Madras High Court
M.Srinivasan vs The Estate Officer on 10 April, 2026
2026:MHC:1540
C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RESERVED ON : 26.02.2026
DELIVERED ON : 10.04.2026
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI
C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
and
C.M.P.Nos.27702 & 29893 of 2025
C.R.P.No.5506 of 2025:
M.Srinivasan ... Petitioner
Vs.
The Estate Officer,
Chennai District,
(Tamil Nadu Public Premises
Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1975),
th
4 floor, Chennai Collectorate,
Chennai. ...
Respondent
PRAYER: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, praying to set aside the order passed by the
Principal Sessions Judge, City Civil Court at Chennai in C.M.A.No.9
th
of 2025 dated 12 September, 2025 and allow the present Civil
Revision Petition.
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
C.R.P.No.6059 of 2025:
M/s.Gopal Naicker and Sons,
Rep. by its Partner Mr.Harikrishnan and C.V.Baskar,
No.1, Cochrane Basin Road,
Chennai – 600 021. ... Petitioner
Vs.
The Estate Officer,
Chennai District,
(Tamil Nadu Public Premises
Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1975),
th
4 floor, Chennai Collectorate,
Chennai. ...
Respondent
PRAYER: Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, praying to set aside the order passed by the
Principal Sessions Judge, City Civil Court at Chennai in
th
C.M.A.No.10 of 2025 dated 12 September, 2025, confirming the
order passed by the respondent in his proceedings dated
17.03.2025 Proc.J6/65759/1995 and allow the present Civil
Revision Petition.
For Appellants : Mr.B.Kumar,
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
Senior Counsel
for Mr.A.K.Raghavulu
[In C.R.P.No.5506/25]
: Mr.R.Parthasarathy,
Senior Counsel
for Mr.A.K.Pradeep
[In C.R.P.No.6059/25]
For Respondent : Mr.R.Ramanlaal,
Additional Advocate General,
Assisted by Mr.T.Arunkumar,
Additional Government Pleader
[In both C.R.Ps.]
COMMON ORDER
The revision petitioners, aggrieved by the judgment of the
Principal Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in the
respective C.M.A.Nos.9 of 2025 and 10 of 2025, have come up by
way of these revision petitions.
2.I have heard Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for
Mr.A.K.Raghavulu, learned Counsel for the revision petitioners in
C.R.P.No.5506 of 2025, Mr.R.Parthasarathy, learned Senior
Counsel for Mr.A.R.Pradeep, learned Counsel for the revision
petitioners in C.R.P. No.6059 of 2025 and Mr.R.Ramanlaal, learned
Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr.T.Arunkumar, learned
Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents.
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
3.As these revisions are connected and arises out of similar
proceedings pertaining to the very same subject matter, with the
consent of all the learned counsel, the revisions have been heard
together.
4.Brief facts leading to the present revision petitions are as
follows:
4.1.The revision petitioners claim that an extent of 43
grounds and 1868 sq.ft was originally given by way of a
Government Grant to Gopal Naicker and sons [revision petitioners
in C.R.P.No.6059 of 2025], way back in the year 1884. The said
Gopal Naicker and sons had put up an iron casting foundry and
have been in lawful occupation of the said property comprised in
R.S.Nos.1801, 1802/4 and 1802/14. According to the petitioners, in
1903, sons of Gopal Naicker entered into a registered partition
deed, registered as Document No.1213 of 1903. There was a
partition suit in C.S.No.135 of 1965, in which proceedings, an
extent of 10 ground fell to the share of the said C.L.Madhanagopal,
which was also affirmed in a subsequent compromise decree dated
30.10.1990 in C.S.No.947 of 1990. The property tax as well as
electricity consumption charges are being paid by the revision
petitioners.
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
4.2.The Government, under G.O.Ms.No.1696, Revenue
Department dated 04.06.1959, has confirmed the Grant dated
31.03.1888, being a lease for 43 grounds, for an indefinite period,
in favour of Gopal Naicker and sons. The petitioners have been
assured of peaceful possession of the said lands without any
disturbance, unless it is required for any public purpose or for any
other grave reasons. A portion of the lands were acquired for
public purpose for establishing a play ground for Subbarayan
Nadar Higher Secondary School and it was only the original
grantees who were paid compensation in terms of the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act. A request that emanated from the
Collector of Madras for capping the tenure of lease in respect of
the remaining lands, post acquisition was also negatived by the
State Government, affirming that the lease was of a permanent
nature.
4.3.In the mean time, the District Collector issued a show
cause notice on 15.10.2018, seeking resumption of lands. The said
order was challenged before the Commissioner of Land
Administration. However, the said challenge was unsuccessful with
the appeal being dismissed on 20.10.2020. The petitioners filed
W.P.Nos.17027 of 2020 and 66 of 2021, which were dismissed by
the Writ Court. However, as against the said dismissal of the Writ
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
Petition, Writ Appeals are pending in W.A.No.2535 of 2023 & 2194
of 2023.
