M/S Alishan Complex Private Limited vs The Initiating Officer on 3 August, 2026

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    Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

    M/S Alishan Complex Private Limited vs The Initiating Officer on 3 August, 2026

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               HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                             AT JODHPUR
    
                 D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1595/2026
            CNR: RJHC010436632026 | URN: CMA / 3831U / 2026
    
    M/s Alishan Complex Private Limited, M/s Alishan Complex Private
    Limited, Having Its Address At Plot No.4, Hanuwant Colony, Umaid
    Bhawan Road, Jodhpur.
    
                                                                          ----Appellant
    
                                           Versus
    
    The Initiating Officer, The Initiating Officer, Dcit, Benami Prohibition
    Unit, Jaipur, Having Its Address At Room No. 103 Na, New Central
    Revenue Building, Statue Circle, Jaipur
    
                                                                        ----Respondent
    
    
    For Appellant(s)              :    Mr. Ashwani Taneja
                                       Mr. Divyansh Dubey
                                       Ms. Divya Bapna
    For Respondent(s)             :    Mr. K.K. Bissa
                                       Mr. G.S. Chouhan
    
    
    
                   HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA

    HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH

    INDEX

    SPONSORED

    1. Introductory__________________________________________ 02

    2. Facts in chronological order____________________________ 04

    3. The proceedings below_________________________________ 05
    A. Initiating Officer___________________________________ 05
    B. Adjudicating Officer________________________________ 07
    C. Appellate Tribunal_________________________________ 12

    4. The case of the appellant______________________________ 17
    A. Arguments on behalf of the Appellant________________ 18
    B. Further Submissions on behalf of the appellant________ 20
    C. Case law cited on behalf of the appellant_____________ 26

    5. Case of the respondents_______________________________ 29

    A. Arguments on behalf of the respondents____________ 29
    B. Further Submissions of the Respondents______________ 30

    6. Discussion and analysis_______________________________ 32
    A. Issues/ Questions involved_________________________ 32
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    B. The Statutory Framework 33

    C. The Material Relied Upon by the Initiating Officer______ 38
    D. The Assessment Order dated 27.03.2026______________ 39
    E. Legal Position on Untested/Retracted Statement 42
    F. Overlapping/Contradictory Findings of the IO and the AO 50
    G. The Cumulative Infirmities 52

    7. Findings_________________________________________ 54
    8. Answers to the questions of law 55

    9. Conclusion/Order________________________________ 56

    Judgment

    Reportable
    Pronounced on : 03/08/2026

    Per: Arun Monga, J.

    I. INTRODUCTORY:-

    1. Appellant company, engaged in the business of real estate

    development and sale/purchase of the properties, is before us, assailing,

    inter alia, an order dated 01.04.2026 passed by Appellate Tribunal

    under Section 46 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act,

    1988 (PBPT Act for short) whereby the Tribunal affirmed the order

    dated 30.08.2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority under Section

    26(3) of the PBPT Act holding 79 immovable properties purchased by

    the appellant to be benami properties.

    2. The adjudicating authority (AA- for short) vide its order dated

    30.08.2024 in turn upheld the final provisional attachment order dated

    28.07.2023 passed under Section 24(4)(a)(i) of the PBPT Act, 1988.

    Both these orders have also been impugned herein. Vide its attachment

    order, the Initiating Officer (IO- for short) prima facie opined that as

    many as 79 immovable properties purchased by the appellant were

    benami properties as defined under Section 2(9) of the PBPT Act, 1988.

    Directions are also sought that as a consequence of quashing the orders,

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    ibid, the provisional attachment of the properties under PBPT Act be

    revoked and the properties be released in favour of the appellant.

    3. The lis in hand, in fact, traces its origin to a search conducted on

    16.06.2022 under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the case

    of one Maharani Group. The material emerging from that search was

    treated by the IO as the foundation for initiating proceedings under

    Section 24 of the PBPT Act against the appellant-company. Pertinently, a

    finding that the properties are benami may ultimately expose the

    properties to confiscation under Section 27 of the PBPT Act and may

    also attract prosecution under Section 53 of the Act, thereby giving the

    present proceedings a serious civil and penal complexion.

    4. The appellant is a private limited company incorporated under the

    Companies Act, 1956, engaged in real estate development, including

    development of Special Economic Zones and industrial plazas, and in

    promoting and developing lands, buildings and townships. In the

    scheme of the allegations levelled by the Initiating officer under PBPT

    Act, it has been cast in the role of the benamidar i.e. the name-lender

    in whose name the subject properties stand.

    5. The alleged beneficial owner is one Shri Mahaveer Lunia, founder and

    principal promoter of the Maharani Group, a Jodhpur-based handicrafts

    business. His connection with the appellant company is that he holds

    approximately 8.33% in each of two intermediary holding companies,

    translating to an indirect interest of roughly 4.17% in the appellant. He

    became a director of the appellant only on 06.01.2020, a date, it will be

    seen, that falls after the property purchases in question.

    6. The Initiating Officer, the Respondent herein, is the Deputy

    Commissioner of Income Tax (Benami Prohibition), Benami Prohibition

    Unit, Jaipur. He functions within the same departmental structure i.e.

    the Central Board of Direct Taxes, as the Income-Tax authorities whose

    assessment findings, (Uploaded
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    Appellant relies upon in its favour. More of it in greater details in the

    subsequent part at appropriate stage.

    II. FACTS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

    7. The financial spine of the appellant’s case reaches back to FY 2006-

    07, by which year the company’s share capital of approximately Rs.

    1.00 crore and reserves of approximately Rs. 8.95 crore, shareholders’

    funds of roughly Rs. 10 crore in aggregate, stood recorded in its books.

    It is not in dispute that these figures remained substantially stable

    thereafter.

    7.1. In FY 2016-17, the shareholding of the two intermediary holding

    companies changed hands and the Lunia family entered the structure.

    Significantly, both sides rely on the same subsequent fact for opposite

    purposes.

    7.2 In FY 2017-18, the appellant purchased 79 immovable properties at

    Jodhpur for a total consideration of Rs. 11,16,06,000, each payment

    made through banking channels. According to the appellant, the

    purchases were funded by the recall and redeployment of short-term

    loans and advances (Rs. 10.61 crore as on 31.03.2017), a conversion of

    one asset class into another, not an infusion of fresh money.

    7.3 On 06.01.2020, Shri Mahaveer Lunia became a director of the

    appellant. The chronology bears emphasis: the directorship post-dates

    every one of the 79 purchases. The appellant treats this as destroying

    the theory of beneficial ownership at the time of acquisition, whereas,

    the respondents treat the directorship as the securing of direct control

    as a future beneficiary.

    7.4 On 16.06.2022, a search under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act,

    1961 was conducted on the Maharani Group. From the residence of Shri

    Lunia were seized, inter alia, a list of the subject properties and, per the

    Initiating Officer, certain original registered sale deeds which were
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    forwarded to him by the income tax officials leading to initiation of

    proceedings under PBPT Act. Custody of these documents at the

    residence of the alleged beneficial owner is one of the affirmative

    circumstances the Revenue asserts. Though, of course, the appellant

    disputes such characterisation and the inference alike.

    7.5 During the search, the statement of Shri Anil Sanklecha, a Mumbai-

    based Chartered Accountant, was recorded under Section 132(4). In

    answer to Question Nos. 50 and 55, he is stated to have disclosed about

    routing of cash through hawala/angadia channels. However, by affidavit

    dated 27.06.2022, nine days after the search concluded, he retracted

    the statement, alleging that it had been extracted under duress in the

    course of some 65 hours of continuous questioning.

    III. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

    A. Initiating Officer

    8. Based, inter alia, on the information received from income tax

    department, on 28.04.2023, the Initiating Officer (Deputy

    Commissioner of Income Tax -Benami Prohibition Unit, Jaipur), issued a

    show cause notice under Section 24(1) and (2) of the PBPT Act, calling

    for a reply by 15.05.2023. The ‘reasons to believe’ were recorded in

    paragraph 13.3 of the notice.

    8.1 On 01.05.2023, before the reply period had expired, the Initiating

    Officer passed a provisional attachment order under Section 24(3). The

    prematurity of this order was the principal procedural grievance carried

    by the appellant to this court in an earlier foray of litigation without any

    success. 1 The consequence is that the procedural terrain stands

    substantially traversed, and the present appeal falls to be decided on

    the substantive framework of the Act.

    1
    Writ Petitions Nos. 16732/2023 (M/s Alishan Complex), 14527/2023 and 15074/2023, challenging the
    initiation and the provisional attachment, were dismissed by this court on 12.12.2023. The procedural
    challenges were rejected; the merits were expressly left open to be agitated before the Adjudicating Authority.

    A review petition (D.B. Review (Writ)     No. 20/2024)
                                       (Uploaded           was dismissed
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    at 04:57:43 09.04.2024. The special leave petition
    arising therefrom did not alter this position.

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    8.2. Meanwhile, on 28.07.2023, a final attachment order under Section

    24(4)(a)(i) was passed continuing the attachment. The said attachment

    order continuing the proceedings initiated under PBPT Act, reflecting the

    mind of the initiating officer, as to what he understood and noted, for

    seeking the reference before the adjudicating authority, is extracted as

    under:

    “2. A Search & Seizure action u/s 132 of the 1.T. Act, 1961 was conducted on
    16.06.2022 by the DDIT(Inv.)-1, Jodhpur in the case of Maharani Group,
    Jodhpur of which Shri Mahaveer Lunia is the founder and main promoter.
    Further, relevant documents seized during the course of the search action related
    to benami transactions in respect of the above group were received in this office
    through the office of the DGIT (inv.), Rajasthan, Jaipur.
    2.1 Based on the factual matrix of the matter which stands fortified from the
    information and credible material shared by the Investigation wing as above, a
    Show Cause Notice u/s. 24(1) of the PBPT Act, 1988 was issued on 28.04.2023.
    The materials analyzed to form “the reasons to believe” are as follows:

    I. Income-tax Returns of M/s Alishan Complex Pvt. Ltd.
    II. A detailed list of various immovable properties purchased in the name of
    M/s Alishan Complex Pvt. Ltd. found & seized (Exhibit-6 of Annexure-BS) at
    the residence premises of Sh. Mahveer Lunia i.e. Lalit Kunj, Opposite Hotel
    Mapple Abhay, Paota, Jodhpur.

    III. Statement of Shri Anil Sanklecha, CA dated 17.06.2022 & 18.06.2022
    recorded during the course of search.

    IV. Page No. 76 to 83 of exhibit B-9, i.e., a detailed list found during the
    course of search in which cash transactions made between Shri Anil
    Sanklecha and Shri Mahaveer Lunia are recorded.

    V. Bank Book/Ledger book of the company for the period of 01.04.2012 to
    31.03.2022.

    VI. Documents available on the database of Ministry of Corporate Affairs.
    VII. Statements of Shri Praveen Agarwal recorded under section 1,32(4) of
    the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 10/11.02.2015, 15.02.2014 & 18.11.2014.
    VIII. Statements of Shri Pramod Ramdeen recorded under section 132(4) of
    the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 10.11.2012.

    IX. Statement of Sh. Rakesh Kumar Agarwal recorded u/s 131 of the 1.T.Act,
    1961 on 21.11.2014 by the Investigation wing of Kolkata.

