Chattisgarh High Court
Raja Nikose vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 4 August, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
CGHC010426882025 2026:CGHC:33819-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
BABLU
RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
Digitally signed by
BABLU RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
Date: 2026.08.06
10:33:35 +0530
CRA No. 2072 of 2025
1 - Raja Nikose S/o Kailash Nikose Aged About 25 Years R/o Near
Firantin Mandir Ward No. 43, Basantpur, Police Station-Basantpur,
District Rajnandgaon, C.G.
2 - Pankaj Yadav S/o Ashwani Yadav Aged About 26 Years R/o
Mahamaya Chowk Ward No. 43, Basantpur, Police Station-Basantpur,
District Rajnandgaon, C.G.
3 - Choti @ Vishnu Singh Rajput S/o Suresh Singh Rajput Aged About
20 Years R/o Bangali Chowk Ward No. 43, Basantpur, Police Station-
Basantpur, District Rajnandgaon, C.G.
4 - Khemu @ Khemchand Dewangan S/o Mehattar Ram Dewangan
Aged About 21 Years R/o Kaurinbhatha, Near Jaitkhambh, Police
Station-Basantpur, District Rajnandgaon, C.G.
--- Appellants
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police
Station- Basantpur, District- Rajnandgaon, C.G.
--- Respondent(s)
ACQA No. 8 of 2026
Minakshi Varma W/o Shri Suraj Varma Aged About 42 Years R/o House
No. 1204, Rajeev Nagar, Ward No. 38, Basantpur, Rajnandgaon,
District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
---Appellant
2
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Office, Police Station-
Basantpur, District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
2 - Cheen @ Pintu @ Pratham Yadav S/o Mohan Yadav Aged About 20
Years R/o Jaldhara Chowk, Basantpur, Police Station-Basantpur,
District Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
3 - Nanu @ Kameshwar Yadav S/o Arjun Yadav Aged About 22 Years
R/o Jaldhara Chowk, Basantpur, Police Station- Basantpur, District-
Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
4 - Vikas Das Vaishnav @ Chinna S/o Late Ramnarayan Vaishnav
Aged About 21 Years R/o Chandra Colony (Rented House, House
Owner- Dr. Sharma), Police Station- Basantpur, District- Rajnandgaon
(C.G.)
5 - Sanjay Yadav @ Sanju S/o Late Shankar Yadav Aged About 22
Years R/o Rajeev Nagar Ward No. 42, Basantpur, Police Station-
Basantpur, District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
6 - Amit Nikosey S/o Kailash Nikosey Aged About 21 Years R/o Near
Firantin Mandir, Ward No. 42, Basantpur, Police Station-Basantpur,
District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
7 - Aman Nikosey S/o Kailash Nikosey Aged About 20 Years R/o Near
Frantin Mandir, Ward No. 42, Basantpur, Police Station-Basantpur,
District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
8 - Sahil Khobragade S/o Poonamchand Khobragade Aged About 21
Years R/o Ward No. 42, Near Sharda Mandir Basantpur, Police Station-
Basantpur, District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
9 - Avinash Sinde S/o Jhaman Sinde Aged About 24 Years R/o Near
Frantin Mandir, Ward No. 42, Basantpur, Police Station- Basantpur,
District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
--- Respondents
ACQA No. 69 of 2026
State Of Chhattisgarh Through-The Station House Officer, Police
Station-Basantpur, District- Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
3
---Appellant
Versus
1 - Chhin @ Pintu @ Pratham Yadav S/o Mohan Yadav Aged About 20
Years R/o Jaldhara Chowk, Basantpur, Thana Basantpur, Distt.-
Rajnandgaon, C.G.
2 - Nanu @ Kameshwar Yadav S/o Arjun Yadav Aged About 22 Years
R/o Jaldhara Chowk, Basantpur, Thana Basantpur, Distt.-Rajnandgaon
(C.G.)
3 - Vikas Das Vaishnav @ Chinna S/o Late Ramnarayan Vaishnav
Aged About 21 Years R/o Chandra Colony (Rented, Name Of The
Owner Of The House- Dr. Sharma, Thana- Basantpur, Distt.-
Rajnandgaon, C.G.)
4 - Sanjay Yadav @ Sanju S/o Late Shankar Yadav Aged About 22
Years R/o Rajiv Nagar, Ward No. 42, Basantpur, Thana Basantpur,
Rajnandgaon, C.G.
5 - Amit Nikose S/o Kailash Nikose Aged About 21 Years R/o Near
Firantin Mandir, Ward No. 42, Basantpur, Distt.- Rajnandgaon, C.G.
6 - Aman Nikose S/o Kailash Nikose Aged About 20 Years R/o Near
Firantin Mandir, Ward No. 42, Basantpur, Distt.- Rajnandgaon, C.G.
7 - Sahil Khobragadhe S/o Punamchand Khobragadhe Aged About 21
Years R/o Ward No. 42, Basantpur, Near Sharda Mandir, Thana-
Basantpur, Distt.- Rajnandgaon, C.G.
8 - Avinash Sinde S/o Jhaman Sinde Aged About 24 Years R/o Near
Firantin Mandir, Ward No. 42, Basantpur, Distt.- Rajnandgaon, (C.G.)
--- Respondents
For Appellants in : Mr.B.P.Singh and Mr.Aditya Shrivastava,
CRA Advocates
No.2072/2025 and
For Respondents
in ACQA
Nos.8/2026 and
69/2026
For Appellant in : Mr.A.V.Shridhar and Mr.Avinash Chand Sahu,
ACQA No.8/2026 Advocates
4
For Appellant in : Mr.Sanghrash Pandey, Government Advocate
ACQA No.69/2026
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
4/8/2026
1. Though Criminal Appeal No.2072/2025 is listed for hearing on the
application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the
appellants, but since the appellants are in jail since 24.09.2020,
with the consent of the parties, this Court proceeds to hear the
appeal finally.
