Supreme Court – Daily Orders
P. Elaiyappan vs Natarajan on 24 February, 2026
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal Nos. /2026
@ SLP (C) Nos. 1989-1990/2024
P. ELAIYAPPAN ...Appellant
VERSUS
NATARAJAN & ORS. ...Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted. Heard learned counsel
for the parties.
2. These appeal(s) impugn common
judgment and order of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras1 dated 27.01.2023 in
Second Appeal Nos. 704 and 705 of 2017.
3. Two suits seeking permanent
prohibitory injunction in respect of same
property were instituted. Original Suit
(for short, O.S.) No. 74 of 1998 was
instituted by P. Elaiyappan (the appellant
herein), inter alia, against Natarajan (the
first respondent herein). Whereas O.S. No.
371 of 1997 was instituted by the first
Signature Not Verified respondent, inter alia, against the present
Digitally signed by
CHETAN ARORA
Date: 2026.03.09
16:29:14 IST
Reason: appellant.
1 High Court
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4. There is no dispute that the suit
schedule property was owned by one
Ganapathy. Ganapathy suffered a money
decree in execution of which, the suit
property was sold through court conducted
auction dated 03.05.1991 to one Ramasamy.
Ramasamy vide sale deed dated 15.10.1991
sold it to the present appellant.
5. On the other hand, the first
respondent, who instituted O.S. No. 371 of
1997, claimed that though original owner of
the suit property was Ganapathy, he died in
an accident and prior to his death he had
executed a registered Will in favour of the
first respondent. As a result, the first
respondent is the owner of the suit
property.
6. Interestingly, both sides claimed
that they are in possession of the suit
property and the other side is causing
unlawful interference in their possession.
7. The trial court decreed the suit of
the present appellant whereas the suit of
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the first respondent was dismissed.
8. Aggrieved by the decree passed by the
trial court, two first appeal(s) were
preferred which were dismissed thereby
affirming the decree passed by the trial
court. Though no specific issue was framed
on the question of possession, apparently,
both sides led evidence on it as the same
was implicit in the relief sought. Further,
in paragraph 19 of its judgment, the first
appellate court, on the question of
possession, observed as follows2:
“19. Suit properties were purchased by
defendant Elaiyappan on 15.10.1991. After
so purchasing, patta was granted in the
name of defendant Elaiyappan in respect of
the suit properties. The land ownership
register for that is exhibit D-6. The
notices given by the plaintiff Natarajan to
the Revenue Officers not to change the name
in patta are exhibits P-15 and P-16. But as
exhibit D-6 was given in the name of
defendant Elaiyappan, in the appeal filed
by the plaintiff Natarajan to cancel that
the Sub Collector passed an order dated
22.03.1994 in exhibit P-20 that no order2 Note: The extract is copied from Annexure P-4. Possibility of typographical errors in the
said Annexure are not ruled out.
3
can be passed for patta name transfer as
the dispute as to title of the suit
properties were pending in civil court. For
the tapioca mill in the suit property, the
registration certificate issued by the
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Rasipuram is
in the name of defendant Elaiyappan. That
Form-D2 in exhibit D-7 is what was issued
in the name of defendant Elaiyappan by the
aforesiad Deputy Commercial Tax Officer,
Rasipuram. That is exhibit D-8. In order to
run tapioca mill in the suit properties,
Small Scale Administration Registration
Certificate has been given in the name of
defendant Elaiyappan by the Tamil Nadu
Government. That is exhibit D-9. For the
tapioca mill in the suit properties which
was in the name of Ganapathy, the
Commissioner passed an order dated
15.11.1993 transferring it in the name of
defendant Elaiyappan. That is exhibit D-10.
For running business in the suit properties
in the name of Sri Lakshmi Seco Factory of
Ganapathy, Deputy Chief Inspector of
Industries, Salem passed an order exhibit
D-12. The exhibits D-13 to D-16 confirm
that the payments to be made to the
government for the suit properties and the
tax to be paid for the buildings situated
therein were made by defendant Elaiyappan.
Exhibit D-17 confirms that the defendant
Elaiyappan is running the tapioca mill in
the suit property and sending the product
manufactured in the tapioca mill to Salem
Starch and Seco Manufacturers Service
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Industrial Co-operative Sangam. For the
product manufactured in tapioca mill
situated in the suit properties was being
done by distribution representative
Elaiyappan. For that sale tax has been
collected by Collection Inspector. Exhibits
D-18 and D-19 series are documents
confirming it. Electricity connection in
the suit properties are numbered 49 and 58.
