, engage
in consensual sexual relation over a sustained period, the
subsequent refusal of the man to marry the woman,
howsoever regrettable, does not, ipso facto, transmute
such intimacy into the offence of rape as punishable
under Section 376 of the IPC.
13.2. The principle is reaffirmed in SHAMBHU
KHARWAR supra where the Apex Court interdicted the
criminal process at the threshold holding that the
relationship between the parties was purely consensual
and accordingly quashed the crime as well as the charge
sheet.
13.3. Likewise, in NAIM AHAMED v. STATE (NCT OF
DELHI) [(2023) 15 SCC 385], the Apex Court addressed an
identical factual complexion, where the complainant had
even become pregnant on account of the relationship,
34
and yet held that such circumstance, by itself cannot
clothe the relationship with criminality, for pregnancy
arising out of consensual intimacy.
13.4. In SAMADHAN supra the Apex Court sounded a
note of stern caution against the disquieting tendency of
coloring failed relationships, with the hue of heinous
crimes. The Apex Court holds that mere breakdown of a
relationship between the consenting adults, cannot
constitute rape nor can the criminal law be set into
motion as a retaliatory instrument, merely because the
relationship did not ultimately culminate in marriage.
13.5. Further, in AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL, the Apex
Court observes that where the complainant is already
married, the allegation of physical intimacy induced by
promise of marriage stands on infirm grounds, for a
promise which is ex-facie unenforceable, cannot in those
circumstances, be elevated into a foundation of imputing
criminality.
13.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR
ANURAG supra the Apex Court goes even further, on a
perusal of contemporaneous chats, it found that the
complainant had exhibited manipulative and vindictive
tendencies and held that man backing out of marriage,
even assuming such promise existed, cannot
automatically attract the offence of rape. Holding the
prosecution to be malicious and fabricated, the Apex
Court obliterates the proceedings against the accused.
13.7. In the light of the overwhelming majority of such
decisions, the Apex Court has exercised its Constitutional and
inherent jurisdiction to arrest the criminal process, even
at the stage of registration of the crime, where the
allegation taken to their highest, disclose nothing beyond
a consensual relationship subsequently turning sore.
APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE:
14. In the case at hand, the relationship between
the complainant and the petitioner, at its inception, was
plainly that of a client and a counsel. Yet to determine
35
whether the complaint is a bonafide invocation of
criminal law or an endeavour covered by manipulation
and vendetta, it becomes necessary to notice certain
antecedent facts, which emerge not from conjecture, but
from documents placed on record.
Manipulation and Malafides of the complainant:
A brief chronology bears mention:
14.2. The complainant is said to have married one Yathish
Kumar T. R. in the year 2014. The said marriage, by an order
dated 22-10-2016, was annulled. However in the year 2020, it
appears that a child was born to the complainant, the date of
birth being 21-08-2020. The birth certificate is placed on
record. The birth certificate depicts the date of birth of the child
born to Yathish Kumar T. R. and the complainant is as follows:
The birth certificate placed on record is not without
significance. It indicates two distinct and telling
36
circumstances; first, that notwithstanding the annulment
decree dated 22-10-2016 in M.C.No.3017 of 2015, a child
is born on 21-08-2020 to the complainant and the very
same Yathish Kumar T. R. and second, that the
complainant appears to have continued association with
the said Yathish Kumar T. R. even long after the
severance of the marital tie. Photographs are also produced
to demonstrate that the child now about 4 years of age, has
been living with the complainant and Yathish Kumar T. R., as a
family.
The matter does not rest there:
14.3. The petitioner has also produced another birth
certificate evidencing the birth of a child on 15-12-2008 where
the father's name is shown as Nagaraju and the mother, the
complainant. The said birth certificate is as follows:
37
The inevitable inference is that the complainant has two
children, the first born on 15-12-2008 from Nagaraju and the
second born on 21-08-2020 from Yathish Kumar T. R., long
after the annulment of marriage dated 22-10-2016. These
circumstances do not float in isolation. They connect
with yet another material episode.
14.4. A crime comes to be registered on 28-11-2022 and
on the basis of the said complainant a crime in Crime No.602 of
2022 for offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC is
alleged. The gravamen of the complaint is that the child born
from their earlier relationship, went missing on 25-11-2022.
