Telangana High Court
N. Laxma Reddy vs A. Indrasena Reddy on 17 April, 2026
*THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN
+ APPEAL SUIT No.191 of 2019
%17.04.2026
Between
# N.Laxma Reddy
...Appellant
vs.
$ A.Indrasena Reddy and 4 others
...Respondents
!Counsel for the appellant : Sri P.Venkat Reddy, learned
counsel for appellant
^Counsel for respondents : Sri M.Damodar Reddy, learned
counsel for respondents
<Gist :
>Head Note :
? Cases referred
1. 2019 (3) ALD 177
2. 2023 (4) ALT 38
3. 2024 (2) ALD 74
4. 2024 (5) ALD 64
5. 2017 (5) ALT 8
6. (2009) 10 SCC 654
7. Second Appeal No.190 of 2004 dated 25-09-2025
8. (2003) 1 SCC 557
9. AIR 2020 SC 2721
10. (2006) 3 SCC 100
11. MANU/SC/0593/2025
12. MANU/SC/1433/2024
13. (2018) 6 SCC 422
14. AIR 1996 SC 869
15. (2004) 10 SCC 779
16. MANU/KA/2085/2015
2
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN
APPEAL SUIT No. 191 OF 2019
DATE:17.04.2026
Between:
N.Laxma Reddy
....Appellant
And
A.Indrasena Reddy and 4 others
....Respondents
JUDGMENT
Heard, Sri P.Venkat Reddy, learned counsel for the
appellant and Sri M.Damodar Reddy, learned counsel for the
respondents and perused the record.
2. This appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC‘), is directed
against the order and decretal order dated 08.02.2019 passed
by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.
Nagar (for short ‘the trial court’) in I.A.No.1189 of 2017 in
O.S.No.981 of 2017. By the said order, the trial court allowed
the application filed by the defendants under Order VII Rule
11(a) and (d) of the CPC and rejected the plaint in its entirety,
3
holding that the suit was barred by limitation and lacked a valid
cause of action.
3. The appellant is the plaintiff and the respondents are the
defendants in O.S.No.981 of 2017.
4. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties are
hereinafter referred to in the capacity they were arrayed before
the trial Court.
5. The appellant/plaintiff instituted O.S.No.981 of 2017 on
the file of the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy
District at L.B. Nagar, seeking the following reliefs:
a) A declaration that the Gift Settlement Deed dated
18.04.2006, bearing Document No.5744 of 2006,
registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar,
Ibrahimpatnam, Ranga Reddy District, in respect of the
suit schedule property, i.e., agricultural dry land
admeasuring Ac.4.20 guntas in Survey No. 67, situated at
Nazdiksingaram Village, Yacharam Mandal, Ranga Reddy
District (hereinafter referred to as the “suit schedule
property”), is null and void; and
b) A consequential relief of recovery of vacant and peaceful
possession of the suit schedule property from the
defendants.
4
Plaint Averments (Appellant/Plaintiff’s case)
6. The case of the appellant/plaintiff, as set out in the
plaint, in substance, is as follows:
i. The plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property from
the 2nd defendant, who is his maternal uncle, under a
registered Sale Deed bearing Document No.50 of 1971
dated 20.01.1971. It is specifically pleaded that
possession of the property was delivered to the plaintiff
pursuant to the oral agreement of sale and, thereafter, the
plaintiff became the absolute owner and possessor of the
property.
ii. It is further pleaded that, owing to his employment as a
Government servant in various remote places, the plaintiff
was unable to personally supervise the property.
Consequently, he entrusted the suit schedule property to
the 2nd defendant for the limited purpose of looking after
the agricultural operations. Accordingly, the 2nd defendant
continued to cultivate the land and was allegedly
remitting the agricultural income/proceeds to the
plaintiff.
iii. After his retirement from service in the year 2006, the
plaintiff sought to regularize the revenue entries and
thereby, submitted an application dated 20.12.2016
5before the Tahsildar, Yacharam Mandal, for mutation of
his name and issuance of pattadar passbook. Upon such
application, notice was issued to the 2nd defendant.