    3. Brief facts of the case leading to the issue of Show Cause Notice u/s. 24(1) of
    the Prohibitions of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988
    On careful perusal and examination of the seized documents, other
    details/documents and statements recorded during the Search Action on the
    Maharani Group the following facts have come to the notice:
    4 Modus-operandi adopted by the Group
    4.1 Maharani group is mainly engaged in the business of handicraft items viz
    cloths, wooden handicraft and various metal handicraft items and retails sale
    thereof to local as well as foreign tourist in the name of mainly M/s Maharani
    Textile and Handicraft and key person is Shri Mahaveer Lunia resident of
    Jodhpur (Rajasthan). This business generates huge margin as the tourists pay
    handsome price for choice items. To reduce the profit margin and also to manage
    cash for requirements of the group for making further investment in purchase of
    lands and immovable properties, the firm debits huge bogus purchase bills
    managed from jewellers of Jodhpur. Payment is made to these jewellers through
    banking channel against the bogus purchases and cash is received back.

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    4.2 Apart from this, Shri Mahaveer Lunia also works as money-lender and earns
    unaccounted interest income also. The unaccounted cash is then utilized for
    making purchase of immovable properties and also to buy shell/paper companies
    namely (1) Alishan Complex Pvt. Ltd., (2) Swagatama Enclave Pvt. Ltd. and (3)
    Principal Dealers Pvt. Ltd. etc., earlier managed and controlled by the entry
    operators. These companies have large amount of security premium reserve in it,
    which is further utilized to buy immovable properties. These shell companies
    have been purchased by the group making investment out of the cash generated
    through bogus purchases. The unaccounted cash generated through bogus
    purchases were routed by the group through Sh. Anil Sanklecha, CA (Mumbai
    based and also covered u/s 132 of the 1.T. Act., 1962 with the group) for
    purchasing the shell companies. These facts have been verified from the
    documents/details found during the course of search action and the statement of
    Sh. Anil Sanklecha, СA.

    5. Acquisition of Kolkata based Shell Companies (Benamidars) by the Group.
    5.1 On the basis of documents seized during the course of search, investigation
    and post search enquiries conducted in the group, the DDIT(Inv.)-1, Jodhpur has
    reported that the group has taken control of few Kolkata based shell companies
    namely (1) Alishan Complex Pvt. Ltd., (2) Swagatama Enclave Pvt. Ltd. and (3)
    Principal Dealers Pvt. Ltd.etc. Few of these companies have considerable
    accumulated share premium reserve. The assessee group has utilized these
    reserves for advancing loans to sister concerns and/or for purchasing immovable
    properties. These companies have huge reserves and loans and advances (assets).
    These companies were bought by the group through Sh. Anil Sanklecha and cash
    was paid by the group to Anil Sanklecha, who has helped the beneficial owner
    i.e. Shri Mahaveer Lunia to purchase these companies. (Benamidars).”

    8.3 Perusal of the above reveals that the case constructed by the

    Initiating Officer, distilled to its essentials, runs thus: unaccounted cash

    of approximately Rs. 40-42 crore, generated by the Lunia family

    through bogus jewellery purchase bills and money-lending, was routed

    through hawala and angadia channels, with CA Sanklecha as conduit,

    into shell or paper companies formerly operated by Kolkata and

    Mumbai-based entry operators; those companies, already carrying large

    share premium reserves, then acquired the 79 properties in the

    appellant’s name, rendering the company a benamidar and Shri Lunia

    the beneficial owner.

    B. Adjudicating Authority

    9. Basis above finding/observations, a reference was thus made on

    07.08.2023 by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Benami

    Prohibition Unit, Jaipur), the Initiating Officer under the PBPT Act, to the

    Adjudicating Authority under Section 24(5) i.e. The Commissioner of

    Income tax.

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    9.1 Upon notice, the appellant submitted its detailed response before

    the adjudicating authority, inter alia, submitting that:

    “1. Alishan Complex Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Company or Alleged
    Benamidar) is a private limited company. The Company is authorized by its
    memorandum and articles of association to engage in business as builder,
    promoter and developers of lands, buildings, building sites, townships and other
    building. In furtherance of achieving its objects, the Company purchased various
    immovable properties during financial year 2017-18, details of which are given
    in Annexure A to impugned reference available at page no. 1-9 of relied upon
    documents enclosed with Impugned reference.

    2. The Company during FY 2017-18 purchased the various immovable properties
    as described in Annexure A as aforesaid out of the funds of the company being
    the capital and reserves including the loans and advances given to various
    parties and received back during the year. The details of the properties
    purchased during FY 2017-18 are given in the foregoing reply/explanation of the
    Company. The said properties have been alleged to be Benami Properties by Ld.
    IO in Impugned reference before Your Honour.

    3. The Company regularly files its returns of income, accounts and audited
    finances to Registrar of Companies (hereinafter referred to as “ROC”) and
    income tax department which has been accepted by the ROC and income tax
    department.

    4. The Company has always been operated and managed by the same
    shareholders namely Surpati Packaging Pvt Ltd., and Upward Commerce Pvt.
    However, in FY 2016-17, the shareholders of Surpati Packaging Pvt Ltd., and
    Upward Commerce Pvt changed to new shareholders and thereby the ultimate
    individual shareholders of the Company changed to new shareholders i.e., the
    Lunia family.

    5: It is submitted that the shareholding pattern of Alishan Complex Private
    Limited is as follows:

    (i) M/s: Surpati Packaging Pvt Ltd holding 49.99% shareholding

    (ii) M/s Upward Commerce Pvt. Ltd holding 49.99% shareholding

    6. The change in shareholding did not impact the business of the Company and
    there has been no substantial change in nature of business. Further, in order to
    achieve the objects of the Company, immovable properties were purchased by the
    Company on which the capital project was likely to be introduced.

    7. The financial position of the company since financial year 2006-07 till 2021-

    22 is given hereunder:

          F.Y.        Share Capital            Reserves (INR)           Total
                                                                        Shareholder
                                                                        Funds in Rs/-
          2006-07     1,00,50,000              8,95,50,000                    9,96,00,000
          2007-08     1,00,50,000              8,95,50,000                    9,96,00,000
          2008-09     1,00,50,000              9,04,66,932.28             10,05,16,932.28
          2009-10     1,00,50,000              9,05,12,341.37             10,05,62,341.37
          2010-11     1,00,50,000              9,05,19,898.37             10,05,69,898.37
          2011-12     1,00,50,000              8,89,93,785.37              9,90,43,785.37
          2012-13     1,00,50,000             8,89,94,791.52
                              (Uploaded on 03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 PM)      9,90,44,791.52
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          2013-14     1,00,50,000              8,89,90,691.52             9,90,40,691.52
          2014-15     1,00,50,000              8,89,92,178.37             9,90,42,178.37
          2015-16     1,00,50,000              8,91,02,748.37             9,91,52,748.37
          2016-17     1,00,50,000              8,90,41,745.87             9,90,91,745.87
          2017-18     1,00,50,000              8,89,46,122.13             9,89,96,122.13
          2018-19     1,00,50,000              8,89,23,482.00             9,89,73,482.00
          2019-20     1,00,50,000              8,89,15,964.30             9,89,65,964.30
          2020-21     1,00,50,000              8,89,10,209.10             9,89,60,209.10
          2021-22     1,00,50,000              8,89,05,140.00             9,89,55,140.00
                                             -x-x-x-x-x-
    

    21. It is humbly submitted that the whole gamut of the impugned proceedings is
    bald allegation that the Company is a shell company and it does not have its own
    funds and capital to purchase the Said immovable properties, as against the fact
    that Company independently acquired these properties from its own funds. It is
    baselessly alleged by Ld. IO that consideration of purchase has been provided by
    Shri Mahaveer Lunia through bogus accommodation entries. Without admitting
    to any such allegation, it is submitted that the Company purchased the Said
    Immovable Properties in its own name and the source of investment for
    purchasing such immovable properties was the funds of was the funds of
    Company. Details with respect to the purchase of the Said Immovable Properties
    are given in the foregoing reply/ explanation of Company.

    22. It is pertinent to mention here that the Assessee company is regularly filing
    its income tax return and balance sheet, wherein the purchases of the Said
    Immovable Properties were duly disclosed in the assets of the Company, and the
    same has been accepted by the Income Tax Department. It is submitted that the
    fact that the Income Tax Department has never assumed jurisdiction and
    thereupon initiated proceedings against the Company with respect to the alleged
    transactions clearly goes to show that the allegations levelled by the Ld. I.O. are
    absolutely baseless and devoid of any merit. It is further submitted that when the
    income tax department has itself not doubted the genuineness of these
    transactions, then the Ld. I.O., had no jurisdiction to declare the Company as
    shell company and accordingly it is not justified to hold Company as Benamidar
    of its own properties purchased from its own funds

    23. Furthermore, shareholders of the Maharani Group were searched u/s 132 of
    the IT Act on 16.6.2022 and the same has resulted in initiation of re-assessment
    proceedings u/s 148 of the IT Act in case of some of the shareholders in respect
    of suspected undisclosed income. Those proceedings are still pending and are at
    only inception stage. If at all there is any undisclosed income of shareholders,
    the same would-be subject matter of those proceedings and the law would take
    its own course. However, the entire Show Cause Notice dated 28.04.2023 as well
    as the Impugned Order(s) dated 28.07.2023 and the Impugned Reference dated
    07.08.2023 is just overwhelmed with the un-concluded suspicion of involvement
    of some unaccounted money, which is again self-contradictory and without
    evidence. In any case, that would be relevant only in the proceedings under the
    Income Tax Act, that too against those persons of Maharani group, to whom such
    unaccounted money belongs, which is yet to be determined. As stated above,
    there are no income tax proceedings against the Company.

    24. Even otherwise, the entire allegation of the Ld. IO is yet to be ascertained in
    the income tax proceeding. Therefore, these proceeding under the PBPT Act, to
    say the least, are premature. The
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    whereby proceedings under the PBPT Act may be taken up if required, after
    complete investigation and adjudication under the Income Tax Act, 1961.”

    9.2 After going through the defense of the appellant, as well as, the

    material available on record, the adjudicating authority, vide its order

    dated 30.08.24, held as under:

    “5.6 To sum up all, the financial investigation carried out by the IO results in
    emerging the fact that D-1 to D-3 did not have creditworthiness or wherewithal
    for acquiring the properties under question and it was D-4, who created a smoke
    screen to kept himself in disguise and was the real kin-ping of whole
    arrangement, where unaccounted funds were introduced by him in D-1 to D-3
    through Hawala operators and also with the help of Shri Anil Sanklecha, CA and
    had complete control over D-1 to D-3 through mediator companies. For the sake
    of brevity, what constitutes Benami property and Benami transaction in the
    present case are specified below:

            Particulars           Remarks
            Benami Property       As mentioned above in para 1.1 of this order
            Benami Transaction    The transactions carried out by D-4 in the form of
    

    providing consideration which was routed by Sh. Anil
    Sankhlecha, CA to the sellers for making purchases
    of the said lands/immovable properties in the names
    of D-1 to D-3 are “Benami Transaction” within the
    meaning of Section 2(9)(A) of the PBPT Act, 1988.

    Benamidar (1) M/s Alishan Complex Pvt. Ltd. (D-1)
    (2) M/s Principle Dealer Pvt. Ltd. (D-2)
    (3) M/s Swagatama Enclave Pvt. Ltd (D-3)

    Beneficial Owners (1) Shri Mahaveer Lunia (D-4)
    5.7 Further, the defendants contended that the order passed by the IO does not
    satisfy any of the six parameters prescribed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
    case of Valiammal V. Subraaniam, AIR 2004 SC 4187.

    The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Valiammal V. Subraaniam, AIR 2004
    SC 4187 laid down following parameters, while examining a benami transaction:

    (i) the source from which the purchase money came;

    (ii) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase;

    (iii) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour;

    (iv) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant
    and the alleged benamidar;

    (v) the custody of the title deeds after the sale; and

    (vi) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the
    sale.”

