Chattisgarh High Court
M/S Sunil Kumar Agrawal vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 29 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:19816-DB
NAFR
Digitally
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
signed by
BABLU
BABLU RAJENDRA
RAJENDRA BHANARKAR
BHANARKAR Date:
2026.04.30
10:11:55
+0530
WPC No. 1992 of 2026
M/s Sunil Kumar Agrawal Through Proprietor Sunil Kumar Agrawal,
Office At-Sewa Kunj Road, Near Girls College, Raigarh, District-
Raigarh (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Water Resource
Department, Ministry, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nava Raipur,
District- Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Engineer-In-Chief Water Resources Department, Raipur District-
Raipur (C.G.)
3 - Chief Engineer Mahanadi Godavari Basin, Water Resource
Department, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)
4 - Chief Engineer (Tender Cell) O/o EinC Shivanth Bhawan North Block
Sector 19, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, Water Resource Department,
Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.)
5 - Executive Engineer Water Resources Division, Balod, District- Balod
(C.G.)
6 - M/s Ram Shiromani Tiwari Through- Proprietor Ram Shiromani,
Office At-Vardhman Nagar, House No. 103, Rajnandgaon, District
Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner : Ms.Hamida Siddique, Advocate
For Respondents : Mr.Vivek Sharma, Advocate General with
No.1 to 5/State Mr.Praveen Das, Additional Advocate General
2
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
29.04.2026
1. Heard Ms. Hamida Siddique, learned counsel for the petitioner as
well as Mr.Vivek Sharma, learned Advocate General along with
Mr.Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate Geneal appearing for
respondents No.1 to 5/State.
2. By filing the present petition, the petitioner has prayed for following
relief(s) :-
“10.1 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
quash/set-aside the disqualification e-mail issued to the
petitioner by Respondent no. 4.
10.2 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
direct the respondent authority may allow the participation
in Tender no, 186416 NIT No. 08/SAC/25-26, Dated
06.03.2026.
10.3 That, the Hon’ble court may kindly be pleased to direct
the respondent authorities to reconsider the “Bid Capacity
Document” of the petitioner accordance with clause 1.3 of
the NIT and applicable law.
10.4 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
direct the respondent authorities open & evaluate the
technical bid of the petitioner.
10.5 That, That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
direct the respondent authorities if technical bid of the
3Petitioner is found to be L1 then he may be declared L1 in
place of the Respondent no. 610.6 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
grant any other relief, as it may deems fit and appropriate.”
3. Facts of the case are that the respondent Department issued a
Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for civil works, for which the petitioner,
being fully eligible, submitted his bid within time along with all
requisite documents in Envelope ‘A’ and ‘B’, duly complying with
all conditions including Clause 1.3 relating to bid capacity. The
petitioner has substantial experience in execution of similar civil
engineering works and has successfully completed projects for
the respondent department. All required certificates, including
pre-bid qualification and work experience, were duly submitted
and are verifiable as per the NIT. Despite full compliance with the
tender conditions, the petitioner was arbitrarily disqualified without
any specific reason being communicated. The impugned e-mail is
vague and does not disclose the grounds of disqualification.
4. Upon receiving the impugned communication, the petitioner
immediately submitted a detailed representation along with
additional supporting documents; however, the respondents failed
to consider the same and proceeded with the tender process. The
respondent authorities thereafter declared Respondent No. 6 as
L1, despite the petitioner quoting a significantly lower bid amount
(₹23.29 crore approx.) compared to Respondent No. 6 (₹25.00
crore approx.), resulting in a substantial loss to the public
4
exchequer. The petitioner’s disqualification does not fall within any
of the grounds specified under Clause 2.1.6 of the NIT, and no
deficiency or false information has been attributed to him.
