Punjab-Haryana High Court
National Highway Authority Of India … vs Ashok Kumar And Others on 27 February, 2026
Author: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
Bench: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
CWP-6486-2026 -1-
121
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-6486-2026
Date of decision: 27.02.2026
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
ASHOK KUMAR GARG AND OTHERS
...Respondent(s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI
Present:- Mr. Kanwalvir Singh Kang, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Mandeep Nagpal, Advocate for respondent No.1.
(Through Video Conferencing)
Mr. Somesh Arora, Addl. A.G., Punjab.
****
JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J.
1. The present Civil Writ Petition has been filed under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of
certiorari for setting aside the order dated 19.02.2026 (Annexure P-25) passed
by the Statutory Arbitrator/Divisional Commissioner, Patiala (appointed under
Section 3G(5) of the National Highway Act, 1956), wherein the petitioner has
been denied the opportunity to cross-examine respondents No.1 and 2 despite
the fact that the learned Arbitrator had permitted the said respondents to tender
their evidence by way of affidavit as RW-Ashok Kumar Garg (respondent No.1)
and RW-1/A-Gurmukh Singh (respondent No.2), with a further prayer to issue
appropriate directions to respondent No.5-Arbitrator not to proceed further or
pronounce the award during the pendency of the present petition.
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2. Mr. Kanwalvir Singh Kang, learned counsel for the petitioner-
NHAI while stating the brief facts of the case submitted that the petitioner-
NHAI acquired land situated in different villages in the year 2020 for the
purpose of widening (four/six laning) of roads. Thereafter, an award was passed
by the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) on 27.09.2021. The
petitioner-NHAI thereafter approached the statutory Arbitrator appointed under
Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act and the arbitration proceedings
commenced on 21.12.2022, which are pending since then. On 18.03.2024, the
respondents-landlosers filed their claims before the learned Arbitrator, which
were thereafter clubbed together.
3. The learned Arbitrator on 19.07.2024 reserved the award but before
the pronouncement of the award, respondent No.1 filed a writ petition before
this Court bearing No.CWP-33483-2024, titled Ashok Kumar Garg versus
Union of India and others by contending that the mandate of the learned
Arbitrator had already expired as he did not adhere to the timeline stipulated
under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Act’). A Coordinate Bench of this Court after issuing notice of motion in the
aforesaid petition passed an interim order dated 20.12.2024 (Annexure P-6)
directing that in the meanwhile, passing of the final award shall remain stayed.
The aforesaid writ petition filed by respondent No.1 was thereafter withdrawn
on 12.08.2025 vide Annexure P-8 with liberty to file a fresh petition with better
particulars.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-NHAI submitted that there was
another writ petition bearing No.CWP-1554-2025 filed by some of the
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landlosers, although not connected with the subject matter of the present
petition, whereby a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide Annexure P-9 dated
24.12.2025 while taking note of the pendency of a large number of statutory
arbitral proceedings under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act passed
general directions pertaining to both the States of Punjab and Haryana, in which
timeline was fixed for deciding the arbitration cases and in this way, even the
present case of arbitration was required to be decided on the basis of the
directions so issued. In the aforesaid general directions, it was so directed that
all the pending arbitration cases upto the year 2020 shall be disposed of on or
before 28.02.2026 and those cases instituted during the years 2021 to 2023 shall
be disposed of within the next three months i.e. by 30.06.2026 and in this way,
the present arbitral proceedings pending before the statutory Arbitrator was
required to be disposed of by 30.06.2026. He further submitted that in the later
part of the aforesaid order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide
Annexure P-9, it was also directed that in all the arbitration cases where the
arguments have been heard and judgments have been reserved for more than
one month, the final outcome be pronounced on or before 28.02.2026 by all the
Arbitrators throughout the States of Punjab and Haryana.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner-NHAI submitted that so far as
the subject matter of the present arbitration is concerned, the award was
reserved on 19.07.2024 but its pronouncement was stayed by the Coordinate
Bench of this Court vide Annexure P-6 as aforesaid. The said petition was
thereafter withdrawn on 12.08.2025 vide Annexure P-8 with liberty to file a
fresh petition with better particulars and consequently, a fresh petition bearing
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No.CWP-208-2026 was filed by respondent No.1, which was disposed of by
this Court on 16.01.2026 vide Annexure P-12, in which learned counsel for the
petitioner-NHAI submitted that he had sought specific instructions to state that
it will be in the interest of justice if the new incumbent, who is the Arbitrator-
cum-Commissioner hears the final arguments of the case and passes an award in
accordance with law since the earlier Arbitrator, who had reserved the award
had already demitted the office. The learned State counsel had submitted in the
aforesaid petition that it will be in the interest of justice in case the new
incumbent, who is the Arbitrator-cum-Commissioner passes an award after
hearing both the parties in accordance with law. On this basis, the aforesaid
petition was disposed of by this Court vide Annexure P-12 and it was also
directed that since the earlier Arbitrator had kept the draft award in a sealed
cover, it will be in the interest of justice to direct the learned Arbitrator-cum-
Commissioner to pass the award in accordance with law after hearing all the
parties and till the time the award is passed, the draft award which was kept in a
sealed cover shall not be opened and accordingly, the aforesaid petition was
disposed of on 16.01.2026.