    The above parameters are discussed as under:

    S.
    No. Circumstances Remarks
    1 The source from which the The entire consideration for purchase of
    purchase money came the said lands/immovable properties in
    the names of D-1 to D-3 was paid by Sh.

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    LuniaPM)which was routed
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    through Sh. Anil Sankhlecha, CA
    2 The nature and possession The actual possession over the said lands
    of the property, after the purchased in the names of D-1 to D-3
    purchase; was/is always with Sh. Mahaveer. Lunia,
    the beneficial owner. D-1 to D-3 are only
    the name lenders of the transactions for
    land records only.

        3     Motive, if any, for giving       Unaccounted cash of D-4 has been
              the transaction a benami         introduced in D-1 to D-3, which clearly
              colour;                          shows that the tax evasion legetimising
                                               the unaccounted cash was the only
                                               motive.
        4     The position of the parties      Sh. Mahaveer Lunia through self and his
              and the relationship, if any,    family members is having full control and
              between the claimant and         management of D-1 to D-3 since F.Y.
              the alleged benamidar            2016-17 (from the date of transfer of
                                               shares of the company in their own
                                               names or in the name of the other
                                               companies wherein they are holding
                                               100% share).
        5     The custody of the title         It is evident from the fact that during the
              deeds after the sale;            search conducted on 16.06.2022, a
                                               detailed list of various immovable
                                               properties purchased in the name of this
                                               company was found at the residence
                                               premises of Sh. Mahveer Lunia i.e. Lalit
                                               Kunj, Opposite Hotel Mapple Abhay,
                                               Paota, Jodhpur Further, original
                                               registered sale deeds of some of the said
                                               lands/immovable properties were also
                                               found & seized from the residence of Shri
                                               Mahaveer Lunia.
        6     The conduct of parties           After       purchasing        the      said
              concerned in dealing with        lands/immovable properties in the names
              the property after the sale.     of D-1 to D-3, Shri Mahaveer Lunia is
                                               having full possession over the said
                                               lands/immovable properties for his
                                               immediate/future benefits.
    

    5.8 In view of above discussion, the other contentions of the defendants that the
    IO has not discharged the burden of proof, the case of the defendants falls under
    exception II of section 2(9) (A) of the PBPT Act and every cash transaction could
    not be treated as benami transaction hold no ground, hence rejected.

    6. Order:

    6.1 I, Rajendra Kumar, in view of the above findings and in exercise of the
    powers conferred on me by virtue of Section 7 read with Section 26 of the PBPT
    Act, 1988 (as amended), hereby confirm the Provisional Attachment Orders u/s
    24(4) of the PBPT Act dated 28.07.2023 of the Initiating Officer thereby holding
    the properties specified in Para 1.1 of this order to be Benami Properties, title
    holder thereof i.e., D-1, D-2 & D-3 to be Benamidars, D-4 to be Beneficial
    Owner and further direct that the properties specified in Para 1.1 of this Order
    shall not be transferred or otherwise dealt with, in any manner, except with the
    prior permission of the undersigned. The Reference nos. R-

    0271/PBPT/DLI/2023, R-0272/PBPT/DLI/2023 and R-0273/PBPT/DLI/2023
    are allowed.

    6.2 This is an appealable order and any party hereto, if aggrieved by this order
    may appeal in term of section 46 of the PBPT Act, 1988 to the Appellate Tribunal
    for Forfeiture of Property, 4th Floor, Lok Nayak Bhavan, Khan Market, New
    Delhi-110003, within 45 days from
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    C. Appellate Tribunal

    10. The above order passed by the adjudicating authority was

    challenged before the learned Appellate Tribunal under section 46 of the

    PBPT Act. While that appeal was pending, on 27.03.2026 the

    jurisdictional Assessing Officer passed the assessment order for AY

    2018-19, the very year of the purchases qua the appellant, arising out

    of the very same search. The order records that the investment was

    duly recorded in the audited balance sheet, supported by registered

    sale deeds, made through banking channels with no cash involvement,

    and that the source stood satisfactorily explained; no addition was

    made under Section 69. This order, and its uneasy coexistence with the

    benami findings, constitutes the another central controversy in the

    appeal. The relevant portion whereof may be usefully extracted before

    proceeding further:

    “7.1 I have carefully considered the submission of the assessee with reference to
    documents attached therewith.

    It is observed that the assessee has made investment in purchase of immovable
    property during the year under consideration amounting to Rs. 11,16,06,000/-.
    Copies of ledger A/cs of all the parties to whom payments made against purchase
    of properties have been furnished. On verification, the above investment is found
    to be duly recorded in the audited balance sheet under fixed assets and is
    supported by registered sale deeds and payments made through banking
    channels. The amount has been duly reconciled with the bank statements and
    books of account and, therefore, the same cannot be treated as unexplained.
    The primary condition for invoking section 69 of the Act is that investment not
    recorded in the books of account, whereas in the present case of the assessee, the
    investment is fully reflected in the books of a/c and further reconciled with the
    bank statements and, therefore, no adverse inference is drawn. 11
    Further, the assessee has submitted that reduction in loans and advances is on
    account of recovery or adjustment of earlier balance and, therefore, does not
    constitute income of the year under consideration. Confirmations of parties,
    their ITRs and copies of relevant ledger accounts have been furnished. Loans
    and advances have been received through banking channel. Thus, identity of the
    creditors / parties, their creditworthiness and genuineness of transactions has
    been established.

    With regard to the increase in liabilities reflected under the head “Other Current
    Liabilities” amounting to Rs. 1,72,15,000/- as against Rs. 1,02,10,000/- in the
    preceding year, the assessee has furnished party-wise details of the liabilities
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    along with confirmations and copies of ITR acknowledgements of the concerned
    parties.

    Details furnished have been examined carefully. It is observed that the liabilities
    are duly recorded, in the regular books of account and are identifiable with
    specific parties. The assessee has furnished confirmations and basic details
    establishing the identity of the creditor land, therefore, such liabilities cannot be
    considered non-genuine or represent unexplained income of the assessee.
    The assessee has further established that all transactions in the bank accounts
    are duly recorded in the regular books of account and are relatable to disclosed
    business and investment activities. The assessee reply has been examined and
    test check and it is noticed that the bank transactions are duly reflected in the
    books of account. Therefore, the assessee’s reply is accepted. 1
    Thus, the assessee has satisfactorily explained all the issue on which explanation
    with supporting documents and hence, no adverse inference is drawn and
    returned income of Rs. 0/- with c/f of current year’s loss of Rs. 64,177/- is
    accepted as such.

    8. Assessed u/s 147 r.w.s. 143(3) at NIL. Issue demand notice & challan. The
    form ITNS-150 showing calculation of tax and interest chargeable, if any, is
    attached herewith and forms are part of this Order. A notice of demand u/s 156 of
    the Income-tax Act, 1961 and challan for payment of tax, if payable, is hereby
    issued.

    This order is being issued after obtaining approval of the Addl. Commissioner of
    Income Tax, Central Range, Jodhpur vide DIN no. ITBA/COM/F/17/2025-
    26/1087984411(1) dated 27.03.2026.”

    10.1 On 01.04.2026, the learned Appellate Tribunal dismissed the

    appeal by an order now impugned herein, which reads as under:

    “2. The case in hand was initiated after a search conducted under Section 132 of
    the Income Tax Act on 16.06.2022 on Maharani Group of company founded by
    Shri Mahaveer Lunia. The office of the 10 received information along with
    relevant documents from DGIT (Inv.), Rajasthan, Jaipur. Shri Mahaveer Lunia
    was shown to be the founder and main promoter of the Maharani Group. The
    group is mainly engaged in the business of handicraft items viz. clothes, wooden
    handicraft, various metal handicraft items, for retail sale thereof to local as well
    as foreign tourists. The business generated huge margin of profit as tourists pay
    handsome price for choice items. To reduce the profit margin and also to manage
    cash for the requirements of the group for making further investment in purchase
    of lands and immovable properties, the firm debited huge bogus purchase bills
    managed from jewelers of Jodhpur. Payment was made to these jewelers through
    banking channels against the bogus purchases and cash was received back.
    Apart from this, Shri Mahaveer Lunia also worked as a money-lender and earns
    unaccounted interest income. The unaccounted cash was utilized for making
    purchase of immovable properties and also to acquire shell/paper companies
    namely (1) M/s Alishan Complex Pvt. Ltd., (2) M/s Principal Dealers Pvt. Ltd.,
    and (3) M/s Swagatama Enclave Pvt. Ltd., earlier managed and controlled by
    entry operators of Kolkata and Mumbai. Those companies were having security
    and premium reserves, which was utilized to buy immovable properties. These
    companies were acquired by the group by making investment out of the cash
    generated through bogus purchases.

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    bogus purchases was routed through Shri Anil Sanklecha, CA, a relative of Shri
    Mahaveer Lunia for purchasing the shell companies. Those companies were
    operated by Shri Neeraj Khemka and Shri Praveen Agarwal (dummy Director) at
    the time of share allotment, wherein Shri Praveen Agarwal accepted that these
    companies are shell companies/paper companies used by him for providing
    accommodation entries in lieu of cash payment.

    4. The allegation was for operation of those entities from Kolkata and Mumbai
    with the help of Shri Anil Sanklecha, Chartered Accountant, a relative of Shri
    Mahaveer Lunia. He remained instrumental in facilitating the transactions where
    approximately Rs.40 to 42 Crores was transacted in cash through Hawala
    Operators (Angadias), as admitted by the witnesses in his statements The modus
    was to induce cash in the shell companies (appellants no. 1 to 3) and thereupon
    to acquire various properties in the name of those companies and accordingly 79
    properties were purchased in the name of the appellant M/s Alishan Complex Pvt.
    Ltd. while 50. properties in the name of the appellant M/s Principle Dealer Pvt.
    Ltd. and lastly 14 properties in the name of appellant M/s Swagatma Enclave Pvt.
    Ltd. making it in all 143 properties. The money involved therein was found to be
    Rs.40 Crores, Rs. 18 Crores and Rs. 17 Crores respectively in the entities named
    above. Finding a case of benami transaction, notice was issued to the appellants
    under Section 24(1) followed by notice under Section 24(3) of the Act of 1988.
    The provisional attachment order was caused thereupon. It was followed by
    adjudication by the Adjudicating Authority on a reference by IO. After hearing
    the parties, the Provisional Attachment Order was confirmed and aggrieved by
    the aforesaid, these appeals have been preferred by the appellants.

    -x-x-x-x-x-

    Arguments of counsel for the appellants:

    20. One of the argument of the appellants is that statements of different persons
    recorded by the Income Tax Department, behind their back could not have been
    relied upon.

    21. We have considered the aforesaid issue also. The statements recorded under
    one statute can be used in proceedings under another statute, if the provisions
    and purposes of the statutes align and there is no express prohibition against it.

    In the case at hand, statements were recorded under section 132(4) of the Income
    Tax Act, 1961 and the same have been used for the proceedings under the PBPT
    Act. Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine whether Income Tax Act and
    PBPT Act can be construed together. It cannot be denied that the purpose of both
    the Income Tax Act and the PBPT Act is to ensure transparency and legality in
    financial transactions and asset holdings. The PBPT Act, like many other legal
    frameworks. allows for the use of statements and evidence that are relevant to
    the case, regardless of where or under which Act they were originally recorded.
    Section 60 of the PBPT Act clarifies “Applications of other laws not barred”. The
    provisions of the Act of 1988 shall be in addition to, and not, save as hereinafter
    expressly provided. in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. It
    is evident from above that the PBPT Act empowers and enables /Authorities to
    use application of other laws. In view of above, the statements recorded under
    the Income Tax Act, 1961 could have been used for the proceedings under the
    PBPT Act, 1988. The appellants failed to explain as to why the statements
    recorded under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act could not have been relied. It
    is along with other material collected during the course of search and
    subsequently.

