Jharkhand High Court
M/S Shiv Jyoti Stone Minerals vs The State Of Jharkhand on 28 April, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:12393-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (C) No. 2610 of 2026
M/S Shiv Jyoti Stone Minerals, through its partner, Sudama
Prasad Yadav, S/o Budhnath Yadav, R/o Village-Parodih,
P.O.-Hemrodih, P.S.-Dhanwar, District-Giridih ..... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Secretary, Department of
Mines and Geology, Ranchi
2. The Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Giridih
4. The District Mining Officer, Giridih ..... Respondents
-----
CORAM
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
—–
For the Petitioner: Mr. Kanti Kumar Ojha, Advocate
For the State: Mr. Ratnesh Kumar, S.C. (L&C)-I
—–
02/28.04.2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This writ petition challenges the communications made by the
respondents declining to entertain the petitioner’s application for
renewal of mining lease, on the ground that it was barred by the
limitation prescribed under Rule 23(1) of the Jharkhand Minor
Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 [said Rules].
3. Rule 23(1) of the said Rules prescribes that an application for
renewal of the mining lease must be made a minimum of 90
days but not more than 180 days before the date of the expiry
of the said mining lease.
4. Mr Kanti Kumar Ojha, learned counsel for the petitioner, points
out that in the present case, such an application was barred by a
delay of hardly one or two days and that too because the
petitioner was suffering from dengue fever. He submitted that
given the genuineness of the reason and the fact that the delay
was of hardly one or two days, the same should have been
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condoned by resorting to the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
5. Mr Ojha further submitted that there was no provision in the
said Rules that barred the application of the provisions of Section
5, or, in any event, the principles of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. He also referred to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act
to contend that, in the absence of any specific prohibition, the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought to have been
made applicable.
6. Mr Ratnesh Kumar, learned S.C. (L&C)-I, submitted that the
Mining Officers, who are to consider applications for renewal of
mining leases, are not “Court” nor do they discharge any quasi-
judicial functions. Therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act could not apply to their consideration of an
application for renewal of a mining lease.
7. Mr Ratnesh also submitted that the issue is no longer res-integra
because the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of
Sunil Kumar Chourasia vs State of Jharkhand through
the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi &
Ors. [W.P. (C) No. 2992 of 2013], decided on 19.11.2014,
has, in a specific context of Rule 23 of the said Rules, held that
there is no power for condonation.
8. Mr Ratnesh Kumar further submitted that once there is no power
to condone the delay, even this Court, exercising its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, may not condone the
delay. He also submitted that in this case, there is no
explanation why, for the entire period of 90 days available to the
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petitioner, no renewal was applied for. He submitted that in
terms of the recent decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is
the duty of an applicant, even in a matter where the provisions
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply, to explain why, during
the entire permissible period, no prompt steps were taken.
9. For all these reasons, Mr Ratnesh submitted that the impugned
communications ought not to be interfered with.
10. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
11. As pointed out earlier, Rule 23 of the said Rules provides that an
application for renewal must be filed at least 90 days and not
more than 180 days before the date on which the lease in
question is due to expire. Neither Rule 23 nor any other
provision in the said Rules refers to the application of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, including in particular
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, when it comes to considering an
application for renewal of a lease.
12. Upon considering the nature of the powers exercised by the
authorities when considering an application for the renewal of a
lease, we cannot say that the authorities in question are either a
“Court” or exercising any quasi-judicial powers. Therefore, even
by invoking Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, we cannot agree
that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be
made applicable to an application to condone the delay in
applying before a District Mining Officer or other authorities
under the said rules for the renewal of a mining lease.
13. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Property
Company (P) Ltd v. Rohinton Daddy Mazda 2026 INSC
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33 after analysing the law and previous precedents on the
subject held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963
would apply to suits, applications or appeals which are made to
‘Courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or
Tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals are
specifically empowered in that regard.
14. In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah
Manilal Chandulal, 1996 (9) SCC 414, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court categorically held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 cannot be invoked by statutory authorities that are not
“Courts”. The Court was concerned with whether the Collector or
the Land Acquisition Officer could condone the delay and extend
the time by resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. A
similar view was expressed in Prakash Jain v. Marie
Fernandes, 2003 (8) SCC 431 and Ganeshan v.
Commission, 2019 (7) SCC 108.
15. A Learned Single Judge of this Court, Hon’ble Justice Shree
Chandrashekhar (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Sunil
Kumar Chourasia (supra) has, in specific context of the said
Rules, held that the District Mining Officer or the Mines
Commissioner, who are statutory authorities under the scheme
of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, have
not been vested with any power to condone the delay.
Therefore, such statutory authorities were justified in dismissing
the applications for renewal, which were filed beyond the
prescribed limitation period under the said Rules.
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16. In Sunil Kumar Chourasia‘s case, the learned Single Judge
has considered several precedents emanating from the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, including the decisions in the cases of Sakuru
vs. Tanaji [(1985) 3 SCC 590], Birla Cement Works vs.
G.M., Western Railways and Another [(1995) 2 SCC 493]
and France B. Martin and Another vs. Mafalda Maria
Teresa Rodrigues [(1999) 6 SCC 627]. In those cases, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the context of similar arguments
concerning the Collector acting under the Andhra Pradesh
Tenancy Act, the Railway Claims Tribunal under the Railways
Act, and the authorities under the Consumer Protection Act, held
that such authorities were not vested with the powers of
condonation prescribed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of the
Limitation Act would not apply to such authorities.
17. Learned Single Judge has also considered the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mangu Ram vs.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(1976) 1 SCC 392] and
held that the said decision would not apply and based upon the
same, there was no question of holding that the District Mining
Officer or the Mines Commissioner had the power to condone
the delay in applying for renewal of mining lease.
18. Despite our repeated queries, we were not shown any decision
in which the view of Sunil Kumar Chourasia (supra) was
either reversed or even stayed. We were also not shown any
contrary decisions in the context of the powers to condone the
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delay in considering the applications for renewal of the mining
lease.
19. In the case of Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada
and Others vs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care
Limited reported in (2020) 19 SCC 681, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that once the original authority does not have the
power to condone the delay, this Court, exercising its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
also cannot condone the delay by ignoring the statutory regime.
20. The arguments that the delay in this case is minimal or that the
cause shown is impeccable are beside the point, once there is no
power to condone the delay. In any event, in the case of
Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. In Karnataka Housing
Board and Others reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1969,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even an antecedent delay
must be explained, and it is not sufficient to explain only the
delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation. This is because
the issue of delay has to be considered holistically, and the
conduct of the applicants seeking condonation of delay and the
diligence they have shown are relevant considerations in such
cases.
21. For all the above reasons, we cannot fault the impugned
communications by which the petitioner’s application for renewal
of the mining lease has been rejected on the ground of
limitation. In the absence of any power to condone the delay,
there is no question of going into the issue of sufficient cause,
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which may or may not have been shown by the petitioner when
seeking condonation of the delay.
22. Accordingly, we dismiss this writ petition. No costs.
(M. S. SONAK, C.J.)
(RAJESH SHANKAR, J.)
28.04.2026
Vikas/AKT
A.F.R.
Uploaded on 29.04.2026
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