6. Thereafter, the learned Arbitrator commenced the proceedings for
the purpose of hearing both the parties in compliance with the aforesaid order
passed by this Court. Subsequently, the petitioner-NHAI filed an application on
05.02.2026 vide Annexure P-13 seeking permission to cross-examine the
witness i.e. respondent No.1, who tendered into evidence his affidavit-cum-
examination-in-chief. Thereafter, another application was also filed by the
petitioner vide Annexure P-14 seeking permission to cross-examine the witness
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i.e. respondent No.2. Similar applications were also filed by respondents No.1
and 2 but by way of the impugned order dated 19.02.2026 (Annexure
P-25), the learned Arbitrator-cum-Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala
dismissed the said applications and the learned Arbitrator is now proceeding
with the hearing of the final arguments by the parties.
7. While referring to the aforesaid impugned order passed by the
learned Arbitrator-cum-Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala, learned
counsel for the petitioner-NHAI submitted that it was so observed by the
learned Arbitrator that by virtue of the specific directions passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court vide Annexure P-9, the hearing is to be
completed by 28.02.2026. He further submitted that the matter is fixed for today
i.e. 27.02.2026 before the learned Arbitrator for deciding the case of arbitration
and therefore, the present Civil Writ Petition has been filed challenging the
aforesaid impugned order (Annexure P-25), vide which the applications for
cross-examination filed by the petitioner-NHAI have been dismissed.
8. While advancing his submissions, Mr. Kang submitted that the
learned Arbitrator has erroneously recorded in the impugned order that there are
specific directions from this Court to complete the hearing by 28.02.2026,
whereas as per the order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court issuing
general directions vide Annexure P-9, the last date for disposal would be
30.06.2026 because it was so observed that the cases instituted during the years
2021 to 2023 shall be disposed of before 30.06.2026 and in the present case, the
arbitration proceedings commenced on 21.12.2022 and therefore, the last date
for disposal would be 30.06.2026 and not 28.02.2026. He further submitted that
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the learned Arbitrator has hurriedly proceeded with the arbitral proceedings
after deciding the applications for cross-examination with a view to finally
dispose of the matter by 28.02.2026, which was not in accordance with the
general directions issued by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide Annexure
P-9. He also submitted that the petitioner-NHAI had a right to cross-examine
the witnesses, who had tendered their affidavit-cum-examination-in-chief into
evidence and therefore, adequate opportunity ought to have been granted by the
learned Arbitrator in this regard since it was necessary for the proper
adjudication of the case of arbitration and because of this reason, the aforesaid
impugned order, vide which the applications for cross-examination were
dismissed, is liable to be set aside and the learned Arbitrator be directed to
allow the cross-examination of the witnesses before finalizing the award.
9. On the other hand, Mr. Somesh Arora, Addl. A.G., Punjab
submitted that although the learned Arbitrator is a statutory Arbitrator and
exercises his powers in a quasi-judicial capacity but assistance in the present
case is required from the State on correct facts with regard to the factum of
passing various orders by the learned Arbitrator after the petition was disposed
of by this Court vide Annexure P-12 on 16.01.2026 as well as with regard to the
facts relating to the order passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide
Annexure P-9 while issuing general directions. He submitted that as per the
directions issued by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide Annexure P-9,
which contain general directions for the statutory Arbitrators throughout the
States of Punjab and Haryana hearing arbitration cases under Section 3G(5) of
the National Highways Act, the last date for disposal in the present case was
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28.02.2026 and not 30.06.2026. He also submitted that it was because of
various adjournments being sought by the learned counsel for the petitioner-
NHAI from the learned Arbitrator that the matter was delayed.
10. The learned State counsel supplied photocopies of the procedural
orders passed by the learned Arbitrator from 02.01.2026 onwards. The same are
hereby taken on record as Mark-‘X’. The Registry is directed to tag the same at
an appropriate place in the paper-book.
11. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 (landloser) appearing through
video conferencing prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
12. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties.
13. The arbitral proceedings in the present case under Section 3G(5) of
the National Highways Act commenced on 21.12.2022 but the award was
reserved by the learned Arbitrator on 19.07.2024. However, respondent No.1
filed a writ petition before this Court and a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide
order dated 20.12.2024 (Annexure P-6) stayed the passing of the final award
and thereafter, the said petition was withdrawn on 12.08.2025 (Annexure P-8)
with liberty to respondent No.1 to file a fresh petition with better particulars.
When a fresh petition was filed by respondent No.1, the same was disposed of
by this Court vide order dated 16.01.2026 (Annexure P-12) and the following
order was passed:-
“1. The present petition has been filed under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in
the nature of certiorari for quashing the order/draft award
dated 07.01.2025, whereby a draft award has been passed by
De-Jure Arbitrator in a sealed cover, as the same has not
been pronounced by the arbitrator within the mandated7 of 32
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CWP-6486-2026 -8-period as enshrined under Section 29A of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’),
with a further prayer to consider the same in the light of
Section 29A of the Act.