The child was about 13 years at that point in time. In the
complaint, the complainant narrates that she is married and
settled with another person. The gist of the complaint is as
follows:
"&_ಾ* ಯು "ಾ#ೆ ೆ Dಾಜ ಾ1 ೕ ದ ದೂ ನ =ಾ ಾಂಶ@ೇ ೆಂದ ೆ &_ಾ* ಯು
ಸು8ಾರು 4 ವಷ*ಗ ಂದ 7ಾ ೆ ಮ ೆಯ-. ಕುಟುಂಬ ಸ!ೕತ @ಾಸ@ಾ1ದುOBೊಂಡು
ಗೃ U_ಾ1ರು6ಾ3 ೆ, &_ಾ* ಯ ಮಗ ಹ|*} ಾ~-13ವಷ* ಈತನು ಅಂಜ ಾನಗರದ-.ರುವ
\Lೕ; ಾಯಕ ಸೂvಲ:-. 9 ೇ ತರಗ ಯ-. @ಾ,=ಾಂಗ 8ಾಡು 3ರು6ಾ3 ೆ. &_ಾ* ಯ ಮಗ ಈ ಂ ೆ
ಸು8ಾರು 2 ವಷ*ಗ ಂದ 4-5 7ಾ ಮ ೆ XಟುT Dೋ1 7ೇ ೆಯವರ ಮು+ಾಂತರ Yೕ• 8ಾ 5
@ಾಪಸು€ ಮ ೆ ೆ ಬಂ ರು6ಾ3 ೆ. ಾಂಕ:25/11/2022 ರಂದು ಾ L: 08-00 ಗಂ•ೆ ೆ ಮ ೆaಂದ
Dೊರಗ^ೆ Dೋದವನು @ಾಪಸು€ ಮ ೆ ೆ ಬಂ ರುವ 0ಾ., &_ಾ* ಯ =ೆ:ೕ 6ೆ ಪ‚U*ಮ ರವರು
ಮಂಡ,ದ-. @ಾಸ@ಾ1ದುO, ಇವರ ƒೊ6ೆ &_ಾ* ಯ ಮಗ Dೆಚು„ ಒಡ ಾಟ;ಟುTBೊಂ ದುO, ಪ‚Uೕ*ಮ
ರವರನು: ಕ ೆ5 ;<ಾರ#ೆ 8ಾಡ7ೇBೆಂದು Bೋರು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ. ನಂತರ &_ಾ* ಯು ಸಂಬಂoಕರು ಮತು3
=ೆ:ೕ ತರ ಬ ;<ಾರ 8ಾಡ0ಾ1 _ಾವ ೇ ಉಪಯುಕ3 8ಾ ೊ ೆ ರುವ 0ಾ., ಆದO ಂದ
Bಾ#ೆ_ಾ1ರುವ ಹ|*} ಾ~-13ವಷ* ರವರನು: ಪ6ೆ3 8ಾ Bೊಡ7ೇBೆಂದು BೊಟT ದೂರು ಇ6ಾ, .."
14.5. Yet another record is placed before this Court; the
complainant filed Crl.Misc.No.1467 of 2023 invoking Section
13(3) of the Karnataka Registration of Births and Deaths Act,
1969 and in the cause title therein, in the year 2023, the
complainant describes herself to be the wife of Yathish Kumar.
The cause title reads as follows:
"IN THE COURT OF THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE.
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU
38
Present:- Sri. SUNIL.R., B.COM., LL.B.,
CJM., Bengaluru Rural District,
Bengaluru.
Dated this the 20th day of January, 2024.
Crl. Misc. No. 1467/2023
PETITIONER: Smt. Nagarathna,
W/o. Sri. Yathish Kumar,
31 years, R/at No.458,
Muddinapalya Main Road,
Anjananahara, Bengaluru North,
Bengaluru-560 061.
(By Sri.B.L.Jayarama, Adv)
- V/S -
RESPONDENT: The Chief Registrar,
Births and Deaths,
Office of the Tahsildar,
Bengaluru South Taluk,
Bengaluru.
(Respondent placed exparte)
*************"
The prayer sought therein is follows:
"The petitioner has filed the petition under Section
13(3) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969
seeking direction of this Court to direct the respondent to enter
the date of death of Renukamma, W/o Late Nagaraja, as
19.07.2011 in the death register."
