Uttarakhand High Court
M/S Instapower Limited vs Gujrat State Electricity Corporation … on 17 March, 2026
2026:UHC:1780-DB
RESERVED JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA
AND
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUBHASH UPADHYAY
APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 354 OF 2019
M/s Instapower Limited.
...Appellant
Versus
Gujrat State Electricity Corporation Limited and another.
...Respondents
Counsel for the appellant. : Mr. Karthik Jayashankar, learned counsel.
Counsel for respondent no. 1. : Mr. V.K. Kohli, learned Senior Counsel
assisted by Mr. I.P. Kohli, learned counsel.
JUDGMENT RESERVED : 24TH FEBRUARY, 2026
JUDGMENT DELIVERED : 17TH MARCH, 2026
JUDGMENT :
(per Hon’ble The Chief Justice Shri Manoj Kumar Gupta)
1. This Appeal, under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 is directed against the judgment and
order dated 10.07.2019 passed by the Additional District
Judge (Commercial), Dehradun, in Arbitration Case No.
160/2016, whereby the petition filed by respondent no. 1
(hereinafter, referred to as the ‘respondent-company’), under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for
short, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was allowed, and
the Arbitral Award dated 29.07.2016, rendered by the
respondent no. 2-Uttarakhand State Micro and Small
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Enterprises Facilitation Council, Dehradun (for short ‘the
Facilitation Council’), was set-aside.
2. The facts, giving rise to the present proceedings, in
brief, are that the respondent-company invited tender for
supply of 5350 numbers of 28 watt Retrofit Type Energy
Efficient Tubelights (T5) for use at its Thermal Power Stations.
Pursuant thereto, the bid of the appellant came to be
accepted, and a Purchase Order was issued on 10.06.2008,
which stipulated that the goods would be supplied within four
months of the order. Clause 11 provided that delivery of
goods would be made, after getting the sample approved from
the respondent-company.
3. Clause 8 of the Purchase Order provides for
imposition of penalty for late delivery. Clause 8 is as follows:-
“8. Penalty for Late Delivery:
In case, the materials are not delivered within the
period stipulated in the order, penalty shall be levied at ½%
per week on the prices (End cost) subject to maximum 10%
reckoned on the value of undelivered supplies.
Due consideration will be given for waival / levy of
penalty only for the reasons absolutely beyond your control
(Viz.Force Majeure conditions) for which documentary
evidence will have to be provided. The request for
extension in delivery giving reasons and supporting
documents shall have to be made within one month on
completion of the supply.”
4. Clause 9 relates to extension in the contractual
delivery date and power of the respondent-company to
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consider extension of delivery period with or without penalty,
if the appellant were able to prove by documentary evidence
that the delivery got delayed on account of reasons beyond its
control. Relevant part of Clause 9 is as follows :-
“9. Extension in the Contractual Delivery Date:
It will be supplier’s responsibility to ensure that goods
are delivered within the stipulated delivery period. However,
if on account of reasons beyond ones control as laid down in
the DGS & D Force Majeure Conditions the Company may
consider extension of delivery period with or without penalty
& with or without statutory variations. However, delivery
extensions will be considered only after execution of the
order fully and upon submission of documentary evidence for
the reasons of delay.
However, such extension will be subject to the following
conditions shown hereunder.
a) ......
b) ......
c) ......"
5. The appellant, for the first time, submitted sample
for approval on 08.07.2008, but which was not approved, and
was rejected. On 25.08.2008, the appellant was asked to
submit a new sample. The second sample was submitted on
06.10.2008, which was again not found to be suitable, and
hence was rejected. On 10.10.2008, the appellant was
informed about the rejection of the sample and also that it had
not deposited Security Deposit, as per Clause 48. On
21.11.2008, the respondent-company issued a show-cause
notice to the appellant, whereby it was required to show
cause, as to why the Purchase Order should not be cancelled.
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On 02.12.2008, the appellant submitted a request to permit it
to submit fresh sample. In this regard, a letter dated
18.12.2008 was issued to the appellant. The appellant
submitted another sample, and it was approved on
23.12.2008. According to the respondent-company, the
appellant failed to submit Test Certificate, as was required
under Clause 29. The said fact was intimated to the appellant,
vide letter dated 17.01.2009. The appellant was issued
reminders dated 20.02.2009 and 03.03.2009 for furnishing
Test Certificate, and, ultimately, it was submitted on
12.03.2009.
6. As per Clause 11, all supplies were subject to
inspection of the respondent-company, and the Joint
Inspection was carried at Gurgaon, Haryana on 04.06.2009.
