Delhi High Court
Pravin Bataniya vs Union Of India & Anr on 30 April, 2026
Author: V. Kameswar Rao
Bench: V. Kameswar Rao, Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
$
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 06.02.2026
Judgment delivered on: 30.04.2026
Judgment uploaded on: As per Digital Signature~
+ W.P.(C) 192/2024
PRAVIN BATANIYA .....Petitioner
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case
For the Petitioner : Dr. S. S. Hooda, Mr. Shaurya Banshtu, Mr.
Manpreet Singh, Advs.
For the Respondents : Mr. Manish Kumar, SPC with Mr. A. K.
Tiwari, Adv. for R1 and R2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
JUDGMENT
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following
prayers:
“a. Issue a Writ, order or direction in the nature of
Certiorari quashing and setting aside Order dated
30.11.2020 passed by Respondent No. 2 whereby the
Petitioner has been dismissed from service; and
b. Issue a Writ, order or direction in the nature of
Certiorari quashing and setting aside Order dated
20.09.2023 passed by Respondent No. 2 whereby the
Petitioner‟s representation has been rejected; and
c. Issue a Writ, order or direction in the nature ofSignature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 1 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
Mandamus directing the Respondents to reinstate the
Petitioner in service with all consequential benefits like
back pay etc.”
2. The facts as noted from the present petition are that, the petitioner was
a Constable in Border Security Force (BSF) and has challenged his dismissal
from service vide the impugned order dated 30.11.2020 under Section 11 of
the Border Security Force Act, 1968 (the Act) read with Rule 177 of the
Border Security Force Rules, 1969 (the Rules) and Rule 22(1)(b) of the
Rules.
3. The petitioner while he was posted at Samba, Jammu and Kashmir in
2018, received a friend request from a girl named Krishna on his social
media. As per the petition, she claimed to be a native of Chandigarh and is
residing in Dubai for studies. As per the petitioner, the girl initiated the
contact primarily through Facebook and messenger and solicited his pictures
in uniform and enquired about his place of posting which as per the
petitioner was never disclosed.
4. Dr. S. S. Hooda, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has
argued that, in September, 2018, while the petitioner was on leave, the said
girl asked for the petitioner‟s bank account number in order to buy a gift for
petitioner‟s son and transferred a sum of Rs.5000/- in his account. He stated
that, once petitioner found out that the account of the transferor belonged to
one Mr. Srinivas which is when the petitioner became suspicious of the
intentions of the said girl.
5. According to him, after the battalion had moved to Meghalaya, the
petitioner broke all contacts with the girl on suspicion of intel-collection
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 2 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
through false identity. After two or three months, he received a call from an
unknown number asking him to delete all the contents/ data relating to the
said girl. One year later, i.e., in 2019, the petitioner received another friend
request from a different girl named “Preety Sharma” who claimed to be a
resident of Shillong and showed active interest in meeting him but the
petitioner ignored her and stopped receiving messages from her.
6. He stated that, in November, 2020, the respondent No.2/BSF
allegedly received security inputs that the petitioner is in constant touch with
Pakistani Intelligence Operatives („PIO‟) and on 20.11.2020, the petitioner
was interrogated at his place of posting by the Deputy Commandant of
respondent No.2. Subsequent, Staff Court of Inquiry (SCOI) was held and
the petitioner was found liable for misconduct.
7. Simultaneously, a complaint was made by respondent No.2 and an
FIR was registered against the petitioner with the Meghalaya Police. The
Investigating Officer in his final report before the Judicial Magistrate First
Class has concluded that, on grounds of no concrete evidence, the petitioner
shall be discharged. Dr. Hooda has drawn our attention to the said final
report which was accepted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, East Khasi
Hills, vide order dated 26.05.2023. Consequently, after the acceptance of the
final report, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 07.06.2023
seeking reinstatement in service. However the same was rejected vide order
dated 20.09.2023.
8. It is the submission of Dr. Hooda that the petitioner was not provided
any documents/ information in respect of the SCOI conducted against him.
He also alleged that the petitioner was kept in complete dark throughout the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 3 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
proceedings before SCOI and no details were shared with him.
9. According to him, the SCOI stands vitiated on this ground alone as
the same was not in compliance of Rule 173(8) of the Rules, which mandate
that, if a person is found blameworthy in the SCOI then such a
accused/official ought to be granted an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses and also be provided with all the material relied upon against him.