4.4.In the Writ Appeal proceedings, a common order was
passed in respect of the revision petitioners recording that the
State Government is at liberty to resort to the provisions of the
Tamil Nadu Public Premises [Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants]
Act, 1975 [hereinafter referred as ‘State PP Act for convenience’].
Insofar as the petitioner in C.R.P.No.5506 of 2025, no conditions
were imposed, directing any deposit of money. However, in respect
of C.R.P.No.6059 of 2025, the Hon’ble Division Bench directed
deposit of Rs.1 crore, besides other directions. Proceedings were
initiated under the PP Act and the Estate Officer by order dated
17.03.2025 directed the revision petitioners to vacate and hand
over possession to the District Collector.
4.5.Aggrieved by the order of the Estate Officer, the
petitioners filed C.M.A.Nos.9 & 10 of 2025, respectively. The
Principal City Civil Court, Chennai confirmed the orders of the
Estate Officer and dismissed the appeals, as against which the
present Civil Revision Petitions have been filed.
5.Contentions of Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
appearing for Mr.A.K.Raghavulu, learned Counsel for the petitioner
in C.R.P.No.5506 of 2025:
5.1.There is no public premises involved in the present case,
for the Estate Officer to invoke the provisions of the PP Act. In this
regard, Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel has taken me through
the provisions of the Central Act, namely The Public Premises
[Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants] Act, 1971, as well as the
State enactment, namely, Tamil Nadu Public Premises [Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants] Act, 1975, to drive home his arguments
that the provisions are pari materia. Mr.B.Kumar, would specifically
take me through the definitions of ‘premises’ under Section 2(d),
‘public premises’ under Section 2(e) and ‘unauthorised occupation’
under Section 2(g).
5.2.His primordial submission is that the Government
themselves wrongly invoked the provisions of the Land
Encroachment Act, 1905 and the said proceedings were dropped
without any further action being taken, especially after an effective
reply was given by the revision petitioner and it is therefore, his
submission that when both the Land Encroachment Act as well as
the Public Premises [Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants] Act,
1971, [hereinafter referred to as Central PP Act, for convenience]
occupy different fields altogether, the very invocation of the
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025provisions of the Act was fallacious and unsustainable.
5.3.Drawing my attention to Section 4(3) of the Act,
Mr.B.Kumar, would state that before issuing a notice invoking
section 4, in order to seek eviction of unauthorised occupants, the
Estate Officer has to satisfy the grounds on which the order of
eviction is proposed to be made and thereafter, issue a show cause
notice and conduct fair enquiry. In this regard, it is his submission
that the show cause notice does not make out any justifiable
grounds in the first place and therefore, there is a violation of
mandate of Section 4(2)(a) of the Central PP Act.
5.4.With specific reference to definition of ‘public premises’
under Section 2(e), Mr.B.Kumar, would state that it is nobody’s case
that the revision petitioners had been given a lease on behalf of the
Government or any company defined under Section 3 of the
Companies Act, 1956, in which, company not less than 51% of the
capital is held by the Government. With regard to the definitions
under Section 2 as well as requirements under Section 4,
Mr.B.Kumar, would state that the PP Act itself would have no
application to the facts of the present case, since the revision
petitioner was given a Grant was only in respect of the land alone
and the structure in the form of a factory has been put up only by
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025the revision petitioners.
5.5.As an argument in demurer, Mr.B.Kumar, would contend
that, if at all, without admitting that the provisions of the PP Act
would apply to the lands of the petitioner, even then, the PP Act is
not retrospective in nature, especially when the Act does not
specifically set out such retrospective application. The next
argument placed by Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel is that the
Grant in favour of the revision petitioner involves property rights
and under Section 300-A of the Constitution of India as well, the
petitioner is entitled to protection.
5.6.It is also his submission that The Tamil Nadu Lease-holds
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Act 27 of
1963), would alone apply to the facts of the case and without taking
recourse to the provisions of the said Act, the respondents could
not have taken any steps to recover possession of the property from
the petitioners.
5.7.The next argument of Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior
Counsel is that when it is the Government which alone has granted
the lands in favour of the revision petitioner, the Estate Officer
exercising jurisdiction under the State PP Act will not be the
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competent person to initiate proceedings, much less pass the
impugned order. To sum up the arguments of Mr.B.Kumar, in short,
Public Premises Act has been incorrectly invoked and in any event
there is neither any public premises nor any unauthorised
occupation for any punitive action to be initiated against the
revision petitioner. The proceedings under the PP Act are summary
in nature and substantial rights involving immovable property
cannot be decided under such summary proceedings contemplated
under the PP Act.