When all these facts, borne out from official records, are
considered cumulatively, it becomes difficult to comprehend,
far less accept, how the complainant could credibly assert that
she consented to sexual relationship on a "promise of
marriage", when she appears to have been in a subsisting
marital relationship or at the very least, in a continuing
39
domestic association, and is also mother of 2 children, one
about 13 years old and the other about 4 years.
14.6. What is more disturbing is the disquieting fashion in
which the complainant has sought to implicate other members
of the family of the petitioner. They are arraigned on a tenuous
allegation that they did not cooperate or support the petitioner's
marriage with the complainant, thereby attempting to create
a narrative of cheating. Criminal law cannot be permitted
to be expanded by such facile insinuation.
15. The offences alleged included Section 69 of the BNS.
Section 69 of BNS reads as follows:
"69. Sexual intercourse by employing
deceitful means, etc.--Whoever, by deceitful means or
by making promise to marry to a woman without any
intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse
with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the
offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten
years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.--"deceitful means" shall include
inducement for, or false promise of employment or
promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity."
Section 69 criminalizes sexual intercourse by employing
deceitful means including a promise of marriage, without
intention of fulfilment. The provision though newly introduced,
cannot be interpreted, in a manner that allows it to become an
instrument of retroactive criminalization of consensual
relationships upon the mere recital of "promise". The statute
punishes deceit, not disappointment; fraud, not failed
affection; and exploitation, not the collapse of
relationship. On the facts presented, it is difficult to discern
where from the offence under Section 69 could even spring.
The complainant on her own showing and on admitted
records, appears to have been married/associated in
other relationships, and to have children. In such
circumstances, the allegation of sexual intercourse,
induced solely on promise of marriage is inherently
implausible and legally unsustainable, consequently,
40
neither Section 96 BNS nor Section 64 BNS (Section 376
of the earlier regime, the IPC) can be attracted.
16. The offence under Section 89 of the BNS (Section 313
of the earlier regime) is also not made out. In view of the
principle enunciated by the Apex Court in NAIM AHAMED
supra, consensual sexual acts, do not by themselves, invite such
provision, in the absence of essential legal ingredients.
17. What then remains is, Section 318(2) of the BNS
(Section 420 of the earlier regime, the IPC), even that cannot
be invoked merely because a relationship did not
culminate in marriage. The settle position of law is that,
breach of a marriage to marry, howsoever morally
questionable, is not per se cheating in the criminal sense,
unless dishonest intention at the inception is established,
which is conspicuously absent in the case at hand."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the judicial landscape as quoted hereinabove,
permitting further trial against the petitioner would on the face of it
become an abuse of the process of law. It also becomes necessary
to notice the manipulation of the complainant.
12. The complainant is alleged to have registered several
crimes against several men on the same score, one such crime was
against Thammanna Vittal Badiger in Crime No.446 of 2015, which
was tried as C.C.No.19282 of 2016. The statement under Section
164 of the Cr.P.C. recorded therein is necessary to be noticed. It
reads as follows:
41
"=ಾJ ಾರರ Dೆಸರು: XXXXXX
ತಂ ೆಯ Dೆಸರು : XXXXXX
ವಯಸು€ : XXXXXX
ಉ ೊ,ೕಗ : XXXXXX
@ಾಸ : XXXXXX
ಾಂಕ: 09-12-2015
ಸತ, ಪL8ಾಣ ‡ೋoಸ0ಾaತು.
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42
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ನಂತರ ಾನು @ಾಸ8ಾಡು ದ
3 O `ಮ ೆಯನು: ಬ ೇd ಅವ ೆ XಟುTBೊಟುT ಾನು ನನ:
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8ಾ 5Bೊಂ ರು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ. ಗಭ*pಾತ 8ಾ 5Bೊಂಡು ಒಂದು @ಾರ ಸಹ ಆ1ರ-ಲ.. ಆದರೂ
ಬ ೇd ಒ6ಾ3ಯಪ‚ವ*ಕ@ಾ1 ನನ:ನು: ಾನು XಟುTBೊಟT ಮ ೆ ೆ ಕ ೆ5Bೊಂಡು ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ
ೈ ಕ ಸಂಬಂಧವನು: . ಮುಂದುವ ೆ5ದರು. ಆ ಸಮಯದ-. ನನ ೆ ಆಗುವ ಲ. ಮತು3 ಇಷT
ಇಲ. ಎಂದು Dೇ ದರೂ ಒ6ಾ3ಯ 8ಾ ೈ ಕ ಸಂಬಂಧವನು: ಮುಂದುವ ೆ5ರು6ಾ3 ೆ. ಾನು
ಆತನ ƒೊ6ೆ ೈ ಕ ಸಂಬಂಧ 8ಾಡುವ ದು ಸ ಅಲ. ಎಂದು ಆತ ೆ Dೇ ದರೂ ಆತ ಅದನು:
Bೇಳ ೇ ನನ ೆ 7ೆದ 5 ಮತು3 ಆತ4ಹ6ೆ, 8ಾ Bೊಳ'•ಕು•˜6ೆ3ೕ ೆ ಎಂದು Dೆದ 5 ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ
ಸಂಬಂಧವನು: ಮುಂದುವ ೆ5ದರು ನನ ೆ ಅವರ ƒೊ6ೆಯ-. ಒಂ ೇ ಮ ೆಯ-.