He stated that these rules were not followed or applied to the petitioner.
Whereas, the petitioner was only asked to narrate the facts of his case, which
he did in Hindi and the same were recorded in English. After which, the
petitioner was directed to sign his statement by his superior officer and he
complied with the same. As per Dr. Hooda, the statement of petitioner was
neither read over to him nor translated to him in Hindi nor a copy of the
statement was given to him.
10. Dr. Hooda in his rejoinder submission has argued that the respondents
despite claiming that the provisions under Rule 173(8) were complied, has
not placed on record any documents which would show the argument of the
respondents of the compliance. He has further argued that, when an
opportunity said to be granted to the petitioner to cross examine the witness,
a separate document needs to be typed stating that the accused has been
granted such an opportunity and the answer of the accused has to be
recorded and signed by him. Moreover, the statement of each witness is also
supposed to be counter signed by the accused after he has been given an
opportunity to cross examine them. However, in the instant case, no such
document has been placed on record and hence compliance of Rule 173(8) is
unsubstantiated.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 4 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
11. Furthermore, he submitted that the failure to comply with the
provisions of rule 173(8) is a fatal flaw in the SCOI proceedings and is in
violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the SCOI proceedings
ought to be set aside on this ground alone. He also submitted that, since the
foundations of the SCOI were non est, the findings cannot be relied upon.
He argued that the respondents have also failed to comply with Rule 176 of
the Rules which entitles the petitioner to a copy of the SCOI proceedings
conducted against him, however neither the same have been supplied to him
nor has an order passed claiming exception to Rule 176 of the Rules has
been provided to the petitioner.
12. Dr. Hooda argued that the respondents have resorted to making false
submissions in as much as the petitioner has neither admitted nor confessed
to sharing any secret or classified information with any person outside the
force. The petitioner has only stated that, he was contacted by a lady on
social media and he has only interacted with the said profile casually and
shared photographs of himself in uniform and general scenery with her. He
submitted that the police investigation conducted at the behest of the
respondent authorities has not supported the version of the respondents, that
the petitioner shared any secret or classified information. He stated that, it is
a matter of common sense that general topographical images are widely
available on the internet and can be accessed using free software such as
Google Earth.
13. He submitted that the respondents believed (in the SCOI proceedings)
that the petitioner was not aware that the person talking to him was a PIO
and also nothing has been placed on record to show that the said Facebook
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 5 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
profile was being operated by the PIO. Consequently, the petitioner could
not have been found blameworthy on merits. It appears that the
apprehension of the acquittal of the petitioner from the trial prompted the
respondent authorities to declare that the trial as inexpedient and resorted to
terminating his services summarily.
14. Mr. Manish Kumar, learned Senior Panel Counsel for the respondents
stated that this petition ought to be dismissed in limine as the petitioner had
acted in a manner which was prejudicial to the national security and national
interest. He stated that the petitioner was found blameworthy for sharing
sensitive/secret information with the PIO in the SCOI. He stated that after
careful examination of facts and circumstances of this case, his
reinstatement in service was rejected by the Inspector General, FTR HQ,
BSF, Kashmir vide letter no. L/No.518/Est.-1/R-Statement/2023/14640/44
dated 20.09.2023.
15. He stated that the petitioner was dismissed from service on account of
misconduct under Rule 22 of the Rules, after observing the laid down
procedure under the Act and Rules. The SCOI was conducted in the present
case and the remarks of the DIG, SHQ Jowai reveals that the petitioner
befriended a PIO on Facebook and Messenger and proceeded to pass on
personal information relating to the department including photographs of the
petitioner in uniform; details of deployment of the Battalion at location in
Samba and the proposed move of the Battalion from Samba (Jammu and
Kashmir) to Mawpat, Shillong (Meghalaya). Further, the petitioner had
confessed to the fact of receiving an amount of Rs.5000/- from the PIO in
his Savings Account which is also his salary account. At the time of the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 6 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
SCOI, the petitioner had given his statement and was afforded an
opportunity to cross examine witnesses and produce witnesses in support of
his case under Rule 173(8), however the petitioner declined to do so. For
these reasons, the argument of the petitioner that the SCOI was held in
violation of principles of natural justice would not survive.