5.8.Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel, in support of his
submissions, has relied on the following decisions:
1) N.Padmamma & others Vs. S.Ramakrishna Reddy &
others reported in 2008 (15) SCC 517.
2) Secretary, Tanjore Union Club Vs. Estate Officer,
Thanjavur City Municipal Corporation, reported in 2022 SC
Online Mad 1957.
3) Teri Oat Estates P.Ltd., Vs. U.T.Chandigarh & others
reported in 2004 (2) SCC 130.
4) Kolkatta Municipal Corporation & Another Vs. Bimal
Kumar Shah & others reported in 2024 (1) SCC 533.
5) State of UP & others Vs. Maharaja Dharmander
Prasad Singh & others and Lucknow Development Authority
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025& others Vs. Maharani Rajalaxi Kumari Devi & others
reported in 1989 (2) SCC 505.
6) Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Thummala
Krishna Rao & another reported in 1982 (2) SCC 134.
7) Asma Lateef & another Vs. Shabbir Ahmed & others
reported in 2024 (4) SCC 696.
8) G.Manikyamma & others Vs. Roudri Co-op Housing
Society reported in 2014 (15) SCC 197.
9) Western Coal Fields Vs. Ballarpur Collieries reported
in 2019 (2) SCC 327.
10) Suhas H Pophale Vs. Oriental Insurance Company
Limited and its Estate Officer reported in 2014 (4) SCC 657.
11) K.Kathalingam Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in
1983 (III) CTC 636.
12) Express News Paper Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Union of India,
reported in 1986 (1) SCC 133.
13) State of Uttar Pradesh (Now Uttarakhand) Vs.
Rabindra Singh reported in 2009 INSC 623
14) Baldeo Raj Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others
reported in 1984 SCC Online ALL 310.
15) Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji Vs. Union of
India & another reported in (2019) 20 SCC 705.
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Sri.Madhayarjuneswaraswami & 5 others reported in 1998 (I)
CTC 630.
6.Arguments of Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for Mr.A.R.Pradeep, learned Counsel for the petitioner in
C.R.P.No.6059 of 2025:
6.1.Apart from advancing arguments on the same lines on
which Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel has projected the case
of the revision petitioner in the other petition, additionally,
Mr.S.Parthasarathy, invites my attention to the Civil Suit filed by
the revision petitioner in C.S.No.861 of 1999, where this Court
recognised the right and possession of the revision petitioner and
granted an interim injunction until further orders. He would
however, fairly bring to my notice that though the suit was
dismissed for non-prosecution, however subsequently, it was
restored to file and the interim order would also therefore revive.
6.2.The revision petitioner is in settled possession of the
lands and not been called upon to pay any rent ever since the grant
was made in 1888.
6.3.Eventhough the order of resumption was unsuccessfully
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025challenged before this Court, he would state that Writ Appeals are
pending and therefore, the issue has not attained finality. Further,
as directed in the Writ proceedings, the petitioner has admittedly
deposited a sum of Rs.1 Crore.
6.4.In support of his submission Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned
Senior Counsel relied on the Full Bench judgment in the case of
Thavvala Veeraswami Vs. Pulim Ramanna & others reported in
AIR 1935 Mad 365 and Ishrat Jahan Vs. Vth A.D.J. & Ors in
W.P.No.4263 of 2004 dated 24.09.2004.
7.Arguments of Mr.R.Ramanlaal, learned Additional Advocate
General, assisted by Mr.T.Arunkumar, learned Additional
Government Pleader appearing for the respondent:
7.1.At the outset, the revisions invoking Article 227 of the
Constitution of India are not maintainable, especially when the
petitioners have not shown any lack of jurisdiction or perversity in
the findings of the Estate Officer as well as the Principal Sessions
Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai.
7.2.Points touching factual matrix which were not agitated
either before the Estate Officer or before the appellate court are
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now being raised for the first time and canvassed in revision, which
is impermissible, that too, under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.
7.3.The order of the Collector was unsuccessfully challenged
before the Writ Court and though the matter is now pending before
the Division Bench in Writ Appeal, there is no interim stay or
protection to the petitioners and in such circumstances,
substantive rights of the revision petitioners have already been
tested in collateral proceedings and it is not open to the petitioners
to agitate the very same issues in these revision petitions.
7.4.Inviting my attention to Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the PP
Act, defining ‘premises’ and ‘public premises’ respectively,
Mr.R.Ramanlaal, learned Additional Advocate General, would state
that the definition of ‘public premises’ should be read along with
the definition of ‘premises’ under Section 2(d) and therefore, it
would also include a case of land as well and in such
circumstances, the arguments advanced by Mr.B.Kumar, learned
Senior Counsel that the Act will have no application is without any
merit.