5. The petitioner has previously participated in similar tenders with
identical documentation and has been declared successful,
demonstrating consistency and credibility in his qualifications. The
action of the respondents is arbitrary, non-transparent, and
violative of principles of natural justice, as no reasons for
disqualification have been furnished and relevant materials have
been ignored. The impugned action is also violative of Articles 14
and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, as it denies a level
playing field and unfairly excludes the petitioner from the tender
process. Hence, this petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the action of the
respondent authorities is arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of
the doctrine of level playing field, which mandates that all similarly
placed bidders must be afforded equal and fair opportunity in
matters of public contracts. The petitioner, being fully eligible, has
been unfairly excluded. It is contended that the disqualification of
the petitioner is ex facie illegal, as no deficiency or defect in the
documents submitted by him has been pointed out. The impugned
e-mail is vague and reflects a pre-determined intent to exclude the
petitioner from the tender process. Learned counsel submits that
a bare perusal of the documents submitted by the petitioner in
5
compliance with Clause 1.3 (Bid Capacity) clearly establishes that
the petitioner fulfilled all eligibility criteria. The disqualification,
therefore, is wholly unjustified.
7. It is further submitted that even after receipt of the impugned
communication, the petitioner promptly submitted a detailed
representation along with additional supporting documents.
However, the respondents failed to consider the same and
proceeded to open the technical bid of Respondent No. 6 alone,
thereby effectively ousting the petitioner. Learned counsel argues
that the respondent authorities have erected artificial barriers to
exclude the petitioner, which is impermissible in law. The State
cannot act in a manner that skews the tender process in favour of
a particular bidder. It is submitted that the arbitrary disqualification
has caused serious prejudice to public interest, as the petitioner’s
financial bid is approximately ₹3 crores lower than that of the
selected bidder. The impugned action has resulted in an
avoidable loss to the public exchequer, contrary to the State’s
obligation to ensure transparency and economic prudence.
Learned counsel contends that malice in law and in fact is
evident, as the petitioner has been excluded without any valid
reason, indicating favoritism towards Respondent No. 6. It is
further submitted that such arbitrary action is violative of Articles
14, 19(1)(g), and 300A of the Constitution of India, as it denies
equality, fair opportunity in trade, and lawful consideration in
public contracts. Reliance is placed on the judgments of the
6
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v.
State of Chhattisgarh, Civil Appeal No.2025/2025, decided on
06.10.2025 and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489, wherein it has
been held that the State cannot act arbitrarily in granting or
withholding largesse and must adhere to fairness, transparency,
and non-discrimination. In view of the above, it is prayed that this
Court may be pleased to set aside the impugned action of
disqualification and grant appropriate relief in the interest of
justice.
8. On the other hand, learned Advocate General appearing for
respondents No.1 to 5/State opposes the submissions of learned
counsel for the petitioner and submits that the entire tender
process has been conducted strictly in accordance with the terms
of the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) and the applicable procurement
procedure, leaving no scope for arbitrariness or deviation. It is
contended that the petitioner was rightly disqualified by the duly
constituted Pre-Qualification Committee upon objective evaluation
of documents. The petitioner failed to satisfy the eligibility criteria,
particularly with respect to bid capacity and proof of execution of
works, as the documents furnished were either post bid-date or
inadequate for verification. It is further submitted that adequate
opportunity was granted to the petitioner to cure deficiencies, and
his replies along with additional documents were duly considered
in the Committee meetings dated 01.04.2026 and 08.04.2026.
7
However, the deficiencies persisted, and therefore, the decision of
disqualification is reasoned and justified.
9. It is contended by learned Advocate General that the evaluation of
technical qualifications lies within the domain of expert
committees, and the Court should exercise restraint in substituting
its own assessment in place of that of the competent authority. It
is further submitted that the financial bid of only the technically
qualified bidder was opened in accordance with the tender
conditions, and the declaration of L-1 bidder is a natural
consequence of such evaluation.