16. He submitted that, even if the petitioner neither revealed the real
identity of the person with whom he was in contact with nor shared personal
details, the same is in itself a violation of the guidelines issued by the
respondent no.2 regulating the usage of social media. He stated that the
information regarding the movement of the Unit and its deployment is vital
secret pertaining to the national security and the petitioner was found to be
blameworthy for sharing these particulars during the SCOI. Resultantly the
petitioner was dismissed from the force effect from 30.11.2020 on account
of misconduct. Simultaneously, SI Neeraj Choudhary being unit (SI/LO)
lodged an FIR before PS Nongmynsong, Shillong against the petitioner for
allegedly sharing information with the PIO in exchange of Rs. 5,000/-.
17. Mr. Kumar has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Ajit Kumar Nag v. GM, (PJ) Indian Oil corporation Ltd., (2005) 7
SCC 764, to state that departmental proceedings as well as criminal
proceedings can be conducted simultaneously. While deciding the case of
the petitioner after the SCOI proceedings were complete, it was found that
the trial of the petitioner was inexpedient and impracticable as it would have
an impact on the interest of security of the State and such matters were not
seen to be fit to be made public, including the source of information. It is for
these reasons that the trial by the Security Force Court as well as issuing
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 7 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
show cause notice with all details adverse to the petitioner would have
prejudiced the security of the state, if this information were to be made
public. Accordingly, the services of the petitioner were terminated under
BSF Rules 22(1)(b).
18. He stated that the decision as citied by the petitioner is not applicable
in the instant case, as the decision to terminate the service of the petitioner
was taken on the basis of the evidence as produced at the time of the SCOI
proceedings. He has drawn our attention to Proviso (b) of Rule 22(1) of the
Rules which stipulates that, where the competent authority is satisfied that it
is not expedient or reasonably practicable to give the person (to be
terminated from services) an opportunity to show cause, the authority must
record reasons for the same in writing. In this regard, he has also relied upon
the judgment of this Court in the case of Kishore Chandra Sahoo v. Union
of India and Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4868.
19. According to him, in the present case, the allegation against the
petitioner is that, he was in regular contact with the PIO and if a show cause
notice is issued, the reply thereto would likely jeopardise the national
security and certain vital operational and deployment details would come
into focus in such an inquiry. The source and material forming an opinion
for the person contacted with the PIO would also need to be disclosed which
is why the decision of respondent no.3 cannot be said to be unreasonable or
perverse and warrants no interference in the present case by this Court.
20. Mr. Kumar has stated that, during the course of hearing, the petitioner
has given a false statement and has tried to mislead this Court, despite the
fact that the impugned order dated 20.09.2023 has been passed in New Delhi
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 8 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
and the same is annexed as Annexure P-6, the petitioner has taken a ground
that this Court does not possess territorial jurisdiction to entertain this
petition. Another ground on the issue of jurisdiction is that the petitioner
belongs to Madhya Pradesh and the cause of action has arisen in Uri and
Shillong and not in Delhi. This ought not to be considered, as the impugned
order has been issued in Delhi. He seeks dismissal of the present petition.
ANALYSIS
21. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record, the short issue which falls for consideration is that the action of the
respondents in dismissing the petitioner from service is justified. The
impugned order dated 30.11.2020, passed by the respondents gave the
following reasons, which we reproduce as under:
“Whereas, a SCOI was ordered by SHQ BSF Jowai, vide their
O/No.43/Estt/SCOI/SHQ-Jowai/BSR/2020/7831-34 dated
27.11.2020 to investigate into the circumstances under which
No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya of 97 Bn BSF
allegedly involved in espionage activities over social media.
2. As per findings of the Staff Court of inquiry,
No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya 97 Bn BSF
Befriended a PIO namely Miss Krishna through Facebook and
Messenger and later on passed information on Whatsapp to her
No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya accepted
receiving money of Rs.5,000 Rupees five thousand) only from
that PIO on his saving account No.20094719991 which is also
his salary account. No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin
Bataniya of 97 Bn BSF confessed having shared his
photographs in uniform and place of deployment details of the
Battalion at Samba location and also the move of the battalion
to present location i.e. Mawpat, Shillong with PIOs.
3. No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya found
blameworthy for sharing secret information of vital NationalSignature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 9 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
Security including unit deployment and its movement to PIO.
He has also received five thousand rupees from PIO. Doing so,
he has violated existing guidelines/instructions regarding use of
social media, issued by Bn and H/HQrs, which he was well
aware of.