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7.5.Under Section 10 of the PP Act, finality is provided for
specifically and being a self-contained Code and when a fair
opportunity was given to the revision petitioners by invoking
Section 4 in the manner prescribed under the Act, it is not open to
the revision petitioners to challenge the proceedings under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
7.6.The petitioners are in huge arrears of lease rent to the
respondent and when revenue recovery proceedings were initiated,
the challenge by way of writ petition was unsuccessful. Further,
according to learned Additional Advocate General, as on date, the
petitioners are due more than Rs.30 crores to the Government.
7.7.Meeting the arguments of Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned
Additional Advocate General would state that the suit that was filed
and referred to where an injunction was also granted was only
relating to a challenge to the proceedings under the Revenue
Recovery Act and nothing more and even the injunction that was
granted was only to refrain the official respondents from taking the
revenue recovery proceedings.
7.8.As regards the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, learned
Additional Advocate General would contend that the Estate Officer
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has been conferred with powers under G.O.(P).No.2598 dated
19.11.1978 and therefore, there is nothing improper or irregular in
the exercise of power by the Estate Officer in taking action under
the provisions of the PP Act.
7.9.Inviting my attention to the order passed by the Hon’ble
Division Bench, permitting the respondents to proceed to take
action under the Public Premises Act, Mr.Ramanlaal, learned
Additional Advocate General would state that the said order was
passed in the presence of the revision petitioners and they have
acquired themselves with the maintainability of proceedings under
the PP Act and virtually submitted to the jurisdiction under the Act
and therefore, it is not today open to them to contend that the Act
will have no application.
7.10.As regards compensation paid by the Government to the
grantee, it is the submission of the learned Additional Advocate
General that the compensation was not paid in respect of
S.Nos.1801, 1802/4 and 1802/14, but in respect of a totally
different land, comprised in different survey numbers and
therefore, the fact that compensation was paid to the petitioners
has totally no connection to the subject lands in question.
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7.11.The grant was only in the nature of a lease and it was in
respect of the entire 43 grounds and behind the back of the
Government, the revision petitioners have filed Civil Suits and
effected partitions and now, projecting independent claims, one in
respect of 10 grounds, revision petitioner in C.R.P.No.5506 of 2025
and one in respect of 8 grounds in C.R.P.No.6059 of 2025. He would
further state that when admittedly, the State is not a party to any of
these partition proceedings, it will not bind the respondent in any
manner.
7.12.Referring to the Grant, Mr.Ramanlaal, learned
Additional Advocate General would state that it is not as if the lease
was permanent in nature and any assurance was given to the
revision petitioners that they will never be disturbed, that is since
1888. He would state that it was always open to the State to take
action in a manner known to law to resume possession. Here
according to the learned Additional Advocate General, the lands
are required for a laudable public purpose and when there has
been sub-letting by the petitioners, it is also amounting to violation
of the grant conditions and all these facts have been duly assessed
by the Writ Court while dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the
revision petitioners.
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7.13.Having admitted the lease in their favour, estoppel
under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, would operate
against them and today, it is not open to the petitioners to contend
that there is no grant by way of lease and that the petitioners are
the owners. He would state that, it is not open to the lessee to deny
the title of the Government. In fact, according to the learned
Additional Advocate General, for the first time, in W.P.
[MD]Nos.17027 of 2020 and 66 of 2021, alone, there has been a
claim of ownership made by the revision petitioners.
7.14.He would also refer to the 1959 proceedings, in and
whereby, the Government has turned down the request of the
original grantee, Gopal Naicker and sons, vide petition dated
12.10.1959, for assignment of lands in their favour and for stay of
the operation of G.O.Ms.No.1696, Revenue dated 04.06.1959. In
fact, it is the further submission of Mr.Ramanlaal, learned
Additional Advocate General that the petitioners have even
suppressed the 1959 proceedings, not only before the Writ Court
but also before the Estate Officer, as well as in the appeal before
the Principal City Civil Court, Chennai.
7.15.As regards Mr.B.Kumar’s arguments, insofar as the
necessity to resort to The Tamil Nadu Lease Holders [Abolition and
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Conversion into Ryotwari] Act, 1963, Mr.Ramanlaal, would contend
that the said Act has no application. Inviting my attention to the
notification under the Rules to the said enactment, Mr.Ramanlaal,
would state that the subject lands are not covered under the
notification and therefore, the Act has no application to the subject
lands. As regard the arguments complaining violation of Article
300-A of the Constitution of India, Mr.Ramanlaal, learned
Additional Advocate General would state that the revision
petitioners are only lessees and no rights of property have been
infringed in any manner, especially since the Government alone is
the owner of the subject lands and revision petitioners are mere
encroachers. He would therefore state that neither Article 300–A
nor Article 14 would have any application to the facts of the
present case.