They have not been transferred in the name
of defendant Elaiyappan. They are
continuing in the name of Ganapathy. Still
for the aforesaid electricity connection,
it is confirmed by documents exhibits D-21
and D-22 in the name of defendant. Exhibits
D-23 and D-24 are the electricity payment
cards filed in respect of the aforesaid
electricity connections. Exhibit D-39 is a
copy of cultivation Adangal Accounts
proving that the suit properties are in the
possession of Elaiyappan. Chitta has been
issued in the name of defendant Elaiyappan
for the suit properties. As such the
aforesaid documents prove that the suit
properties are in possession of defendant
Elaiyappan. DWs 1 to 4 examined on behalf
of the defendants also confirm that the
suit properties are in possession of
defendant Elaiyappan. When exhibit C-1
commissioner’s report is perused, he has
mentioned that when he inspected the suit
properties Sri Laskhmi Seco Mills was
functioning in the suit properties.
Further, the commissioner has mentioned in
his exhibit C-1 report that certificates
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given for running the tapioca mill in the
name of defendant Elaiyappan were found in
the mill’s office room. Though the
commissioner cannot be used as an
instrument to prove as to in whose
possession suit properties are, when the
commissioner has mentioned through his
report exhibit C-1 as to the features of
the suit properties when he had inspected,
it will confirm that the suit properties
were in possession of the defendant
Elaiyappan. When it has been proved on
behalf of defendant Elaiyappan that the
suit properties are only in the possession
on the basis of the oral and documentary
evidences filed, it is not possible for
this Court to conclude that the contention
on behalf of the plaintiff Natarajan that
the suit properties are in his exclusive
possession can be accepted.”
9. Being aggrieved by dismissal of his
appeals, the first respondent filed two
second appeals before the High Court. While
entertaining the Second Appeal, the High
Court framed following substantial
questions of law for its consideration:
“i. Are the Courts below justified in
dismissing the suit O.S. No. 271/1997 in
spite of the fact that the appellant had
proved the Will Ex. A2 in the manner known6
to law?
ii. Whether Court below was justified in
granting decree in favour of respondent in
O.S No. 74 of 1998 while respondent taken
possession not in accordance with law?”
10. Thereafter, the High Court proceeded
to hold that, though title to the suit
property vested in the appellant (i.e., P.
Elaiyappan) consequent to a sale deed
executed by the auction purchaser being in
his favour, there is no documentary
evidence on record to indicate that
possession of the suit property was
lawfully taken by the predecessor-in-
interest of the appellant. Based on above,
the High Court partly allowed the appeals
and dismissed both suits by observing that
the plaintiff (the appellant herein) had
failed to prove his lawful possession on
the date of institution of the suit.
11. Aggrieved by the decision of the High
Court, these appeal(s) have been preferred.
12. The learned counsel for the appellant
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has submitted that once the High Court had
concluded that title in the suit property
was with the present appellant, the
appellant was entitled to injunction as he
was in possession. It is also submitted that
the High Court has ignored the findings of
the two courts below on possession being
with the appellant. Further, the High Court
has not referred to the documents brought
on record by the appellant to indicate that
there was a running factory located over
the land in suit which was run and managed
by the appellant since before the
institution of the suit and, therefore, on
the date of institution of the suit, the
appellant was in possession of the suit
property and as such entitled to the relief
of injunction.
13. Additionally, it was argued that to
obtain relief of injunction, the plaintiff
must prove his title and possession on the
date of institution of the suit. Once title
is with the plaintiff, and he establishes
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his possession over the suit property on
the date of institution of the suit, he
cannot be denied injunction, particularly
against a person with no title, merely
because such possession was obtained by
private negotiation or other means. It is
contended that the appellant had brought
evidence on record to indicate that though,
initially, there was resistance in handing
over possession of the suit property, a
decision was taken in a panchayat to hand
over possession to the appellant and based
on it, possession was taken over and the
documentary evidence indicated that
possession of the suit property was with
the appellant on the date of institution of
the suit. It has also been submitted that
the second appellate court’s jurisdiction
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 19083 is limited and findings of
fact can be interfered with only where a
finding is based either on no admissible
3 CPC
9
evidence or on inadmissible evidence or
suffers from misreading of evidence or
ignorance of material evidence on record,
or is perverse, which is not the case here.
As both trial court and the first appellate
court have referred to documentary as well
as oral evidence in support of their
respective findings, those findings were
not amenable to interference in exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC.
Besides, the High Court did not even frame
a question of law regarding the correctness
or validity of the finding on possession
returned by the first appellate court as
well as the trial court.
14. Based on the above submissions, it
has been prayed that the order passed by
the High Court be set aside and the decree
passed by the first appellate court is
restored.
15. Per contra, learned counsel for the
contesting respondent submitted that the
evidence brought on record indicated that
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the respondent had all throughout
questioned the auction sale made in favour
of the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellant. Thus, even if challenge to the
auction sale may not have succeeded, there
was no question of surrendering or handing
over of possession to the predecessor-in-
interest of the appellant or to the
appellant. Therefore, in absence of
evidence that possession was taken over in
accordance with the provisions of Order 21
Rule 95 of CPC, there was no basis to hold
that possession was with the present
appellant. Moreover, if CPC prescribes a
procedure for taking over possession of a
property subjected to an auction, evidence
of obtaining possession through out of
court settlement or by private means has no
sanctity in law.