iv. In response thereto, the 2nd defendant, by his reply dated
10.03.2017, for the first time set up a hostile claim by
denying the very sale in favour of the plaintiff. 2nd
defendant asserted that the suit property had fallen to his
share in a partition suit in O.S.No.33 of 1990 and further
claimed that he had executed a Gift Settlement Deed
dated 18.04.2006 in favour of his son, the 1st defendant,
in respect of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff has
specifically pleaded that the said partition decree was
collusive in nature and that the 2nd defendant had no
right, title or interest to execute the said Gift Settlement
Deed.
v. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that he had no
knowledge of the said Gift Settlement Deed dated
18.04.2006 until the reply of the 2nd defendant dated
10.03.2017 before the Tahsildar. It is only thereafter that
the cause of action arose, compelling him to institute the
present suit on 03.07.2017. The plaintiff has asserted
that the suit is within limitation, as it was filed within the
prescribed period from the date of knowledge.
6
vi. It is also borne out from the record that, in view of the
objection raised by the 2nd defendant, the Tahsildar
advised the parties to approach the competent civil Court,
and the plaintiff was constrained to initiate the present
proceedings for declaration and recovery of possession.
Written Statement (Respondents/Defendants case)
7. The respondents/defendants filed their written statement
resisting the suit, inter alia, denying the title and possession of
the appellant/plaintiff, wherein it was specifically contended
that:
i. The plaintiff was never in possession of the suit schedule
property pursuant to the alleged Sale Deed of 1971;
ii. The 2nd defendant had been in continuous, open,
uninterrupted and hostile possession of the property for
several decades;
iii. The defendants have perfected their title by way of
adverse possession; and
iv. The 1st defendant has been in possession pursuant to the
Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006.
v. The defendants further relied upon various revenue
records, including pahanies from as early as 1964-65
7onwards, to substantiate their plea of long-standing
possession.
Interlocutory Application (I.A.No.1189 of 2017 in
O.S.No.981 of 2017)
8. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants filed
I.A.No.1189 of 2017 under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read
with Section 151 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint on the
ground that the suit was barred by limitation and did not
disclose a valid cause of action.
9. The plaintiff filed a detailed counter opposing the said
application, contending that the question of limitation involved
disputed questions of fact and that the plaint disclosed a clear
cause of action, which required adjudication in a full-fledged
trial.
Impugned Order of the trial Court
10. The trial Court, by order dated 08.02.2019, allowed the
said application and rejected the plaint, wherein it held as
under:
Thus in my considered opinion the plaint filed by the
respondent/plaintiff seeking relief of declaration that the gift settlement
deed in favour of first defendant is null and void and that he is entitled
to recovery of possession is not tenable and the plaint is deserves to be
rejected. Accordingly, accepting the contention of the counsel for the
petitioner/defendant, and following the decision relied on by him, I am of
the view that the present petition filed under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC
can be allowed.
8
13. In the result, the present petition filed by the petitioner/
defendant to rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(a)& (d) of C.P.C, is
hereby allowed and consequently the plaint is hereby rejected as barred
by Limitation and lack of valid cause of action. Let a decree may be
drawn to that effect.
11. Accordingly, the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule
11(a) and (d) CPC.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant (Plaintiff)
12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff
assailed the impugned order and decree dated 08.02.2019
passed in I.A.No.1189 of 2017 in O.S.No.981 of 2017 and
advanced his submissions as under:
i. That the trial Court committed a manifest error in placing
reliance upon the written statement filed by the
respondents/defendants and the revenue records
(pahanies) produced by them while adjudicating an
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. It is a well-
settled principle that, for the purpose of deciding an
application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, the Court is
required to confine itself strictly to the averments
contained in the plaint and the documents forming part
thereof. The defence set up by the
respondents/defendants cannot be looked into at that
stage. By undertaking an examination of the pahanies
9and other defence material, the trial Court has virtually
conducted a roving enquiry, which is impermissible in
law.