7.16.In support of his submissions, learned Additional
Advocate General has relied on the following decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court:
1) Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd., Vs. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay and others reported in (1974)
2 SCC 402.
2) Life Insurance Corporation of India & another Vs.
Vita reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 2772.
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3) Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & another Vs.
Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi reported in (1995) 6 SCC
576.
ANALYSIS:
8.I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by
both the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners and the
learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the
respondents. I have also gone through the records as well as the
decisions on which reliance has been placed by both the learned
Senior Counsel as well as the learned Additional Advocate
General.
9.The Public Premises [Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants]
Act, 1971 was introduced for providing a mechanism for eviction of
unauthorised occupants from public premises and for incidental
matters. The State of Tamil Nadu, on similar lines passed the Tamil
Nadu Public Premises [Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants] Act,
1975, with the very same objects on which the Central Act came to
be promulgated. In view of the arguments advanced on either side,
it would be relevant to extract the definition of ‘premises’ under
Section 2(d), definition of ‘public premises’ under Section 2(e) and
definition of ‘Unauthorised Occupant’ under Section 2(g). The same
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are usefully extracted hereunder:
2(d) “premises” means any land or any
building or hut or part of a building or hut and
includes,-
(i) gardens, grounds and outhouses, if
any, appertaining to such building or hut for the
more beneficial enjoyment thereof;
(ii) any fittings affixed to such building or
hut or part of a building or hut for the more
beneficial enjoyment thereof;
2(e) “public premises” means any
premises belonging to, or taken on, lease or
requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the
Government, and includes-
(1) any premises belonging to, or taken
on lease by, or on behalf of –
(i) any company as defined in Section 3 of
the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1 of
1956) in which not less than fifty one percent of
the paid-up share capital is held by the
Government; and
(ii) any corporation (not being a company
as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act,
1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956) or a local
authority) established by or under any law and
owned or controlled by the Government; and
(2) any premises belonging to, or vested
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025under any law;
2(g) “unauthorised occupation” in
relation to any public premises, means the
occupation by any person of the public
premises without authority for such occupation
and includes the continuance in occupation by
any person of the public premises after the
authority (whether by way of grant or any other
mode of transfer) under which he was allowed
to occupy the premises has expired or has been
determined for any reason whatsoever.
10.It is the primordial submission of the learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the revision petitioners that the grant in
favour of Gopal Naicker in 1888, was only in respect of vacant
lands and the same will fall outside the scope of definition of ‘public
premises’ under State PP Act. However, I am unable to accept the
said arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the
revision petitioners. ‘Premises’ is defined to include not only
building or hut or part of a building or hut but also land. ‘Public
Premises’ has been defined to be any premises belonging to or
taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Government.
It is an inclusive definition and the definition of ‘Public Premises’
should also take its fold ‘Premises’ as well. Thus, reading Section
2(d) and 2(e) together, I do not see how the vacant lands being
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subject matter of the Grant would not fall within the scope of
‘public premises’ defined under Section 2(e).
11.Even insofar as unauthorised occupation, it includes a
person in occupation of public premises without authority and also
persons who continue to occupy public premises, after the
authority under which the said person was allowed to occupy has
expired, or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. In the
present case, the revision petitioners have been slapped with a
show cause notice under Section 4, calling upon the revision
petitioners as to why they should not be proceeded against for
eviction. The strong thrust of arguments advanced by learned
Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners is that the revision
petitioners are the absolute owners, their rights have been
recognised even by the State, while paying compensation for lands
acquired from them and when there is no lease in the first place,
the question of invoking the provisions of Section 4 of the Act does
not arise.
12.Insofar as the said claims asserting title and interest in
the subject lands, I find that after the Grant was made in the year
1888, when the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.1696, Revenue
Department dated 04.06.1959, portion of the lands in S.No.1802/4
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were exempted for the purpose of play ground for students of
Subbarayan Nadar Higher Secondary School. It is seen that at that
relevant point of time, the petitioners voluntarily approached the
Government and sought the remaining lands in S.No.1802/4 &
1802/14, to be assigned to them besides reconsidering the decision
to assign a portion of the lands in S.No.1802/4, for playground in
and by a memorandum dated 12.11.1959 in Memorandum
No.91173.A3/59-1. The Government has rejected the request of the
revision petitioners. The revision petitioners have not chosen to
challenge the said rejection. Thus, the said order has attained
finality. The stand of the revision petitioners therefore, that they
are owners, grant is perpetual and they are not lessees,
automatically falls to the ground.