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    22. It was further submitted that the statements recorded behind the back had no
    evidentiary value. The issue has been linked with the issue of denial of cross-
    examination of the witnesses.

    23. We may first clarify the issue of right of cross-examination of the witnesses
    which is not inbuilt under the Act of 1988. The right of cross-examination
    depends on the nature of the proceedings. The issue aforesaid has been dealt
    with by Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Harivallabh Mohanlal Joshi
    Vs. Union of India
    in Writ Petition (C) No. 16633/2018 decided by the order
    dated. 13.08.2018. The judgment of the Apex Court was taken into consideration
    to hold that cross-examination is not an integral part of the principle of natural
    justice. However, it is open for the competent authority to examine the available
    circumstances and if deems fit, the opportunity to cross-examination can be
    provided, but not as a matter of right.
    The same view was taken by the Madras
    High Court in the case of M/s Marg Realities Ltd. Vs. Dy. CIT (Benami
    Prohibition
    ) reported in 448 ITR 574 (Mad) (HC) to hold that there is no
    provision under the Act of 1988 to provide an opportunity for cross-examination.

    25. Detailed finding in that regard has been recorded, thus, the impugned order
    has not been passed merely on the statements of the witnesses but other material
    to prove the case of benami transaction. At this stage, we may further refer to the
    retraction of the statement by Sh. Anil Sanklecha, CA, relative of Mahaveer
    Lunia. The retraction was made by an affidavit after expiry of the considerable
    period and it is not that the statement of Sh. Anil Sanklecha, CA was recorded by
    the Income Tax authorities under duress or coercion. Retraction for the sake of it
    and with the delay is not acceptable. It is otherwise a fact that the impugned
    order has not been passed only based on statements, rather it was with
    corroborative eviden the material and, therefore, rightly relied upon by the
    respondents.

    It may be that stand-alone statements indeed may lack evidentiary value, if they
    are not corroborated or supported by other evidence. However, if these
    statements are consistent with other evidence or provide essential context to
    understanding a transaction ог arrangement covered under the PBPT Act, they
    can carry significant weight.

    26. In the case at hand, it is observed that the IO has not relied only on the
    statements of third persons like Sh. Anil Sanklecha, CA etc. but duly analyzed the
    shareholding pattern as well as current Directors in these companies and after
    analyzing all financials, found that Shri Mahaveer Lunia and his family members
    are now having full control and management of three companies since F.Y. 2016-

    17. Moreover, during the search conducted on 16.06.2022, detailed list of
    various immovable properties purchased in names of these three companies were
    found at the residence premises of Shri Mahaveer Lunia. These facts show that
    the statements were corroborated and supported by other evidences. Therefore,
    the contention of the defendants that statements recorded behind their back have
    no evidentiary value, cannot be accepted. They could not otherwise question
    truthfullness of the statements. There is no provision to record statement in the
    presence of the benamidar or beneficial owner.

    x-x-x-x-x-x

    34. It is noticed that Shri Anil Sanklecha, CA in response to question numbers 50,
    55 in his statement recorded on oath u/s 132(4) of the 1.T Act, 1961 stated on
    17.06.2022/18.06.2022 and admitted that he has received cash from Mahaveer
    Lunia to the tune of Rs. 40-42 crores (approx.) through Angadia (Hawala
    operator) in Mumbai, which was routed in the shell entities. He also stated that
    his servant Mr. Suresh(Uploaded
    Mukhiaonwas one ofat 04:57:43
    03/08/2026 the Directors
    PM) in those companies
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    earlier. In order to verify the veracity of said submission, list of current and
    previous directors was perused from the records, wherein it is seen that Shri
    Suresh Mukhia was director in past. It is also noticed from material on record
    that one company was having two shareholders namely M/s Surpati Packaging
    Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Upward Commerce Pvt. Ltd, with shareholding of 49.99% each.
    It is also seen that Mahaveer Lunia and his family members were having 50%
    shareholding in both M/s Surpati Packaging Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Upward
    Commerce Pvt. Ltd. Similarly, M/s Shivaasha Mercantile Ltd. is having 99.98%
    shareholding in other companies, in which Mahaveer Lunia and his family
    members were having 58.24% shareholding. Likewise, M/s Mahavir Agency Pvt.
    Ltd. and M/s Jagdamba Dealer Pvt. Ltd. are having 49.98% each shareholding.
    Further, M/s Jodhana Buildmart Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Marudhar Landcon Pvt.
    Ltd. are having 50% each shareholding in M/s Mahavir Agency Pvt. Ltd.
    Mahaveer Lunia and his family members are having 100% shareholding of M/s
    Jodhana Buildmart Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Marudhar Landcon Pvt. Ltd.
    x-x-x-x-x-x

    39. It was urged that when the Income Tax Department has assumed the
    jurisdiction and initiated proceedings against the benamidar companies with
    regard to the alleged transactions, then there was no reason to make allegations
    about benami transactions in regard to the same facts. It is more so when the
    Income-Tax Department made the assessment of undisclosed income thus it
    could not have been taken to be involved in benami transactions:

    40. We find no substance in the argument, rather it has been raised based on
    misconceived notions. According to the appellants, element of benami
    transaction can rest only when unaccounted or illegal money is transacted. The
    said concept is incorrect because element of benami transaction may exist even if
    it has been transacted out of the disclosed income and source. We would
    illustrate it. If somebody is having disclosed income declared in the income tax,
    however, transferred to a third person for purchase of the property in his name,
    then it would be a case of benami transaction despite disclosed income being
    used in benami transaction. In the similar manner, even if the income tax
    authority has made assessment of undisclosed income after causing notice under
    Section 148 of the Income Tax Act or otherwise it may become legalized money
    but would not nullify the element of benami transaction, if exists. The facts of this
    case have been disclosed to show how the benami transaction has been cash out
    of betting and gambling but the fact remains that the appellants changed their
    stand regarding earning which was initially said to be out of service and
    thereupon through the agriculture income and disclosed in the revised income
    tax return. It was after the notice caused by the respondents. The IO found an
    element of benami transaction where the money was routed for purchase of
    shares, mutual funds and properties. It was transacted by beneficial owner and
    thereupon purchase remained in the name of benamidar’s companies. The
    detailed fact to show how a case of benami transaction has been made has
    already been discussed thus it is not required to be repeated, however, element of
    benami transaction, if made out, would not be effected by subsequent assessment
    of income.

    41. The next question is co-related to the last issue. The counsel for the
    appellants submitted that the cash transaction cannot be taken to be the basis for
    the benami transaction. It is nothing but admission about the involvement of cash
    in the transaction though with the qualification that mere involvement of cash
    would not make out a case of benami transaction. The proposition taken by the
    counsel for the appellant may be correct and we may endorse that each cash
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    allegation to make out a case under Section 2(9)(A) of the Act of 1988. If the
    involvement of cash transaction results in benami transaction, it cannot be
    nullified only on the ground that involvement of the cash would make out a case
    of benami transaction. However, if no allegation is made out then even
    involvement of cash would not make out a case of benami transaction. It depends
    on the facts of the case. In the instant case, huge amount was involved which
    remained unaccounted and even if in the revised return, it was assessed, if the
    fact remained that it was used for benami transaction and, therefore, the
    argument is clarified with the aforesaid and in this case respondents could not
    satisfy route of transaction to make out a case of benami transaction.

    42. The next question was that Mahaveer Lunia is not shareholder of the
    appellant companies. In fact, he purchased share of shareholding company and
    that too of limited extent. The appellant company purchased the immovable
    properties out of their own funds and, therefore, shareholders did not become the
    owner of the properties. The fact aforesaid has been raised in ignorance of the
    fact that the appellant company could not support the source of funds to acquire
    the properties though they had taken an excuse about availability of funds in the
    account of the company itself and, therefore, it was used for purchase of the
    properties. It is, however, without clarification about the generation of funds and
    more specifically receipt of the amount from those to whom money was advanced
    by the appellant companies. There is no material to show as to when money was
    advanced and source for advance of money to the appellant company so as to
    legally received it back. In the background aforesaid, receipt of the amount as a
    repayment of the advances was taken to be nothing, but for creation of the
    benami transaction where beneficial owner infused the cash which was shown to
    be nothing but out of repayment of the advances. The source of advance and
    necessary material was not found with the appellants in the proceedings
    conducted by the Income Tax Department as well as the respondents and
    otherwise if the appellant Mahaveer Lunia was holding shares only in the
    shareholding company, then it makes a case of benami transaction because he
    had infused cash amount in those companies for purchase of shares, mutual
    funds and properties making out a case of benami transaction under Section
    2(9)(A)
    of the Act of 1988. The infusion of cash by Mahaveer Lunia in the
    shareholding companies was admitted by Shri Anil Sanklecha, CA. Thus, even
    the last argument raised by the counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted,
    rather analysis aforesaid reveals satisfaction of the ingredients of Section 2(9)(A)
    of the Act of 1988.

    43. In the light of the discussion made above, the appeals would fail and are
    dismissed.”

    IV. THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT

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    A. Arguments on behalf of the Appellant

    11. Mr. Ashwani Taneja, argued broadly on the lines of the grounds

    pleaded in the appeal. Basis thereof, case of the appellant is crystallized

    on following seven heads.

    12.1 First, independent financial capacity: shareholders’ funds of

    roughly Rs. 10 crore have been maintained consistently since FY 2006-

    07, predating the Lunia family’s entry by a decade. The purchases were

    made entirely through banking channels, funded by the repayment and

    redeployment of loans and advances already appearing in the books, a

    conversion of assets, not an infusion. On this footing, no external

    consideration entered the transactions at all.

    12.2 Second, the twin conditions of Section 2(9)(A) are said to

    be unmet: the company paid from its own corpus, and it holds,

    possesses and enjoys the properties itself. There is, on the appellant’s

    submission, no identified person who provided the consideration and for

    whose benefit the properties are held, and both limbs must be

    affirmatively established before the definition is attracted.

    12.3 Third, shareholding is not beneficial ownership. Shri Lunia is

    not even a direct shareholder of the appellant; a shareholder of a

    holding company cannot in law be the beneficial owner of property held

    by the subsidiary, which is a separate juristic person, shareholders own

    shares, not the company’s assets. Reliance is placed on Pr. CIT v.

    Pradeep Wig2, and, for the proposition that the corporate veil may be

    pierced only upon a finding of fraud, sham or facade, on Vodafone

    International Holdings BV v. Union of India3 and LIC v. Escorts

    Ltd.4.

    12.4 Fourth, factual errors going to the root of the impugned

    order (Tribunal): (i) the learned Tribunal attributed an investment of

    2
    ITA 681/2025, DELHI HIGH COURT
    3
    (2012) 6 SCC 613 (Uploaded on 03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 PM)
    4
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    Rs. 40 crore to the appellant against an actual figure of Rs. 11.16 crore,

    an overstatement exceeding 250%; (ii) it confused the shareholding of

    two distinct companies, applying the 58.24% Lunia holding in M/s

    Shivaasha Mercantile to the wrong entity; and (iii) it conflated one

    individual, holding an indirect interest of about 4.17%, with a twelve-

    member extended family, whereas a collective family holding cannot

    substitute for proof that a specific person provided the consideration.

    12.5 Fifth, the burden of proof was wrongly shifted. The initial

    burden of establishing a benami transaction lies on the Initiating Officer,

    who, the appellant contends, never ascertained the exact amount of

    cash allegedly provided nor the benefit accrued, and the Tribunal

    impermissibly required the appellant to prove a negative.