@ಾಸ8ಾಡುವ ದು ಇಷT ಇಲ. ೆ ಇದOರೂ ಬಲವಂತ@ಾ1 ನನ:ನು: ಾನು ಅವ ೆ XಟುTBೊಟT
ಮ ೆಯ-. ಅವರ ƒೊ6ೆಯ-. ಉ ಯುವಂ6ೆ 8ಾ ದರು. ಸದ ಬ ೇd ೕನು ನನ:
Dೆಂಡ , ಾನು ನ: ಗಂಡ ಾನು ನ: ƒೊ6ೆಯ-. ಇ ೆOೕ ೆ, ೕನು BೆಲಸBೆv Dೋಗುವ ದು
7ೇಡ ಾನು ನ:ನು: ೋ Bೊಳ'•6ೆ3ೕ ೆ, ಾನು 5 8ಾ 6ೆ ೆಯ7ೇBೆಂದುBೊಂ ೆOೕ ೆ ೕನು
ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆಯ-. ಇದO ೆ =ಾಕು. ಎಂದು Dೇ ನಂX5 ನನ:ನು: Bಾ0ೇ) ೆ ಾ)ೕ ಾ!
Bೊಡುವಂ6ೆ 8ಾ ದುO Bಾರಣ ಾನು ಆಗZT 2014 ರ-. ನನ: BೆಲಸBೆv ಾ)ೕ ಾ!ಯನು:
Bೊ'Tರು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ. ಸದ ಬ ೇd ನನ: ಗಂಡನ ೕ ಯ-. ನನ ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟT ಆ53, ಹಣ,
ಒಡ@ೆ ಮತು3 ಎ0ಾ. ವ,ವDಾರಗಳನು: ಸಂಪ‚ಣ*@ಾ1 ತನ: ಹ6ೋ' ೆ 6ೆ ೆದುBೊಂಡು ಾನು
ನ: ಗಂಡ ಎಂದು Dೇಳ' ದ
3 ರ
O ು. ಾನು Bೆಲಸ XಟT ನಂತರ ಬ ೇd 5ಸT™ ^ೊ!ೖ•
ಎಂಬ ಕಂಪ ಯ-. ಕಂಪ‚,ಟd •ೆBಾ:ಲ) ಬ ೆG ೆZT •ಾ,ಕ-T ಆ1, ಉಪ ಾ,ಸವನು: Bೊಡು6ಾ3
ಹಣವನು: ಸಂpಾದ ೆ 8ಾಡಲು pಾLರಂš5ದರು. ಆಗ ಅವ ೆ ಂಗ ೆ ಐದ ಂದ ಎಂಟು
=ಾ;ರ - ಬರು ತ
3 ು3. ಬ ೇd =ಾ›T@ೇd ಇಂ) ಯd ಆದ Bಾರಣ 5 8ಾ 6ೆ ೆಯುವ
ƒೊ6ೆ ೆ ಮ4 YL•ೇಶ• ೆ ಗಮನ Bೊ ಎಂದು Dೇ ಾಗ ಬ ೇ ತನ: ಾಖ0ೆಗಳನು:
43
ತರಲು 8ಾಗ ರ=ೆ3ಯ Y-ೕಸರ ಮು+ಾಂತರ ಅವರ Dೆಂಡ ಯ ಮ ೆ ೆ Dೋ1 Bೇ ಾಗ
ಾಖ0ೆಗಳ' ಇಲ. ಅವನು: ಅವ ೇ 6ೆ ೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1 ಾO ೆ ಎಂದು ಸುಳ'• Dೇ ದ Bಾರಣ
Y-ೕಸ ಂದ ಾಖ0ೆಗಳ' ಕ•ೆದುDೋ1@ೆ ಎಂದು ಂಬರಹ ಪ^ೆದು ನಂತರ ನಕ-