2. Appellants-Raja Nikose, Pankaj Yadav, Choti @ Vishnu Singh
Rajput and Khemu @ Khemchand Dewangan have preferred
Criminal Appeal No.2072/2025 under Section 415(2) of the
Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 questioning the
impugned judgment dated 30.08.2025 passed by the First
Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon, in Sessions Case
No.35/2021, by which appellant-Raja Nikose has been convicted
convicted and sentenced in the following manner:-
S.No Conviction Sentence
.
1. Under Section 147 of the RI for 1 year and fine of
IPC Rs.500/-, in default of
payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 15 days.
2. Under Section 148 of the RI for 2 years and fine of
5
IPC Rs.1000/-, in default of
payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 1 month.
3. Under Section 307 of the RI for 7 years and fine of
IPC Rs.1500/-, in default of
payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 2 months.
4. Under Section 302 of the Imprisonment for life and fine
IPC of Rs.2000/-, in default of
payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 3 months.
and appellants-Pankaj Yadav, Choti @ Vishnu Singh Rajput and
Khemu @ Khemchand Dewangan have been convicted and
sentenced in the following manner:
S.No Conviction Sentence
.
1. Under Section 147 of the RI for 1 year and fine of
IPC Rs.500/-, in default of
payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 15 days.
2. Under Section 148 of the RI for 2 years and fine of
IPC Rs.1000/-, in default of
payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 1 month.
3. Under Section 307 of the RI for 7 years and fine of
IPC Rs.1500/-, in default of
payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 2 months.
4. Under Section 302 of the Imprisonment for life and
IPC fine of Rs.2000/-, in default
of payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 3 months.
5. Under Section 25 of the RI for 2 years and fine of
6
Arms Act Rs.1000/-, in default of
payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 1 month.
6. Under Section 27 of the RI for 3 years and fine of
Arms Act Rs.1500/-, in default of
payment of fine to further
undergo RI for 2 months.
3. Appellant-Minakshi Varma has filed Acquittal Appeal No.8 of 2026
against the judgment dated 30.08.2025 passed by the First
Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon, in Sessions Case
No.35/2021, whereby the trial Court has acquitted the eight
accused / respondents from the charge under Sections 147, 148,
307 & 302/149 of the IPC and Sections 25 & 27 of the Arms Act.
4. Appellant-State has preferred Acquittal Appeal No.69/2026
against the judgment dated 30.08.2025 passed by the First
Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon, in Sessions Case
No.35/2021, whereby the trial Court has acquitted the
respondents / accused Chhin @ Pintu @ Pratham Yadav, Nanu
@ Kameshwar Yadav, Vikas Das Vaishnav @ Chinna, Sanjay
Yadav @ Sanju, Amit Nikose, Aman Nikose, Sahil Khobragade
and Avinash Shinde for offences under Sections 147, 148, 307,
307/149, 302, 302/149 of the IPC and Sections 25 & 27 of the
Arms Act.
5. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 24.09.2020, the
complainant, Pintu Markam, resident of Basantpur, near Firantin
Temple, Police Station Basantpur, District Rajnandgaon, lodged a
7
complaint stating that he runs a dance academy named D-Action
near Fursat Ke Pal. On the night of 23.09.2020, while he was
present at his dance academy, at about 11:40 P.M., he received a
phone call on his mobile number 8319091153 from his younger
brother, Mahendra Markam @ Chintu, using mobile number
7974678556. Mahendra informed him that his elder brother,
Goldy Markam @ Yogendra Sahu, had been assaulted near the
fruit market by Raja Nikose, Pankaj Yadav, Choti @ Vishnu
Rajput, Khemchand Devangan, Chhin @ Pintu @ Pratham
Yadav, and Nanu Yadav @ Kameshwar Yadav, who had attacked
him with a tangi (axe) and knife with the intention of killing him,
and that he was lying injured near the fruit market. Upon receiving
this information, the complainant immediately rushed to the spot,
where his brothers had also arrived. He found his brother, Goldy
Markam @ Yogendra Sahu, lying on the roadside near a drain,
covered in blood, with injuries on his right shoulder and head,
from which blood was oozing. The injured was taken to the
District Hospital, Rajnandgaon, in his own Fortuner car bearing
registration No. CG10/DA/9009, which was parked at the scene.
Upon examination, the doctor declared him dead. Postmortem
was conducted by Dr.Nitin Barmate (PW-11) and found following
injuries:-
“1) Chop wound present over left fronto-temporo-
parietal region, 7cm from left eyebrow, 9cm x 2cm x
cavity deep, margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
With brain exposed out.
8
2) Chop wound present over occipital region, 6cm from
left mastoid, 8cm x 4cm x bone deep. margins clean cut
and blood infiltrated.
3) Chop wound present over central occipital region,
2cm below external occipital protrubance, 7cm x 1.2cm
x bone deep, margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
4) Chop wound present over left zygoma up to nostril,
8cm x 1.5cm x bone deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated.
5) Incised wound present over left side of forehead, 3cm
lateral to left eyebrow, obliquely placed, 4.5cm x 0.5cm
x bone deep, margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
6) Two Incised wound present over right side of chest,
obliquely placed, 3cm x 0.2cm x muscle deep and 4cm
x 0.2cm x muscle deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated.
7) Chop wound present over left arm lower 1/3, 8.5cm x
3cm x bone deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated.
8) Incised wound present over left forearm upper 1 /3^
prime prime , dorsally, 4.5cm x 1cm x muscle deep,
margins clean cut and blood infiltrated with e/o tailing at
upper end of 7cm in length.
9) Incised wound present over left forearm middle 1 /3^
prime prime, dorsolaterally, 7cm x 1cm x muscle deep,
margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
10) Chop wound present over left dorsum of hand,
7.5cm x 4.7cm x bone deep, margins clean cut and
blood infiltrate with e/o fracture of all metacarpal bone.
9
11) Chop wound present over left dorsum of hand, 2cm
from injury No. (10), 6.5cm x 2cm x bone deep, margins
clean cut and blood infiltrate
12) Incised wound present over left index finger, 3cm x
0.5cm x bone deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrate.