    12.6 Sixth, the income-tax findings were ignored, lead to two

    contradictory findings: under the same Act and out of the same

    search, the Assessing Officer accepted the source of the investment and

    made no addition under Section 69, yet the learned Tribunal treated the

    same search material as inculpatory, the Section 132(4) statements as

    conclusive, while dismissing the exculpatory assessment findings as

    irrelevant. Reliance is placed on Central Warehousing Corporation v.

    Adani Ports SEZ Ltd. 5 against the respondent and IT department

    approbating and reprobating on the same facts. The appellant thus

    submits that the same Department cannot rely upon income-tax search

    statements and investigative material when they appear incriminatory,

    yet disregard the later findings of the Assessing Officer when those very

    findings exculpate the appellant on the source and banking trail of the

    same investments.

    12.7 Seventh, the evidence is tainted and uncorroborated. The

    case rests on the retracted statement of CA Anil Sanklecha; the

    retraction, by affidavit of 27.06.2022, within nine days, alleging some

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    65 hours of continuous questioning, was not belated, and accords with

    the CBDT’s own instructions dated 10.03.2003 and 18.12.2014

    discouraging confessions during search. The maker of the statement

    was never summoned or examined in the benami proceedings, and

    cross-examination, though sought, was never granted. The findings, it

    is urged, amount to borrowed satisfaction from investigation reports

    without independent inquiry by the Initiating Officer.

    B. Further Submissions on behalf of the appellant

    (i) Submissions of the appellant on the Statement of Shri Anil

    Sanklecha

    13. During the search, the statement of CA Anil Sanklecha (Mumbai)

    was recorded under s.132(4), Income Tax Act, on 17-18.06.2022; it

    was never supplied to the Appellant.

    13.1 In answers to Q.50 and Q.55, Sanklecha allegedly stated he

    received cash of about ₹40-42 crores from Shri Mahaveer Lunia via

    Angadia in Mumbai and passed it on to persons as directed by Lunia, his

    family, or agents.

    13.2 Sanklecha nowhere stated the cash was used in the Appellant or

    for purchasing the subject properties; per extracts in the s.24(4)

    Provisional Attachment Order, he expressly said he had no knowledge of

    its ultimate utilization.

    13.3 The Initiating Officer wrongly drew an adverse inference,

    attributing utilization of the cash to the Appellant by implication through

    Q.55 , unsupported by the statement’s actual contents and legally

    unsustainable.

    13.4 This statement is the primary basis of the Impugned Order dated

    01.04.2026 (paras 34, 42), though self-contradictory and non-

    inculpatory. Sanklecha retracted it within nine days by notarized

    Affidavit dated 27.06.2022, stating: the search ran more than 65 hours
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    (16-19.06.2022); he and family were continuously grilled without food,

    rest or sleep; his statement was taken on 18.06.2022 when exhausted

    and confused; he signed without application of mind at the officers’

    dictate; he never received or gave funds to Lunia or Gautam Chopra;

    and the ₹40-42 crore transaction was “absolutely an incorrect version.”

    His reply dated 11.02.2023 to JDIT-1, Jodhpur, confirmed no

    documentary evidence was found at his premises.

    13.5 The findings of the Impugned Order passed by the AA are perverse:

    no evidence establishes cash payments to sellers of the impugned

    properties; the AA ignored relevant material, relied on inadmissible

    material, and its conclusion rests on conjecture without documentary

    evidence or money trail.

    13.6 The Tribunal also merely reproduced the Respondent’s allegations

    as established fact without independent scrutiny. The allegations rest on

    Income-tax Act statements never furnished completely/legibly, denied

    cross-examination despite requests, and never independently verified

    by the Initiating Officer under the Benami Act, 1988.

    13.7 Several such statements were retracted by sworn affidavits,

    denting their evidentiary value; absent independent corroboration by

    the Initiating Officer (BPU), reliance on them is legally untenable.

    13.8 This violates natural justice: adverse findings on third-party

    statements require an effective opportunity of cross-examination; its

    denial vitiates the proceedings, especially under so harsh a law.

    13.9 Even taking Sanklecha’s statement at face value (without

    admitting), it contains no reference to cash infusion into the Appellant

    or use for acquiring the properties; being uncorroborated, untested and

    retracted, it establishes no nexus, rendering the Respondent’s case

    unsustainable under the Benami Act.

    13.10 Tribunal wrongly discards the retraction as made “after expiry of

    considerable period,” (Uploaded
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    nine days of the search — a prompt retraction that could not be

    summarily brushed aside, given the original statement was allegedly

    coerced and untested by cross-examination.

    (ii) Submissions of the appellant on the Findings of the

    Assessing Officer (Income Tax)

    14. That the same Income Tax Department, the very Department

    under the CBDT that houses the Benami Prohibition Unit and the IO –

    has, through its Assessing Officer (DC, Central Circle 1, Jodhpur),

    conducted full-fledged scrutiny assessments of the Appellant for five

    assessment years (AY 2018-19 and AY 2020-21 through AY 2023-24),

    all consequential to the very same search and seizure operation of

    16.06.2022 that gave rise to the present benami proceedings and has

    arrived at diametrically opposite findings on the very same questions of

    source of funds and genuineness of the Appellant’s transactions for

    acquiring the subject properties.

    14.1 That the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (DC CEN CIR1, Jodhpur)

    passed the Assessment Order under Section 147 r.w.s. 144 of the IT Act,

    after obtaining prior approval of the Addl. CIT, Central Range, Jodhpur.

    This assessment was conducted consequential to the very same search

    of 16.06.2022. During the proceedings, the AO issued detailed Show

    Cause Notices specifically proposing addition of Rs.11,16,06,000/- as

    unexplained investment under Sections 68 and 69 of the IT Act, the

    very same properties that are the subject matter of the present benami

    proceedings. The Appellant filed comprehensive replies furnishing ledger

    accounts of all parties, bank statements, registered sale deeds,

    confirmations from counterparties with their ITRs and Financial

    Statements of the Appellant and others. The AO, after careful

    examination, recorded the following findings:

    (i) ‘The above investment is found to be duly recorded in the audited balance
    sheet under fixed assets and is supported by registered sale deeds and payments
    made through banking(Uploaded
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    bank statements and books of account and, therefore, the same cannot be treated
    as unexplained.’

    (ii) ‘Loans and advances have been received through banking channel. Thus,
    identity of the creditors/parties, their creditworthiness and genuineness of
    transactions has been established.’

    (iii) ‘Thus, the assessee has satisfactorily explained all the issues on which
    explanation with supporting documents and hence, no adverse inference is
    drawn and returned income of Rs.0/- with c/f of current year’s loss of Rs.64,177/-

    is accepted as such.’
    14.2 That post-search assessment was also carried out for other

    assessment years, in the case of the appellant. The Assessment Orders

    for AY 2020-21, AY 2021-22, AY 2022-23 and AY 2023-24, dated

    27.02.2025, 27.02.2025, 28.02.2025 & 26.02.2025, were passed

    during the pendency of the appeal before the Tribunal. The AO (DC CEN

    CIR1, Jodhpur) passed Assessment Orders for all four years after

    issuing detailed notices under Section 142(1) and examining the

    Appellant’s replies, financial statements and bank statements. In each

    year, the identical finding was recorded: ‘Considering the

    reply/submission of the assessee and the details and documents

    available on record, the return income is accepted as such.’ No addition

    was made in any year.

    14.3 That the significance of these Assessment Orders, particularly the

    Assessment Order for AY 2018-2019, cannot be overstated. The

    Impugned Order’s core finding, that the Appellant is a ‘shell company’

    whose properties were purchased from ‘unaccounted cash of Shri

    Mahaveer Lunia’, has been directly and specifically negated by the same

    Department’s own Assessing Officer, who after examining the very same

    properties, the very same bank statements, and the very same source

    of funds, has recorded that the investment is duly recorded, reconciled,

    supported by banking channels and registered sale deeds, and that the

    source is satisfactorily explained. These are not tangential findings;

    they go to the heart of the benami allegation.

    14.4 That the issue regarding acquisition of the subject properties and

    the source of funds has already been duly examined by the Assessing
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    assessment proceedings. The Assessing Officer had raised specific

    queries with respect to the acquisition of properties and their source of

    funds, to which the Appellant furnished detailed explanations,

    demonstrating that the investments were made out of repayment of

    loans and advances reflected in the financial statements, and that all

    payments were effected through regular banking channels. The

    corresponding sale deeds were duly registered and examined by the

    Assessing Officer before passing the assessment orders, without

    drawing any adverse inference.

    (iii) Submissions of the appellant on the Contradictions in the

    Tribunal order

    15. The Tribunal (Para 40) held that income tax assessment of

    undisclosed income “legalizes” the money but does not nullify the

    benami element. This is selective reliance: the Tribunal accepts

    inculpatory income tax material (statements, search material,

    shareholding data) but rejects exculpatory findings from the same

    machinery (Assessment Orders accepting the source). Such asymmetric

    borrowing violates consistency, fairness and judicial discipline, rendering

    the findings arbitrary and unsustainable.

    15.1 The Tribunal ignored that the Assessing Officer had already

    examined the acquisition of properties and source of funds, accepted

    them as genuine, and recorded no adverse findings.

    15.2 The Tribunal (Para 25) wrongly dismissed Shri Sanklecha’s

    retraction as made “after a considerable period.” Factually, the

    retraction affidavit dated 27.06.2022 came just nine days after the

    search ended (18.06.2022), not a considerable period. CBDT’s

    Instruction dated 10.03.2003 and Letter dated 18.12.2014 prohibit

    extracting confessions during search. A retraction within nine days,

    detailing duress (65 hours of continuous interrogation without food or

    rest), deserved serious consideration.

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    corroborative evidence of benami; the IO misread the statement in

    isolation, ignoring unrebutted documentary evidence. Uncorroborated

    oral statements carry low evidentiary weight, and denial of cross-

    examination has led courts to delete additions as based on suspicion.

    Further, the Department cannot blow hot and cold: its AO accepted the

    source as satisfactorily explained while its Benami Unit alleged the same

    funds were Shri Mahaveer Lunia’s unaccounted cash routed through

    hawala.

    15.3 The Order suffers from perversity and internal contradiction. At

    Paras 20-26 the Tribunal admits Section 132(4) statements and search

    material (photocopies, without originals) into benami proceedings via

    Section 60 PBPT Act, yet at Para 40 dismisses the same Department’s

    Assessment Orders accepting the source as irrelevant. Evidence from

    the same statutory source must be treated with parity — if the income

    tax machinery can inculpate, it must equally exculpate. The Tribunal

    cannot approbate and reprobate the same process; this legal error

    vitiates the Order.

    15.4 The Tribunal’s finding (Para 33) that no legitimate documents

    disclosed the source of loans, reserve capital and share premium is

    squarely contradicted by the Assessment Order for AY 2018-19 dated

    27.03.2026, which, after examining audited financials, bank statements,

    ledgers, confirmations and counterparties’ ITRs , held the investments

    duly recorded, banked, reconciled, and the creditors’ identity,

    creditworthiness and genuineness established.

    15.5 Even Section 164 CrPC statements are not automatically

    admissible without proof before the Magistrate and cross-examination;

    statements before other authorities stand on weaker footing.

    15.6 Neither copies of the statements were furnished to the Appellant

    nor cross-examination allowed, a clear breach of natural justice.

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    15.7 Even where the Evidence Act does not strictly apply, no judicial,

    quasi-judicial or executive authority may rely on adverse statements

    without affording effective cross-examination.

    15.8 Denial of cross-examination renders reliance on such statements

    illegal and the Order unsustainable.

    15.9 The Order rests substantially on the retracted Section 132(4)

    statement of Shri Anil Sanklecha, CA, recorded behind the Appellant’s

    back, never furnished, with no cross-examination — contrary to

    Andaman Timber Industries v. CCE6, Andaman Timber Industries v. CCE,

    holding such denial “a serious flaw which makes the order a nullity.”