ii. That the issue of limitation, particularly in cases where
the appellant/plaintiff asserts knowledge of the cause of
action on a specific date, constitutes a mixed question of
fact and law and cannot be adjudicated without a full-
fledged trial. In the present case, the appellant/plaintiff
has categorically pleaded that he came to know about the
execution of the Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006
only on 10.03.2017, when the 2nd defendant submitted
his reply before the Tahsildar. Such pleading is required
to be taken as true for the limited purpose of deciding an
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. If so construed,
the suit instituted on 03.07.2017 is well within the
limitation prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, insofar as the relief of declaration is concerned,
and under Article 65, insofar as recovery of possession
based on title is concerned. However, the trial Court,
failed to advert to this crucial pleading and erroneously
held the suit to be barred by limitation.
iii. That the plaint comprises two distinct and independent
reliefs, namely, (i) declaration that the Gift Settlement
10Deed is null and void, and (ii) recovery of possession.
Even assuming, without conceding, that one of the reliefs
is barred by limitation, the entire plaint could not have
been rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The settled
position of law is that rejection of plaint is permissible
only where the entire suit is barred by law. If the plaint
discloses any triable cause of action, the matter ought to
proceed to trial. The trial Court mechanically rejected the
plaint in its entirety without examining this aspect.
iv. That a meaningful reading of the plaint clearly discloses a
complete cause of action. The appellant/plaintiff has
asserted his title on the basis of a registered Sale Deed
dated 20.01.1971, pleaded constructive possession
through the 2nd defendant, who was entrusted with the
property as a caretaker, and specifically averred that he
came to know of the impugned Gift Settlement Deed only
in March, 2017. These facts constitute a bundle of
essential facts giving rise to a right to sue.
v. That the plea of adverse possession raised by the
respondents/defendants in their written statement is
purely a defence, which requires strict proof. The
appellant/plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the
possession of the 2nd defendant was permissive in nature,
11as he was entrusted with the property for cultivation.
Whether such possession is permissive or adverse is a
disputed question of fact, which can be adjudicated only
upon appreciation of evidence during trial. Thus, the trial
Court cannot accept the respondents/defendants’ plea of
adverse possession at the threshold and reject the plaint.
vi. Further, the reliance is placed on the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Kumarakurubaran v.
P.Narayanan & others and Babasaheb Ramdas
Shirole & Ors. v. Rohit Enterprises & others wherein
it has been consistently held that when the plaint
specifically pleads the date of knowledge, such averment
must be accepted at the threshold and the question of
limitation, being a mixed question of law and fact, cannot
be summarily decided under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
without appreciation of evidence; and unless the bar of
limitation is ex facie apparent from the plaint, the suit
cannot be rejected at the preliminary stage.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents (Defendants)
13. The learned counsel appearing for the
respondents/defendants supported the impugned order and
decree and advanced the following submissions:
12
i. That the appellant/plaintiff claims to have purchased the
property under a Sale Deed dated 20.01.1971, but
admittedly did not initiate any proceedings for recovery of
possession for several decades. The revenue records
(pahanies), which are public documents, disclose that the
respondents/defendants and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the suit property from as early as 1964-65
onwards. Such long, continuous and uninterrupted
possession amounts to ouster of the appellant/plaintiff’s
title and establishes adverse possession. The suit, having
been filed only in the year 2017, is hopelessly barred
under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a
period of 12 years for recovery of possession based on
title.
ii. That the plaint does not disclose any valid cause of
action. Though the appellant/plaintiff alleges that the
property was entrusted to the 2nd defendant, there is
neither any documentary evidence nor any specific
pleading to show that the appellant/plaintiff ever
demanded possession or that the respondents/defendants
denied his title at any point prior to 2017. The mere filing
of an application for mutation in the year 2016 does not
13give rise to a fresh cause of action nor does it extend the
period of limitation.
iii. That although the Court is primarily required to examine
the plaint while considering an application under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC, it is permissible to consider documents
referred to in the plaint and forming part of the record. In
the present case, the appellant/plaintiff himself has
referred to the Sale Deed and the Gift Settlement Deed.
The respondents/defendants produced revenue records to
demonstrate that the suit is ex facie barred by limitation.
