Delhi High Court – Orders
Praveen @ Parveen vs State Of Nct Of Delhi on 27 July, 2026
Author: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
Bench: Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
$~10
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ BAIL APPLN. 1881/2026
PRAVEEN @ PARVEEN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mohit Rana, Mr. Aditya
Choudhry, Mr. Sidhant Verma,
Mr.Himanshu Rohilla, Mr. Shivam
Gaur, Ms. Sanjoli and Ms. Ambika
Gupta, Advocates.
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent
Through: Ms.Shubhi Gupta, APP for State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
ORDER
% 27.07.2026
1. The instant application has been filed by the applicant under Section
483 r/w Section 528 of the BNSS, 2024 seeking grant of regular bail in
connection with FIR No.337/2022 registered at PS Special Cell, Rohini for
offences punishable under Sections 21/29 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances AcT, 1985 [“NDPS Act“] and 14 of the Foreigners
Act, 1946.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant submits that the
applicant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. It is
contended that there are six accused persons in the case, out of whom three
have already been enlarged on regular bail. In this regard, it is submitted that
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the main accused, Umesh Singh, from whose possession the contraband was
allegedly recovered, was granted bail by the learned Trial Court vide order
dated 13.01.2026. It is further submitted that accused Jaipal was granted bail
vide order dated 09.01.2025, while accused Mohan Babu was enlarged on
bail by this Court vide Judgment dated 28.03.2026. It is, therefore, urged
that only the applicant and the remaining two co-accused continue to remain
in judicial custody. According to learned counsel, no recovery of any
contraband has been effected from the possession of the present applicant.
3. It is further submitted that the trial is progressing at a slow pace. Out
of the total 29 prosecution witnesses, only one witness has been fully
examined, while only the examination-in-chief of another witness has been
recorded. In these circumstances, it is contended that the conclusion of the
trial is likely to take considerable time. Learned counsel further submits that,
except for one pending criminal case under Section 420 of the IPC, no other
criminal case, particularly under the NDPS Act, is pending against the
applicant.
4. Learned APP for the State opposes the prayer for grant of regular bail
and submits that the earlier bail application preferred by the present
applicant was dismissed as withdrawn by this Court vide order dated
19.03.2024 and subsequently another bail application of the present
applicant was dismissed by this Court on merits vide order dated
21.04.2025, which was subsequently assailed before the Supreme Court by
way of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 11004/2025 [“SLP”]; however, the
said SLP also came to be dismissed vide order dated 30.07.2025. It is further
contended that the material collected during the course of investigation, if
appreciated in its proper perspective, clearly reveals the role attributed to the
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present applicant and prima facie establishes his involvement in the alleged
offence. It is, therefore, submitted that the applicant is not entitled to the
grant of regular bail and the present application deserves to be dismissed.
5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on
record.
6. As per the Nominal Roll dated 21.07.2026, the applicant has remained
in judicial custody for almost two year and six months. It is further reflected
that the applicant was released on interim bail on five occasions and, on
each occasion, surrendered before the jail authorities within the stipulated
period without violating any of the terms and conditions of the interim bail.
The Nominal Roll further indicates that no other case under the NDPS Act is
pending against the applicant. Though one criminal case arising out of FIR
No. 266/2019 is stated to be pending against him, the applicant has already
been enlarged on bail therein.
7. As pointed out by the learned APP, the earlier bail application
preferred by the applicant was dismissed on merits by this Court and the
challenge thereto by way of SLP also came to be dismissed by the Supreme
Court. The earlier order proceeded on the prima facie view that the applicant
was an active participant in the alleged narcotic syndicate and that the
rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act stood attracted. It is, however, well
settled in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan,1 that while successive
bail applications are maintainable, the Court is required to consider the
reasons on which the earlier application was disposed of and to examine
whether any subsequent circumstances justify taking a different view.
8. In the present case, subsequent to the rejection of the earlier bail
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application, material developments have taken place. During the
interregnum, the principal accused, Umesh Singh, as well as co-accused
Mohan Babu Gupta have been enlarged on regular bail. The trial, though
underway, has made little progress, inasmuch as only 2 out of 29
prosecution witnesses have been examined till date. These subsequent
developments, which were not available for consideration while rejecting
the earlier bail application, constitute fresh circumstances warranting an
independent examination of the present application on its own merits.