10. Learned Advocate General submits that the allegation of loss to
public exchequer is misconceived, as price comparison arises
only among technically qualified bidders. A disqualified bidder
cannot claim consideration of its financial bid. It is contended that
there is no violation of principles of natural justice, as the
petitioner was duly informed of the reasons for disqualification and
was given an opportunity to respond. With regard to subsequent
developments, it is submitted that the tender process had
substantially concluded upon approval by the competent authority,
and the issuance of the order dated 27.04.2026 was merely a
procedural consequence of such approval. It is further submitted
that any omission in placing subsequent facts before this Court
was bona fide and unintentional, and not with any intent to
overreach judicial proceedings. Learned Advocate General also
8
submits that the State authorities have acted fairly, transparently,
and in public interest, and no case of arbitrariness, mala fide, or
discrimination is made out. In view of the above submissions, it is
prayed that the present petition be dismissed as being devoid of
merit.
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made hereinabove and also gone through the
records with utmost circumspection.
12. In compliance of the Court’s order dated 28.04.2026, Ms.Vidya
Bharti, Under Secretary, Water Resources Department,
Mantralaya, Nawa Raipur, Raipur is present in person and has
filed her personal affidavit which states as under:-
“1. It is submitted that, a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) was
issued on 06.03.2026 for construction of canal lining,
remodelling works, and installation of various Colaba of
Matiamoti Dam. The estimated contract value was Rs.
2881.45 lakhs, and the stipulated period for completion of
work was 24 months. The bid submission commenced on
13.03.2026 and the last date for submission was
23.03.2026.
2. It is submitted that, bidders including the petitioner
submitted their bids. On 24.03.2026, the Pre-Qualification
(PQ) documents submitted by three bidders were
downloaded and scrutinized.
3. That, the Pre-Qualification Committee convened its
meeting on 01.04.2026 and, upon evaluation, found that
two out of three bidders (including the petitioner) did not
9
meet the qualification criteria. The reasons for
disqualification were duly communicated to them on
02.04.2026 (Annexure P-1), granting them two days to
submit clarification/documents.
4. It is submitted that, the petitioner submitted replies on
04.04.2026 and 07.04.2026 along with certain documents.
The Committee reconvened on 08.04.2026 and found
that:
• The documents submitted were post bid
submission date (23.01.2026);
• The running bills did not sufficiently disclose
payment details to verify execution of works;
• Hence, the petitioner remained disqualified.
The evaluation proceedings dated 01.04.2026 and
08.04.2026 are annexed as ANNEXURE A-1 (colly.), for
the kind perusal of the Hon’ble Court.
5. That, on 08.04.2026, the financial bid of the sole
qualified bidder was opened based on the evaluation
reports. Copy annexed as ANNEXURE A-2 for the kind
perusal of the Hon’ble Court.
6. It is submitted that, the bidder Shri Ram Shiromani
Tiwari was declared L-1, and the tender file was
forwarded to the Chief Engineer for further action.
7. That, the Chief Engineer, Mahanadi-Godawari Basin,
forwarded the agenda note to the Water Resources
Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Raipur for approval.
Relevant documents are annexed as ANNEXURE A-3
(colly.) for the kind perusal of the Hon’ble Court.
8. It is submitted that, vide letter dated 22.04.2026, a
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meeting of the Tender Evaluation Committee was
convened on 23.04.2026, wherein the rates of the L-1
bidder were accepted. Documents are annexed as
ANNEXURE A-4 (colly.), for the kind perusal of the
Hon’ble Court.
9. That, thereafter, the matter was placed before the
Hon’ble Chief Minister (who also holds the portfolio of
Water Resources Department) on 23.04.2026, and
approval was granted on 26.04.2026. Consequently, the
Secretary incharge (as the Secretary, WRD, has been
appointed as Observer in West Bengal Election) issued
order dated 27.04.2026 for issuance of Letter of
Acceptance (LoA) in favour of the successful bidder.
10. It is submitted that, the tender approval process had
substantially culminated upon approval accorded at the
highest level on 23.04.2026, followed by formal
ratification.
11. That, the instructions earlier furnished to the office of
the Learned Advocate General were limited to
proceedings up to 08.04.2026. Due to an inadvertent and
bona fide omission, subsequent developments, including
approval by the Hon’ble Chief Minister, could not be
communicated before the Hon’ble Court on 27.04.2026.
