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HomeM/S Shiv Jyoti Stone Minerals vs The State Of Jharkhand on 28...

M/S Shiv Jyoti Stone Minerals vs The State Of Jharkhand on 28 April, 2026

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Jharkhand High Court

M/S Shiv Jyoti Stone Minerals vs The State Of Jharkhand on 28 April, 2026

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                                                  2026:JHHC:12393-DB




                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                                W.P. (C) No. 2610 of 2026
            M/S Shiv Jyoti Stone Minerals, through its partner, Sudama
            Prasad Yadav, S/o Budhnath Yadav, R/o Village-Parodih,
            P.O.-Hemrodih, P.S.-Dhanwar, District-Giridih     ..... Petitioner
                                            Versus
         1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Secretary, Department of
            Mines and Geology, Ranchi
         2. The Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi
         3. The Deputy Commissioner, Giridih
         4. The District Mining Officer, Giridih           ..... Respondents
                                              -----

CORAM
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR

—–

SPONSORED

For the Petitioner: Mr. Kanti Kumar Ojha, Advocate
For the State: Mr. Ratnesh Kumar, S.C. (L&C)-I

—–

02/28.04.2026

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This writ petition challenges the communications made by the

respondents declining to entertain the petitioner’s application for

renewal of mining lease, on the ground that it was barred by the

limitation prescribed under Rule 23(1) of the Jharkhand Minor

Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 [said Rules].

3. Rule 23(1) of the said Rules prescribes that an application for

renewal of the mining lease must be made a minimum of 90

days but not more than 180 days before the date of the expiry

of the said mining lease.

4. Mr Kanti Kumar Ojha, learned counsel for the petitioner, points

out that in the present case, such an application was barred by a

delay of hardly one or two days and that too because the

petitioner was suffering from dengue fever. He submitted that

given the genuineness of the reason and the fact that the delay

was of hardly one or two days, the same should have been

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2026:JHHC:12393-DB

condoned by resorting to the provisions of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963.

5. Mr Ojha further submitted that there was no provision in the

said Rules that barred the application of the provisions of Section

5, or, in any event, the principles of Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, 1963. He also referred to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act

to contend that, in the absence of any specific prohibition, the

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought to have been

made applicable.

6. Mr Ratnesh Kumar, learned S.C. (L&C)-I, submitted that the

Mining Officers, who are to consider applications for renewal of

mining leases, are not “Court” nor do they discharge any quasi-

judicial functions. Therefore, the provisions of Section 5 of the

Limitation Act could not apply to their consideration of an

application for renewal of a mining lease.

7. Mr Ratnesh also submitted that the issue is no longer res-integra

because the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of

Sunil Kumar Chourasia vs State of Jharkhand through

the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi &

Ors. [W.P. (C) No. 2992 of 2013], decided on 19.11.2014,

has, in a specific context of Rule 23 of the said Rules, held that

there is no power for condonation.

8. Mr Ratnesh Kumar further submitted that once there is no power

to condone the delay, even this Court, exercising its jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution, may not condone the

delay. He also submitted that in this case, there is no

explanation why, for the entire period of 90 days available to the

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2026:JHHC:12393-DB

petitioner, no renewal was applied for. He submitted that in

terms of the recent decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is

the duty of an applicant, even in a matter where the provisions

of Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply, to explain why, during

the entire permissible period, no prompt steps were taken.

9. For all these reasons, Mr Ratnesh submitted that the impugned

communications ought not to be interfered with.

10. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.

11. As pointed out earlier, Rule 23 of the said Rules provides that an

application for renewal must be filed at least 90 days and not

more than 180 days before the date on which the lease in

question is due to expire. Neither Rule 23 nor any other

provision in the said Rules refers to the application of the

provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, including in particular

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, when it comes to considering an

application for renewal of a lease.

12. Upon considering the nature of the powers exercised by the

authorities when considering an application for the renewal of a

lease, we cannot say that the authorities in question are either a

“Court” or exercising any quasi-judicial powers. Therefore, even

by invoking Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, we cannot agree

that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be

made applicable to an application to condone the delay in

applying before a District Mining Officer or other authorities

under the said rules for the renewal of a mining lease.

13. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Property

Company (P) Ltd v. Rohinton Daddy Mazda 2026 INSC

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2026:JHHC:12393-DB

33 after analysing the law and previous precedents on the

subject held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963

would apply to suits, applications or appeals which are made to

‘Courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or

Tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or Tribunals are

specifically empowered in that regard.

14. In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah

Manilal Chandulal, 1996 (9) SCC 414, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court categorically held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

1963 cannot be invoked by statutory authorities that are not

“Courts”. The Court was concerned with whether the Collector or

the Land Acquisition Officer could condone the delay and extend

the time by resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. A

similar view was expressed in Prakash Jain v. Marie

Fernandes, 2003 (8) SCC 431 and Ganeshan v.

Commission, 2019 (7) SCC 108.

15. A Learned Single Judge of this Court, Hon’ble Justice Shree

Chandrashekhar (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Sunil

Kumar Chourasia (supra) has, in specific context of the said

Rules, held that the District Mining Officer or the Mines

Commissioner, who are statutory authorities under the scheme

of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, have

not been vested with any power to condone the delay.

Therefore, such statutory authorities were justified in dismissing

the applications for renewal, which were filed beyond the

prescribed limitation period under the said Rules.

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2026:JHHC:12393-DB

16. In Sunil Kumar Chourasia‘s case, the learned Single Judge

has considered several precedents emanating from the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, including the decisions in the cases of Sakuru

vs. Tanaji [(1985) 3 SCC 590], Birla Cement Works vs.

G.M., Western Railways and Another [(1995) 2 SCC 493]

and France B. Martin and Another vs. Mafalda Maria

Teresa Rodrigues [(1999) 6 SCC 627]. In those cases, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the context of similar arguments

concerning the Collector acting under the Andhra Pradesh

Tenancy Act, the Railway Claims Tribunal under the Railways

Act, and the authorities under the Consumer Protection Act, held

that such authorities were not vested with the powers of

condonation prescribed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

1963. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of the

Limitation Act would not apply to such authorities.

17. Learned Single Judge has also considered the decision of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mangu Ram vs.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(1976) 1 SCC 392] and

held that the said decision would not apply and based upon the

same, there was no question of holding that the District Mining

Officer or the Mines Commissioner had the power to condone

the delay in applying for renewal of mining lease.

18. Despite our repeated queries, we were not shown any decision

in which the view of Sunil Kumar Chourasia (supra) was

either reversed or even stayed. We were also not shown any

contrary decisions in the context of the powers to condone the

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2026:JHHC:12393-DB

delay in considering the applications for renewal of the mining

lease.

19. In the case of Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada

and Others vs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care

Limited reported in (2020) 19 SCC 681, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has held that once the original authority does not have the

power to condone the delay, this Court, exercising its

extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution

also cannot condone the delay by ignoring the statutory regime.

20. The arguments that the delay in this case is minimal or that the

cause shown is impeccable are beside the point, once there is no

power to condone the delay. In any event, in the case of

Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. In Karnataka Housing

Board and Others reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1969,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even an antecedent delay

must be explained, and it is not sufficient to explain only the

delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation. This is because

the issue of delay has to be considered holistically, and the

conduct of the applicants seeking condonation of delay and the

diligence they have shown are relevant considerations in such

cases.

21. For all the above reasons, we cannot fault the impugned

communications by which the petitioner’s application for renewal

of the mining lease has been rejected on the ground of

limitation. In the absence of any power to condone the delay,

there is no question of going into the issue of sufficient cause,

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2026:JHHC:12393-DB

which may or may not have been shown by the petitioner when

seeking condonation of the delay.

22. Accordingly, we dismiss this writ petition. No costs.

(M. S. SONAK, C.J.)

(RAJESH SHANKAR, J.)
28.04.2026
Vikas/AKT
A.F.R.
Uploaded on 29.04.2026

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