9. Having found that fresh circumstances have arisen after the disposal
of the earlier bail application, this Court is also required to examine the plea
of parity. In Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana,2
the Supreme Court has held that though parity is a relevant consideration
while deciding an application for bail, the same is not to be applied
mechanically and the Court is required to undertake a comparative
assessment of the role attributed to the applicant vis-Ã -vis the co-accused
who have already been granted bail.
10. In the earlier order, this Court found that the role attributed to the
present applicant was distinguishable from that of co-accused Jaipal and,
therefore, declined to extend the benefit of parity. However, the factual
position has since undergone a material change. The principal accused,
Umesh Singh, from whose possession 3 kg of heroin was recovered, as well
as co-accused Mohan Babu Gupta, from whose possession 360 grams of
heroin was recovered, have also been enlarged on regular bail.
Consequently, the role attributed to the present applicant is now required to
1
(2004) 7 SCC 528
2
(2021) 6 SCC 230
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be assessed in comparison with all the co-accused who have been granted
bail.
11. The comparative exercise mandated in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod
(supra) would indicate that the allegations against accused Umesh Singh and
Mohan Babu Gupta are qualitatively graver than those attributed to the
present applicant. While Umesh Singh is alleged to have been found in
possession of 3 kg of heroin and Mohan Babu Gupta is alleged to have been
found in possession of 360 grams of heroin, the prosecution case against the
present applicant principally rests on his alleged participation in the larger
conspiracy and the other material collected during the course of
investigation. In the changed factual scenario, where the aforesaid co-
accused have already been enlarged on regular bail, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the present applicant cannot be said to stand on a
footing worse than them and is, therefore, entitled to invoke the principle of
parity.
12. It is, however, equally true that the earlier order dated 21.04.2025 did
not reject the applicant’s prayer for bail merely on the question of parity.
Upon a prima facie appreciation of the material collected during
investigation, this Court had formed an opinion that the applicant was
allegedly a part of an organised narcotic network and, consequently, held
that the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act stood attracted. The present
application, therefore, also requires this Court to examine whether,
notwithstanding the applicability of Section 37, the subsequent
developments noticed hereinabove warrant a different view.
13. While considering the applicability of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
this Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that the principal accused,
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Umesh Singh, as well as co-accused Mohan Babu Gupta, have since been
enlarged on regular bail. Significantly, both the aforesaid co-accused were
granted regular bail subsequent to the dismissal of the applicant’s SLP by the
Supreme Court, assailing the order dated 21.04.2025. These subsequent
developments materially alter the factual backdrop in which the earlier order
came to be passed and assume considerable significance while examining
the continued applicability of the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act to
the present applicant
14. The applicability of the rigours contained in Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, however, cannot be viewed in isolation. It is now well settled that while
the twin conditions prescribed under Section 37 are required to be duly
borne in mind, they cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to render
illusory the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and the right to a
speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The statutory
restrictions under the NDPS Act and the constitutional mandate under
Article 21 are required to be harmoniously construed while considering a
prayer for bail in an appropriate case.
15. In the present case, the applicant has remained in judicial custody for
almost two years and six months. Although the trial has commenced, its
progress has been rather slow, inasmuch as only 2 out of 29 prosecution
witnesses have been examined till date. It is in this backdrop that the
applicability of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article
21 of the Constitution assumes significance while considering the continued
operation of the embargo contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Ac
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Rabi Prakash versus The State Of
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Odisha,3 has duly observed:
“4. As regard to the twin conditions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
learned counsel for the respondent – State has been duly heard.
Thus, the 1st condition stands complied with. So far as the 2nd condition re:
formation of opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the petitioner is not guilty, the same may not be formed at this stage when
he has already spent more than three and a half years in custody.
The prolonged incarceration, generally militates against the most precious
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and in
such a situation, the conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo
created under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act.