    C. Case law cited on behalf of the appellant

    16. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on plethora of judgments.

    Some of the relevant ones are succinctly discussed and noted here in

    after.

    16.1 In the case of CIT v. SMC Share Brokers Ltd.7, the order of the

    ITAT was confirmed by the High court and the Court held that in the

    absence of cross examination of the witness, despite repeated requests

    by the assessee, the statement of the witness cannot be utilized against

    the assessee to arrive at an adverse conclusion against it.

    16.2 In the case of Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. CIT 8 , the

    following propositions were laid down in the matter of utilization of

    adverse evidence and material collected against the assessee:

    The Income Tax officer is not bound by the technical rules of evidence as
    contained in the Indian Evidence Act. He can act on the material which may
    not be considered as evidence under the Evidence Act.
    Although his powers are wide, the Assessing Officer must act in
    accordance with the principles of natural justice. This postulates that he
    cannot lake use of the material or evidence unless tested in cross
    examination.

    Any conclusion which is based on surmise, suspicion and conjectures is not
    outcome of a fair hearing.

    Any estimate of gross profit without confronting the material to the
    assessee is not proper.

    6

    (2015) 324 ELT 641 (SC)
    7
    (2007) 288 ITR 345 (DELHI) (Uploaded on 03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 PM)
    8
    (1954) 26 IT 775 (SC) (Downloaded on 03/08/2026 at 08:24:46 PM)
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    16.3 In Sanjeev Kumar Hain9, the Assessing Officer made use of the

    statements recorded from some witnesses without giving an opportunity

    to the assessee to rebut the same. The court held that up to the stage

    of recording the statements, there could be no infirmity. Illegality would

    arise only after that when no opportunity was given to the assess to

    cross examine the witnesses.

    16.4 In CIT vs. Indrajit Singh Suri 10 , the Assessing Officer made

    additions in the basis of the statements of some parties without giving

    an opportunity to the assessee to cross examine them. The additions

    were deleted.

    16.5 In Strapted (India) P. Ltd. V. Dy. CIT 11 , while dealing with

    penalty under section 271D, it was held that the statement of one

    person cannot be utilized against another person unless the other

    person is given an opportunity to cross examine the first person. In the

    absence of cross examination, the evidence would remain untested and

    would lose its evidentiary value. The penalty was deleted.

    16.6 In V. Mahes Gulabrai Joshi V. CIT12, the sale of a diamond to

    one “V” by the assessee was held to be bogus and the amounts

    introduces in the books were added to the assessee’s income on the

    basis of statement of “V”. the Tribunal held that although the burden of

    proof lies on the assessee in such matters, but when the assessee

    depended on the Assessing Officer for enforcing the attendance of “V”

    for cross examination, any failure in this regard would vitiate the

    assessment and the addition solely basing on the untested testimony of

    “V” could not be sustained.

    16.7 The statements of third parties recorded at the back of the

    assessee has no evidentiary value unless the witness is cross examined

    9
    (2009) 310 ITR 178 (P&H)
    10
    (2013) 33 taxmann.com 284 (Guj.)
    11
    (2003) 84 ITD 320 (Mumbai) (Uploaded on 03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 PM)
    12
    (2005) 95 ITD 300 (Mumbai)(Downloaded on 03/08/2026 at 08:24:46 PM)
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    as held in the case of Alok Agrawal V. DCIT 13 . In this case the

    assessment was set aside to be reframed again.

    16.8 Unilateral utilization of the contents of the statements of third

    parties without affording opportunity to cross examine such person is

    bad in law as held in the case of Hamish Engineering Industries P.

    Ltd. V. DCIT14. In this case the matter was remanded.

    16.9 Evidence tendered by the assessee, by way of production of

    witness cannot be considered on merits by the CIT(A) without affording

    necessary opportunity to the Assessing officer to cross examine the

    witness. This was held in the case of CIT v. Subbu Shashank15.

    16.10 In CIT Vs. Eastern Commercial Enterprise16, it was held that

    the approach of the Assessing Officer was legally infirm as no

    opportunity of cross- examination was given. The matter was remanded

    to the Assessing Officer.

    16.11 Reference is also placed on the following Judgements:

    Amitabh Bansal vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward 46(4), New

    Delhi 17.

    Andaman Timber Industries vs. Commissioner of Central

    Excise18.

    H.R. Mehta vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax19

    Kalra Glue Factory vs Sales Tax Tribunal and Ors 198720

    Marg Realities Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Benami Prohibition)21

    16.12 In light of the above it is thus, submitted by learned counsel

    for the appellant that the statements recorded by another agency

    i.e., Income Tax Department during some different proceedings

    which were retracted by the concerned persons cannot be used out

    13
    (2006) 67 TTJ 109 (Delhi)
    14
    (2010) 120 ITD 166 (Mumbai)
    15
    (2010) 327 ITR 577 (Madras)
    16
    (1994) 210 ITR 103 (Cal)
    17
    175 ITD 401
    18
    2015 SCC OnLine SC 1051
    19
    (2016) 289 CTR 0561 (BOM)
    20
    167 ITR 498 SC (Uploaded on 03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 PM)
    21
    (2022) 448 ITR 649 (Mad.) (HC).

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    of context and the IO has selectively relied upon for framing the

    baseless and untrue charges. The same do not carry any credence

    in legal proceedings and cannot be imported blindly and also the

    statement being relied upon by the IO is also not forming part of the

    RUD.

    16.13 Learned counsel would strenuously argue that it is a settled rule

    of evidence that unless a retracted confession is corroborated in

    material particulars it is not prudent to base the decision on the

    confessional statement alone, (A.I.R. 1953 SC 459).

    V. CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS

    A. Submissions/Arguments on behalf of the respondents

    17. Based on the written submissions and per arguments of Mr.

    K.K.Bissa, learned counsel representing respondent, the respondents’

    case, briefly speaking, can be summed up under five discrete heads.

    17.1 First, the limited scope of this appeal: Section 49 confines the

    Court to substantial questions of law. Facts stand concurrently

    examined by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 26(3) and by the

    Tribunal; dissatisfaction with findings of fact does not render an order

    perverse, and the appellant’s grounds, properly read, are said to be an

    invitation to reappreciate evidence.

    17.2 Second, beneficial ownership rests on control, not percentage.

    The case was never one of arithmetical shareholding; it rests on

    cumulative evidence of effective control, management, fund-routing and

    ultimate beneficial interest since FY 2016-17. Shri Lunia’s directorship

    from 06.01.2020 is characterised not as an afterthought but as the

    securing of direct control, squarely within the statutory words

    ‘immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect’.

    17.3 Third, the income-tax proceedings are independent. The

    Assessing Officer examined only whether the investment was recorded
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    in the books, which is why Section 69 was never attracted, and never

    examined the source of the source or the question of beneficial

    ownership. To treat income-tax findings as binding in benami

    proceedings would render Section 67 of the PBPT Act nugatory; and

    where two statutes carry non-obstante clauses, the later enactment

    prevails (Bank of India v. Ketan Parekh).

    17.4 Fourth, there is no absolute right of cross-examination. Cross-

    examination is not an inbuilt facet of natural justice under the PBPT Act,

    reliance is placed on Harivallabh Mohanlal Joshi v. Union of India22

    and M/s Marg Realities Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Benami Prohibition) 23 ,

    and, in any event, the findings rest on documentary and financial

    evidence, not on the statements alone.

    17.5 Fifth, the retraction is belated and uncorroborated and cannot

    displace a statement recorded on oath; and any mis-recording of

    shareholding figures in the common order is a clerical error, not

    touching the core findings, and rectifiable under Section 47.

    B. Further Submissions of the Respondents

    18. Shri Anil Sanklecha, CA, in his Section 132(4) statements on oath

    dated 17-18.06.2022 (Q. Nos. 50 and 55), categorically admitted

    receiving approximately Rs. 40-42 Crores in cash from Shri Mahaveer

    Lunia through Angadia/Hawala operators in Mumbai, routed through the

    appellant entities, and that his servant Shri Suresh Mukhia had been a

    Director in those companies — a fact independently verified from

    directorship records.

    18.1 The assessment orders relied upon by the Appellants show the AO

    examined only whether the ~Rs. 11 Crore property investments (F.Y.

    2017-18) were recorded in the books. On ledgers, audited balance

    sheets and banking-channel proof, the AO merely held Section 69

    22
    W.P.(C) 16633/2018, MADHYA(Uploaded
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    23
    448 ITR 574 (Mad) (Downloaded on 03/08/2026 at 08:24:46 PM)
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    (unexplained investment) was not attracted since the investments were

    reflected in the books.

    18.2 The AO’s inquiry was thus confined to book entries — not the issue

    in the benami proceedings. He neither examined the “source of source”

    of funds nor rendered any finding on real beneficial ownership.

    18.3 The proceedings were not founded merely on third-party

    statements; the IO independently examined the entire material

    gathered in the Section 132 search and under the PBPT Act.

    18.4 The retraction plea is meritless — the Tribunal rightly held it was

    made after considerable lapse of time and lacks credibility. In any event,

    Shri Mahaveer Lunia is the promoter of the Maharani Group, and the

    incriminating statements of Shri Sanklecha and others identify him as

    the beneficial owner who conceived and executed the benami

    arrangement.

    18.5 The Appellants’ reliance on the AO’s acceptance of returned

    income and book-recorded investments, with no adverse inference, is

    misconceived and does not advance their case.

    18.6 The ground ignores the material findings in the benami

    proceedings. The companies justified acquisitions by funds in their

    accounts but failed to explain the genuine source and genesis of such

    funds, claiming repayment of earlier advances without any evidence of

    when the advances were made, from what legitimate source, or on

    what terms.

    18.7 Absent supporting material, the “repayment of advances” was

    rightly treated as a layering mechanism: the beneficial owner’s cash

    projected as repayments through accommodation entities.

    18.8 The AO’s acceptance of book-recorded investments does not touch

    the crucial issues of source of source, routing of funds and beneficial

    ownership, which were never adjudicated in assessment. Hence
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    assessment findings cannot dilute or override the independent findings

    under the PBPT Act, 1988.

    VI. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

    19. Having heard the competing arguments of learned counsel

    appearing for the respective parties, gist of which has been noted

    hereinabove and having perused the case file including grounds of

    appeal/ submissions filed by the respondents as well as the counter

    affidavit/submissions filed by the respondents, we shall now proceed to

    render our opinion on the issues involved herein by recording our

    reasons thereof, as per the discussion and analysis recorded

    hereinabove.

    A. Issues/ Questions involved

    20. Two substantial questions of law arise for our consideration, which

    are as below :-

    a. Whether the non-indictment of an individual and or an entity

    under section 69 of income tax act in respect of unexplained

    income to purchase the same very immovable property, which is

    also under the scanner of section 2(9) of the PBPT Act alleging it to

    be benami property, shall operate as a legal bar to take any further

    action under PBPT Act ?

    b. Whether the statements of the witnesses recorded during a

    search, and seizure raid committed by the revenue officials under

    section 132 of Income Tax Act, 1961 can be used as the basis of

    forming an opinion under section 2(9) of the PBPT act without

    examining them in the PBPT proceedings and without affording a

    right of cross examination to the affected party being prosecuted

    under PBPT act ?

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    20.1 In the course of consideration of the aforesaid two substantial

    questions, the following sub-questions also crystallise for determination.

    Sub-questions (i), bear upon substantial question (a), while sub-

    question (ii) and (iii) have a bearing upon substantial question (b):

    (i) Whether a company which purchases property in its own name,

    out of own corpus reflected in its books, can be held a benamidar

    under Section 2(9)(A)?