2. Mr. Amit Jhanji, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner with Mr. Mandeep Nagpal, learned counsel
submitted that the Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala is
a statutory authority to act as an Arbitrator under
Section 3(G)(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 and
the matter remained pending before the earlier
Arbitrator/Commissioner from the year 2022 but the same
was never concluded by him and in fact, a writ petition was
filed by the petitioner in which an interim order was passed
vide Annexure P-14 dated 20.12.2024 that in the meantime,
the passing of the final award shall remain stayed till the
next date. Thereafter, the Arbitrator-cum-Commissioner,
Patiala Division, Patiala vide order dated 07.01.2025
stated that the award has been drafted and put in a sealed
cover and the same will not be pronounced in view of the
aforesaid interim order passed by this Court. The
aforesaid writ petition was thereafter dismissed as
withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition vide
Annexure P-16 dated 12.08.2025. He submitted that
the aforesaid draft award is still in a sealed cover and that
the Commissioner being statutory Arbitrator is required
to hear the parties and pass a final award in accordance
with law.
3. At this stage, Mr. K.S. Kang, learned counsel for the
respondent-NHAI submitted that he has sought specific
instructions to state that it will be in the interest of justice if
the new incumbent, who is the Arbitrator-cum-
Commissioner, hears the final arguments of the case and8 of 32
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CWP-6486-2026 -9-pass an award in accordance with law, as the order dated
07.01.2025 was passed by the earlier Arbitrator, who has
since demitted the office.
4. Mr. Somesh Arora, learned Additional Advocate
General, Punjab has submitted that it will be in the interest
of justice in case the new incumbent, who is the Arbitrator-
cum-Commissioner, passes an award after hearing both the
parties in accordance with law.
5. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties,
this Court is of the considered view that since all the learned
counsels for the parties are ad idem that considering the
peculiar facts and circumstances whereby the statutory
Arbitrator who is the Commissioner has now changed,
whereas the earlier Arbitrator has kept the draft award in a
sealed cover, it will be in the interest of justice to direct the
learned Arbitrator-cum-Commissioner to pass the award in
accordance with law after hearing all the parties. Till the
time the award is passed, the draft award which was kept in
a sealed cover shall not be opened.
6. In view of the above, the present petition stands
disposed of.”
14. A perusal of the aforesaid would show that the petition was
disposed of by consent of the parties, who were ad idem and in view of the
peculiar facts and circumstances, where the statutory Arbitrator, who had kept
the draft award in a sealed cover had already demitted the office, it was directed
that the new Arbitrator shall pass the award in accordance with law after
hearing all the parties and till the time the award is passed, the draft award kept
in a sealed cover shall not be opened. The aforesaid order was passed by this
Court on 16.01.2026 and thereafter, the arbitral proceedings commenced,
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regarding which procedural orders have been supplied by the learned State
counsel in the Court (Mark-‘X’). A perusal of the aforesaid procedural orders
would show that the matter was taken up by the learned Arbitrator on
19.01.2026, whereby it was adjourned on account of filing of Vakalatnama and
thereafter, the matter was taken up on 23.01.2026 but due to a resolution passed
by the District Bar Association, the matter was adjourned. Subsequently, the
matter was taken up by the learned Arbitrator on 30.01.2026 and on that date
the counsel for the petitioner-NHAI was not present and requested for an
adjournment through e-mail and the order passed by this Court on 16.01.2026
as aforesaid was also taken note of. Thereafter, the matter was taken up by the
learned Arbitrator on 03.02.2026, whereby the learned counsel for the
petitioner-NHAI requested to file an application for cross-examination and
thereafter, the matter was taken up on 10.02.2026 and it was observed that the
Tribunal is to proceed further as per procedure of Section 19 of the Act in a time
frame manner and the matter was adjourned to 13.02.2026 for consideration.
On 13.02.2026, the counsel for the petitioner-NHAI sought time to file reply to
the applications moved by the learned counsels for the respondents. Thereafter,
the matter was taken up by the learned Arbitrator on 16.02.2026 and the same
was again adjourned for consideration of the applications seeking cross-
examination of the witnesses. Thereafter, on 18.02.2026, the counsel for the
petitioner-NHAI requested the Tribunal to give time for briefing the Tribunal on
the judgments pertaining to the applications filed by him and it was so directed
by the learned Arbitrator that the judgments and counter judgments, if any, shall
be filed by 10.00 A.M. tomorrow i.e. 19.02.2026 and in this way, the matter was
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adjourned to 19.02.2026. Thereafter, on 19.02.2026, the learned Arbitrator
observed that the Tribunal is hearing the matter on day-to-day basis to dispose
of the matter timely and the applications which were filed were dismissed by
way of a separate order, which is the impugned order in the present case i.e.
Annexure P-25 and the matter was then adjourned for final arguments to the
next day i.e. 20.02.2026. On 20.02.2026, the counsel for the petitioner-NHAI
sought an adjournment, which was granted by the learned Arbitrator, who made
it clear that no further adjournment will be granted on the adjourned date i.e.