ಾಖ0ೆಗಳನು: ಪ^ೆದುBೊಂ ರು6ಾ3 ೆ. ಸದ ನಕ- ಾಖ0ೆಗಳನು: ಪ^ೆಯಲು ಾನು ನನ:
ಆಭರಣಗಳನು: ಅಡ8ಾನ;ಟುT ಸDಾಯ 8ಾ ರು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ. ಇದರ ƒೊ6ೆ ೆ 5 8ಾ ;<ಾರBೆv
ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟTಂ6ೆ ಹಣ Bೇ ಾಗ0ೆ0ಾ. =ಾಲ 8ಾ ಸು8ಾರು 30 ಲœ ಹಣವನು: ಅವ ೆ
Bೊ'Tರು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ. ಸದ ಹಣBೆv ಾನು ಬ ಯ
[ ನು: ಕಟT7ೇBಾ1ದುO Bೆಲಸ ಇಲ.ದ Bಾರಣ
ಬ ಯ
[ ನು: ಕಟುT ಲ
3 .. ನ@ೆಂಬd 2014 ರ-. ನನ: ಒ6ಾ3ಯ ಮತು3 ನನ: ಸDಾಯ ಂದ
ಬ ೇd ಅವ ೆ ಚ ೆ:ೖನ-. ಇರುವ Dೆ--5ಎ% ಕಂಪ ಯ-. 'ೕಂ -ೕಡd ಆ1 Bೆಲಸ
5Evರುತ3 ೆ. ಚ ೆ:ೖ ೆ BೆಲಸBೆv Dೋ ಾಗ ನನ:ನು: ಬ ೇd ಒ6ಾ3ಯ 8ಾ ಾನು ಇದO ಕ^ೆ
ೕನು ಇರ7ೇಕು ಏನು ಬಂದರೂ ಾನು ಅದನು: ಹದ ಸು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ, ಇದO ೆ ಇಬ•ರೂ ƒೊ6ೆಯ0ೆ.
ಇ ೋಣ ಸತ3 ೆ ƒೊ6ೆಯ0ೆ. =ಾiೕಣ ಎಂದು Dೇ ನನ:ನು: ನಂX5 ನನ:ನು: ಚ ೆ:ೖ ೆ
ಕ ೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1 ಅವ ೆ BೊಟT ಕಂಪ ಯ ೆZT DೌZನ-. ನನ:ನು: ಅವರ ƒೊ6ೆ
ಒಂದೂವ ೆ ಂಗಳ' ಇ 5Bೊಂ ದOರು. <ೆ ೆ:ೖನ-. ಸತ, ೇž ಎಂಬ 8ಾ,5m ^ೈ ೆಕTd ಇದO
Bಾರಣ ಅವರ ಸDಾಯ ಪ^ೆದು ಅಮೃತXಂದು 5 8ಾವನು: <ೆ ೆ:ೖನ0ೆ. 8ಾಡ7ೇBೆಂಬ
ಉ ೆOೕಶ ಂದ <ೆ ೆ:ೖನ !ೕಡ@ಾಕಂನ-. ರೂ. 11,000/- 7ಾ ೆ ೆ ಮ ೆಯನು: ಸಹ 8ಾ
7ೆಂಗಳŠ ನ ಮ ೆಯ-.ದO ಅಗತ,;ರುವ ಗೃDೋಪiೕ1 =ಾ8ಾನುಗಳನು: ಆ ಮ ೆ ೆ
6ೆ ೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1 ಜನವ 2015 ಂದ ಆಗZT 2015 ರವ ೆ ೆ ಆ ಮ ೆಯ-.