4. No. 115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya has acted
in a manner which was prejudicial to the National Security,
National Integrity and National Interest. Therefore, the SCOI
found No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya
blameworthy of sharing sensitive/secret information to PIOS.
5. Whereas, in view of the above and after going through
the relevant records, I am convinced beyond doubt about the
involvement of No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya
in anti-national activities and crime. I am satisfied that further
retentionof No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya in
service is undesirable due to his involvement in anti-national
activities prejudicial to National security. I am also satisfied
that it is not expedient to give Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya
an opportunity of show cause because show cause notice and
his reply is likely to disclose many minute operational and
deployment related secret information, examination/scrutiny of
which by non-authorized persons will jeopardize the security of
International border and for the same reason his trial by a
Security Force Court is inexpedient.
6. I, therefore, in exercise of powers vested in me under
Section 11(2) of BSF Act, 1968 read with Rule 177 of BSF
Rules, 1969 and under the provisions of Rule 22(1)(b) of BSF
Rules, 1969, dismiss No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin
Bataniya from service w.e.f 30th November 2020 (AN).
No.115441411 Constable (GD) Pravin Bataniya is struck off
from the strength of 97 Bn BSF w.e.f 30th November 2020
(AN).”
22. On the issue of sharing vital information with the PIO, much reliance
has been placed by Dr. Hooda on the fact that in the FIR registered against
the petitioner; he was discharged as no material could be found against the
petitioner to show that he had committed any serious offence/misdemeanor.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 10 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
Though, the said submission looks appealing on a first blush, but on a
deeper consideration it must be held that there cannot be any comparison
between a criminal case and a departmental inquiry(Security Force Court in
this case), as the nature of the evidence required in a criminal case is of a
higher degree, as the charge/offence need to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, whereas, in the case of a departmental inquiry, the misdemeanor has
to be proved on the anvil of preponderance of probability.
23. We note that an FIR was registered against the petitioner on
30.11.2020 in Meghalaya. Though, the investigation culminated in the
police concluding that no concrete information and/or evidence is found
against the petitioner in the USB drive / CFSL report which could be used
against the petitioner but the respondents are not precluded to initiate a
departmental inquiry(Security Force Court) for the misdemeanor. In other
words, the department is within its right to initiate proceedings under the
conduct rules on the same principles as we have delineated above.
24. Dr. Hooda has primarily relied upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of State of West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Dilip
Kumar Ray (2007) 14 SCC 568, to contend that, this is a fit case for this
Court to award the damages to the petitioner, as despite there being no
evidence against the petitioner, he was wrongly proceeded against in a
criminal case by lodging an FIR wherein, he was discharged. He submitted
that, if the charges have not been proved by the respondents, then for the
respondents to even proceed with the departmental inquiry(Security Force
Court) is uncalled for. This submission also seems appealing on a first blush
but the plea is liable to be rejected, in view of the judgment of the Supreme
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 11 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) on which reliance has been
placed by Mr. Kumar, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:
“As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is
concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the
Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise
permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled.
Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer
from exercising power in accordance with Rules and
Regulations in force. The two proceedings criminal and
departmental are entirely different. They operate in different
fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of
criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender,
the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the
delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance
with service Rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement
made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain
officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of
evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental
proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a
conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to
record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to
appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not
similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution
and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the
accused ‟beyond reasonable doubt‟, he cannot be convicted by
a court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand,
penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding
recorded on the basis of ‘preponderance of probability’.
Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore,
does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are,
therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant
that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned
order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and
set aside.”
(emphasis supplied)
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 12 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
25. Having noted the position of law and also, the fact that the conclusion
of the SCOI proceedings is clear, that the petitioner has not denied the fact
that he was in contact with a stranger on Facebook and Messenger and later
passed on information considered sensitive by the respondents on Whatsapp
to the stranger apart from receiving an amount of Rs.5,000/- from the said
person in his savings account, the penalty of dismissal is justified and ought
not to be interfered with.
