Patna High Court – Orders
Maina Devi vs The State Of Bihar on 28 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.6501 of 2026
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Maina Devi wife of Late Mangal chaude Resident of village- Godadhowa,
P.O.- Haveli Kharagpur, P.S.- Kharagpur, Dist- Munger
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Old
Secretariat, Patna
2. The Addl. Chief Secretary, Department of Home, Bihar, Patna
3. The Director General of Police, Bihar, Patna
4. The Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna
5. The Superintendent, Central Prison, Bhagalpur
6. The Accountant General, Bihar, Patna.
... ... Respondent/s
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Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Dhananjay Kumar Pandey, Advocate
For the A.G. : Dr. Anand Kumar, Advocate
: Ms. Kamya Thakur, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Syed Hussain Mojeed, AC to SC-6
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
2 28-04-2026
Heard the parties.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for
quashing the order dated 17.04.2008 vide order no. 77
(Annexure-6) passed by the Suprintendent, Central Prison,
Bhagalpur whereby service of husband of the petitioner namely
Mangal Chauda who was passed as Jail Guard (Katchpal) was
terminated on the ground of unauthorized leave and also for a
direction to the respondents to pay arrears of husband of the
petitioner including pension and other benefit which husband of
the petitioner entitled, petitioner having no any source of
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income and facing monitory crisis regularly represented before
the respondents but, no action taken as yet.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the late husband of the petitioner was posted as Prison Guard
(katchpal), who served in different jails in the State of Bihar and
Jharkhand. Memo of Charge was served upon the late husband
of the petitioner vide memo No. 1399 dated 25.04.2007 for his
unauthorised absence from 09.11.2023. The late husband of the
petitioner was directed to file his show cause reply in the
departmental proceeding, which he submitted on 19.05.2007.
After enquiry, the late husband of the petitioner was again
directed to submit his second show cause reply on 26.09.2007,
which he duly submitted on 03.10.2007. The late husband of the
petitioner was held guilty and last opportunity was given to him
to submit his reply before the Superintendent, Bhagalpur
Central Jail vide Memo No. 4820 dated 12.12.2007 and finally
vide order contained in Memo No. 1393 dated 17.04.2008,
issued under the signature of the Superintendent, Central Jail,
Bhagalpur, the late husband of the petitioner was terminated
from service and it was further directed that for the period he
remained unauthorizedly absent from duty, will not be treated to
be on duty and no payment will be made on the principal of no
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work no pay. He further submits that the late husband of the
petitioner died on 15.08.2016 and prior to his death, nothing
was paid to him.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the case of the petitioner deserves sympathetic consideration,
since her late husband was terminated from service in the year,
2008 and died on 15.08.2016 and no payment has been made to
her or her late husband, by the respondent authorities.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent-State submits that although the punishment
order was passed on 17.04.2008, but no statement has been
made that whether the late husband of the petitioner accepted
the said punishment or had challenged the same or not. He
submits that the writ petition has been filed in the year 2026,
challenging the order of dismissal of the year 2008, which is fit
to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and on the
principal of waiver and acquiescence.
6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and after going through the record, it appears that the impugned
order of punishment has been passed vide Memo No. 1393
dated 17.04.2008 and the late husband of the petitioner died on
15.08.2016. Nothing has been brought on record to suggest that
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whether the late husband of the petitioner has challenged the
said order or had accepted the same. During his lifetime,
whether the late husband of the petitioner assailed the order or
not, is also not clear. Further, no document has been brought on
record to show that whether he raised any objection before any
authority for his grievance or not. The law in this regard is very
much clear. The late husband of the petitioner waived his right
by not challenging the same or accepted the same and now, after
a delay of almost 18 years, the present writ petition has been
filed.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a case
reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 (State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others versus Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors) in paragraph
nos. 20, 21, 22.2 and 23 has held as follows:-
“20. The Court also quoted the following passage
from Halsbury’s Laws of England (para 911,
p. 395) : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam
v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007)
1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, para 12)
“12. … ‘In determining whether there has
been such delay as to amount to laches, the
chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred
on the defendant’s part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean
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standing by while the violation of a right is in
progress, but assent after the violation has
been completed and the claimant has become
aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a
remedy where, by his conduct, he has done
that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his
conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a
position in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards to
be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and
delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of laches.'”