Thus, the trial Court rightly took note of such material to
conclude that the appellant/plaintiff had no subsisting
title or enforceable right.
iv. That even if the plaint averments are taken at face value,
the appellant/plaintiff admits that he was not in actual
physical possession of the suit property for several
decades after 1971. Appellant/plaintiff’s plea that the
property was entrusted to the 2nd defendant is
unsupported by any averment of acknowledgment of title
within the statutory period. In the absence of such
pleading, the continuous possession of the
respondents/defendants necessarily assumes the
character of adverse possession. Hence, the suit is clearly
14barred by limitation, and the rejection of the plaint by the
trial Court is justified.
v. The respondents/defendants in support of their case has
relied on the following decisions:
e) Chintala Narasimha Reddy v. B. Satyanarayana 5
f) Gajara Vishnu Gosavi v. Prakash Nanasaheb
Kamble 6
14. I have taken note of the respective submissions made and
the material on record including the plaint and written
submissions.
Consideration by this Court
15. The scope and ambit of Order VII Rule 11 CPC are no
longer res integra and stand crystallized through a catena of
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The settled position is
1
2019 (3) ALD 177
2
2023 (4) ALT 38
3
2024 (2) ALD 74
4
2024 (5) ALD 64
5
2017 (5) ALT 8
6
(2009) 10 SCC 654
7
Second Appeal No.190 of 2004 dated 25-09-2025
15
that, for the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC, the Court must confine its consideration strictly
to the averments contained in the plaint and the documents
forming part thereof. The defence taken by the defendant in the
written statement or any material produced by the defendants,
is entirely irrelevant at that stage. The Court cannot traverse
beyond the plaint. The question of rejection of plaint is to be
determined by reading the plaint as a whole. The Court while
considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC does
not examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the plaint, but proceeds on the assumption that the
averments in the plaint are true. The sole test is whether, if the
facts alleged are accepted as true, they disclose or give rise to a
cause of action or make out a case for maintainability. The
Court cannot conduct a mini-trial test of truthfulness or weigh
the credibility of the plaintiff’s assertions.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Saleem Bhai and Ors. v.
State of Maharashtra and Ors 8, held that the Court while
deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC has to
only consider the averments in the plaint and that the pleas
taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly
irrelevant. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shakti Bhog
8
(2003) 1 SCC 557
16
Food Industries Ltd. v. The Central Bank of India and Ors 9,
held that the pleadings in plaint ought to be read as a whole
without compartmentalizing, isolation, dissection, inversion of
the language in the plaint, in order to ascertain its true
meaning.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and
Ors. v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express
and Ors 10, held that so long as the plaint discloses some cause
of action which requires determination, the Court cannot reject
it on the threshold merely because it is of the opinion that the
plaintiff may not succeed in his case.
18. Insofar as the question of limitation is concerned,
rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is
warranted only from the statement made in the plaint, on a
plain reading of the plaint itself, the suit appears to be ex facie
barred by the law of limitation. In cases, where the issue of
limitation involves disputed questions, including the starting
point or date of knowledge, the same constitutes a mixed
question of fact and the plaint cannot be rejected at the
threshold. Where the plaintiff specifically pleads that he came to
know of the impugned transaction (such as gift deed or sale
9 AIR 2020 SC 2721
10 (2006) 3 SCC 100
17
deed) only on a particular date, that pleading must be taken as
true for the purpose of an application under Order VII Rule 11
CPC. The question whether the plaintiff had knowledge at an
earlier point of time is a question of fact that cannot be decided
without a trial being drastic in nature, contemplates rejection of
the plaint as a whole, and not in part. Therefore, if the plaint
discloses any triable cause of action or any part of the relief is
maintainable, the plaint cannot be rejected and the matter must
necessarily proceed to trial.
19. In this regard, it is significant refer to the following
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which have
consistently held that when the question of limitation involves
disputed facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues
cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC:
(i) P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan and Ors 11, while
dealing with the starting date of limitation period under Article 59
observed as:
“11. It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
governs suits seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes
a period of limitation of three years from the date when the Plaintiff
first had knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief. The
emphasis Under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction per
se, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases
involving allegations of fraud or unauthorized execution of
documents, hinges upon the date on which the Plaintiff acquired
knowledge of such facts.
12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to
whether the Appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the
transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding
the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily11
MANU/SC/0593/2025
18require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage, the
averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and
assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically
pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of
limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed
question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the
threshold stage Under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without
permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.”