23.02.2026. Subsequently, the matter was taken up by the learned Arbitrator on
23.02.2026 and the counsel for the petitioner-NHAI again requested for an
adjournment beyond 27.02.2026 in view of the Bar Association Resolution. The
matter was then fixed for 25.02.2026 and on that date, it was so observed by the
learned Arbitrator that a number of opportunities have already been granted to
respective parties to argue the matter but the same were not availed and
thereafter, in the interest of justice, the matter was adjourned to 27.02.2026 by
noting that the last date for passing the award is 28.02.2026.
15. As to whether the learned Arbitrator was required to pass the award
on or before 28.02.2026 is clear from the general directions issued by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 24.12.2025 (Annexure P-9).
The aforesaid order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court is reproduced
as under:-
“In pursuance to the order dated 09.12.2025, affidavit
of Sh. Anurag Rastogi, IAS, Chief Secretary to the
Government of Haryana along with letter dated 19.12.2025,
on behalf of respondent No.5 and a short reply dated11 of 32
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CWP-6486-2026 -12-17.12.2025 by way of affidavit of Sh. KAP Sinha, Chief
Secretary to the Government of Punjab, on behalf of
respondent No.6, have been filed in Court and the same was
taken on record vide order dated 18.12.2025.
A perusal of the letter dated 19.12.2025 shows that the
Chief Secretary, Haryana, has directed the Additional Chief
Secretary, Revenue and Disaster Management Department,
to monitor all pending arbitration cases arising out of
proceedings under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways
Act, 1956, and further to review the progress thereof on a
regular basis through the Divisional Commissioners and
Deputy Commissioners.
Along with the affidavits, district-wise and year-wise
details of pending arbitration cases under Section 3G(5) of
the Act have also been placed on record.
The affidavit of Sh. Anurag Rastogi, IAS, Chief
Secretary to the Government of Haryana along with letter
dated 19.12.2025, on behalf of respondent No.5 further
reveal that all the Divisional Commissioners have been
directed to ensure disposal of the pending cases as per the
following timelines:
i) All cases up to the year 2020 by 28.02.2026;
ii) Cases instituted between 2021-2023 by 31.03.2026;
iii) Cases instituted during 2024-2025 by 30.06.2026;
iv) All fresh cases within a period of six months from
the date of institution.
The above communication clearly reflects the intention
of the State Government to ensure expeditious disposal of
long-pending arbitration matters.
However, keeping in view the year-wise pendency, the
volume of cases reflected in the said charts, and the
requirement of following due procedure under law, including
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grant of proper opportunity of hearing to the parties, this
Court is of the considered view that the aforesaid timelines
require suitable rationalisation so as to make them practical,
workable and legally sustainable.
Accordingly, the following directions are issued:
i. All pending arbitration cases up to the year 2020
shall be disposed of on or before 28.02.2026.
ii. Cases instituted during the years 2021 to 2023 shall
be disposed of within the next three months, i.e. by
30.06.2026.
iii. Cases instituted during the year 2024 shall be
disposed of within a further period of six months, i.e.
positively by 31.12.2026.
iv. Cases instituted during the years 2025, endeavour
shall also be disposed of such cases by 31.12.2026.
However, said period may be further extended by
another six months and cases shall be disposed of
positively by 30.06.2027.
v. As far as freshly instituted cases are concerned, the
Arbitrators shall endeavour to decide the same
expeditiously; however, they shall be at liberty to
decide such cases within the statutory period of one
year, as recording of pleadings and evidence is
required and any undue haste may give rise to
avoidable legal complications.
It has been pointed out by learned counsel for the
parties that although year-wise details have been furnished,
however the particulars of the pending arbitration cases,
including the names of the parties whose claims are pending;
whether the claimant is the landowner or NHAI; the year of
initiation of proceedings under Section 3G, and the present
stage of such proceedings, are yet to be provided. As such,
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the same be tabulated and placed before this Court on or
before the next date of hearing.
List on 05.03.2026.
In the meanwhile, learned Arbitrators shall timely
update the dates of hearings to the concerned Advocates.
It is made clear that in case the aforesaid schedule is
not followed, learned Arbitrators shall be personally held
liable for payment of cost of litigation for delaying the
adjudication. In addition, it is also directed that all
arbitration cases wherein, the arguments have been heard
and judgments have been reserved for more than one month,
the final outcome be pronounced on or before 28.02.2026 by
all the Arbitrators throughout the States of Punjab and
Haryana.
Further, if final adjudication is not pronounced, the
learned Arbitrator shall be liable to pay cost of Rs.50,000/-
to the landowners concerned for the delay in disposal of the
arbitration proceedings and the cost shall be borne by the
learned Arbitrator from his/her own pocket and shall not be
treated as a burden upon the State exchequer.
A copy of this order be circulated to all the Divisional
Commissioners throughout the State of Punjab and also the
Deputy Commissioners in the State of Haryana.
Learned Chief Secretaries of both the States are
requested to monitor the progress and compliance of
aforesaid order themselves or through their administrative
secretaries to ensure the necessary compliance.