21. Holding that the respondents had also
acquiesced in accepting the retirements, the
appeal of U.P. Jal Nigam was allowed with
the following reasons : (Jaswant Singh case
[U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11
SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC p.
471, para 13)
“13. In view of the statement of law as summarised
above, the respondents are guilty since the
respondents have acquiesced in accepting the
retirement and did not challenge the same in
time. If they would have been vigilant enough,
they could have filed writ petitions as others
did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it
appears that the claimants lost time or whiled
it away and did not rise to the occasion in
time for filing the writ petitions, then in such
cases, the court should be very slow in
granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly,
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question of acquiescence or waiver on the
part of the incumbent whether other parties
are going to be prejudiced if the relief is
granted. In the present case, if the respondents
would have challenged their retirement being
violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps
the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps
to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by
not asserting their rights the respondents have
allowed time to pass and after a lapse of
couple of years, they have filed writ petitions
claiming the benefit for two years. That will
definitely require the Nigam to raise funds
which is going to have serious financial
repercussions on the financial management of
the Nigam. Why should the court come to the
rescue of such persons when they themselves
are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?”
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-
recognised exceptions in the form of laches
and delays as well as acquiescence. Those
persons who did not challenge the wrongful
action in their cases and acquiesced into the
same and woke up after long delay only
because of the reason that their counterparts
who had approached the court earlier in time
succeeded in their efforts, then such
employees cannot claim that the benefit of the
judgment rendered in the case of similarly
situated persons be extended to them. They
would be treated as fence-sitters and laches
and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be
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a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
23. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we
find that the selection process took place in
the year 1986. Appointment orders were
issued in the year 1987, but were also
cancelled vide orders dated 22-6-1987. The
respondents before us did not challenge these
cancellation orders till the year 1996 i.e. for a
period of 9 years. It means that they had
accepted the cancellation of their
appointments. They woke up in the year 1996
only after finding that some other persons
whose appointment orders were also
cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine
years had passed. The earlier judgment had
granted the relief to the parties before the
Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight
that these respondents have not joined service
nor working like the employees who
succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal.
As of today, 27 years have passed after the
issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not
only was there unexplained delay and laches
in filing the claim petition after a period of 9
years, it would be totally unjust to direct the
appellants to give them appointment as of
today i.e. after a period of 27 years when most
of these respondents would be almost 50 years
of age or above.”
8. Similarly this Court vide order dated 24.04.2026
passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6052 of 2026 (Manoj Kumar versus the
State of Bihar and Others), in paragraph no. 7 has held as
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follows:-
“7. Similarly a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide
oral judgment dated 25.02.2020, passed in
C.W.J.C. No.2276 of 2020 (Arun Kumar Mehta
vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.), in paragraph
nos.4 to 8 held as follows:
“4. I have heard the learned counsel for the
parties and gone through the materials on
record. Apparently, there is a delay of
about 07 years in filing the present writ
petition, even if the appellate order dated
15.12.2012 is taken into account, for which
no plausible explanation whatsoever has
been furnished, hence the writ petition is fit
to be dismissed on the ground of principles
of delay and laches, alone.
5. It is a well settled principle of law that stale
claims should not be adjudicated by the
writ courts. In this connection, reference be
had to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court, reported (2015) 15 SCC 602
(State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K.
Zalpuri & Others), paragraph nos. 26 to
28 whereof are reproduced herein below:-
“26. In the case at hand, the employee was
dismissed from service in the year 1999,
but he close not to avail any
departmental remedy. He woke up from
his slumber to knock at the doors of the
High Court after a lapse of five years.
The staleness of the claim remained
stale and it could not have been allowed
to rise like a phoenix by the writ court.
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27. The grievance agitated by the respondent
did not deserve to be addressed on
merits, for doctrine of delay and laches
had already visited his claim like the
chill of death which does not spare
anyone even the one who fosters the idea
and nurtures the attitude that he can
sleep to avoid death and eventually
proclaim “deo gratias” – ‘thanks to
God’.