(ii) Daliben Valjibhai and Ors. v. Prajapati Kodarbhai
Kachrabhai and Anr 12.
10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the
Defendants made an application for correcting the revenue records
only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy
Collector issued notice to the Plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was
the time when the Plaintiffs came to know about the execution of
the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was
instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court came to the
correct conclusion that Under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit
can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it proceeded to
return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the
knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration.
In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in
allowing the application Under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were
not evident from the plaint averments itself. The High Court was
also not justified in holding that the limitation period commences
from the date of registration itself. In this view of the matter the
judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.
(ii) Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar 13:
“…. the plea regarding the date on which the Plaintiffs gained
knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question
whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable
issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold.”
20. A perusal of the impugned order would disclose that the
trial Court has extensively relied upon the revenue records
(pahanies) produced by the respondents/defendants, said to
pertain to the period from 1964-65 onwards, to conclude that
the respondents/defendants were in long-standing possession of
12 MANU/SC/1433/2024
13 (2018) 6 SCC 422
19
the suit schedule property and that the appellant/plaintiff had
not asserted his rights for several decades.
21. Such an approach, in the considered view of this Court, is
clearly impermissible in law. The trial Court, while exercising
jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, was required to
confine itself to the averments in the plaint alone. The written
statement filed by the respondents/defendants and the
documents annexed thereto could not have been looked into at
that stage. By placing reliance on such material, the trial Court
has travelled beyond the plaint, undertaken an evaluation of
disputed facts, and, in effect, conducted a summary
adjudication on merits, which is wholly outside the scope of
22. It is pertinent to note that the plaint contains a specific
and categorical averment that the appellant/plaintiff came to
know of the execution of the Gift Settlement Deed dated
18.04.2006 only on 10.03.2017, when the 2nd defendant
submitted his objections before the Tahsildar. This averment,
for the limited purpose of deciding an application under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC, is required to be accepted as true. Further, if
such pleading is taken at face value, the suit instituted on
03.07.2017, insofar as the relief of declaration is concerned,
20
cannot be said to be ex facie barred under Article 58 of the
23. Likewise, in respect of the relief of recovery of possession
based on title, governed by Article 65, the question as to when
the possession of the respondents/defendants became adverse
to the appellant/plaintiff is a matter requiring evidence. The
appellant/plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the possession
of the 2nd defendant was permissive, as that of a caretaker. The
said pleading is extracted hereunder:
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that from the said date of
purchase the Plaintiff was in peaceful possession and enjoyment
of the Suit Schedule Property. The Plaintiff humbly submits that
the Plaintiff being the Government Employee in mobile soil testing,
in Agricultural Department of Telangana State (earlier State of
Andhra Pradesh) had been on lines from home town and also
worked in Hyderabad City, Thandur, Pargi and other places in
Telangana Region. The Plaintiff further humbly submits that due
to the said nature of his employment the Plaintiff has requested
Defendant No.2, his maternal uncle to look after agricultural
activity of the Suit Schedule Property along with Defendant No.2
agricultural activity and, as such, Defendant No.2 has been
looking into and paying the proceeds from said activity to Plaintiff
till last year.
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Further, the question as to whether the
respondents/defendants’ possession had at any point assumed
the character of adverse possession, and if so, the precise point
of time from which such adverse possession commenced,
cannot be determined solely on the basis of the averments
contained in the plaint, particularly when the appellant/plaintiff
21
has specifically pleaded that the possession of the
respondents/defendants was permissive in nature. Thus, the
trial Court committed a manifest error in concluding that the
suit was ex facie barred by limitation.
25. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the said
decisions hereunder:
38. In this connection, we may emphasis that a person pleading
adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is
trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly
plead and establish all the facts necessary to establish his
adverse possession. For all the above reasons, the plea of
limitation put forward by the appellant, or by Defendant Nos. 2 to
5 as the case may be, is rejected.
Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and Ors 15.
11. In the eye of law, an owner would be deemed to be in
possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use
of the property by the owner even for a long time won’t affect his
title. But the position will be altered when another person takes
possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse
possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title
in denial of the title of true owner.