To be shown in the urgent list.”
16. A perusal of the aforesaid would show that although a year-wise
time framework has been fixed for the pending arbitration cases i.e. cases upto
the year 2020, 2021 to 2023, during the year 2024 and those instituted in 2025
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but at the same time, in the later part of the order, the Coordinate Bench of this
Court also directed that for the cases where arguments have been heard and
judgments have been reserved for more than one month, the final outcome be
pronounced on or before 28.02.2026 by all the Arbitrators throughout the States
of Punjab and Haryana. In this way, it was clear from the aforesaid order that in
those cases where the Arbitrators have reserved the awards/judgments, the last
date would be 28.02.2026 throughout the States of Punjab and Haryana. In the
present case, the learned Arbitrator had also reserved the award/judgment,
which stood reserved as of the day on which the Coordinate Bench of this Court
passed the aforesaid order on 24.12.2025 and therefore, the last date for
pronouncing the award/judgment as fixed by the Coordinate Bench of this
Court was 28.02.2026. The aforesaid order passed by the Coordinate Bench of
this Court had attained finality and was not challenged by any of the parties and
therefore, it was binding not only on the learned Arbitrator but also on the
petitioner-NHAI, which was party to the said petition.
17. The argument which was raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner-NHAI that the last date fixed for the learned Arbitrator was
30.06.2026 is totally misconceived and factually incorrect. In fact in the present
case, since at the time when the Coordinate Bench of this Court passed the
order, the award was reserved, the last date for pronouncement was 28.02.2026
and therefore, the learned Arbitrator has rightly observed in the impugned order
that in the present case, the last date is 28.02.2026.
18. Following dates are relevant to be noted:-
i) Award received by earlier Arbitrator on 19.07.2024.
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ii) A Coordinate Bench of this Court on 20.12.2024 stayed the
passing of Award till next date (Annexure P-6) in a writ petition.
iii) Aforesaid writ petition withdrawn on 12.08.2025 seeking
liberty to file fresh (Annexure P-8).
iv) A Coordinate Bench issued general directions on 24.12.2025
fixing time-frame work (Annexure P-9). Specific directions were
issued that all arbitration cases wherein arguments have been heard
and judgments have been reserved for more than one month, the
final outcome be pronounced on or before 28.02.2026.
19. In this way, the last date for deciding was 28.02.2026 in the present
case since on the day when Coordinate Bench issued general directions, the
Award was reserved and there was no interim order in operation.
20. After this Court disposed of the petition vide Annexure P-12
directing the learned Arbitrator to decide the arbitral proceedings despite the
fact that the draft award was kept in a sealed cover, the learned Arbitrator had
been trying his level best to hear both the parties and to decide the matter within
the stipulated time as aforesaid i.e. by 28.02.2026 but from the perusal of the
procedural orders supplied by the learned State counsel today, which have been
taken on record as Mark-‘X’, it appears that on number of occasions the matter
was adjourned at the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner-NHAI and
also due to the filing of applications for cross-examination of witnesses.
Therefore, the petitioner-NHAI was also at fault for seeking adjournments from
the learned Arbitrator despite the fact that the time available for concluding the
proceedings was very limited.
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21. So far as the impugned order (Annexure P-25) is concerned, a
perusal of the same would show that the learned Arbitrator has specifically
observed that upon examining the files, it has come to his notice that the matter
was earlier processed on the basis of requisite procedure of the Tribunal and
after giving proper opportunity for completion of pleadings in the shape of
reply, evidence etc., his predecessor after hearing the arguments of all the
parties concerned had reserved the cases for pronouncement of the orders. It
was further observed by the learned Arbitrator that allowing of the applications
filed for cross-examination would rather result in de novo proceedings of the
present cases, which cannot be permitted especially in view of the aforesaid
order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide Annexure P-9,
whereby time framework has been fixed and in the present case, it was
28.02.2026. The impugned order has been passed on 19.02.2026 by the learned
Arbitrator vide Annexure P-25.
22. The learned counsel for the petitioner-NHAI had also prayed that
further proceedings before the learned Arbitrator be stayed because opportunity
has to be given to the petitioner-NHAI for cross-examination of the witnesses.
Such an argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-NHAI is
totally unsustainable and is liable to be rejected.
23. There is no doubt that 28.02.2026 is the last date for the learned
Arbitrator to decide the matter in view of the specific directions issued by a
Coordinate Bench of this Court, as reproduced above. Before proceeding
further, it will be just and proper to refer to Section 5 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, which is reproduced as under:-
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CWP-6486-2026 -18-“5. Extent of judicial intervention.–Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial
authority shall intervene except where so provided in this
Part.”
24. The law with regard to as to whether and when the High Courts
should interfere under the provisions of Article of 226/227 of the Constitution
of India is no longer res integra. A Seven Judge Constitution Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in M/s SBP & Co. versus Patel Engineering Ltd. & Another,
(2005) 8 SCC 618 while dealing with the nature of the orders passed under
Section 11 of the Arbitration Act discussed the scope of judicial intervention in
paras No.45, 46 & 47(vi) of the judgment. It was so observed that Arbitral
Tribunal is a creation of an Agreement between the parties even though it is
constituted on the basis of order passed by the Chief Justice/High Court if any
occasion arises but the parties submit themselves to the Arbitrator on the basis
of Agreement between the parties which is therefore contractual in nature.