ಇ ೆOವ . ಆಗZT 2015 ರಂದು 7ೆಂಗಳŠ ನ-. ನನ: ಅಕvನ ಮಗಳ \„6ಾಥ* ಇದುO ಬ ೇ
ನನ:ನು: ನನ: ಅಕvನ ಮಗಳ \„6ಾಥ*Bೆv 7ೆಂಗಳŠ ೆ ಕ ೆದುBೊಂಡು ಬಂದು XಟುT ಅಕvನ
ಮ ೆಯ-. ಇರು ರƒಾ DಾE ಬರು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ ಎಂದು Dೇ <ೆ ೆ:ೖ ೆ Dೋದರು. <ೆ ೆ:ೖನ-. 2 ನ
ಇದುO ನಂತರ `7ೆಂಗಳŠ ೆ ಬಂದರು. ನಂತರ ಾಂಕ 02-09-2015 ಂದ ಾಂಕ 25-
09-2015 ರವ ೆ ೆ ನನ:ನು: ಬ ೇd Ÿಲಂ ಶ 'ಂ¡ =ಾThಗಳನು: ೋಡ7ೇBೆಂದು
ಸು8ಾರು 25-30 ಪL@ಾ56ಾಣಗ ೆ ಕ ೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1ರು6ಾ3 ೆ. ಾಂಕ 25-09-2015
ರಂದು ತುಮಕೂ ನ ನ;ೕ• ƒೆ € Dೋ•ೆ%ನ-. ಾನು ಮತು3 ಬ ೇd ತಂ1 ೆOವ . ಆ ನ
ೕವ Bೆಲಸವನು: 8ಾಡು ಲ
3 ,. 5 8ಾ ಸಹ 8ಾಡು ಲ
3 . ಈ ಾಗ0ೇ ಅದBೆv =ಾಕಷುT
ಬಂಡ@ಾಳನು: DಾE Oೕ ಾ ಾನು ಸಹ =ಾಲ 8ಾ ಹಣ Bೊ'T ೆOೕ ೆ, ಬ ಯ
[ ನು: ಕಟುT ಲ
3 ..
ನನ:ನು: ಸಹ Bೆಲಸ ಂದ X 5 ೕO ಾ, ನನ: )ೕವನದ ಗ ಏನು ಎಂದು Dೇ ೕ ೆ ಇದO ೆ
ಹಣBಾ5ನ 5e ಸುsಾ ಸುವ ಲ. ಬದುಕಲು ಕಷT ಆಗುತ3 ೆ ಎಂದು Dೇ ಾಗ ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ
44
ಜಗಳ 8ಾ ನನ ೆ Dೊ^ೆದು ನನ ೆ Dೇಳ ೆ Bೇಳ ೆ ನ ಅವರು ನನ:ನು: Dೋ•ೆ%ನ-. XಟುT
DೊರಟುDೋದರು. ಅವರು XಟುT Dೋದ ನಂತರ <ೆ ೆ:ೖನ 7ಾ ೆ ಮ ೆಯ 8ಾ-ೕಕ ೆ
ಾನು 2 ಂಗ ಂದ 7ಾ ೆ ಕ'Tಲ. ಾನು =ೋಮ@ಾರ ಬಂದು 7ಾ ೆ ಕಟುT6ೆ3ೕ ೆ,
7ೇƒಾರು 8ಾ Bೊಳ•7ೇ ಎಂದು !=ೇ~ ಕಳ' 5 ೆOನು. ಅದBೆv ಅವರು ನನ ೆ ಕ ೆ 8ಾ
ಆಗZT 31 ರಂ ೇ ಮ4 ಗಂಡ ಮ ೆ +ಾ- 8ಾ Bೊಂಡು Dೋ1 ಾO ೆ ಎಂದು 5ದರು.
ನನ:ನು: 7ೆಂಗಳŠ ೆ ಕಳ' 5 ನನ ೆ ಸದ Dಾ ೆ ಮ ೆಯ-. ಇದO ಎ0ಾ. ಹಣ, ನನ:
ಆಭರಣ, ನನ ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟT ಾಖ0ೆಗಳ', 5 8ಾ ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟT ಾಖ0ೆಗಳ', ಆ
ಮ ೆಯ-. ಇದO 3 ಲœ 7ೆ0ೆ7ಾಳ'ವ ಗೃDೋಪiೕ1 ವಸು3ಗಳ', ನನ: ಬ•ೆT ಮತು3 ಮ ೆಯ-.