Ultimately, the goods were supplied in the month of July/
August, 2009, i.e. more than after one year.
7. According to the respondent-company, since the
appellant supplied the goods after the stipulated period of four
months, hence, as per agreed terms and conditions, a total
penalty of Rs. 2,48,715/- was imposed upon the appellant.
The appellant requested for waiver of the penalty, and the said
request was rejected by the respondent-company by its letter
dated 18.08.2010.
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8. Further, according to the respondent-company,
some of the goods supplied were defective. The appellant
company failed to replace the same and, therefore, in terms of
Clause 53 (Guarantee Clause), adjustment of value of goods
to the extent of Rs. 2,16,140/- was made from the bank
guarantee.
9. The appellant, being aggrieved, by the imposition of
penalty and deductions made by the respondents, initiated
proceedings before the Facilitation Council, contending that
the delay in supplies was not attributable to it. Its case was
that it could not have commenced supplies, unless the
samples were approved by the respondent-company; that the
respondent-company did not approve the samples within the
original period of four months, and, that once approval was
granted and inspection completed, the supplies were made
soon thereafter. The appellant, thus, asserted that the delay
was occasioned by the acts attributable to the respondent-
company, and, therefore, no penalty could lawfully be imposed
upon it. It further claimed that certain amounts have been
wrongly withheld by the respondent-company, and that the
encashment/ adjustment of bank guarantee was unjustified.
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10. The appellant, consequently, claimed the benefits of
the provisions of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 (for short, hereinafter referred to as
‘MSMED Act‘). The Claim Petition was instituted before the
Council, whereupon notice was issued to the respondent-
company, and the matter initially underwent the stage of
conciliation, as contemplated under Section 18 of the MSMED
Act. As the dispute was not resolved in conciliation, the
Council proceeded to take up the matter as arbitration, under
Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act. Before the Facilitation
Council, both sides filed their pleadings and documents. The
appellant asserted that a sum remained outstanding towards
the price of goods, and that it was also entitled to statutory
interest under the MSMED Act, on account of delayed
payment. The respondent-company filed its response,
disputing the claim, and, consequently, defending the
deductions, on the basis of the terms of the Purchase Order,
and the admitted delay in supply. Ultimately, the Facilitation
Council, allowed the claim of the appellant by award dated
29.07.2016, and directed the respondent-company to pay
interest in accordance with the provisions of MSMED Act.
11. Aggrieved by the award, the respondent-company
filed objections, under Section 34 of the Act, before the
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Commercial Court, Dehradun. The principal ground for
challenging the award was that the Facilitation Council did not
consider the contractual clauses, governing delay and penalty.
Consequently, the award had proceeded without adjudication
of the defence of the respondent-company, and also that the
award was virtually a non-speaking and unreasoned award.
12. The Commercial Court, upon consideration of the
material on record, allowed the objections under Section 34 of
the Act, and set aside the Arbitral Award. It is this order,
which is under challenge in the present Appeal filed under
Section 37 of the Act.
13. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant
is that the Commercial Court has transgressed limits of
jurisdiction, available under Section 34 of the Act. It is
contended that the scope of interference with an Arbitral
Award is extremely limited, and does not permit the Court to
act as an appellate forum, over the findings recorded by the
Arbitral Tribunal. It is submitted that the Commercial Court
misdirected itself in holding that the award is in contravention
of the fundamental policy of Indian law and against public
policy. It is urged that the Facilitation Council had correctly
appreciated the facts, and it was not open to the Commercial
Court to go into the questions of facts for setting aside the
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award. In support of the submission, reliance has been placed
on the judgment of the Supreme Court in OPG Power
Generation Private Limited v. Enexio Power Cooling
Solutions (India) Private Limited & Anr.1, particularly
paragraph no. 37 thereof, which reads as follows:-
“37. What is clear from above is that for an award to
be against public policy of India a mere infraction of the
municipal laws of India is not enough. There must be, inter
alia, infraction of fundamental policy of Indian law including a
law meant to serve public interest or public good.”