Rationale and objective of minimising the judicial intervention was also
discussed. In the concluding part, it was so observed that once the matter
reaches Arbitral Tribunal or Sole Arbitrator then the High Court would
not interfere with the order passed by Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal during the
course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the
Court only in terms of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act or in terms of
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Paras No.45, 46 & 47(vi) are reproduced as
under:-
“45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the
basis that any order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal during18 of 32
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CWP-6486-2026 -19-arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article
226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an
approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the Arbitral Tribunal
appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue
for ventilating its grievances against the award including any in-
between orders that might have been passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved
by any order of the Arbitral Tribunal, unless has a right of appeal
under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed
by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The
Arbitral Tribunal is, after all, a creature of a contract between the
parties, the arbitration agreement, even though, if the occasion
arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract
between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the
Arbitral Tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by
agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some
of the High Courts that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal
is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226
or 227 of the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High Courts
is not permissible.
46. The object of minimising judicial intervention while the
matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be
defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227
or under Article 226 of the Constitution against every order made
by the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that
once the arbitration has commenced in the Arbitral Tribunal,
parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of
course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of
the Act even at an earlier stage.
47. We, therefore, sum up our conclusions as follows:
(i) to (v) xx xx xx xx
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(vi) Once the matter reaches the Arbitral Tribunal or the sole
arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with the orders
passed by the arbitrator or the Arbitral Tribunal during the course
of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the
Court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section
34 of the Act. (vii) to (xii) xx xx xx xx”
25. In M/s Deep Industries Limited versus Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Limited and another, 2020 (15) SCC 706 order passed by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act for staying the
black-listing order was challenged before the learned City Civil Court which
dismissed the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. This order under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act was challenged under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and it was allowed by the High Court and the order of the
City Civil Court was set aside. Thereafter, the Contractor assailed the same
before Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. Argument was raised
regarding the maintainability of filing the said petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India by referring to Section 5 of the Arbitration Act as well as
the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s SBP & Company versus Patel
Engineering Ltd. & Another’s case (Supra). Another argument was also raised
by the appellant that it was not a case of lack of jurisdiction. Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that against the order of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, no petition
under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India can be filed. It was further
held that although Article 227 of the Constitution of India remained untouched
by the provisions of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act but it is only when the
orders that lack patent inherent jurisdiction that the provisions of Article 227 of
the Constitution of India can be invoked. It was also discussed that the
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legislative policy pertaining to general revisional jurisdiction under Section 115
of the Code of Civil Procedure that revision under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure lies only against the final order and not against the
interlocutory orders, is also relevant. In the present petition as well, the
impugned orders are not the final orders and are only interlocutory or
procedural orders. Para Nos.16, 17 & 24 are reproduced as under:-
“16. Most significant of all is the non-obstante clause
contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the
Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where
so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of
first appeal against certain judgments and orders and no others.
Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the
cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed (See Section
37(2) of the Act)
17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if
petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
against orders passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire
arbitral process would be derailed and would not come to fruition
for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227
is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by the non-
obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances,
what is important to note is that though petitions can be filed under
Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals
under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be extremely
circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the
statutory policy as adumbrated by us herein above so that
interference is restricted to orders that are passed which are
patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction.
xx xx xx xx
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24. Mr Rohatgi is also correct in pointing out that the
legislative policy qua the general revisional jurisdiction that is
contained by the amendments made to Section 115 CPC should
also be kept in mind when the High Courts dispose of petitions
filed under Article 227. The legislative policy is that no revision
lies if an alternative remedy of appeal is available. Further, even
when a revision does lie, it lies only against a final disposal of the
entire matter and not against interlocutory orders. These
amendments were considered in Tek Singh v. Shashi Verma 18 in
which this Court adverted to these amendments and then stated:
(SCC p. 681, paras 5-6)
“5. ……A reading of this proviso will show that, after 1999,
revision petitions filed under Section 115 CPC are not
maintainable against interlocutory orders.
6. …..Even otherwise, it is well settled that the revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is to be exercised to
correct jurisdictional errors only. This is well settled. In DLF
Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh 19 this
Court held: (SCC pp. 811-12, para 5)
“5. …The position thus seems to be firmly established that
while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not
competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact
however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors
have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the
dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their
plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It
was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend,
that the learned Additional District Judge had either
exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had
failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording
the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till
the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the22 of 32
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CWP-6486-2026 -23-proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in
question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case
in hand. The words “illegally” and “with material
irregularity” as used in this clause do not cover either errors
of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at
but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors
contemplated by this clause may, in our view, relate either to
breach of some provision of law or to material defects of
procedure affecting the ultimate decision. and not to errors
either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have
been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have
adverted to the limitation imposed on its power under
Section 115 of the Code. Merely because the High Court
would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially,
to come to a different conclusion on the question of
continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending
decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on
revision under Section 115 of the Code when there was no
illegality or material irregularity committed by the
learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing
with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the
High Court treated the revision virtually as if it was an
appeal.”