[Emphasis supplied]
17. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial
Prisoners) v. Union of India,4 recognised that while Section 37 of the
NDPS Act imposes stringent conditions for the grant of bail, denial of bail
coupled with prolonged delay in trial would result in continued deprivation
of personal liberty without a timely adjudication of guilt, a consequence
incompatible with the guarantee of a fair and speedy trial under Article 21 of
the Constitution:
“15. On account of the strict language of the said provision very few persons
accused of certain offences under the Act could secure bail. Now to refuse bail
on the one hand and to delay trial of cases on the other is clearly unfair and
unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of Section 36(1) of the Act, Section
309 of the Code and Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. We are
conscious of the statutory provision finding place in Section 37 of the Act
prescribing the conditions which have to be satisfied before a person accused
of an offence under the Act can be released. Indeed we have adverted to this
section in the earlier part of the judgment. We have also kept in mind the
interpretation placed on a similar provision in Section 20 of the TADA Act by
the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569].
Despite this provision, we have directed as above mainly at the call of Article
21 as the right to speedy trial may even require in some cases quashing of a
criminal proceeding altogether, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court
in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225], release on bail, which can
be taken to be embedded in the right of speedy trial, may, in some cases be the3
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109
4
(1994) 6 SCC 731This is a digitally signed order.
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demand of Article 21. As we have not felt inclined to accept the extreme
submission of quashing the proceedings and setting free the accused whose
trials have been delayed beyond reasonable time for reasons already alluded
to, we have felt that deprivation of the personal liberty without ensuring speedy
trial would also not be in consonance with the right guaranteed by Article 21.
Of course, some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided in
such cases; but if the period of deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long,
the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt.”
[Emphasis supplied]
18. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,5 held that
statutory restrictions on the grant of bail, including those contained in
special enactments such as Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA and NDPS Act, do
not denude constitutional courts of their power to grant bail where continued
incarceration results in a violation of the fundamental right to personal
liberty and speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
“12. Even in the case of special legislations like the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention)Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act“) which too have somewhat rigorous
conditions for grant of bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(1999) 9 SCC 252] , Babba v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 11 SCC 569 and
Umarmia v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 2 SCC 731 enlarged the accused on bail
when they had been in jail for an extended period of time with little possibility of
early completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in
such special enactments, has thus been primarily justified on the touchstone of
speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians.”
***
“15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed
by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only
due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v.
Union of India, it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained
pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts
unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the
practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the
risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the
courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released
pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible
5
(2021) 3 SCC 713
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and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the
courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.”
[Emphasis supplied]
19. The aforesaid principle has been specifically applied to prosecutions
under the NDPS Act by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v.
State (NCT of Delhi)6. The Court observed that an interpretation of Section
37 which results in an accused remaining in custody for years awaiting
conclusion of trial would militate against the guarantee of a speedy trial
under Article 21.
“22……Grant of bail on ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be
fettered by Section 37 of the Act, given the imperative of Section 436A which
is applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too (ref. Satender Kumar Antil
supra). Having regard to these factors the court is of the opinion that in the
facts of this case, the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail.”
20. As aptly observed by division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Hakim v.
State (NCT of Delhi)7, the Court must play the role of a “doctor” rather than
a “coroner”, by protecting the right to a speedy trial before it is rendered
illusory by prolonged incarceration, instead of recognising its violation after
the constitutional injury has become irreversible. This principle squarely
applies to the facts of the present case.
21. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this
Court finds that the applicant has remained in judicial custody for a
substantial period. During this period, the trial has progressed at a slow pace
and only 2 out of 29 prosecution witnesses have been examined and there is
nothing on record to suggest that the delay is attributable to the applicant.
Coupled with the subsequent grant of regular bail to the principal accused
6
(2023) 18 SCC 166
7
2021 SCC OnLine Del 4623
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and other co-accused, this Court is of the opinion that continued
incarceration of the applicant would not be justified merely on account of
the statutory embargo contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
22. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is satisfied that the
subsequent developments noticed, hereinabove, constitute a material change
in circumstances warranting a view different from the one taken in the
earlier order dated 21.04.2025. Accordingly, the present application is
allowed.
23. The applicant is directed to be enlarged on regular bail on such terms
and conditions as the learned Trial Court may deem fit to impose.
24. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of.
25. Nothing in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion
on the merits of the pending matter.
26. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent
forthwith.
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J
JULY 27, 2026
Nc/SA
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