14. It is also the contention of learned counsel for the
appellant that, though the arbitration proceedings commenced
prior to the amendment to Section 34 of the Act, the award
was passed on 29.08.2016, i.e. after Section 34 came to be
amended, w.e.f. 23.10.2015. Thus, the submission is that
amended Section 34 would apply to the present matter, where
under scope of interference with an arbitral award got further
reduced. The Commercial Court grossly erred in interfering
with the Arbitral Award. In support of the said contention,
reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Associate Builders v Delhi Development
Authority 2 (para 56), which is as follows :
“56. Here again, the Division Bench has interfered wrongly
with the arbitral award on several counts. It had no business
to enter into a pure question of fact to set aside the
Arbitrator for having applied a formula of 20 months instead
of 25 months. Though this would inure in favour of the1
(2025) 2 SCC 417
2
(2015) 3 SCC 498
2026:UHC:1780-DBappellant, it is clear that the appellant did not file any cross
objection on this score. Also, it is extremely curious that the
Division Bench found that an adjustment would have to be
made with claims awarded under claims 2, 3 and 4 which are
entirely separate and independent claims and have nothing to
do with claims 12 and 13. The formula then applied by the
Division Bench was that it would itself do “rough and ready
justice”. We are at a complete loss to understand how this
can be done by any court under the jurisdiction exercised
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. As has been held
above, the expression “justice” when it comes to setting
aside an award under the public policy ground can only mean
that an award shocks the conscience of the court. It cannot
possibly include what the court thinks is unjust on the facts
of a case for which it then seeks to substitute its view for the
Arbitrator’s view and does what it considers to be “justice”.
With great respect to the Division Bench, the whole approach
to setting aside arbitral awards is incorrect. The Division
Bench has lost sight of the fact that it is not a first appellate
court and cannot interfere with errors of fact.”
15. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits
that the respondent-company had accepted the goods supplied
by the appellant. It is, thus, urged that, once goods were
accepted, the respondent-company could not have imposed
penalty or withheld the amounts, or detained the bank
guarantee. The Facilitation Council was justified in treating
the withheld amount as delayed payment, and in granting
statutory interest thereon.
16. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the
appellant that the delay in supply of goods was not
attributable to the appellant. The appellant could not be
expected to effect supplies, unless and until the samples were
approved and inspection formalities were completed. Since
the sample came to be approved only on 23.12.2008, and
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Joint Inspection took place on 04.06.2009, it is contended that
the period prior thereto could not have been counted against
the appellant for the purpose of imposing penalty.
17. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-
company supports the judgment and order of the Commercial
Court, and submits that no interference is required in the
present Appeal. It is contended that the contract between the
parties was governed entirely by the Purchase Order dated
10.06.2008, which prescribed the delivery period, procedural
obligations of the supplier, and the consequences of delay. It
is submitted that the appellant failed to comply with the
essential contractual requirements within time. It is further
submitted that the samples submitted by the appellant were
not approved at the first instance; that the requisite Test
Certificates and related technical requirements were not timely
fulfilled, and that ultimately the supplies were made only after
an inordinate delay, i.e. in July/ August, 2009, although the
Purchase Order was issued in June, 2008, and where under
the goods were to be supplied within four months.
18. Learned counsel for respondent-company submitted
that in the aforesaid circumstances, the respondent-company
was fully justified in invoking the penalty clause under the
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contract. The consistent case of the respondent-company is
that mere acceptance of the goods, did not preclude it from
imposing penalty and that the deduction was as per the
stipulations in the contract, and was a result of delay and
defaults attributable to the appellant alone. It is contended
that the arbitral award suffers from a fundamental defect,
inasmuch as, the Facilitation Council failed to decide the core
issue, as to whether the deduction made by the respondent-
company was justified under the terms of the Purchase Order.
19. Learned counsel for the respondent-company, thus,
submits that the award does not analyze the relevant clauses
of the contract, nor return any finding on the legality of the
action of the respondent-company, in invoking the penalty
clause. It merely reproduces the proceedings and the
pleadings, and then jumps to conclusion. In substance, the
contention is that the Arbitral Award is a non-speaking award
and was, thus, rightly set aside.
20. The arbitration conducted by the Facilitation Council,
under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, in terms of the said
provision, is governed by the provisions of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court in Gujarat State
Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods Pvt.
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Ltd. (Unit 2) & Anr. 3 has clarified that the proceedings
before the Facilitation Council, after failure of conciliation,
partake the character of statutory arbitration, and the
resultant award is amenable to challenge under Section 34 of
the Act. Therefore, the award in the present case was
required to satisfy the parameters laid down in the Act
including adherence to Section 31(3) and proper adjudication
of the dispute arising from the contract.
21. On examining the pleadings and the nature of
controversy, it becomes clear that the real dispute between
the parties was not merely, whether some amount stood not
paid, but whether the respondent-company had lawfully
deducted amounts by way of penalty and by invoking/
adjusting the bank guarantee, under the terms of the
Purchase Order. If the deduction was justified under the
contract, then the amount retained by the respondent-
company could not straightway be characterized as delayed
payment for the purpose of statutory interest. On the other
hand, if the deduction was unjustified, then the appellant’s
claim would stand on a different footing. Either way, the
Arbitral Tribunal could not bypass this issue, and was required
3
(2023) 6 SCC 401
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to adjudicate and return a finding on the same, based on the
terms and conditions of the contract.