26. Insofar, the plea of Dr. Hooda that the respondents could not have
dispensed with the inquiry (Security Force Court) is concerned, we may
state here that the law with regard to dispensing with the inquiry is settled as
held by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel,
(1985) 3 SCC 398 wherein the Court in paragraph nos. 133, 138, 142 and
144, has held as under:
“133. The second condition necessary for the valid application
of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary
authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction
that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry
contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a constitutional
obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the
order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty
following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
138. Where a government servant is dismissed, removed or
reduced in rank by applying clause (b) or an analogous
provision of the service rules and he approaches either the
High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32,
the court will interfere on grounds well established in law for
the exercise of power of judicial review in matters where
administrative discretion is exercised. It will consider whether
clause (b) or an analogous provision in the service rules was
properly applied or not. The finality given by clause (3) ofSignature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 13 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
Article 311 to the disciplinary authority’s decision that it was
not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is not binding
upon the court. The court will also examine the charge of mala
fides, if any, made in the writ petition. In examining the
relevancy of the reasons, the court will consider the situation
which according to the disciplinary authority made it come to
the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold
the inquiry. If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant,
then the recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary
authority would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by
clause (b) and would take the case out of the purview of that
clause and the impugned order of penalty would stand
invalidated. In considering the relevancy of the reasons given
by the disciplinary authority the court will not, however, sit in
judgment over them like a court of first appeal. In order to
decide whether the reasons are germane to clause (b), the court
must put itself in the place of the disciplinary authority and
consider what in the then prevailing situation a reasonable man
acting in a reasonable way would have done. The matter will
have to be judged in the light of the then prevailing situation
and not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding the
question whether the inquiry should be dispensed with or not in
the cool and detached atmosphere of a court-room, removed in
time from the situation in question. Where two views are
possible, the court will decline to interfere.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
142. The question under clause (c), however, is not whether the
security of the State has been affected or not, for the expression
used in clause (c) is “in the interest of the security of the
State”. The interest of the security of the State may be affected
by actual acts or even the likelihood of such acts taking place.
Further, what is required under clause (c) is not the
satisfaction of the President or the Governor, as the case may
be, that the interest of the security of the State is or will be
affected but his satisfaction that in the interest of the security of
the State, it is not expedient to hold an inquiry as contemplated
by Article 311(2). The satisfaction of the President or Governor
must, therefore, be with respect to the expediency or
inexpediency of holding an inquiry in the interest of the securitySignature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 14 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
of the State. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Edn.,
defines the word “inexpedient” as meaning “not expedient;
disadvantageous in the circumstances, unadvisable, impolitic”.
The same dictionary defines “expedient” as meaning inter alia
“advantageous; fit, proper, or suitable to the circumstances of
the case”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary also
defines the term “expedient” as meaning inter alia
“characterized by suitability, practicality, and efficiency in
achieving a particular end: fit, proper, or advantageous under
the circumstances”. It must be borne in mind that the
satisfaction required by clause (c) is of the Constitutional Head
of the whole country or of the State. Under Article 74(1) of the
Constitution, the satisfaction of the President would be arrived
at with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers with the
Prime Minister as the Head and in the case of a State by reason
of the provisions of Article 163(1) by the Governor acting with
the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers with the Chief
Minister as the Head. Whenever, therefore, the President or the
Governor in the constitutional sense is satisfied that it will not
be advantageous or fit or proper or suitable or politic in the
interest of the security of the State to hold an inquiry, he would
be entitled to dispense with it under clause (c). The satisfaction
so reached by the President or the Governor must necessarily
be a subjective satisfaction. Expediency involves matters of
policy. Satisfaction may be arrived at as a result of secret
information received by the Government about the brewing
danger to the security of the State and like matters. There may
be other factors which may be required to be considered,
weighed and balanced in order to reach the requisite
satisfaction whether holding an inquiry would be expedient or
not. If the requisite satisfaction has been reached as a result of
secret information received by the Government, making known
such information may very often result in disclosure of the
source of such information. Once known, the particular source
from which the information was received would no more be
available to the Government. The reasons for the satisfaction
reached by the President or Governor under clause (c) cannot,
therefore, be required to be recorded in the order of dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank nor can they be made public.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 15 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
144. It was further submitted that what is required by clause (c)
is that the holding of the inquiry should not be expedient in the
interest of the security of the State and not the actual conduct of
a government servant which would be the subject-matter of the
inquiry. This submission is correct so far as it goes but what it
overlooks is that in an inquiry into acts affecting the interest of
the security of the State, several matters not fit or proper to be
made public, including the source of information involving a
government servant in. such acts, would be disclosed and thus
in cases such as these an inquiry into acts prejudicial to the
interest of the security of the State would prejudice the interest
of the security of the State as much as those acts would.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. From the above, it follows that this Court cannot act as an appellate
authority when the authority concerned is satisfied that the conduct of the
inquiry (Security Force Court) shall be prejudicial to the security of the
State. The justification given by the authority is that, if a show cause notice
is to be issued to him, the reply thereto by him would likely risk the national
security as certain vital information including deployment related details
will come in public domain which would jeopardise the security at the
international border. This according to us is a justifiable reason. Rule 22(1)
of the Rules contemplates that power vests with the competent authority
(with reasons to be recorded in writing) to hold it is not expedient or
reasonably practicable to give the person concerned an opportunity of
showing cause before dismissing or removing from service.