It is a well- settled principle that a party claiming adverse
possession must prove that his possession is ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec
precario’, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession
must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show
that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start
with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual,
visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period.
(See : S M Karim v. Bibi Sakinal MANU/SC/0236/1964 :
[1964]6SCR780 , Parsinni v. Sukhi MANU/SC/0575/1993 :
(1993)4SCC375 and D N Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka
MANU/SC/0766/1997 : AIR1997SC2930 ).
Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus posited to
hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most
14 AIR 1996 SC 869
15 (2004) 10 SCC 779
22
important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature.
Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a
blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims
adverse possession should show (a) on what date he came into
possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether
the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how
long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was
open and undisturbed.
A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his
favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of true owner, it is for
him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish
his adverse possession.
(Dr. Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma
MANU/SC/0231/1996 : AIR1996SC869 ).
26. Further, the Karnataka High Court in S.D. Nagaraju and
Ors. v. Sri Shivaganga Education and Charitable Trust
and Ors 16. has held that the inconsistent pleas such as
permissive possession alongside adverse possession, are fatal to
an adverse possession claim and cannot coexist. The relevant
para of the said decision is extracted hereunder:
24. Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 have executed sale deeds Ex. P33 to Ex.
P37 in respect of the suit schedule properties in favour of
defendant Nos. 1 to 5 on the basis of the resolution of the TMC,
Sira. This resolution was set aside by the Deputy Commissioner in
appeal No. 8/2000-01. The trial Court has therefore set aside the
sale deeds at Ex. P33 to Ex. P37 and declared the plaintiff as the
owner of the properties. The title of the vendor of the plaintiff has
been confirmed in the decree in O.S. No. 5/1984. When the trial
Court has concluded that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit
schedule properties and defendant Nos. 6 to 8 had no right over
the same, the question of other defendants having any right over
the said properties cannot arise. The very defence raised by the
defendants before the Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur in appeal
No. 8/2000-01 cuts the plea of adverse possession because
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 had set up a plea of permissive possession,
which is totally analogous or inconsistent with the plea of adverse
possession. They being diametrically opposite to each other
cannot go hand in hand. The defendants have right to take up
16
MANU/KA/2085/2015
23
inconsistent pleas in any suit. But, it does not mean that they are
at liberty to take up any inconsistent pleas which are capable of
eliminating or demolishing one another.
(Emphasis supplied)
27. It is to be noted that on a meaningful and holistic reading
of the plaint, it is evident that the appellant/plaintiff has
asserted title to the suit schedule property under a registered
Sale Deed dated 20.01.1971, pleaded entrustment of the
property to the 2nd defendant for cultivation, and alleged that
the 2nd defendant, without any right or authority, executed a
Gift Settlement Deed in favour of the 1st defendant in the year
2006. It is further pleaded that the appellant/plaintiff acquired
knowledge of the said transaction only in March, 2017. These
averments, taken together, constitute a bundle of material facts
giving rise to a right to sue. If established in evidence, they
would entitle the appellant/plaintiff to seek declaration of the
Gift Settlement Deed as null and void and also recovery of
possession. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaint does not
disclose a cause of action.
28. The following decisions relied upon by the
respondents/defendants are distinguishable both on facts and
law for the following reasons and are therefore inapplicable:
i. In Raghwendra Sharan Singh (supra 3) the plaintiff
himself was an executant of the gift deed, had full
24knowledge, and challenged it after about 22 years, which
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held to be a case of clever
drafting to overcome limitation. In contrast, the present
appellant/plaintiff is not an executant of the gift deed
which was executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of
defendant No.2. The plaintiff has specifically pleaded lack
of knowledge until 10.03.2017. Limitation in present case
is thus, a mixed question of fact and law and not
amenable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
ii. In Ramisetty Venkatanna (supra 4) the plaintiffs
indirectly questioned a 1953 partition without challenging
it and filed the suit after six decades, leading to rejection
for clever drafting. Here, the appellant/plaintiff directly
challenges the Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006 and
filed the suit promptly upon knowledge.