ಇದO ಎ0ಾ. ವಸು3ಗಳನು: 6ೆ ೆದುBೊಂಡು ಮ ೆ +ಾ- 8ಾ ಾO ೆ ಎಂದು ಾಂಕ 25-09-
2015 ರಂದು ನನ ೆ ದುಬಂ ತು. ಇ ಾದ ನಂತರ ಬ ೇd Bೆಲಸ 8ಾಡು ದ
3 O Dೆ--
5ಎ% ಕಂಪ ೆ ಾನು ಇ-!ೕ% ಮು+ಾಂತರ ಬ ೇd ಅವರ ;ಷಯBೆv ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟTಂ6ೆ
Dೆ--ಆd 8ಾ, ೇಜd ೆ ಇ-!ೕ% ಕಳ' 5 ಾಗ ಾಂಕ 21-08-2015 ಂದ ಬ ೇd
ಅ¢=ಾvಂ ಂ¡ ಎಂದು ಅವರ ಾಖ0ೆಯ-. ಾಖ0ೆ_ಾ1 ೆ ಎಂದು ನನ ೆ ಉತ3ರವನು:
ಕಳ' 5ರು6ಾ3 ೆ. ಅವರು Bೆಲಸ 8ಾಡುವ ಕಂಪ ಯ-. ನನ:ನು: Dೆಂಡ _ಾ1 6ೋ 5ದOರು.
ಬ ೇd =ಾಲ 8ಾ ರುವ 7ಾ,ಂmಗಳ-. ನನ: Dೆಸರನು: Dೆಂಡ _ಾ1 BೊಟುT ನನ:
-7ೈ% ನಂಬd ಅನು: ಅ-. ಾಖ-5ರು6ಾ3 ೆ. ನನ:ನು: ಮದು@ೆ ಆಗು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ ಎಂದು ನಂX5
ನನ:ನು: ಮದು@ೆ ಆಗ ೆ ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ ೈ ಕ ಸಂಬಂಧವನು: 7ೆ•ೆ5, ನನ: ಹಣ, ಒಡ@ೆ
ಎಲ.ವನೂ: ದುರುಪiೕಗ 8ಾ Bೊಂಡು ಈಗ ನನ ೆ -ೕಸ 8ಾ Dೋ1ರು6ಾ3 ೆ. ಸದ
ಬ ೇd ಂದ ಾನು 8ಾನ5ಕ@ಾ1 ಮತು3 ೈ ಕ@ಾ1 ೊಂ ರು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ. ಬ ೇd ನನ:ನು:
ಮದು@ೆ 8ಾ Bೊಳ•ದ . Bಾರಣ ನನ ೆ ಅವರ ƒೊ6ೆ ೈ ಕ ಸಂಬಂಧ Dೊಂದಲು ಇಷT
ಇಲ. ದOರೂ ನನ:ನು: Dೆದ 5 ಮತು3 ನಂXBೆ ಬರುವಂ6ೆ 8ಾ ಪL Dೆƒೆ£ಗೂ ಪL 7ಾ ಮದು@ೆ
ಆಗು6ೆ3ೕ ೆ, ಾನು ನ: ಗಂಡ ೕನು ನನ: Dೆಂಡ ಎಂದು Dೇ ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ ೈ ಕ ಸಂಬಂಧ
Dೊಂ ರು6ಾ3 ೆ.
( ಾ,_ಾಲಯದ ಒ•ಾಂಗಣದ-. =ಾJಯು Dೇ ದOನು: 7ೆರಳ'ಚು„ ಾರ ೆ ಉಕ30ೇಖನ ೕ -
-7ೆರಳಚು„ 8ಾ ಸ0ಾaತು)
=ಾJ ೆ ಓ Dೇ ದOನು:
45
=ಾJ ಸ ಇ ೆ ಎ೦ದು
ಒ&•ದರು.
Sd /-
ಎಂ.ಎಂ.'.5 6"
The complainant does not stop at registration of the crime. But
begins to communicate e-mail and messages to the employer of the
petitioner and gets him arrested all for the offence punishable
under Section 69 of the BNS. Therefore, the complainant being
completely manipulative, shrouded with falsehood, contradictions
and on consensual acts is now wanting to get the petitioner, who is
third in line, be tried in a Sessions case for the aforesaid offences.
If this would be permitted, it would be putting a premium on the
acts of the complainant and permitting the process of law to be
abused by the complainant apart from it resulting in grave
miscarriage of justice. I, therefore, deem it appropriate to exercise
my jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNS and take off the
sword of Damocles hanging on the head of the petitioner.
13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: -
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
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SPONSORED
(ii) Charge sheet and the proceedings in S.C.No.1727 of
2025 (arising out of Crime No.244 of 2025), pending
before the LIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru (CCH-54), qua the petitioner, stand quashed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
nvj
CT:BR