13) Incised wound present over left palm, 4cm x 0.5cm
x muscle deep, margins clean cut and blood infiltrate.
14) Two Incised wound present over rightarm lower 1 /
(3 deg) ventrally, 3.2cm x 1.5cm x muscle deep and 2
cm x 0.5cm x muscle deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated.
15) Three Incised wound present over right forearm
upper 1 /3^ prime d middle 1 /3^ prime prime and lower
1/3″, 4cm x 1.8cm x muscle deep, 4.5cm x 1.8cm x
muscle deep and 1.2 cm x 1cm x muscle deep,
respectively, margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
16) Chop wound present over right dorsum of hand,
9cm x 1.5cm x bone deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrate with e/o fracture of 2nd, 3 ^ prime and 4
metacarpal bone.
17) Incised wound present over left side of chest,
obliquely placed, 7cm from left nipple 2cm tcm x muscle
deep, margins clean cut and blood infiltrated
18) Incised wound present over left side of axillary
region, obliquely placed 18cm from left nipple 3.5cm x
1cm x bonedeep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated.
19) Incised wound present over left side of axillary
region, obliquely placed, 20cm from left nipple, 2.8cm x
10
1.5cm x bone deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated.
20) Incised wound present over left side of lower chest
at trunk, obliquely placed, 15cm from left nipple, 7.5cm x
2cm x bone deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated
21) Stab wound present over right side of chest,
obliquely placed, 5cm from right nipple and 30m from
midline, 2cm x 1cm x cavity deep, margins clean cut
and blood infiltrated medial ne acute. Track of wound:
Skin Subcutaneous tissue Intercostal space -Right
pleura- right lung (Upper lobe). Right sided 3 rib
22) Incised wound present over right side of chest,
obliquely placed, 4cm lateral to right nicole. 1.5cm x
1cm x muscle deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated
23) Incised wound present over right side of chest,
obliquely placed, 10cm below and lateral to right nipple,
2cm x 1cm x muscle deep, margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated.
24) Incised wound present over right side of lower
chest, obliquely placed, 20cm below and lateral to right
nipple, 2.5cm x 1cm x muscle deep, margins clean cut
and blood infiltrated.
25) Incised wound present over right side of abdomen,
obliquely placed, 7cm lateral to umbilicus, 3cm x 2cm x
muscle deep, margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
26) Stab wound present over right side of abdomen,
over trunk, obliquely placed, 19cm lateral to umbilicus,
2.6cm x 1.3cm x cavity deep, margins clean cut and
blood infiltrated. Medial angle acute. Track of wound:
11
Skin Subcutaneous tissue Muscle Peritoneum-right lobe
Liver (Two places)
27) Incised wound present over right side of thigh,
laterally, 21cm below right anterior superior iliac spine,
3cm x 1.5cm x muscle deep, margins clean cut and
blood infiltrated.
28) Stab wound present over right side of chest,
obliquely placed, 10cm below right nipple, of size 3.6 cm
x 1.2cm x cavity deep. Margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated. Right angle acute Track of wound: Skin
Subcutaneous tissue Right sided 6 Intercostal space
Right pleura- right lung (lower lobe).
29) Stab wound present over left side of abdomen,
obliquely placed, 4cm from umbilicus, of size 2.8 cm x
1cm x cavity deep. Margins clean cut and blood
infiltrated. Right angle acute. Track of wound: Skin
Subcutaneous tissue Muscle Peritoneum- left lobe Liver
30) Three linear Abrasion present over left side of
abdomen, of 6cm x 0.1cm to 2 x0.1cm, reddish. 24
31) Stab wound present over left side of back, obliquely
placed 2cm from midline, at the level of thoracic 11 th
vertebra level of size 4 cm x 0.6cm x cavity deep.
Margins clean cut and blood infiltrated Upper angle
acute. Track of wound: Skin Subcutaneous tissue.—–
Left sided 8th intercostal space —— left pleura—–Left
lung (lower lobe).
32) Stab wound present over left side of back, obliquely
placed. 10cm from midline, at the level of Lumbar 1st
vertebral level of size 6 cm x 0.5cm x cavity deep.
Margins clean cut and blood infiltrated. Upper angle
acute. Track of wound: Skin Subcutaneous tissue—–
Muscle —- Retro Peritoneum——. Peritoneal cavity.
12
33) Stab wound present over left side of trunk,
posteriolaterally, obliquely placed, 18om from midline, at
the level of thoracic 12 ^ prime prime vertebral level,, of
size 3.5 cm x 1cm x cavity deep. Margins clean cut and
blood infiltrated. upper angle acute. Track of wound:
Skin ——Muscle —-Retro Peritoneum ——. Peritoneal
cavity——through and through spleen—-Mesntry.
34) Incised wound present over left side of back,
obliquely placed, at the level of thoracic 11 vertebral
level, of size 2 cm x 0.8cm x muscle deep. Margins
clean cut and blood infiltrated.
35) Incised wound present over left side of lower back,
obliquely placed, extend from midline, at the level of
Lumbar 2nd and 3rd vertebral level,, of size 9 cm x 1.5cm
x muscle deep. Margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
36) Incised wound present over left side of lower back,
obliquely placed, at the level of Lumbar 2nd and 3rd
vertebral level,, of size 3 cm x 1.5cm x muscle deep.
Margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
37) Three Incised wound present over left side of back,
of size 15cm x 0.3cm x muscle deep to 7cm x 0.4cm x
muscle deep. Margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
38) Incised wound present over midline of back,
obliquely placed, at the level of thoracic 10 ^ 11
vertebral level,, of size 3.5 cm x 1cm x muscle deep.
Margins clean cut and blood infiltrated.
39) Incised wound present over right scapular region, of
size 3.5 cm x 2cm x muscle deep. Margins clean cut
and blood infiltrated.
40) Abrasion present over right knee joint, 3 x1cm,
reddish.”
13
The doctor has opined that cause of death was due injury to vital
organs and death was homicidal in nature.