26. In Bhaven Construction through Authorized Signatory Premji
Bhai K. Shah versus Executive Engineers, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam
Limited and another, (2022) 1 SCC 75 an application was filed before learned
Arbitrator under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act disputing the appointment of
Sole Arbitrator. Against the aforesaid order in the application of Section 16 of
the Arbitration Act, a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India was filed in the High Court and the learned Single Judge dismissed the
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same. However, on assailing the same by filing a Letter Patent Appeal, it was
allowed and thereafter, an SLP was filed, wherein it was observed that in
exceptional rarity when a party is left remediless under a statute or there is a
clear bad faith then the provisions of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India can be resorted. Para Nos.11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19 & 20 are reproduced as
under:-
11. Having heard both the parties and perusing the material
available on record, the question which needs to be
answered is whether the arbitral process could be interfered
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, and under what
circumstance?
12. We need to note that the Arbitration Act is a code in
itself. This phrase is not merely perfunctory, but has definite
legal consequences. One such consequence is spelled out
under section 5 of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under
“5. Extent of judicial intervention.- Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being
in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial
authority shall intervene except where so provided in
this Part.”
(emphasis supplied)
The non-obstante clause is provided to uphold the
intention of the legislature as provided in the Preamble to
adopt UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, to reduce excessive
judicial interference which is not contemplated under the
Arbitration Act.
13. The Arbitration Act itself gives various procedures
and forums to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator.
The framework clearly portrays an intention to address most
of the issues within the ambit of the Act itself, without there
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being scope for any extra statutory mechanism to provide
just and fair solutions.
14. Any party can enter into an arbitration agreement
for resolving any disputes capable of being arbitrable.
Parties, while entering into such agreements, need to fulfil
the basic ingredients provided under Section 7 of the
Arbitration Act. Arbitration being a creature of contract,
gives a flexible framework for the parties to agree for their
own procedure with minimalistic stipulations under the
Arbitration Act.
xx xx xx xx
18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework,
mandates that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a
Constitutional right. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular
Operators Association of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this
Court referred to several judgments and held:
“11. We have considered the respective
arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute
that the power of the High Courts to issue directions,
orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and
prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a
basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be
curtailed by parliamentary legislation – L. Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261. However,
it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power
vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court can entertain a writ petition against any
order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its
agency/instrumentality or any public authority or
order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it
is an altogether different thing to say that each and25 of 32
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CWP-6486-2026 -26-every petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as
a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved
person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is
settled law that when a statutory forum is created by
law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should
not be entertained ignoring the statutory
dispensation.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise
discretion to allow judicial interference beyond the
procedure established under the enactment. This
power needs to be exercised in exceptional rarity,
wherein one party is left remediless under the statute
or a clear ‘bad faith’ shown by one of the parties. This
high standard set by this Court is in terms of the
legislative intention to make the arbitration fair and
efficient.
19. In this context we may observe Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC
wherein interplay of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act and Article
227 of the Constitution was analysed as under: (SCC p. 714,
paras 16-17)
“16. Most significant of all is the non obstante clause
contained in Section 5 which states that
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law,
in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration
Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where
so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a
constricted right of first appeal against certain
judgments and orders and no others. Further, the
statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the
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CWP-6486-2026 -27-
cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed [see
Section 37(2) of the Act].
17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever
that if petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals
under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be
derailed and would not come to fruition for many
years. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article
227 is a constitutional provision which remains
untouched by the non obstante clause of Section 5 of
the Act. In these circumstances, what is important to
note is that though petitions can be filed under Article
227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first
appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High
Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering
with the same, taking into account the statutory policy
as adumbrated by us hereinabove so that interference
is restricted to orders that are passed which are
patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to show
exceptional circumstance or “bad faith” on the part of the
appellant, to invoke the remedy under Article 227 of the
Constitution. No doubt the ambit of Article 227 is broad and
pervasive, however, the High Court should not have used its
inherent power to interject the arbitral process at this stage. It is
brought to our notice that subsequent to the impugned order of the
sole arbitrator, a final award was rendered by him on merits, which
is challenged by Respondent 1 in a separate Section 34
application, which is pending.”
27. Recently, another Seven Judge Constitution Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under
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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, in Re:,
(2024) 6 SCC 1 again while largely dealing with provisions of Section 11 of the
Arbitration Act also discussed the provision of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act.