    (ii) Whether the Tribunal was obliged to reckon with the

    subsequent assessment order dated 27.03.2026 for AY 2018-19,

    accepting the source of the very investment and whether the

    assessment order discloses an impermissible asymmetry in the use

    of the income-tax record vis a vis PBPT record ?

    and

    (iii). Whether the impugned order records entity-specific and

    property-wise findings qua the appellant’s 79 properties and Rs.

    11.16 crore investment, or proceeds on collective figures and

    generic reasoning, and if the latter, with what consequence. ?

    B. The Statutory Framework:

    Section 69 of the Income-tax Act and Section 2(9)(A) of the

    PBPT Act.

    21. Because so much of the argument turns on the coexistence of the

    assessment order with the benami findings, the relationship between

    the two provisions is required to be looked into.

    “69. Unexplained investments:

    Where in the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year the
    assessee has made investments which are not recorded in the books of account,
    if any, maintained by him for any source of income, and the assessee offers no
    explanation about the nature and source of the investments or the explanation
    offered by him is not, in the opinion of the [Assessing Officer], satisfactory, the
    value of the investments may be deemed to be the income of the assessee of
    such financial year.”

    Section 69 of the Income-tax Act is thus a deeming charging
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    recorded in the books. If the trigger fires and the assessee offers no

    satisfactory explanation of the nature and source, the investment is

    deemed income. If the investment is recorded and bank-routed, the

    trigger never fires and the inquiry stops at the first layer of provenance.

    Section 69 asks: is this investment explained income?

    21.1 Section 2(9)(A) of the PBPT Act, by contrast, defines a benami

    transaction and is concerned with real ownership, not taxability. It

    requires two cumulative conditions: (a) that the consideration for the

    property has been provided or paid by another person; and (b) that the

    property is held for the immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect, of

    that person. It asks: who is the real owner behind this name? Said sub

    section for ready reference is reproduced as below :-

    “(9) “benami transaction” means,–

    (A) a transaction or an arrangement–

    (a) where a property is transferred to, or is held by, a person, and the
    consideration for such property has been provided, or paid by, another person;
    and

    (b) the property is held for the immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect, of
    the person who has provided the consideration,
    except when the property is held by–

    (i) a Karta, or a member of a Hindu undivided family, as the case may be, and
    the property is held for his benefit or benefit of other members in the family
    and the consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the
    known sources of the Hindu undivided family;

    (ii) a person standing in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another person
    towards whom he stands in such capacity and includes a trustee, executor,
    partner, director of a company, a depository or a participant as an agent of a
    depository under the Depositories Act, 1996 (22 of 1996) and any other person
    as may be notified by the Central Government for this purpose;

    (iii) any person being an individual in the name of his spouse or in the name of
    any child of such individual and the consideration for such property has been
    provided or paid out of the known sources of the individual;

    (iv) any person in the name of his brother or sister or lineal ascendant or
    descendant, where the names of brother or sister or lineal ascendant or
    descendant and the individual appear as jointowners in any document, and the
    consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the known
    sources of the individual; or

    -x-x-x-x-x-

    21.2 A cumulative reading of above two sections of Income Tax Act and

    the PBPT Act reveals that the decisive structural difference lies in the

    burden architecture. Once triggered, Section 69 casts the burden on the

    assessee to explain. Section 2(9)(A) places the initial burden on the

    Initiating Officer to establish
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    deeming fiction doing the work for him. A clearance under Section 69

    therefore cannot mechanically become a benami clearance: the

    assessee cleared Section 69 by discharging a burden that fell on him,

    whereas under the PBPT Act the burden was never primarily his. By the

    same token, however, the assessment order is a fact in the record

    which the Initiating Officer must overcome, not a nullity he may ignore.

    21.2 At this stage, section 24(1) of PBPT be seen, which is as below :-

    Section 24(1) of PBPT Act:

    “24. Notice and attachment of property involved in benami transaction.–
    (1) Where the Initiating Officer, on the basis of material in his possession, has
    reason to believe that any person is a benamidar in respect of a property, he may,
    after recording reasons in writing, issue a notice to the person to show cause
    within such time as may be specified in the notice why the property should not be
    treated as benami property.”

    Perusal of Section 24(1) reveals that it is, in fact, the jurisdictional

    gateway of the PBPT Act, and its language carries three built-in

    safeguards, each of which bears directly on where the burden lies i.e.

    (a) : the belief must rest “on the basis of material in his possession,”

    and; (b) : it must rise to “reason to believe” (not suspicion), and; (c) :

    reasons must be recorded in writing before the notice is issued. Read

    together, these make clear that the initial and continuing burden is on

    the IO, not the noticee. The rule thus is that the burden of proving a

    transaction to be benami lies squarely on the person who asserts it,

    because the law presumes that the person in whose name property

    stands is its real owner. “Reason to believe” would mean that the belief

    must be that of an honest and reasonable person, based on relevant

    and tangible material bearing a rational and live nexus to the formation

    of the belief.

    21.3 “Reason to believe” is a higher threshold than “reason to suspect”.

    No doubt, the sufficiency of reasons may not be examined by a court, in

    this case by us, but their existence and relevance certainly are open to

    judicial review. Thus, an IO cannot
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    vague information, or a bare recital of the statutory language; the

    recorded reasons must themselves disclose the material and the nexus.

    A show-cause notice is not an instrument of inquiry to find material, it

    presupposes that the material already exists in the IO’s possession.

    21.4. Per the stand taken by the Department, to argue that once notice

    issued, it is for the noticee to demonstrate why the property is not

    benami may appear convincing on first blush. But, that inverts the

    statutory scheme. The Section 24 notice merely affords the noticee an

    opportunity of rebuttal; the substantive burden of establishing both

    limbs of Section 2(9)(A), that the consideration was provided or paid by

    another person and that the property is held for the immediate or future

    benefit of that person, remains on the IO through provisional

    attachment under 24(4), the reference under 24(5), and its

    adjudication under Section 26.

    21.5. In fact, we are of the view that in proceedings under section 24

    of the PBPT Act, 1988, the burden of proof operates as a shifting burden

    rather than a fixed one. The Initiating Officer must first possess credible

    and cogent material to justify issuance of the show-cause notice and

    any order of provisional attachment. The statutory scheme does not

    permit action on mere suspicion or mechanical application. Once such

    material is disclosed and the notice is issued, the affected party,

    typically the person in possession or the recorded owner, bears the

    burden of rebutting the allegation by explaining the source of funds, the

    nature of the transaction, and the bona fides of the ownership. If the

    party furnishes a satisfactory explanation supported by documents, the

    ultimate burden to establish that the transaction is benami shifts back

    to the revenue/Initiating Officer, who must then prove the benami

    character by evidence.

    21.6. Once a party shows that the transaction was legitimately funded

    and explains the arrangement, the burden
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    prove benami, and in the absence of such proof, the attachment can not

    be sustained. Really speaking, the IO has ample investigative power but

    must still form a meaningful prima facie basis before proceeding under

    section 24. The broader legal principle is that benami must be proved

    by cogent evidence and not lightly presumed. 21.5. In the context of

    burden of proof, reference may be had to Hon’ble Suprme Court in

    Valliamal vs Subramaniam 24 relevant thereof is extracted here in

    below :-

    “13. This Court in a number of judgments has held that it is well established
    that burden of proving that a particular sale is benami lies on the person who
    alleges the transaction to be a benami. The essence of a benami transaction is
    the intention of the party or parties concerned and often, such intention is
    shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such
    difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of
    any part of the serious onus that rests on him, nor justify the acceptance of mere
    conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. Refer to Jaydayal Poddar v.
    Bibi Hazra
    , Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of M.P.2, Thakur Bhim Singh v. Thakur
    Kan Singh³
    , Pratap Singh v. Sarojini Devi and Heirs of Vrajlal J. Ganatra v. Heirs
    of Parshottam S. Shah
    . It has been held in the judgments referred to above that the
    question whether a particular sale is a benami or not, is largely one of fact, and
    for determining the question no absolute formulas or acid test, uniformly
    applicable in all situations can be laid. After saying so, this Court spelt out the
    following six circumstances which can be taken as a guide to determine the nature
    of the transaction:

    “(1) the source from which the purchase money came;
    (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase;
    (3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour;(4) the
    position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the
    claimant and the alleged benamidar;

    (5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale; and
    (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property
    after the sale.” (Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra, SCC p. 7, para 6)

    14. The above indicia are not exhaustive and their efficacy varies according to the
    facts of each case. Nevertheless, the source from where the purchase money came
    and the motive why the property was purchased benami are by far the most
    important tests for determining whether the sale standing in the name of one
    person, is in reality for the benefit of another. We would examine the present
    transaction on the touchstone of the above two indicia.”

    (emphasis is ours)

    21.6. Taking the debate further on the stand taken by the respondent

    i.e. the ‘source of the source’ inquiry pressed by the Revenue to

    ascertain if it is tainted. In principle, such recourse is, no doubt open to

    it, but it is a licence to inquire, not a licence to presume. The authority

    must prove that the source is tainted; it may not assume it. To reason

    that ‘the company lacked creditworthiness, therefore the money must
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    have been the beneficiary’s cash’ is to reverse the statutory burden by

    the back door. The existence of unaccounted cash somewhere in a

    group is not proof that these properties were funded by that cash: a

    business group may genuinely generate huge cash and, separately, a

    company within it may genuinely hold pre-existing reserves and

    redeploy repaid advances into property. Both can be true at once. In the

    absence of a traced flow of the cash, the narrative assigned by the

    respondent is more of a speculation and does not fall within the

    meaning of “consideration” as envisaged within limb (a), as stated in

    para 21.1 of the preceding para of his order.

    21.7 There is also a temporal dimension. Section 2(9)(A)(a) asks who

    ‘has provided’ the consideration, in the past tense, anchored to the

    acquisition. If the corpus that funded the purchases demonstrably

    existed a decade before the alleged beneficial owner came near the

    company, then prima facie the consideration was not provided by him;

    control acquired after an asset was funded is not the same as having

    provided the consideration for it. The respondents’ answer pushes the

    inquiry back to the genesis of the 2006-10 capital itself, a far heavier

    evidentiary undertaking, and one exposed to the objection that distinct

    transactions across different years have been clubbed into a single

    reference.

    C. The Material Relied Upon by the Initiating Officer

    22. Before we advert to address the questions, ibid, first and foremost,

    it is pertinent to note that the triggering point for initiation of

    proceedings under the PBPT Act was the search and raid conducted on

    the promoter family group of the appellant on 16.06.2022. The said

    search led to discovery of the list of the properties in questions along

    with some of the sale deeds. The said information led to an enquiry

    under the PBPT Act. The following material formed the basis of the

    initiating officer declaring the property as Benami (duly noted in his
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    order dated 07.08.2023), which in turn was also relied upon by the

    adjudicating authority as well as the learned appellate Tribunal :-

    “I. Income-tax Returns of M/s Alishan Complex Pvt. Ltd.
    II. A detailed list of various immovable properties purchased in the name of M/s
    Alishan Complex Pvt. Ltd. found & seized (Exhibit-6 of Annexure-BS) at the
    residence premises of Sh. Mahveer Lunia i.e. Lalit Kunj, Opposite Hotel Mapple
    Abhay, Paota, Jodhpur.

    III. Statement of Shri Anil Sanklecha, CA dated 17.06.2022 & 18.06.2022
    recorded during the course of search.

    IV. Page No. 76 to 83 of exhibit B-9, i.e., a detailed list found during the course
    of search in which cash transactions made between Shri Anil Sanklecha and Shri
    Mahaveer Lunia are recorded.