28. We may refer to the judgment of this Court in Yacub Kispotta & Ors.
v. Director General BSF & Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 12437, wherein a
Coordinate Bench of this Court has held that the decision, whether to hold
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 16 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
an inquiry in prevailing circumstances which in certain cases would not be
reasonable or practical, is in the domain of the disciplinary authority, and
has to be based on objective facts, the role of the Writ Courts to exercise
their mandate of judicial review is confined to considering whether such
reasons were germane and relevant and nothing more.
29. Moreover the Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of
Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force in Civil Appeal No(s).
3877/2011, dated 12.02.2026 has held that, in cases where national security
is of a paramount concern, any misdemeanor by a security personnel, has to
be viewed sternly. The relevant part of the findings of the Supreme Court
read as under:
“7. Insofar as prayer of the appellant for extending the benefit
of pension in the teeth of Yasodhar Kamat‟s referred to supra
though at first blush looks attractive, on a deeper examination
it is not. We say so, for the simple reason that in the said case,
the delinquent employee was absent unauthorizedly which
triggered the authorities to dismiss the appellant from service.
In that factual background, this Court is of the view that
punishment imposed was highly disproportionate and found the
antecedent of the appellant therein was also for a similar
offence, namely, unauthorized absence, whereas in the instant
case, the appellant has four incidents resulting in punishment
being imposed on 13.05.1980, 06.01.1989, 25.07.1994 and
29.12.1995 which has also resulted in the imprisonment of ten
days for the first offence, and punishment of severe reprimand
for the second and third offences, and the fourth one is the
present case of permitting smuggling of cattle at the Border of
the country. When the national security is paramount, any
infraction thereof that too by the officers or the concerned
who would be manning the Borders cannot be viewed lightly
and it is for this reason, the punishment permissible under
Section 48(1)(c) of the BSF Act, 1968 has been imposed on
the appellant. However, having regard to the fact that theSignature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 17 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
appellant has put in 36 years of service, we permit the
appellant to submit a representation to the respondents for
granting pension, if any, and in the event of such application
being filed, the authorities would be at liberty to consider the
same on its own merits and in accordance with law
notwithstanding the confirmation of the order of dismissal
taking into consideration that 36 years of service had been
rendered by appellant and respondent would be at liberty to
restrict the pension for any particular quantum or period or
otherwise. However, we make it clear that this order shall not
be construed as an order directing the respondent to grant
pension to appellant and it would be in the complete discretion
of the competent authorities.”
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Insofar as the plea of Dr. Hooda, that there is violation of Rule 173(8)
of the Rules is concerned, the submission is in the context that the petitioner
has not been given the right of cross-examination of the witnesses and was
also not provided all the material that has been relied against him. Suffice to
state the case of the respondents as noted in paragraph 15 above reveal that
the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and
produce witnesses in support of his case under Rule 173(8), however, the
petitioner declined to do so. In the rejoinder to the counter-affidavit, the
petitioner has stated that it is not the case of the respondents that the
Director General has specifically passed an order denying a copy which is to
be given to the petitioner and thereby claim exemption from the mandate of
Rule 176 of the Rules. So, in that sense, the respondents were under
obligation to supply the SCOI proceedings. We are afraid, Rule 173(8) and
176 of the Rules, which we reproduce as under cannot be interpreted in the
manner stated by the petitioner.
“173. Procedure of Courts of Inquiry.-(1) The
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 18 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
proceedings of a Court of Inquiry shall not be open to
the public. Only such persons may attend the
proceedings as are permitted by the court to do so.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
(8) Before giving an opinion against any person
subject to the Act, the court will afford that person the
opportunity to know all that has been stated against
him, cross-examine any witnesses who have given
evidence against him, and make a statement and call
witnesses in his defence.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
176. Copies of Court of Inquiry Proceedings.- A
person subject to the Act against whom the Court of
Inquiry has given an opinion or who is being tried by a
Security Force Court on a charge relating to matter
investigated by the Court of Inquiry, shall be entitled to
copies of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry unless
the Director-General orders otherwise.”