22. In other words, the Arbitral Tribunal was required to
determine, whether the appellant had, in fact, delayed the
supplies beyond the contractual period, whether such delay
was attributable to the appellant, or the respondent-
company’s own acts, including delay in approval of samples;
what was the effect of sample approval and subsequent
inspection on the delivery obligation; and whether in the facts
of the case, the respondent-company was contractually
entitled to impose the penalty.
23. A perusal of the Arbitral Award shows that the
Facilitation Council has largely set out the background facts;
recorded the dates and meetings, and noticed the rival stand
of the parties. It also refers to the sequence concerning the
contract, approval of samples, inspection of subsequent
supply. However, after setting out these matters, the award
does not proceed to undertake a reasoned analysis of the
contractual clauses, or the defence of the respondent-
company. There is no discussion in the award, as to the exact
contractual stipulations relating to delay and penalty. There is
no reasoned finding, as to whether time was essence of the
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contract, and whether the delay was attributable to the
appellant, or the respondent-company. There is no clear
adjudication of the respondent-company’s plea that the
appellant was in breach of other pre-supply obligations, such
as submission of Test Certificate and furnishing of security/
bank guarantee. There is no express finding that the penalty
imposed by the respondent-company was contrary to the
contract. Instead, the award moves from a recitation of the
history of the dispute to the conclusion that payment had been
delayed, and, therefore, interest under MSMED Act was
payable.
24. It is true that, under Sections 15 & 16 of the MSMED
Act, a supplier is entitled to claim interest, where payment for
goods supplied is delayed beyond a prescribed period.
However, the liability, under these provisions, would arise only
when the liability is admitted, or the amount is held to be due
after due adjudication. Where the purchaser disputes the
liability on the grounds that deductions have been made
strictly in accordance with the contractual terms governing the
transaction, the Arbitral Tribunal is required first to determine,
whether such deductions were justified under the terms and
conditions of the contract.
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25. The main submission of learned counsel for the
appellant, as noted above, is that the Commercial Court
exceeded the scope of Section 34 of the Act. In support of the
said submission, the learned counsel for the appellant has
placed reliance on the amended provisions of Section 34 of the
Act.
26. Before adverting to the merits of the contention of
learned counsel for the appellant, regarding wrongful
interference with the Arbitral Award, it is necessary to notice
the effect of the amendments introduced in Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, which came into force on
23.10.2025. By virtue of the said amendment, Section 34(2A)
was inserted, providing that, in case of domestic arbitrations,
and Arbitral Award may also be set aside if the Court finds that
the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face
of record. At the same time, the amended provision makes it
clear that an award shall not be merely set aside on the
ground of erroneous application of the law, or by re-
appreciation of evidence. The legislative intent, underlying the
amendment, was to limit excessive judicial interference with
Arbitral Awards, and to permit interference only where the
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award suffers from a fundamental defect, such as patent
illegality.
27. The Supreme Court has explained the scope of the
amended provision in Ssangyong Engineering &
Construction Company Limited v. National Highways
Authority of India (NHAI) 4, and the law laid down in
Associate Builders (supra), prior to amendment, as follows:-
“40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the
Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paragraphs
42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders (supra), namely, that the
construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an
arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the
contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable
person would; in short, that the arbitrator’s view is not even
a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders
outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to
him, he commits an error of jurisdiction. This ground of
challenge will now fall within the new ground added under
Section 34(2A).
41. What is important to note is that a decision which
is perverse, as understood in paragraphs 31 and 32 of
Associate Builders (supra), while no longer being a ground for
challenge under “public policy of India”, would certainly
amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the
award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an
award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision
would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of
patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents
taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would
also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as
such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and
therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse.”
28. Thus an award, which ignores the vital terms of the
contract, or fails to decide the core issue between the parties,
4
(2019) 15 SCC 131
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would undoubtedly fall within the ambit of patent illegality and
may be set aside under Section 34(2A) of the Act.
29. In the present case, as noted earlier, the principal
dispute between the parties was, whether the penalty imposed
by the respondent-company, for delayed supply, was justified
under Clause 8 of the Purchase Order. The Arbitral Tribunal,
however, did not examine the contractual provision governing
delay in delivery, nor did it return any clear finding on the
legality of the deductions made by the respondent-company.
Therefore, the award fails to determine the core issue, arising
between the parties, and does not disclose the reasoning
process, leading to the conclusion reached. Such omission, in
the considered view of this Court, brings the award squarely
within the category of patent illegality appearing on the face of
record, as contemplated under Section 34 (2A) of the Act.