13.Coming to the grant itself, it clearly mentions that the
grant was only by way of lease to Gopal Naicker and sons and
having admittedly claimed under the said lease and moved the
Government way back in the year 1959 as well for assignment of
the very same subject lands in their favour, it is not open to the
revision petitioners to turn around and deny the title of the
Government. Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, dealing with
estoppel would come into play and would apply in all force to the
facts of the present case. Therefore, the contention of the revision
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
petitioners that they are the owners and their rights have been
protected in civil suit filed before this Court and further as owners
they have partitioned the properties and are in separate enjoyment
without any interference from any person whomesoever, as rightly
contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that the
partition deeds are amongst the family members / members of
Gopal Naicker and sons alone and even the said suit was only in
respect of the proceedings initiated against the revision petitioners.
14.Insofar as the suit in C.S.No.861 of 1999, it was only
relating to the revenue recovery proceedings initiated against
Gopal Naicker and sons. By interim order dated 25.04.2003, in
C.S.No.861 of 1999, this Court granted an interim injunction
against the State represented by District Collector as well as the
Tahsildar, Thondayarpettai Taluk, from initiating revenue recovery
proceedings, pursuant to proceedings dated 05.07.2002, that too
subject to conditional order that Rs.5 Lakhs shall be deposited
within two months and Gopal Naicker and sons would continue to
th
pay Rs.15,000/- per month on or before 10 of every succeeding
month.
15.In fact, I find that yet another suit was filed by Gopal
Naicker and sons in O.S.No.1858 of 2018, seeking relief of
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permanent injunction to restrain the State of Tamil Nadu
represented by District Collector, Revenue Divisional Officer and
Tahsildar, from dispossessing the plaintiff, namely Gopal Naicker
and sons from the suit schedule property. The said suit, despite the
defendants remaining absent and set ex-parte was dismissed by
judgment dated 09.10.2018.
16.I also find that Gopal Naicker also moved this Court in
W.P.No.379 of 1999, challenging the proceedings initiated under
the Revenue Recovery Act and this Court by order dated
19.03.1999, dismissed the Writ Petition, finding that the petitioner
has not come to Court with clean hands and even through
communication dated 25.09.1999, they have permitted to be
lessees for a period of 99 years and in such circumstances, the said
Gopal Naicker and sons cannot claim to be owners of the subject
lands, claiming right under the 1888 grant. The said order of
dismissal was challenged in W.A.No.621 of 1999 and the Hon’ble
Division Bench, finding no error in the dismissal order, confirmed
the same, giving liberty to the Government to conduct separate
enquiry with regard to arrears of rent and sub-lease and directed
the petitioner to appear for enquiry before the Tahsildar, Fort-
Tondiarpet Taluk, by judgment dated 23.04.1999.
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17.Thereafter, in proceedings No.J6/ 65759/1995 dated
19.06.2019, the District Collector referring to the earlier eviction
notice dated 15.10.2018, moved for termination of lease and
resumption of lands, citing violations of lease conditions. A reply to
the said show cause notice was given by the Gopal Naicker and
sons and the District Collector came to the conclusion that the
stand taken by the lessee claiming right under C.S. 135/1965
partition amongst themselves, would not bind the Government, who
is the true owner of the lands. Further, after unprecedented rain
fall and flooding in entire city of Chennai in 2016, several lakhs of
people have been affected and majority of those being Socio-
economically downtrodden persons, working on daily wages, the
Government has taken policy decisions for restoration of water
bodies, removal of encroachments and rehabilitation of deserving
families by constructing new tenements through Tamil Nadu Slum
Clearance Board, finding that the subject lands would be ideal for
meeting the said object and the fact that the petitioners are
enjoying the Government property and have also violated the lease
conditions by sub-letting the lands, directed resumption of the
entire lands of an extent of 43 grounds and 1868 sq.ft.
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
18.An appeal was preferred by the revision petitioners before
the Commissioner of Land Administration, Chennai – 5 and after
considering the arguments of the revision petitioners in
Proceedings No.E3/15827/2019 dated 27.10.2020, the
Commissioner of Land Administration, dismissed the appeal
petitions filed by the revision petitioners, as being devoid of merits
and the order of the District Collector dated 19.06.2019 was
confirmed. The said order of the Commissioner of Land
Administration was challenged in W.P.Nos.17027 of 2020 and 66 of
2021. The Writ Court, by order dated 21.07.2023, dismissed both
the Writ Petitions, upholding the orders of the District Collector as
well as the Commissioner of Land Administration. This Court also
took note of the vital admissions of the petitioners that the land
belongs to the Government and that they were only lessees and
even in a suit in CS.135/1965, the title of the property being with
the State has been conceded by the petitioners themselves.