6. The complainant further alleged that Raja Nikose, Pankaj Yadav,
Choti alias Vishnu Rajput, Khemchand Devangan, Chheen alias
Pintu alias Pratham Yadav, Nanu Yadav alias Kameshwar Yadav,
and Vikas Das Vaishnav had jointly assaulted and murdered his
elder brother, Goldy Markam, by inflicting injuries with knives and
a tangi, resulting in his death. At the time of the incident, Prateek
Tamrakar, a friend of Goldy Markam, was also present. When
Prateek attempted to intervene and rescue Goldy, all the accused
jointly assaulted him with a tangi and knife, causing serious
injuries to his right shoulder and head. He was also taken to the
hospital in a critical condition and admitted for treatment.
7. Based on the said complaint, Police Station Basantpur, District
Rajnandgaon, registered a Dehati Marg Intimation (inquest
intimation) and recorded a Dehati Nalishi (preliminary complaint)
at the spot. A spot map (Naksha) and inquest panchnama were
prepared. The post-mortem examination of the deceased,
Yogendra Sahu @ Goldy Markam, was conducted. Thereafter, a
First Information Report (FIR) was registered at Police Station
Basantpur. The accused persons, namely Raja Nikose, Pankaj
Yadav, Choti alias Vishnu Singh Rajput, Khemu alias Khemchand
Devangan, Chhin alias Pintu alias Pratham Yadav, Nanu alias
Kameshwar Yadav, Vikas Das Vaishnav alias Chinna, Sanjay
Yadav alias Sanju, Amit Nikose, Aman Nikose, Sahil Khobragade,
14
and Avinash Shinde, were taken into custody and interrogated.
During interrogation, they allegedly confessed to having jointly
committed the offence. Their memorandum statements were
recorded, and, pursuant thereto, the weapons allegedly used in
the offence, namely knives, tangi (axe), and iron rod, along with
the clothes worn by them at the time of the incident, were seized.
A site plan of the place of occurrence was prepared, and blood-
stained as well as plain soil were seized from the spot. The
seized weapons and the clothes recovered from the accused
were sent for forensic examination. The accused persons were
arrested, and information regarding their arrest was
communicated to their respective family members. A requisition
was also sent to the Tahsildar, Rajnandgaon, for preparation of
the Patwari map of the place of occurrence. Statements of the
complainant, the injured witness, and other witnesses were
recorded.
8. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed
before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajnandgaon, against the
accused persons for offences punishable under Sections 147,
148, 149, 307, and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The case was
thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions, Rajnandgaon,
under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, from where
the First Additional Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon received the
case on transfer for trial in accordance with law.
15
9. Charges were framed against the accused under Sections 147,
148, 307 (alternatively Section 307 read with Section 149), and
302 (alternatively Section 302 read with Section 149) of the
Indian Penal Code. Additionally, co-accused Pankaj Yadav, Choti
alias Vishnu Singh Rajput, Khemu alias Khemchand Devangan,
Vikas Das Vaishnav alias Chinna, Sanjay Yadav alias Sanju, Amit
Nikose, Sahil Khobragade, and Avinash Shinde were also
charged with offences punishable under Sections 25 and 27 of
the Arms Act. The charges were read over and explained to all
the accused, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
10. After the prosecution evidence was recorded, the statements of
the accused were examined under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. In their examination, the accused stated that
the allegations against them were false, that they had no
knowledge of the alleged incident, and that the prosecution
witnesses were falsely implicating them. They asserted that they
were innocent and had been falsely implicated due to personal
enmity at the instance of their in-laws. The accused further
expressed their intention to lead defence evidence. Accordingly,
on behalf of accused Raja Nikose, Amit Nikose, Avinash, and
Aman, the testimony of Bela Shinde (Defence Witness No. 1) was
examined.
11. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 30.08.2025,
while acquitting accused Chhin @ Pintu @ Pratham Yadav, Nanu
16
@ Kameshwar Yadav, Vikas Das Vaishnav @ Chinna, Sanjay
Yadav, Amit Nikose, Aman Nikose, Sahil Khobragade and
Avinash Shinde for offences under Sections 147, 148, 307,
307/149, 302, 302/149 of the IPC and Sections 25 & 27 of the
Arms Act convicted and sentenced appellants-Raja Nikose,
Pankaj Yadav, Choti @ Vishnu Singh Rajput and Khemu @
Khemchand Dewangan for the offences as mentioned in opening
paragraph of this judgment. Hence, these criminal appeal and
acquittal appeals.
12. Mr.B.P.Singh, learned counsel for appellants-Raja Nikose, Pankaj
Yadav, Choti @ Vishnu Singh Rajput and Khemu @ Khemchand
Dewangan submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 30.08.2025 passed by the learned Trial
Court is illegal, perverse, contrary to the facts, evidence available
on record, and settled principles of law, and is therefore liable to
be set aside. It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court
has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record. The
prosecution has not been able to establish that the appellants had
any intention or common intention to cause the death of the
deceased. There is no evidence to show that the appellants
assaulted the deceased with the requisite intention or knowledge
necessary to attract the offence of murder. The prosecution has
also failed to establish any motive on the part of the appellants for
committing the alleged offence. Learned counsel further contends
that there is no direct eyewitness to the alleged occurrence, and
17
the conviction of the appellants has been recorded in the absence
of reliable and cogent evidence. The appellants have been falsely
implicated in the present case, and the prosecution has failed to
produce any convincing evidence connecting them with the
alleged crime.
13. It is also submitted that the learned Trial Court has adopted a
contradictory approach by acquitting the co-accused persons on
the same set of evidence while convicting the appellants without
assigning any cogent or convincing reasons for such differential
treatment. Such findings are arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution evidence
suffers from material contradictions, omissions, and
inconsistencies, which strike at the root of the prosecution case
and render the testimony of the prosecution witnesses unreliable.
The learned Trial Court failed to consider these infirmities in their
proper perspective. It is further argued that the prosecution has
failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court are based on conjectures and
surmises rather than legally admissible and reliable evidence.
The learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the oral
and documentary evidence placed on record and has arrived at
findings that are perverse and contrary to the evidence. In view of
the aforesaid facts and circumstances, learned counsel submits
that the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants are
unsustainable in law and deserve to be set aside. The appellants
18
are entitled to the benefit of doubt and deserve to be acquitted of
all the charges.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant in ACQA No.8/2026 submit that
although an appellate Court exercises caution while interfering
with an acquittal, it has wide powers to re-appreciate the
evidence. Where the acquittal is perverse, based on
misappreciation of evidence or erroneous application of law,
interference is justified. The Trial Court erred in rejecting the
prosecution’s last-seen evidence. The respondents/accused were
proved to be last seen with the deceased, and having failed to
explain the incriminating circumstances, an adverse inference
ought to have been drawn under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
The Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the testimony of
PW-1, an injured eyewitness, whose evidence consistently
established the presence and participation of all the accused. His
testimony remained substantially unchallenged and could not
have been discarded on minor discrepancies. The evidence of
PW-8 (Girish Totwani) corroborated PW-1 regarding the presence
and involvement of the accused, yet the Trial Court ignored this
material evidence without assigning cogent reasons. The finding
that PW-1’s evidence was inadmissible is legally unsustainable.
The testimony of an injured eyewitness carries great evidentiary
value unless effectively discredited. They further submit that the
Trial Court adopted a selective approach by convicting only four
accused on the basis of recovery while acquitting the remaining
19
accused despite direct eyewitness evidence establishing their
participation in the unlawful assembly. The Trial Court also erred
in disbelieving the recoveries made pursuant to the disclosure
statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, despite the
recoveries being duly proved. The accused neither pleaded alibi
nor offered any plausible explanation in their statements under
Section 313 CrPC regarding the incriminating circumstances or
their presence at the scene, thereby strengthening the
prosecution case. They also submit that the Trial Court failed to
consider the cumulative effect of the prosecution evidence,
particularly the last-seen circumstance, eyewitness testimony,
corroborative evidence, and recoveries, resulting in a manifest
miscarriage of justice. The impugned judgment is based on
surmises, undue emphasis on minor inconsistencies, and
disregard of material evidence. The findings are perverse and
contrary to settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, warranting
interference by this Court and reversal of the acquittal.
15. Learned State Counsel for the appellant in ACQA No.69/2026
submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal is wholly
erroneous, unreasonable and contrary to the settled principles
governing appreciation of evidence in criminal trials, inasmuch as
the learned trial Court has failed to correctly evaluate the cogent
and reliable evidence available on record against the
respondents/accused. It is contended that there exists sufficient
ocular as well as circumstantial evidence establishing the
20
involvement of the accused in the commission of the offence,
which has been unjustifiably discarded on the basis of minor,
immaterial and trivial discrepancies. The trial Court, it is urged,
has ignored the consistent testimonies of material prosecution
witnesses including Prateek Tamrakar (PW-1), Pintu Markam
(PW-2), Smt. Minakshi Verma (PW-3), Dr. Anil Mahakalkar (PW-
4), Lalit Markam (PW-5), Lokesh Kumar Dewangan (PW-6),
Mahendra Kumar (PW-7), Girish Totwani (PW-8), Dr.Runarayan
Sahu (PW-9), Dinu Gore (PW-10), Dr. Nitin Barmate (PW-11),
Navluram Dhawde (PW-12), Kamlesh Kumar Sahare (PW-13),
Siddharth Prithyani (PW-14), Ruchi Verma (PW-15) and Yogesh
Kumar Patel (PW-16), which collectively establish the previous
enmity and the chain of circumstances pointing towards the guilt
of the accused. It is further submitted that the medical evidence,
particularly the postmortem report and the testimony of the
doctors, unequivocally proves that the death of the deceased was
homicidal in nature, caused by injuries to vital organs which were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and the
same has remained uncontroverted. It is further contended that
the learned trial Court has failed to draw the necessary adverse
inference against the respondent/accused, who, even in their
statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., failed to furnish
any plausible explanation regarding the incriminating
circumstances appearing against them or their presence at the
relevant time and place of occurrence. The prosecution has duly
21
established that the accused persons, forming an unlawful
assembly, acted in concert and inflicted multiple injuries on the
deceased with sharp-edged weapons, and several blood-stained
weapons were duly recovered pursuant to their memorandum
statements, which lends further corroboration to the prosecution
case. The documentary evidence including FIR, dehati nalishi,
merg intimation, inquest proceedings and spot map also
substantiate the prosecution story. It is thus submitted that the
findings of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court are based
on conjectures and surmises and are liable to be set aside, as the
evidence on record clearly establishes the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, warranting their conviction for the
offence of murder.
16. Learned State Counsel further submits that the trial Court has
rightly convicted the appellant-Raja Nikose for offences under
Sections 147, 148, 307 and 302 of the IPC and appellants-Pankaj
Yadav, Choti @ Vishnu Singh Rajput and Khemu @ Khemchand
Dewangan for offences under Sections 147, 148, 307, 302 of the
IPC and Sections 25 & 27 of the Arms Act in which no
interference is called for by this Court.
17. We have heard learned appearing for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also
went through the records with utmost circumspection.
22
18. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of
deceased Yogendra @ Goldy Markam was homicidal in nature ?
19. The trial Court has answered this issue in affirmative. After going
through the medical evidence of Dr.Nitin Barmate (PW-11) and
postmortem report (Ex.P-50) and considering the nature of
injuries, the trial Court has rightly held that death of the deceased
was homicidal in nature, which has not been seriously disputed
by learned counsel for the appellants. As such, the finding
recorded by the trial Court that death of the deceased was
homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence
available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to
record. We hereby affirm that finding.
20. In the present case, the prosecution has shown Prateek Tamrakar
(PW-1), Lalit Markam (PW-5), Mahendra Markam (PW-7), Girish
Totwani (PW-8) and Siddharth Prithyani. Prateek Tamrakar (PW-
1) is also a injured witness.