31. In Baljinder Singh v. UOI & Ors., ILR (2006) 2 P&H 423, the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in its judgment dated 21.10.2006 has
interpreted the said Rule in the following manner:-
“17. It is true that the expression “cross-examine the
witnesses” is not mentioned in the above reproduced note,
however, the fact that the petitioner himself has signed and
acknowledged the opportunity given to him to lead defence
evidence etc., thus, he could put up a note of protest against
denial of opportunity coupled with the fact that the Presiding
Officer has certified the compliance of 173(8) of the Rules,
leaves no doubt in one’s mind that the plea as if the petitioner
was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine Karnail
Singh–the civilian during the course of Court of Inquiry
proceedings, is merely an afterthought.
18. Another vital contention which goes to the root of the
matter pertains to non-compliance of rule 176 of the rules,
namely, non-supply of the copies of the proceedings of the
Court of Inquiry. Whereas Learned Counsel for the petitionerSignature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 19 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
contended that respondent No. 3 was obligated in law „to
supply‟ copies of these proceedings, the respondents contend
that the petitioner never „demanded‟ the same. In my view, the
expressions “shall be entitled to copies of the proceedings of
the Court of Inquiry unless the Director General order
otherwise” as contained in rule 176 are of significant
importance. It appears that the right to seek copies of the
proceedings of the Court of Inquiry has been given to a
delinquent in order to ensure that he can effectively participate
in the trial proceedings berore the Summary Security Force
Court and no prejudice is caused to him. However, the fact that
the Director General, BSF is entitled to refuse the supply of
copies of the Court of Inquiry proceedings, clearly indicates
that there is no obligation is cast upon the authorities to supply
copies of these proceedings to the delinquent and it is for him
to apply and seek copies thereof. Further, prior permission of
the Director General before supplying such copies is also
visible, who, in turn is competent to decline such request. It is
not the case of the petitioner that he had applied for the copies
of the Court of Inquiry proceedings yet the same were denied to
him, no advantage of rule 176 can be taken by him at this stage.
19. There is yet another aspect of the matter. As observed
earlier, the object of getting copies of the Court of Inquiry
proceedings is to have effective participation in the trial
proceedings before the Summary Security Force Court. A
perusal of the Summary Security Force Court proceedings
(Annexure P-6) reveals that after recording the statement of
each witness, a note has been given that “the accused is
provided an opportunity to cross examine the witness but he
declines to do so”. This note has been duly signed and
acknowledged by the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter
declined “to make any statement” and also refused to “produce
any witness”. Before conclusion of the proceedings, he
confessed his guilt of the charge, a detailed reference to which
has already been made. The petitioner, thus, having refused to
avail the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or to
produce his own evidence and rather having admitted his guilt,
cannot be permitted to turn around and say that he has been
held guilty in derogation to the principles of natural justice andSignature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 20 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
fair play. Further, the note recorded by the Summary Court in
terms of rule 142 of the rules, suggests that the petitioner did
not object to the charge framed against him though such a right
is conferred under rule 139. Similarly, the procedure laid down
under rule 145 also appears to have been complied with.”
32. So, it is clear there is no obligation on the part of the respondents to
supply the SCOI proceedings. It is important to note that the SCOI
proceedings become relevant/important to be relied upon in the trial
proceedings before the Summary Security Force Court. In the case in hand,
the show cause notice and the Summary Security Force Court proceedings
were dispensed with; so no question arises for placing reliance upon the
proceedings of SCOI. In any case, it is not the case of the petitioner that he
has asked for the record of the proceedings of the SCOI, which has been
refused. In view of the interpretation to the Rule 176, it must be held that
this plea of Dr. Hooda is unmerited and the same is rejected.
33. We hold that there were sufficient reasons for the authorities to
dispense with the show cause notice and the proceedings of the Security
Force Court.
34. In view of the conclusion above, we do not see any merit in the
petition. The present petition being devoid of merits is dismissed. No costs.
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J
APRIL 30, 2026/RT
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PRADEEP W.P.(C) 192/2024 Page 21 of 21
SHARMA
Signing Date:30.04.2026
17:52:26