19.This said common order was challenged in W.A.Nos.2535
& 2194 of 2023. The Hon’ble Division Bench, by order dated
27.09.2023, passed an interim order. The said order assumes a lot
of significance and relevance for the purpose of arriving at a
decision in these Civil Revision Petitions. Hence, I am extracting
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025
the operative portion of the order of the Division Bench:
“8.Considering the above, we pass the
following order:
(i) The respondent authorities may
proceed ahead with the proceedings under the
Act of 1975 in accordance with law. The
appellants can also participate in the said
proceedings and file reply to the notice, a copy
of which has been handed over to learned
Counsel for the appellants;
(ii)The appellant in W.A.No.2194 of 2023
shall also deposit rupees one crore in the
account of the Collector, Chennai. Upon deposit
of the said amount, the respondent authorities
shall open the lock and seal of the Foundry. The
same is subject to the decision in the present
appeals or in the proceedings under the Act of
1975; and
(iii) In case the proceedings under the Act
of 1975 is not decided within one month, then
the appellant in W.A.No.2194 of 2023 shall
deposit Rupees fifty lakh on lapse of one
month.”
20.As could be seen from the above order, the revision
petitioner in C.R.P.No.6059 of 2025 was directed to deposit Rs.1
crore for enabling the authorities to remove the lock and seal of the
Foundry and the Hon’ble Division Bench made it clear that such a
direction would be subject to the final decision in the Writ Appeals
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025or in the proceedings initiated under the 1975 Act.
21.Admittedly, the revision petitioner has complied with the
said order. In the first clause, the Hon’ble Division Bench gave
liberty to the authorities to proceed under the PP Act, in
accordance with law. It was also made clear that the appellants,
that is the revision petitioners herein, were at liberty to file reply to
the show cause notice provided to them at the hearing before the
Hon’ble Division Bench and participate in the enquiry. The Hon’ble
Division Bench made it clear that in the event of the proceedings
under the PP Act, not being decided within one month, then the
revision petitioner in C.R.P.No.6059 of 2025, was directed to
deposit further Rs.50 Lakhs on the lapse of one month. It is not
brought to my notice as to whether the revision petitioner in
C.R.P.No.6059 of 2025, has even complied with the said direction,
since I find that the proceedings under the PP Act was concluded
only on 17.03.2025.
22.Be that as it may, admittedly, the said order directing the
proceedings to be taken and continued and the provisions of the PP
Act was in the presence of the revision petitioners. If at all, it was
their case that they are owners and the lands in question will not
fall within the scope of the enactment itself, the petitioners either
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025ought to have challenged the said order of the Hon’ble Division
Bench by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
or atleast, should have sought a review, contending that they are
not obligated to go before the authorities under the PP Act as the
Act, would have no application to them. Admittedly, neither of this
has been done. I therefore find force in the submission of
Mr.Ramanlaal, learned Additional Advocate General that the
revision petitioners are bound by the said order of the Division
Bench and are now estopped from raising the issue of
maintainability of proceedings under PP Act.
23.It is contended by Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel
that the Hon’ble Division Bench has only said that the authorities
can go ahead with the proceedings under the Act, 1975, in
accordance with law. Therefore, it was open to the petitioners to
still contend that the Act would not apply. I am unable to agree
with this line of arguments of the learned Senior Counsel. The
incorporation of ‘in accordance with law’ only means that the
action taken under the Public Premises Act would comply with the
mandate of the said enactment and this cannot be construed as
even giving liberty to the revision petitioners to question the very
jurisdiction or application of the Public Premises Act in the first
place. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025petitioners today cannot contend that the Public Premises Act
cannot be invoked against them.
24.As regards the assertion of ownership rights, in several of
their communications including leading up to the civil suit in
C.S.No.861 of 1999, the revision petitioners have admitted title of
the Government and they have acknowledged the fact that they are
only lessees. That is the reason why in 1969, portion of the lands
were sought to be acquired for the purpose of playground for
Subbarayan Nadar Higher Secondary School, the grantee Gopal
Naicker and sons, sought for stay of the Government Order
acquiring said lands and also sought for assigning the entire lands
which are subject matter of the Grant. As rightly contended by
Mr.Ramanlaal, learned Additional Advocate General, the petitioners
have also conveniently suppressed the proceedings of the year
1959, clearly with a view to gain undue advantage for themselves.
25.Even with regard to the contention that it is only Act 23 of
1963, that would have to be complied and not the Public Premises
Act and with regard to the earlier conduct of the respondents in
invoking the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act, 1905 and
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025abandoning the same, as seen from the provisions of the Act 23 of
1963 as well as Rules framed thereunder, the application of the Act
has not been extended to Fort-Tondiarpet, where the subject lands
are admittedly situated and therefore, in such circumstances, the
respondent is not obligated to take recourse to the provisions of the
Act. Thus, I do not see any error committed by the respondents in
taking action under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. The
grant also clearly mentions that lands have been leased out to
Gopal Naicker and sons and their request for assignment of these
lands was also rejected way back in 1959. In such circumstances,
the revision petitioners are only lessees, whose permission has also
been revoked and therefore, there is no impediment for the
respondents to proceed under the Public Premises Act.