12. It is submitted that, the said omission was purely
unintentional and not actuated by any mala fide intent.
The relevant note-sheets, being confidential, are being
produced in a sealed cover for kind perusal.
13. That, pursuant to the order dated 27.04.2026, an offer
letter was issued by the Executive Engineer, WRD
Division Balod. Execution of agreement and issuance of
work order are contingent upon submission of requisite
11
documents, including additional performance security and
earnest money.
14. It is submitted that, as on date, no agreement or work
order has been executed in favour of the successful
bidder.
15. That, in compliance with the Hon’ble Court’s order
dated 28.04.2026, further proceedings have been kept in
abeyance by the Under Secretary, Water Resources
Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, Raipur (CG)
vide letter dated 28.04.2026. Copy the same is annexed
as ANNEXURE A-5.
16. It is submitted that, the deponent and concerned
authorities have acted strictly in accordance with
procedural requirements and without any intention to
violate the orders or dignity of this Hon’ble Court.
17. That, the order dated 27.04.2026 was issued purely as
a procedural consequence of prior approvals of the
Hon’ble Chief Minister/Minister of WRD, and not with any
intent to overreach judicial proceedings.
18. It is submitted that, the deponent holds the highest
respect for this Hon’ble Court and submits that there was
no deliberate or intentional act of disobedience.
19. That, the deponent acted in her official administrative
capacity after completion of all technical and procedural
formalities by the Hon’ble Chief Minister/Minister WRD,
who accorded his approval on 26.04.2026.
20. It is submitted that, the deponent tenders
unconditional and sincere apology for any inadvertent
omission or act that may have appeared to be
12
inconsistent with the orders of this Hon’ble Court and
assures utmost diligence in future.”
13. From perusal of the record and affidavit filed by the Under
Secretary, Water Resources Department, Mantralaya, Nawa
Raipur, Raipur, it is evident that the tender process in question
has been conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions
stipulated in the NIT and the applicable procurement procedure.
The record reflects that the petitioner’s bid was subjected to
scrutiny by a duly constituted Pre-Qualification Committee, which
evaluated the documents on an objective basis. The petitioner
was found deficient in meeting the prescribed eligibility criteria,
particularly in relation to bid capacity and proof of execution of
works. The documents relied upon by the petitioner were either
submitted beyond the bid date or were otherwise insufficient for
proper verification.
14. It further emerges that the petitioner was afforded adequate
opportunity to rectify the deficiencies. The replies submitted by the
petitioner, along with additional documents, were duly considered
in the Committee meetings held on 01.04.2026 and 08.04.2026.
Despite such consideration, the deficiencies were found to persist.
The decision of disqualification, therefore, cannot be said to be
arbitrary or unreasonable, but rather appears to be based on due
application of mind.
15. This Court is mindful of the settled principle that the evaluation of
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technical bids lies within the domain of expert bodies, and judicial
review in such matters is limited. In the absence of arbitrariness,
mala fide, or procedural irregularity, this Court ought not to
substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authority.
16. The contention regarding alleged loss to the public exchequer is
also found to be misconceived. Consideration of financial bids
arises only amongst technically qualified bidders, and a
disqualified bidder cannot claim a right to have its financial bid
opened or compared.
17. As regards the plea of violation of principles of natural justice, the
record demonstrates that the petitioner was duly informed of the
grounds of disqualification and was granted an opportunity to
respond. Thus, no prejudice can be said to have been caused.
18. The subsequent developments pointed out do not, in any manner,
vitiate the tender process. The issuance of the order dated
27.04.2026 appears to be a consequential step following approval
by the competent authority. The omission in placing such facts
earlier is satisfactorily explained and does not indicate any intent
to mislead or overreach the proceedings.
19. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the actions of the respondent authorities are fair, transparent, and
in consonance with the governing rules and public interest. No
case of arbitrariness, mala fide, or discrimination is made out
warranting interference under writ jurisdiction.