21. Prateek Tamrakar (PW-1) in para para 6 of his cross-examination
has stated that he lay down under a DI vehicle parked far from
the scene of the incident, so no one saw him there. There was
light where he lay, but he was under the vehicle, so no one saw
him. In para 7 of his cross-examination, he has admitted that he
did not name any of the accused involved in the incident and the
police had recorded the names of all the accused in the case.
23
22. The trial Court in para 59 of the impugned judgment has
observed that it is also evident from the record that, during the
course of investigation, no Test Identification Parade (TIP) was
conducted to enable the eyewitnesses present at the scene of
occurrence to identify any of the accused persons. In such
circumstances, the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses does not
establish the involvement of the accused persons in the incident
solely on the basis of their identification in Court. The next
question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution
has succeeded in proving a complete chain of circumstantial
evidence against the accused persons.
23. The trial Court in para 78 of its judgment has observed that it has
been found that the four accused persons, namely Raja Nikose,
Pankaj Yadav, Chhoti alias Vishnu Singh, and Khemu alias
Khemchand Devangan, voluntarily appeared before the police
station and surrendered. In such circumstances, their voluntary
surrender, the recording of their memorandum/disclosure
statements while in custody, the recovery of blood-stained
weapons and the clothes worn by them pursuant to such
disclosure statements, and the subsequent forensic examination
confirming the presence of human blood on the seized weapons
and clothing, complete the entire chain of circumstantial evidence
against them. The only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn
therefrom is that these accused persons, being members of an
unlawful assembly and armed with deadly weapons, participated
24
in the murder of Goldy Markam and the attempted murder of
Prateek Tamrakar. Accordingly, these four accused are held
guilty.
24. The trial Court in para 79 of its judgment has observed that
Insofar as the involvement of the other co-accused persons, apart
from the aforesaid surrendered accused, namely Raja Nikose,
Pankaj Yadav, Chhoti alias Vishnu Singh, and Khemu alias
Khemchand Devangan, is concerned, it is noteworthy that the
prosecution appears to have implicated them solely on the basis
of the memorandum (disclosure) statements recorded under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Their memorandum
statements were recorded under Section 27, and, pursuant to the
information furnished by them, the investigating officer claims to
have recovered the weapons allegedly used in the offence and
the clothes worn by them at the time of the incident. The
Investigating Officer has deposed to this effect in his evidence.
Similarly, Mahendra Markam (PW-6) has also stated that these
co-accused made disclosure statements in his presence and that,
pursuant to their disclosures, the weapons and clothes were
seized in accordance with the seizure memos. The Forensic
Science Laboratory (FSL) report further indicates that blood and
human blood were detected on the clothes and weapons seized
from them.
25. The trial Court in para 80 of its judgment has also observed that
since these other co-accused persons did not surrender before
25
the concerned police station, as the aforesaid four accused had
done, and as there is no other circumstantial evidence against
them except their memorandum statements, the seizure memos,
and the forensic examination reports, the chain of circumstances
against them remains incomplete. In the absence of any further
evidence completing the chain of circumstances and leading to
the only irresistible conclusion that Chhin @ Pintu @ Pratham
Yadav, Nanu @ Kameshwar Yadav, Vikas Das Vaishnav @
Chinna, Sanjay Yadav, Amit Nikose, Aman Nikose, Sahil
Khobragade, and Avinash Shinde were members of the unlawful
assembly along with the four surrendered accused and had
participated in the commission of the offence, they are entitled to
the benefit of acquittal.
26. In a case dependent on circumstantial evidence, the law is well
settled that the chain of circumstances must be complete,
conclusive, and exclude every hypothesis consistent with
innocence (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra1). Here, the chain is broken at multiple points:
hostile testimony from key relatives, unreliable extra-judicial
confession, doubtful recovery, and no conclusive forensic link.
27. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jagroop Singh v. State of
Punjab2 has held thus in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 & 15 which is
reproduced hereunder:-
1 AIR 1984 SC 1622
2 (2012) 11 SCC 768
26“12. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra [(1984) 4 SCC 116] a three-Judge Bench
has laid down five golden principles which constitute the
“panchsheel” in respect of a case based on circumstantial
evidence. Referring to the decision in Shivaji Sahebrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [1973 2 SCC 793], it
was opined that it is a primary principle that the accused
“must be” and not merely “may be” guilty before a Court
can convict and the mental distance between “may be”
and “must be” is long and divides vague conjectures from
sure conclusions. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to lay
down that the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is
to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; that the
circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; that they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved; and that there
must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must show that in all
human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.
13. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh
and others [1989 Supp (2) SCC 706], this Court held
that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence,the
following tests must be satisfied:
“10………(1) the circumstances from which an
inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be
cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite
27tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the
accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should
form a chain so complete that there is no escape from
the conclusion that within all human probability the
crime was committed by the accused and none else;
and
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain
conviction must be complete and incapable of
explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the
guilt of the accused and such evidence should not
only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but
should be inconsistent with his innocence.”
A similar view has been reiterated in Ramreddy Rajesh
Khanna Reddy and another v. State of A.P.[(2006) 10
SCC 172].
14. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [1995
Supp(4) SCC 259], it has been laid down:
“4. ……..that the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
proved and those circumstances must be
conclusive in nature to connect the accused with
the crime. All the links in the chain of events must
be established beyond reasonable doubt and the
established circumstances should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused
and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In a
case based on circumstantial evidence, the Court
has to be on its guard to avoid the danger of
allowing suspicion to take the place of legal proof
28and has to be watchful to avoid the danger of being
swayed by emotional considerations, howsoever
strong they may be, to take the place of proof.”
15. In Harishchandra Ladaku Thange v. State of
Maharashtra [(2007) 11 SCC 436], while dealing with the
validity of inferences to be drawn from circumstantial
evidence, it has been emphasised that where a case
rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference
of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating
facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible
with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other
person and further the circumstances from which an
inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be
shown to be closely connected with the principal fact
sought to be inferred from those circumstances.”
28. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Pradeep Kumar v.