28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ
court while deciding a writ petition is
required to remain alive to the nature of
the claim and the unexplained delay on
the part of the writ petitioner. Stale
claims are not to be adjudicated unless
non-interference would cause grave
injustice. The present case, needless to
emphasise, did not justify adjudication.
It deserved to be thrown overboard at
the very threshold, for the writ petitioner
had accepted the order of dismissal for
half a decade and cultivated the feeling
that he could freeze time and forever
remain in the realm of constant
present.”
6. In a judgment reported in 1986(4) SCC 566
(State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal
& Ors.), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as
follows:-
“That the High Court in exercise of its
discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent
Patna High Court CWJC No.6501 of 2026(2) dt.28-04-2026
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delay on the part of the petitioner, the
Court may decline to intervene and grant
relief inasmuch as entertaining such a
belated claim would have not only the
effect of inflicting hardship and
inconvenience butalso injustice on third
parties and creation of third party rights
during the interregnum period, is a matter
to be considered while exercising
discretionary writ jurisdiction.”
7. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T. Murali
Babu, it has been ruled thus:
“Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches
should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ
court is re-quired to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same.
The court should bear in mind that it is
exercising an extraordinary and equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has
a duty to protect the rights of the citizens
but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive
to the pri-mary principle that when an
aggrieved person, without adequate reason,
approaches the court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a
belated stage should be entertained or not.
Be it noted, delay comes in the way of
equity. In certain circumstances delay and
laches may not be fatal but in most
circumstances inordinate delay would only
Patna High Court CWJC No.6501 of 2026(2) dt.28-04-2026
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at the doors of the court. Delay re- flects
inactivity and inaction on the part of a liti-
gant – a litigant who has forgotten the
basic norms, namely, “procrastination is
the greatest thief of time” and second, law
does not permit one to sleep and rise like a
phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and
causes injury to the lis”.
Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. Through its
Chairman & Managing Director & Anr Vs.
K. Thangappan and Anr would be
apposite:- “Delay or laches is one of the
factors which is to be borne in mind by the
High Court when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution. In an appropriate case the
High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omis- sion on the part of the
applicant to asert his right as taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice to
the opposite party”. It was, therefore,
contended that the appellant itself had
agreed with respondent 2 to pay bonus for
1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956 according to
the terms of the bonus agreement. It was
also pointed out that the appellant ahd not
pressed its objection with regard to
jurisdiction before the labour court or the
industrial court. But it appears that the
decision of this Court in Prakash Cotton
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Mills case 1962 (1) LLJ 108] (vide supra)
was given on February 16, 1961 after the
decision of K. K. Desai, J., on July 1, 1960
and before the decision of the Letters
Patent Bench on February 6, 1962. In the
circumstances of this case, we do not
consider that there is such acquiescence on
the part of the appellant as to disentitle it
to a grant of writ under Art. 226 of the
Constitution. It is true that the issue of a
writ certiorari is largely a matter of sound
discretion. It is also true that the writ will
not be granted if there is such negligence
or omission on the part of the applicant to
assert his right as, taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other
circumstance, cause prejudice to the
adverse party. The principle is to a great
extent, though not identical with, similar to
the exercise of discretion in the Court of
Chancery. The principle has been clearly
stated by Sri Barnes Peacock in Lindsay
Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurd, Abram Farewell and John Kemp
[Law Reports 5 P.C., 221 at 239] as
follows:”
Now the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
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that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these
cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay
of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are the
length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might
affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as relates to the
remedy.”
8. Having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, considering the
submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties as also taking into account
the law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the cases referred to hereinabove,
regarding the principles of delay and
laches, this Court finds that as far as the
present case is concerned, no plausible
explanation has been furnished by the
petitioner so as to convincingly explain the
delay in question of about 07 years in
approaching this Court, hence the present
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writ petition is fit to be dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches. Accordingly,
the writ petition stands dismissed.”
9. Considering the above and in view of the settled
legal proposition, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and
the same is dismissed accordingly.
(Ritesh Kumar, J)
AjayMishra/-
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