14
20. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the doctrine of level
playing field and the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
does not advance his case in the facts of the present matter, as
the said principles operate within the framework of compliance
with tender conditions. The petitioner having failed to meet the
prescribed criteria cannot invoke such doctrines to seek
interference.
21. The scope of judicial review in contractual and tender matters is
limited. Unless the decision-making process is shown to be arbitrary,
irrational, mala fide or in violation of the terms of the tender,
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not
warranted. The Court does not sit as an appellate authority to re-
evaluate the bids or substitute its own decision for that of the
tendering authority.
22. The Apex Court, in the matter of Banshidhar Construction Pvt.
Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Others, {Civil Appeal No.
11005 OF 2024, decided on 04.10.2024}, taking note of the
decisions rendered in various other celebrated judgments,
observed as under:-
“21. There cannot be any disagreement to the legal
proposition propounded in catena of decisions of this
Court relied upon by the learned counsels for the
Respondents to the effect that the Court does not sit as a
Court of Appeal in the matter of award of contracts and it
merely reviews the manner in which the decision was
made; and that the Government and its instrumentalities
must have a freedom of entering into the contracts.
However, it is equally well settled that the decision of the
15government/ its instrumentalities must be free from
arbitrariness and must not be affected by any bias or
actuated by malafides. Government bodies being public
authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and
public interest even while dealing with contractual
matters. Right to equality under Article 14 abhors
arbitrariness. Public authorities have to ensure that no
bias, favouritism or arbitrariness are shown during the
bidding process and that the entire bidding process is
carried out in absolutely transparent manner.
22. At this juncture, we may reiterate the well-established
tenets of law pertaining to the scope of judicial
intervention in Government Contracts.
23. In Sterling Computers Limited vs. M/s. M & N
Publications Limited and Others1, this Court while
dealing with the scope of judicial review of award of
contracts held: –
“18. While exercising the power of judicial review, in
respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the
State, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether
there has been any infirmity in the “decision making
process”. In this connection reference may be made
to the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales
Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141] where it was
said that: (p. 144a)
“The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that
the individual receives fair treatment, and not to
ensure that the authority, after according fair
treatment, reaches on a matter which it is
authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself
a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the
court.”
By way of judicial review the court cannot examine
the details of the terms of the contract which have
been entered into by the public bodies or the State.
Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any
such enquiry. But at the same time as was said by
the House of Lords in the aforesaid case, Chief
Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans
[(1982) 3 All ER 141] the courts can certainly
examine whether “decision-making process” was
1 (1993) 1 SCC 445
16
reasonable, rational, not arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution.”
24. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India2, this Court had
laid down certain priniciples for the judicial review of
administrative action.
“94. The principles deducible from the above are:
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but
merely reviews the manner in which the decision
was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct
the administrative decision. If a review of the
administrative decision is permitted it will be
substituting its own decision, without the necessary
expertise which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be
open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to
tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking,
the decision to accept the tender or award the
contract is reached by process of negotiations
through several tiers. More often than not, such
decisions are made qualitatively by experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract.
In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary
concomitant for an administrative body functioning in
an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative
sphere. However, the decision must not only be
tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of
reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out
above) but must be free from arbitrariness not
affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy
administrative burden on the administration and lead
to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on
these principles we will examine the facts of this
case since they commend to us as the correct
principles.”
25. It has also been held in ABL International Limited
and Another vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation
of India Limited and Others3, as under: –
2 (1994) 6 SCC 651
3 (2004) 3 SCC 553
17“53. From the above, it is clear that when an
instrumentality of the State acts contrary to public
good and public interest, unfairly, unjustly and
unreasonably, in its contractual, constitutional or
statutory obligations, it really acts contrary to the
constitutional guarantee found in Article 14 of the
Constitution.”