iii. In the case of Vasantha (supra 5), the plaintiff was aware
of possession and failed to seek recovery, and limitation
ran from a definite legal event. In the present case, the
appellant/plaintiff pleads that the defendant No.1 was
asked to look after the suit schedule property (thereby
pleading permissive possession to the defendant No.1)
and lack of knowledge of the execution of gift deed by the
defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 and seeks
25both declaration and possession. Limitation here depends,
begins to run from the date of knowledge, which requires
evidence and cannot be decided at the threshold.
iv. In Bhagwantpal Singh (supra 6) the plaint was vague
and suppressed material facts despite long-standing
knowledge. In contrast, the present plaint clearly
discloses the date and source of knowledge, with no
suppression or ambiguity apparent on its face.
v. In Chintala Narasimha Reddy (supra 7), the plaint itself
disclosed that the claim was based on an unregistered
sale deed of 1987 and that the plaintiff was never in
possession, leading the Court to hold the suit as ex facie
barred by limitation and liable for rejection under Order
VII Rule 11(d) CPC. In contrast, the present plaint is
founded on a registered sale deed of 1971, coupled with a
specific plea that the impugned gift deed came to the
appellant/plaintiff’s knowledge only in 2017. Thus, the
ban of limitation is not apparent on the face of the plaint
but depends on disputed facts such as knowledge and
possession, making it a mixed question of law and fact
not amenable to rejection at the threshold.
vi. In Gajara Vishnu Gosavi (supra 8) the case pertained to
a purchaser of an undivided share in joint family
26property, where it was held that in the absence of
partition, possession could not be claimed, based on
concurrent findings after trial. In contrast, the present
case is founded on absolute title under a registered sale
deed, coupled with a specific plea of permissive
possession and a challenge to a subsequent gift deed by
the person who was granted permissive possession. The
questions of adverse possession, limitation, and date of
knowledge are disputed and cannot be decided at the
threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Hence, the said
judgment has no application.
vii. In Ashok Kumar Mahto (supra 9) the case pertains to
proof of partition in joint family property, decided after full
trial on evidence. The present case, however, involves a
challenge to a subsequent gift deed allegedly executed
without title, based on prior ownership (which stood
divested) on account of execution of a registered sale deed
in favour of the plaintiff) and alleged permissive
possession. The issues herein relate to title, possession,
and limitation based on knowledge, which require
adjudication upon evidence and which cannot be decided
in an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
27
29. It is also relevant to note that the plaint seeks multiple
reliefs, such as declaration and recovery of possession. The
cause of action for the relief of declaration is specifically linked
to the date of knowledge, i.e., 10.03.2017. Even assuming, for
the sake of argument, that the relief of recovery of possession is
open to challenge on the ground of limitation, the relief of
declaration cannot be said to be ex facie barred on the basis of
the plaint averments. Nonetheless, the trial Court, rejected the
plaint in its entirety without examining whether any part of the
claim was maintainable. Such an approach is contrary to the
settled principles governing Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The proper
course would have been to frame appropriate issues, including
on limitation and adverse possession, and decide the same upon
appreciation of evidence.
30. Further, there is a distinction between a plaint that does
not disclose a cause of action and a plaint that has no cause of
action. For determining whether the plaint discloses a cause of
action under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court must look only
at the plaint, and if the plaint, on a plain and meaningful
reading, shows a bundle of facts that gives the plaintiff a right to
sue it cannot be rejected even if the defence is strong.
28
Conclusion
31. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered
view that the impugned order and decree of the trial court in
I.A.No.1189 of 2017 in O.S.No.981 of 2017 are unsustainable in
law. The trial court has acted beyond its jurisdiction under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC by considering the written statement and
extraneous documentary evidence, and by prejudging the issues
of limitation and cause of action which require a full-fledged
trial.
32. Accordingly, this Appeal Suit is allowed. The order and
decree dated 08.02.2019 passed by the Principal Senior Civil
Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, in I.A.No.1189 of
2017 in O.S.No.981 of 2017 are hereby set aside.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any in
the appeal, shall stand closed. No costs.
__________________________
G.M.MOHIUDDIN, J
Date:17.04.2026
Note: LR copy to be marked.
B/o.
szt