It was observed that one of the objectives of the Arbitration Act was to
minimize the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitration proceedings. The
principle of minimum judicial interference was also discussed and it was so
observed that the principle of judicial non-interference in arbitration
proceedings respects the autonomy of the parties to determine the arbitral
procedures and this principle has also been incorporated in international
instruments, including the New York Convention and the Model Law. Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that one of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act
is to minimize the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process and party
autonomy and settlement of disputes by an arbitral tribunal are the hallmarks of
arbitration law. Section 5 gives effect to the true intention of the parties to have
their disputes resolved through arbitration in a quick, efficient, and effective
manner by minimizing judicial interference in the arbitral proceedings and the
Parliament has enacted Section 5 to minimize the supervisory role of Courts in
the arbitral process to the bare minimum and only to the extent “so provided”
under the Part-I of Arbitration Act. Para Nos.76, 81, 82 and 186 of the aforesaid
judgment are reproduced as under:-
“76. The principle of judicial non-interference in arbitral
proceedings is fundamental to both domestic as well as
international commercial arbitration. The principle entails
that the arbitral proceedings are carried out pursuant to the
agreement of the parties or under the direction of the
tribunal without unnecessary interference by the national
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courts.61 This principle serves to proscribe judicial
interference in arbitral proceedings, which would undermine
the objective of the parties in agreeing to arbitrate their
disputes, their desire for less formal and more flexible
procedures, and their desire for neutral and expert arbitral
procedures.62 The principle of judicial non- interference in
arbitral proceedings respects the autonomy of the parties to
determine the arbitral procedures. This principle has also
been incorporated in international instruments, including the
New York Convention and the Model Law.
xx xx xx xx
81. One of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act is to
minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral
process. Party autonomy and settlement of disputes by an
arbitral tribunal are the hallmarks of arbitration law.
Section 5 gives effect to the true intention of the parties to
have their disputes resolved through arbitration in a quick,
efficient, and effective manner by minimizing judicial
interference in the arbitral proceedings. Parliament enacted
Section 5 to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the
arbitral process to the bare minimum, and only to the extent
so provided” under the Part I of Arbitration. In doing so, the
legislature did not altogether exclude the role of courts or
judicial authorities in arbitral proceedings, but limited it to
circumstances where the support of judicial authorities is
required for the successful implementation and enforcement
of the arbitral process. The Arbitration Act envisages the
role of courts to “support arbitration process” by providing
necessary aid and assistance when required by law in
certain situations.
82. Section 5 begins with the expression “notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in
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force.” The non-obstante clause is Parliament’s addition to
the Article 5 of the Model Law. It is of a wide amplitude and
sets forth the legislative intent of limiting judicial
intervention during the arbitral process. In the context of
Section 5, this means that the provisions contained in Part I
of the Arbitration Act ought to be given full effect and
operation irrespective of any other law for the time
being in force. It is now an established proposition of
law that the legislature uses non-obstante clauses to remove
all obstructions which might arise out of the provisions of
any other law, which stand in the way of the operation
of the legislation which incorporates the non-obstante
clause.
xx xx xx xx
186. Section 5 is effectively rendered otiose by the
interpretation given to it in N.N. Global (2). The Court failed
to provide a reason for holding that Section 5 of the
Arbitration Act does not have the effect of excluding the
operation of Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act in
proceedings under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. The non
obstante clause in Section 5 does precisely this. In addition
to the effect of the non obstante clause, the Arbitration Act is
a special law. We must also be cognizant of the fact that one
of objectives of the Arbitration Act was to minimise the
supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process.”
28. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and upon perusal
of the procedural orders passed by the learned Arbitrator, which have been
taken on record as Mark-‘X’, this Court is of the considered view that the
present Civil Writ Petition is wholly devoid of merit. The law governing
judicial interference in arbitral proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the
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Constitution of India is well settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the High
Courts ought not to interfere with interlocutory orders/procedural orders passed
during arbitral proceedings except in cases of patent lack of jurisdiction, bad
faith or cases of exceptional rarity, neither of which has been made out in the
present case. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-NHAI that
the deadline for disposal was 30.06.2026 is wholly misconceived as the general
directions issued by the Coordinate Bench vide order dated 24.12.2025
specifically mandated pronouncement of all reserved awards by 28.02.2026,
which was binding upon the petitioner-NHAI, which was itself a party thereto
and the award in the present case had been reserved since 19.07.2024. This
Court further notes that the petitioner-NHAI having sought repeated
adjournments between 19.01.2026 and 25.02.2026 is itself substantially
responsible for causing delay in the arbitral proceedings and thereafter, filing
the present writ petition at the eleventh hour on 27.02.2026 i.e. one day before
the deadline for passing of the award with the apparent object of obstructing the
pronouncement of the award amounts to a blatant abuse of the process of
this Court.
29. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the present Civil
Writ Petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh). The
petitioner-NHAI is hereby directed to deposit the aforesaid costs with the High
Court Legal Services Committee, within a period of two months from today and
thereafter, furnish the receipt of such deposit to the Registry of this Court. In
case the aforesaid costs are not deposited by the petitioner within the aforesaid
stipulated period, then this Court will further proceed in accordance with law,
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including recovery of the same as arrears of land revenue and if the receipt of
the aforesaid costs is not furnished by the petitioner to the Registry of the Court
within two months, then the Registry shall list this case for compliance
purposes after two months.
(JASGURPREET SINGH PURI)
27.02.2026 JUDGE
Chetan Thakur
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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