16. In such circumstances, it is
submitted on behalf of the respondent, when
possession of the suit property is
disputed, the view taken by the second
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appellate court absent documentary evidence
to indicate handing over of possession,
cannot be faulted. It has, thus, been
prayed that these appeal(s) be dismissed.
17. We have accorded due consideration to
the rival submissions and have carefully
perused the materials available on record.
18. Before we address the vexed issue of
possession, we may notice that the suit
property was subjected to auction in
execution of a money decree, and the said
sale was confirmed in favour of the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellant.
It is trite law that title in immovable
property vests in the auction purchaser on
confirmation of sale4. No doubt, Order 21
Rule 95 CPC provides for the procedure to
take possession by an auction purchaser but
if the auction purchaser gets possession
and is in possession on the date of
institution of the suit, in our view, he
cannot be denied injunction against a non-
4 4 B. Arvind Kumar V. Govt. of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 745, paragraph 12
12
title holder seeking to interfere with his
possession. Therefore, the question of
possession on the date of institution of
the suit was important for deciding the
suit(s) in question.
19. Surprisingly, it appears, a specific
issue on possession was not framed.
However, where parties go to trial with
knowledge that a particular question is in
issue, though no specific issue has been
framed thereon, and adduce evidence
relating thereto, they cannot claim
prejudice for the issue being not
specifically framed.5
20. In the instant case, it appears,
parties went to trial fully aware that
issue of possession is central to the two
suit(s), and they seem to have led evidence
accordingly. A perusal of the lower
court(s) judgment would indicate that they
had taken notice of the documentary
evidence which disclosed that there was a
5 5 See: Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao & Ors., (1956) 1 SCC 698 : 1956 SCC
OnLine SC 14
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running factory over the suit property, and
some documents pertaining to the factory
reflected the name of the current
appellant.
21. Besides, the first appellate court, in
paragraph 19 of its judgment, has referred
to various documentary evidence available on
record to indicate the possession of the
present appellant over the suit property.
23. It is well-settled that where a
finding is returned by a court and the same
is assailed before the appellate court, the
appellate court, if it is a court of fact,
may reverse it by appreciating the evidence,
but would have to record reasons in support
of its conclusion. However, when the High
Court exercises its jurisdiction under
Section 100 of CPC, particularly where there
are concurrent finding(s) of fact by two
courts below, interference with it is
permissible on limited grounds such as where
the finding in question is perverse, or is
based on consideration of inadmissible
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evidence, or by misreading or grossly
misconstruing the evidence, or is recorded
without considering relevant evidence.
24. In the present case, the second
appellate court i.e., the High Court has not
at all adverted to the documentary evidence
relied by the first appellate court in
support of its order affirming the trial
court decree. In fact, the second appellate
court has not even framed a question of law
much less a substantial question of law to
test the finding of the first appellate
court on the issue of possession within the
scope of Section 100 of CPC.
25. In such circumstances, we are of the
view that the matter requires
reconsideration by the High Court as it had
set aside the decree of the court below
without considering whether the finding(s)
of the court(s) below on plaintiff’s
(appellant herein) possession over the suit
property on the date of institution of the
suit was amenable to interference within the
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scope of jurisdiction under Section 100 of
CPC.
26. For the foregoing reasons, we deem it
appropriate to remand the matter to the High
Court.
27. The appeal(s) are, accordingly, partly
allowed. The impugned judgment and order of
the High Court is set aside.
28. The second appeal(s) shall stand
restored on the file of the High Court to be
decided afresh in accordance with law.
29. No order as to costs.
30. Pending application(s), if any, shall
stand disposed of.
…………………………………………………………..J
[MANOJ MISRA]
…………………………………………………………..J
[MANMOHAN]
New Delhi;
February 24, 2026
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ITEM NO.14 COURT NO.14 SECTION XII
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal Nos. /2026
@ SLP (C) Nos. 1989-1990/2024
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 27-01-2023
in SA No. 704/2017 27-01-2023 in SA No. 705/2017 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Madras]
P. ELAIYAPPAN Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
NATARAJAN & ORS. Respondent(s)
IA No. 263491/2023 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
Date : 24-02-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHANFor Petitioner(s) :
M/S. Ksn & Co., AOR
Mr. V Balachandran, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Naidu, Adv.
Mr. Saurabh Bharadwaj, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :
Mrs. Malavika Jayanth, AOR
Ms. Isha Singh, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal(s) are partly allowed in
terms of the signed order which is placed
on the file.
3. Pending application(s), if any, shall
stand disposed of.
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(CHETAN ARORA) (NIKITA SINGH)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
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