State of Chhattisgarh3 has observed thus in para 27:-
“27. It is important to note that the cardinal principles in
the administration of criminal justice in cases where
heavy reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence, is
that where two views are possible, one pointing to the
guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence,
the one which is favourable to accused must be
adopted.”
29. When the case is entirely based upon the circumstantial
evidence, the chain of such circumstantial evidence in all
probabilities ‘must’ indicate towards guilt of accused and
3 (2023) 5 SCC 350
29
circumstances ‘must be’ and not ‘may be’ lead towards guilt of
accused.
30. Memorandum statements (Exs.P-11, P-13, P-15 and P-17) of the
appellants have been proved by investigating officer Ruchi Verma
(PW-15) and on that basis, the appellants have been convicted.
31. A careful perusal of memorandum statements of the appellants
(Exs.P-11, P-13, P-15 and P-17) would show that it has been
recorded by investigating officer Ruchi Verma (PW-15) at Police
Station Basantpur in presence of two panch witnesses in which
the appellants are said to have assaulted Yogendra @ Goldy
Markam by axe and knife, due to which he died.
32.At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under: –
“27. How much of information received from accused
may be proved.–Provided that, when any fact is deposed
to as discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a
police officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”
33. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is applicable only if the
confessional statement relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered.
34. The Supreme Court in the matter of Asar Mohammad and
others v. State of U.P.4 with reference to the word “fact”
4 AIR 2018 SC 5264
30
employed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act has held that the
facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as
contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to
“actual physical material object”. It has been further held that the
discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information
given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental
awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular
place and it includes a discovery of an object, the place from
which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its
existence. Their Lordships relying upon the decision of the Privy
Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor5
observed as under: –
“13. It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be
self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual
physical material object”. The discovery of fact arises by
reason of the fact that the information given by the
accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental
awareness of the informant as to its existence at a
particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the
place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the
accused as to its existence. It will be useful to advert to
the exposition in the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v.
State of Maharashtra6, in particular, paragraphs 23 to 29
thereof. The same read thus:
“23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of
discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind.
5 AIR 1947 PC 67
6 (2015) 1 SCC 253
31
The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King
Emperor (supra) has held thus: (IA p. 77)
“… it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’
within the section as equivalent to the object
produced; the fact discovered embraces the
place from which the object is produced and the
knowledge of the accused as to this, and the
information given must relate distinctly to this
fact. Information as to past user, or the past
history, of the object produced is not related to
its discovery in the setting in which it is
discovered. Information supplied by a person in
custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in
the roof of my house’ does not lead to the
discovery of a knife; knives were discovered
many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the
fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the
informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is
proved to have been used in the commission of
the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant.
But if to the statement the words be added ‘with
which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible
since they do not relate to the discovery of the
knife in the house of the informant.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx"
35. Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the principles of law
laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Asar
32
Mohammad (supra), only discovery of an object, the place from
which it is produced and knowledge of the accused as to this
extent would be admissible and incriminating part of the accused
statement that they have inflicted injuries to deceased Yogendra
@ Goldy Markam would not be admissible under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act. In the present case, no incriminating article has
been seized pursuant to the memorandum statements of the
appellants (Exs.P-7, P-8 and P-9). As such, that part of evidence
would not be admissible.
36. The Supreme Court in the matter of Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of
Bihar7 has clearly held that confession to police whether in
course of investigation or otherwise and confession made while in
police custody would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and
observed as under:-
“9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions
of law dealing with confessions made by an accused. The
law relating to confessions is to be found generally in Ss.
24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Ss. 162 and 164 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of
the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading
“Admissions”. Confession is a species of admission, and
is dealt with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission
is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility
is excluded by some provision of law. Section 24
excludes confessions caused by certain inducements,
threats and promises. Section 25 provides : “No
confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as7 AIR 1966 SC 119
33against a person accused of an offence.” The terms of S.
25 are imperative. A confession made to a police
officer under any circumstances is not admissible in
evidence against the accused. It covers a confession
made when he was free and not in police custody, as also
a confession made before any investigation has begun.
The expression “accused of any offence” covers a person
accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was
accused of the offence when he made the confession.
Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a
confession made by him in the custody of a police officer,
unless it is made in the immediate presence of a
Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a
confession made to a person other than a police officer.
Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by
S. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27
is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban
imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26. It provides that when any
fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of
information received from a person accused of any
offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such
information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be
proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
forbids the use of any statement made by any person to a
police officer in the course of an investigation for any
purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence
under investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and
in cases falling under sub-s (2), and it specifically
provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the
provisions of S. 27 of the Evidence Act. The words of S.
162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a
police officer in the course of an investigation. A
34statement or confession made in the course of an
investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate under S.
164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the
safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as
provided by S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an
accused to a police officer is absolutely protected under
S. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course
of an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any
other person made by him while in the custody of a police
officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions
seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by
an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is
in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and
should not be used in evidence against him. They are
based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect
should be given to them.”
Their Lordships further held as under:-
“18. If the first information report is given by the accused
to a police officer and amounts to a confessional
statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25.
The confession includes not only the admission of the
offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts
related to the offence contained in the confessional
statement. No part of the confessional statement is
receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of
S. 25 is lifted by S.27”
37. In the case in hand, confessional statements (Exs.P-11, P-13,
P-15 and P-17) made by the appellants before the police officer is
35
hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and no part of it is
admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. As such, we are
of the considered opinion that alleged memorandum statements
of the appellants (Exs.P-11, P-13, P-15 and P-17) are hit by
Section 25 of the Evidence Act and no part of it is admissible
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act in view of decisions
rendered by Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya (supra) followed
by the the Supreme Court in Asar Mohammad (supra). Even
otherwise, no other incriminating piece of evidence is available on
record to convict the appellants for offence under Sections 302 of
the IPC.
38. In the present case, as per FSL report (Ex.C-2), human blood
was found on Articles H axe, Article I1 fullpant and I2 t-shirt
seized from appellant Raja Nikose, Article J knife seized from
appellant Pankaj Yadav, Article K1 and K2 T-shirt and scissor
seized from appellant Raja Nikose, Article L knife seized from
appellant Choti @ Vishnu Singh and Article N knife seized from
appellant Khemu @ Khemchand Dewangan.