30. Although, undoubtedly, the award was under the
provisions of the MSMED Act, but as noted above, it partakes
the character of statutory arbitration. Therefore, the award, in
the present case, was required to satisfy the discipline of
arbitral adjudication, including adherence to Section 31(3),
mandating requiring of reasons, on which award is given. In
the instant case, there was no agreement between the parties
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that award could be rendered without requiring reasons, nor
the award was on agreed terms under Section 30 of the Act,
and, therefore, non-recordal of the reasons has resulted in a
fundamental defect in the award.
31. In M/s Som Datt Builders Ltd. v State Of
Kerala5, the Supreme Court emphasized that the award must
indicate the basis, on which conclusions have been reached.
In Dyna Technologies Pvt Ltd v. Crompton Greaves Ltd. 6,
and even in OPG Power Generation Private Limited
(supra) cited by learned counsel for the appellant, the
Supreme Court observed that, though reasons need not be
elaborate like a judgment of a Court, they must at least be
intelligible and reflect the thought process adopted by the
Tribunal. Thus, while brevity or inadequacy of reasons is not,
by itself, a ground to invalidate an award, failure to adjudicate
the core dispute, or omission to disclose the basis of the
conclusion, certainly renders the award vulnerable.
32. Examining from the aforesaid aspects, the award of
the Arbitral Tribunal fails to consider the contractual terms,
the defence of the respondent-company, and without
adjudication of the core dispute, as to whether the penalty
5
(2009) 10 SCC 259
6
(2019) 20 SCC 1
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was rightly imposed or not, and deductions were permissible
under the contract, or not, virtually on assumptions that the
amount was due, proceeds to award statutory interest, and
this, in the considered opinion of the Court, amounts to a
patent illegality. The Commercial Court has not replaced the
award with its own view of facts, but has essentially held that
the award is unsustainable due to non-consideration of
essential issue, and absence of proper reasons. The order
under Section 34 is, thus, consistent with the settled principles
of arbitral review, and does not call for appellate correction.
33. At the same time, the dispute between the parties
has not yet been adjudicated on the merits of the contractual
controversy. Since the arbitration in the present case arises
from proceedings initiated under Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Act, 2006 Section 18, which
contemplates statutory arbitration upon failure of conciliation,
the underlying dispute does not stand extinguished merely
because the award has been set aside. Therefore, in our
opinion, remand of the claim to the Facilitation Council would
sub-serve the ends of justice. While doing so, we would not
be modifying or reviewing the award. The present course
would not be inconsistent with the principle laid down by the
Supreme Court in Gayatri Balasamy v. IS Novasoft
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Technologies Ltd.7, which holds that courts exercising
jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot modify arbitral awards.
34. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of with the
following directions:
1. The judgment dated 10.07.2019 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge (Commercial),
Dehradun in Arbitration Case No. 160 of 2016,
whereby the arbitral award dated 29.07.2016 was
set aside, is affirmed.
2. The dispute between the parties is remitted to
the Uttarakhand Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council for fresh adjudication in
accordance with law.
3. The Facilitation Council shall reconsider the
matter after affording opportunity of hearing to both
parties and shall pass a reasoned award, specifically
examining:
(i) the contractual provisions governing
delayed delivery,
(ii) the justification of the penalty imposed
under Clause 8 of the purchase order, and
(iii) the entitlement, if any, of the appellant to
claim interest under the MSMED Act, 2006.
7
2025 SCC OnLine SC 986
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35. The Facilitation Council may proceed on the basis of
the pleadings, documents and evidence already on record.
However, if the Council considers it necessary in the interest of
justice, it shall be open to it to permit the parties to place
limited additional material or evidence relating to the issues
identified in this order.
36. The Facilitation Council shall endeavour to conclude
the proceedings expeditiously, preferably within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
37. All contentions of the parties are left open to be
urged before the arbitral tribunal.
38. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No order as
to costs.
39. All pending applications also stand disposed of
accordingly.
______________________
MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, C.J.
___________________
SUBHASH UPADHYAY, J.
Dt: 17th March, 2026
Rahul
Digitally signed by RAHUL PRAJAPATI
RAHUL
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=aa4fa3bee6691397758b14516ed3e6
6e61bf4c848741983ed8c39e4145cf1dab,
PRAJAPATI
postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=303B55CC3063D34AC45BF8A
192FCAD15C390A1AAD7B39857D2540AE4C
28A4898, cn=RAHUL PRAJAPATI
Date: 2026.03.20 10:53:13 +05’30’
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