26.More importantly, having challenged the order of
resumption before the Writ Court, after exhausting the appeal
remedy before the Commissioner of Law Administration, I do not
see how the present revision petitions are even maintainable, that
too under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The very same
issues have been agitated before the authorities as well as the
Commissioner of Law Administration and before the Writ Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Writ Petitions were
dismissed and admittedly Writ Appeals are pending in which appeal
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025proceedings, a direction was given for proceeding with the enquiry
under the Public Premises Act.
27.I find force in the arguments of learned Additional
Advocate General. When the petitioners have lost their substantive
right by unsuccessful challenge to the resumption proceedings in
respect of the very same subject matter and there being no stay
also before the Division Bench in the pending Writ Appeals, the
petitioners cannot invoke Article 227 in the absence of proof of
material that the original authority as well as the Court sitting in
appeal have acted perversly or with material irregularity
warranting exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India. I do not see any material irregularity or
perversity in the finding of the authority as well as Principal
Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, warranting exercise of
powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
28.Coming to the decisions that have been relied on for the
proposition that when disputed questions of title are involved, then
resort to summary proceedings cannot be taken, I do not see how
these decisions would apply, since in my considered opinion, in
view of the candid admissions made by the petitioners themselves
that they are at best lessees under the original grant and at no
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025point of time, any right or title came to be vested in them.
29.The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suhas H
Pophale‘s case relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel
Mr.B.Kumar, for the proposition that the Public Premises Act does
not have retrospective operation and eviction of the person
aggrieved was subject to his protected vested right under the State
Land Act and therefore, he could not be proceeded against. The
facts of the said case is entirely on a different footing. There was
conflict between the State Rent Control Act and Public Premises
Act and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, on facts, found that the
“occupation” was falling only within the domain of the Tenancy Act
and not ‘unauthorised occupation’ defined under Section 2(g) of the
Public Premises Act. No doubt, the argument of Mr.B.Kumar, with
regard to the application of the Public Premises Act being
prospective appears to be attractive at first blush. It is contended
by learned Additional Advocate General that the Act, no doubt, will
have prospective application and the interpretation given by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard, has to be viewed in the facts
of the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court alone. He would
therefore, state that in respect of retrospective operation, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Public Premises Act of 1971,
would not apply to persons who had already acquired vested rights
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C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025of occupation and were covered by the State Rent Act, even prior
to 1971 and in such circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that the Public Premises Act, 1971 cannot be applied
retrospectively, to take away the vested right and protection given
to the occupants under the State Rent Act.
30.In fact, in a much later decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Life Insurance Corporation‘s case the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has specifically dealt with the ratio laid down in Suhas H
Pophale‘s case and ultimately, held that the Public Premises Act,
1971, will apply to tenancy which may have been created and in
existence before them coming into force of the Act or subsequent
to the coming into force of the Act and the only twin conditions to
be satisfied are that tenancy must fall within the purview of the
definition under Section 2(e) of the Act and premises should have
been in unauthorised occupation. I have already held in detail as to
how these two conditions has been satisfied in the present case.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held in the very same decision
that the invocation and applicability of the provisions of the Act is
not dependent of the act of possession and what is material is
occupation of premises which has become unauthorised occupation
and that occupation is a continuous concept.
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31.With regard to Suhas H Pophale‘s case, the larger
Bench held that the proposition enunciated in the said case, does
not state the correct position of law and are not in consonance with
settled legal principles and have been held to be contrary to
principle of stare decisis and thereby in Life Insurance
Corporation‘s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has overruled the
ratio laid down in Suhas H Pophale‘s case.
32.In such circumstances, there is no merit in the argument
that Public Premises Act will not apply to the Grant made in 1888. I
do not find any material error or perversity or illegality in the
findings arrived at by the Estate Officer, as well as the learned
Principal Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, being the appellate
court, in concurrently holding that the order of resumption passed
by the Estate Officer, after providing a fair opportunity to the
petitioners, was a considered order, warranting interference in
revision, that too under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Thus, I do not see any merit in the revision petitions.
33.Accordingly, these Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected
miscellaneous petitions are closed.
37/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025 10.04.2026 Index : Yes / No NCC : Yes / No MR To 1.The Principal Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. 38/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025 2.The Section Officer, VR Section, Madras High Court, Madras. 39/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025 P.B.BALAJI, J. MR PRE-DELIVERY COMMON ORDER MADE IN C.R.P.Nos.5506 & 6059 of 2025 10.04.2026 40/40 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