39. At this stage, pertinent decision of the Supreme Court on this
point in the matter of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh
and another8 may be noticed herein, in which the Supreme
Court has summarized the law on this point after taking into the
decision of the Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) in the matter
of Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P. 9. In Raghav
Prapanna Tripathi (supra), the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court has held that in case the prosecution needed to
prove that the bloodstains found on the earth or the weapons
were of a human origin and were of the same blood group as that
of the accused.
40. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court i.e. Raghav
Prapanna Tripathi (supra) was followed in Balwan Singh
(supra) in which it was observed as under:-
“23. From the aforementioned discussion, we can
summarise that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is
proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and
if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may
be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found
on the articles is of human origin though, even though the
blood group is not proved because of disintegration of
blood. The court will have to come to the conclusion based
on the facts and circumstances of each case, and there
cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to
prove, or need not prove, that the blood groups match.”
41. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Balwan Singh (supra) relying
upon the fact that the prosecution has failed to prove that the
blood was of human origin declined to rely upon the aspect of
recovery of the weapons from the accused therein. It was
observed as under:-
9 AIR 1963 SC 74
37“24. In the instant case, then, we could have placed some
reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least
proved that the blood was of human origin. As observed
supra, while discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16,
the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stage
to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material
indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and
of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would
be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspect of
recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery
does not help the case of the prosecution.”
42. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and
having carefully re-appreciated the entire oral and documentary
evidence available on record, we are of the considered opinion
that the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained in law.
43. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish a
complete and unbroken chain of circumstances pointing only
towards the guilt of the appellants. The testimony of the alleged
eyewitnesses does not inspire confidence. Admittedly, no Test
Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted during the course of
investigation, and Prateek Tamrakar (PW-1), though an injured
witness, admitted in his cross-examination that he had not
disclosed the names of the accused persons. In such
circumstances, the identification of the accused for the first time
before the Court loses much of its evidentiary value.
38
44. The Trial Court itself recorded a finding that the case against the
appellants rested substantially on circumstantial evidence.
However, the principles governing conviction on circumstantial
evidence, as authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), Jagroop Singh (supra),
and Pradeep Kumar (supra), require that every incriminating
circumstance must be firmly established, the chain of
circumstances must be complete, and the evidence must exclude
every hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. The present
case falls short of these settled requirements.
45. We further find that the learned Trial Court committed a serious
error in placing reliance upon the memorandum statements
(Exs. P-11, P-13, P-15 and P-17). The confessional portions
contained therein are clearly barred by Section 25 of the Indian
Evidence Act and are inadmissible in evidence. Only that part of
the information which distinctly relates to the discovery of a fact is
admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. As held by the
Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya (supra) and reiterated by the
Supreme Court in Asar Mohammad (supra) and Aghnoo
Nagesia (supra), the inculpatory statement that the accused had
assaulted the deceased cannot be read in evidence. The Trial
Court, therefore, committed a manifest error in treating the
inadmissible confessional portions as substantive evidence
against the appellants.
39
46. Even the recoveries allegedly made pursuant to the disclosure
statements do not conclusively establish the guilt of the
appellants. Although the FSL report indicates the presence of
human blood on certain seized articles, the prosecution has failed
to establish any forensic nexus connecting those articles with the
deceased or the crime. There is no evidence regarding the blood
group of the deceased matching the stains found on the
recovered weapons or clothes. In the absence of such connecting
evidence, the recoveries alone cannot form the basis of
conviction. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Balwan
Singh (supra) makes it abundantly clear that recovery of
bloodstained articles, by itself, cannot sustain a conviction unless
it forms part of a complete chain of incriminating circumstances.
47. The prosecution has also failed to establish any convincing
motive, and the evidence led is insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellants shared the common object
or intention necessary to attract liability under Sections 302/149
or 307/149 of the IPC. Suspicion, however grave, cannot
substitute legal proof.
48. The Trial Court has, on the same set of evidence, acquitted the
remaining co-accused by holding that the chain of circumstantial
evidence was incomplete. We find that the evidence against the
present appellants also suffers from similar infirmities. The
distinction drawn by the Trial Court solely on the basis of
surrender and recoveries is not sufficient to sustain the conviction
40
when the foundational evidence itself is legally inadmissible or
inconclusive.
49. So far as Acquittal Appeal No. 8 of 2026, preferred by the
appellant-Minakshi Verma, and the acquittal appeal preferred by
the State are concerned, we do not find any ground warranting
interference with the judgment of acquittal. The settled principle
governing appeals against acquittal is that unless the view taken
by the Trial Court is manifestly perverse or wholly unreasonable,
the appellate Court ought not to substitute its own view merely
because another view is possible. In the present case, after
excluding the inadmissible confessional statements and
considering the deficiencies in the prosecution evidence, the view
taken by the Trial Court in acquitting the remaining accused is a
reasonably possible view based on the evidence available on
record. Consequently, no case for interference is made out.
50. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 2072 of 2025 deserves to be
and is hereby allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 30.08.2025, passed by the learned Trial Court
against appellants-Raja Nikose, Pankaj Yadav, Choti @ Vishnu
Singh Rajput and Khemu @ Khemchand Dewangan, are set
aside. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges by
extending to them the benefit of doubt. The appellants are in jail,
they be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
41
51. Consequently, Acquittal Appeal No. 8 of 2026, preferred by the
appellant-Minakshi Verma, as well as Acquittal Appeal
No.69/2026 preferred by the appellant-State, are dismissed. The
acquittal of the remaining accused recorded by the Trial Court is
affirmed.
52. Appellants-Raja Nikose, Pankaj Yadav, Choti @ Vishnu Singh
Rajput and Khemu @ Khemchand Dewangan are directed to file
personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the Court concerned in compliance with Section
437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Now Section 481
of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).
53. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted
to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information
and compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