26. In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Others 4,
this Court after discussing number of judgments laid
down two tests to determine the extent of judicial
interference in tender matters. They are: –
“22. (i) Whether the process adopted or decision
made by the authority is mala fide or intended to
favour someone; or Whether the process adopted or
decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the
court can say: “the decision is such that no
responsible authority acting reasonably and in
accordance with relevant law could have reached;”
(ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers
are in the negative, there should be no interference
under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or
imposition of penal consequences on a
tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse
(allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences,
dealerships and franchises) stand on a different
footing as they may require a higher degree of
fairness in action.”
27. In Mihan India Ltd. vs. GMR Airports Ltd. and
Others5, while observing that the government contracts
granted by the government bodies must uphold fairness,
equality and rule of law while dealing with the contractual
matters, it was observed in Para 50 as under: –
“50. In view of the above, it is apparent that in
government contracts, if granted by the government
bodies, it is expected to uphold fairness, equality
and rule of law while dealing with contractual
matters. Right to equality under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India abhors arbitrariness. The
transparent bidding process is favoured by the Court
to ensure that constitutional requirements are
satisfied. It is said that the constitutional guarantee4 (2007) 14 SCC 517
5 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 574
18as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India demands the State to act in a fair and
reasonable manner unless public interest demands
otherwise. It is expedient that the degree of
compromise of any private legitimate interest must
correspond proportionately to the public interest.”
28. It was sought to be submitted by the learned
Counsels for the Respondents relying upon the
observations made in Central Coalfields Limited and
Another vs. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) and
Others6, that whether a term of NIT is essential or not is
a decision taken by the employer which should be
respected. However, in the said judgment also it is
observed that if the employer has exercised the inherent
authority to deviate from the essential term, such
deviation has to be made applicable to all the bidders and
potential bidders. It was observed in Para 47 and 48 as
under:-
“47. The result of this discussion is that the issue of
the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder
should be looked at not only from the point of view
of the unsuccessful party but alsofrom the point of
view of the employer. As held in Ramana Dayaram
Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] the
terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant
or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and
the necessary significance. As pointed out in Tata
Cellular [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6
SCC 651] there must be judicial restraint in
interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the
soundness of the decision taken by the employer
ought not to be questioned but the decision-making
process can certainly be subject to judicial review.
The soundness of the decision may be questioned if
it is irrational or mala fide or intended to favour
someone or a decision “that no responsible authority
acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant
law could have reached” as held in Jagdish Mandal
[Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC
517] followed in Michigan Rubber [Michigan Rubber6 (2016) 8 SCC 622
19(India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC
216].
48. Therefore, whether a term of NIT is essential or
not is a decision taken by the employer which
should be respected. Even if the term is essential,
the employer has the inherent authority to deviate
from it provided the deviation is made applicable to
all bidders and potential bidders as held in Ramana
Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty
v.International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3
SCC 489] . However, if the term is held by the
employer to be ancillary or subsidiary, even
thatdecision should be respected. The lawfulness of
that decision can be questioned on very limited
grounds, as mentioned in the various decisions
discussed above, but the soundness of the decision
cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court would be
taking over the function of the tender issuing
authority, which it cannot.”
23. Recently, the Apex Court in the matter of M/S. Steag Energy
Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. GSPC Pipavav Power Company
Ltd. (GPPC) & Ors. {SLP (C) No(S).30209-30210 of 2025},
decided on 25.03.2026 held that the final choice is of the owner,
and it is for the owner to take the final decision with necessary
flexibility and pragmatism. While exercising judicial review of
contractual matters, constitutional courts do not exercise, should
not exercise ex-ante jurisdiction to pre-empt executive actions. On
this count, High Court has exceeded the first principle of judicial
restraint in contractual matters.
24. Applying the well settled proposition of law to the facts of this case,
we do not find any merit in this petition and the petitioner is not
entitled to any relief as claimed in this petition. As such, the writ
20
petition is dismissed. No order as to cost.
25. Presence of Ms.Vidya Bharti, Under Secretary, Water Resources
Department, Mantralaya, Nawa Raipur, Raipur is discharged.
Sd/- Sd/-
Sd Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