    V. Bank Book/Ledger book of the company for the period of 01.04.2012 to
    31.03.2022.

    VI. Documents available on the database of Ministry of Corporate Affairs.
    VII. Statements of Shri Praveen Agarwal recorded under section 132(4) of the
    Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 10/11.02.2015, 15.02.2014 & 18.11.2014.
    VIII. Statements of Shri Pramod Ramdeen recorded under section 132(4) of the
    Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 10.11.2012.

    IX. Statement of Sh. Rakesh Kumar Agarwal recorded u/s 131 of the 1.T.Act,
    1961 on 21.11.2014 by the Investigation wing of Kolkata.”

    22.1 From perusal of the above, it is borne out that except at serial

    number VI, (Documents from database of MCA viz. ROC returns etc.)

    rest of the material is nothing but what was provided by the income tax

    officials during the raid carried out by them under section 132 of the

    income tax act. Thus, predominantly it’s the same material being relied

    upon by income tax authorities, and parallel by the initiating officer

    under the PBPT act who is also an income tax official under the income

    tax act and is simultaneously exercising ex officio powers as initiating

    officer under the PPT act.

    D. The Assessment Order dated 27.03.2026

    23. During the pendency of the proceedings under the PBPT Act, an

    assessment order dated 27.03.2026 (Annexure 20) came to be

    passed.Perusal thereof shows that it is based upon detailed examination

    of the entire material. The Assessing Officer found that the earlier

    suspicion formed pursuant to the raid conducted under Section 132 of

    the Income Tax Act was misplaced. Resultantly, the appellant was given

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    of cash transactions and/or the material seized during the raid,

    including the very property documents that are the bone of contention

    in the present proceedings under the guise of being “benami”. No doubt,

    other material was also taken into consideration by the Initiating Officer,

    but perusal of the order passed by the Initiating Officer, followed by the

    adjudicating authority and the learned Appellate Tribunal, reveals that

    predominantly it is the same material relied upon under the PBPT Act

    which was the very basis of the assessment proceedings resulting from

    the raid under Section 132 of the Income-Tax Act.

    23.1 Though, of course, the Income-Tax Act and the PBPT Act operate in

    different domains, the material relied upon being the same, the

    evidentiary value of that material in both proceedings has a bearing on

    each other.

    23.2 In the course of hearing, on a query put by the Court to the

    learned counsel for the respective parties as to whether the assessment

    order was ever placed on record before the competent authority under

    the PBPT Act or the Appellate Tribunal, it transpired that although a

    request had been made to keep the proceedings in abeyance pending

    the outcome of the assessment, no such course was adopted, and the

    proceedings before the Initiating Officer as well as the Adjudicating

    Authority continued regardless. Learned counsel for the appellant

    further submitted that the assessment order was in fact passed after

    the judgment was reserved by the learned Appellate Tribunal, and

    hence the Tribunal too had no occasion to take it into consideration.

    Having examined the contents of the show cause notice issued by the

    Initiating Officer as well as the orders passed by the Adjudicating

    Authority, followed by the appellate order of the learned Tribunal, as

    reproduced hereinabove in paras 8 to 10, especially the heavy reliance

    placed on the statement of the witness (the Chartered Accountant)

    recorded during the raid qua alleged cash receipts, a statement that
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    was subsequently retracted, and in respect of which the appellant’s

    request for cross-examination was given short shrift, it does appear

    that the appellant has been denied a fair opportunity to defend itself,

    apart from resulting in an impermissible shifting of the onus from the

    Initiating Officer under the PBPT Act on to the appellant.

    23.3 From the importance given to the statement of the CA, it appears

    to be rather foundational, and not merely corroborative. The alleged

    benami character of the transactions rests on one factual premise, that

    unaccounted cash of the Lunia family was routed into these companies,

    and Sanklecha’s Section 132(4) statement (Q. 50 and 55) is the only

    direct evidence of that premise anywhere in the record. Everything else

    the IO and Tribunal invoke, shareholding pattern, family control, the

    property list found in the search, the “shell company” characterisation,

    is circumstantial, and each of those circumstances is equally consistent

    with lawful corporate ownership unless the cash story is given

    overriding acceptance. That’s why the Tribunal’s own reasoning at paras

    25, 26 and 34 keeps circling back to the statement and to defending its

    use. The Tribunal’s assertion at para 26 of its order that the IO “has not

    relied only on the statements” is the respondents’ best answer, but the

    test is severability: strike the statement out mentally and ask whether

    the remaining material can independently sustain a finding that

    consideration was provided by another person under s. 2(9)(A). On this

    record, no banking trail, cash deposit, or financial instrument linking

    Lunia money to the 79 purchases has been identified, so the structure

    seems to stand or fall with the statement.

    23.4 Adverting now to consequence of denying opportunity of cross-

    examination. The settled position, Andaman Timber Industries being the

    sharpest expression, is that where statements form the basis of the

    order, denial of cross-examination despite request is a serious violation

    of natural justice that vitiates the order itself; it is not a curable
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    irregularity. The consequence is therefore conditional: if the statement

    is foundational (as above), the denial goes to the root; if genuinely

    independent material sustains the finding, the denial may be treated as

    non-prejudicial. Three features aggravate the position here. First, the

    witness was never summoned or examined in the benami proceedings

    at all, the material is wholly borrowed from another statute’s proceeding

    and was never tested in this one. Second, the statement stands

    retracted within days, and the diminished evidentiary value requires

    corroboration of a retracted statement before acting on it, corroboration

    which is precisely what cross-examination might have tested and what

    the record allegedly lacks. Third, the Tribunal’s answer that cross-

    examination is “not inbuilt” under the 1988 Act sits uneasily with the

    penal consequences the Act carries (attachment, confiscation,

    prosecution), which ordinarily attract full natural-justice protections

    regardless of whether the statute spells them out.

    E. The Legal Position on Untested and Retracted Statements

    24. The legal position on the use of untested and retracted statements,

    as canvassed at the Bar, may now be noticed. Conceded position is that

    there has been a denial of opportunity to summon and cross-examine

    the witness whose statement under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act,

    1961 forms the foundation of proceedings under the Prohibition of

    Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 (“PBPT Act”). The entire edifice

    of the proceedings initiated by the Ld. Initiating Officer (“IO”) rests

    upon the statement of one witness recorded under Section 132(4) of

    the Income-tax Act, 1961. The said statement has since been

    unequivocally retracted by its maker. Despite a specific and reasoned

    request by the Respondent, the IO has neither summoned the witness

    nor afforded any opportunity to examine or cross-examine him.

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    PROPOSITION 1:

    25. Where the statement of a witness forms the basis of the order,

    denial of cross-examination despite request renders the order a nullity

    25.1 Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central

    Excise, Kolkata-II25, — The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where

    the statements of witnesses were made the basis of the impugned order,

    not allowing the assessee to cross-examine those witnesses, despite a

    specific request, is a serious flaw which makes the order a nullity,

    inasmuch as it amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice.

    The Court further held that it was not open to the adjudicating authority

    to unilaterally conclude that cross-examination was unnecessary; if the

    testimony was to be relied upon, the opportunity had to be given, and if

    the authority disputed the need for cross-examination, it ought not to

    have relied upon the statements at all.

    25.2 The present case falls squarely within Andaman Timber. The

    Section 132 statement is not corroborative surplusage; it is the very

    substratum of the “reason to believe” recorded under Section 24(1) of

    the PBPT Act and of the reference made to the Ld. Adjudicating

    Authority. Remove the statement, and the proceedings have no legs to

    stand on.

    25.3 State of Kerala v. K.T. Shaduli Grocery Dealer 26 — In the

    context of sales tax assessment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that

    where the assessing authority relied upon the books and accounts of

    third parties to reject the assessee’s returns, the right to be heard

    included the right to cross-examine those third parties, and denial

    thereof vitiated the assessment.

    25.4 Lakshman Exports Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise27– The

    Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the assessee had specifically

    asked for cross-examination of the persons whose statements were

    25
    (2016) 15 SCC 785 : (2015) 324 ELT 641 (SC)
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    (1977) 2 SCC 777 (Uploaded on 03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 PM)
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    relied upon, that request could not be brushed aside, and the matter

    was remanded for the purpose of allowing cross-examination.

    25.5 Kishinchand Chellaram v. CIT 28 — Even in income-tax

    proceedings, where strict rules of evidence do not apply, the Hon’ble

    Supreme Court held that evidence gathered behind the back of the

    assessee (a letter from a bank manager) could not be used against the

    assessee without giving the assessee an opportunity to controvert it and

    to cross-examine its author. The statement in the present case,

    recorded behind the back of the Respondent, stands on an identical

    footing.

    25.6 Mehta Parikh & Co. v. CIT 29 — Where the deponents of

    affidavits were neither called for examination nor cross-examined, the

    Revenue could not thereafter challenge the correctness of their

    statements. The converse equally applies: the Revenue cannot rely on

    an untested statement while shutting out the very process by which its

    probative value could be assessed.

    PROPOSITION 2:

    26. A deposition acquires probative value only when tested by cross-

    examination.

    26.1 M/s Telestar Travels Pvt. Ltd. v. Special Director of

    Enforcement 30 — Even this decision, ordinarily cited against cross-

    examination, expressly holds that it is only when a deposition “goes

    through the fire of cross-examination” that a court or statutory

    authority is able to determine and assess its probative value; that using

    an untested deposition may amount to using evidence which the party

    has had no opportunity to question; and that such refusal may amount

    to violation of the rule of fair hearing. The Supreme Court sustained the

    denial in that case only because the statements were merely

    28
    (1980) 125 ITR 713 (SC)
    29
    (1956) 30 ITR 181 (SC) (Uploaded on 03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 PM)
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    corroborative of undisputed documents seized from the appellants’ own

    premises, which were disclosed and never disputed, and hence no

    prejudice arose (para 28).

    26.2 The distinction is decisive. In Telestar, the documentary evidence

    was primary and undisputed; the statements were peripheral. Here, (i)

    the statement is foundational, and (ii) far from being undisputed, it

    has been retracted by its own maker. Both conditions on which

    Telestar excused cross-examination are absent. Telestar, properly read,

    therefore supports the Respondent.

    26.3 For the same reason, Vallabh Textiles v. Additional

    Commissioner, Central Tax GST, Delhi East31and K.L. Tripathi v.

    State Bank of India32 are distinguishable: those were cases where the

    statements merely corroborated undisputed documentary evidence

    (kaccha ledgers seized in search), and the request was a blanket one.

    Indeed, para 19 of Vallabh Textiles itself lays down that where a

    specific, reasoned request is made in respect of a specific witness,

    the Authority “has to consider the same fairly and if the need is so felt

    in respect of a particular person, the same ought to be permitted”, and

    if refused, reasons must be recorded. The Respondent’s request here is

    precisely such a specific, reasoned request directed at the sole material

    witness, whose credibility stands demolished by his own retraction. No

    reasons worth the name have been recorded for its refusal.

    PROPOSITION 3:

    27. A retracted statement cannot be the foundation of an adverse

    finding without independent corroboration and without being tested

    27.1 Vinod Solanki v. Union of India33– The Hon’ble Supreme Court

    held that a retracted confession may be acted upon only if it is

    corroborated by independent and cogent evidence, and that the burden

    31
    2025:DHC:2559-DB (Delhi HC, 09.04.2025)
    32
    (1984) 1 SCC 43 (Uploaded on 03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 PM)
    33
    (2008) 16 SCC 537 (Downloaded on 03/08/2026 at 08:24:47 PM)
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    lies on the prosecution/department to show that the confession was

    voluntary. The court must bear in mind the attending circumstances

    including the time of retraction, the nature thereof, and the manner in

    which the initial statement was recorded.

    27.2 K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India 34 — Statements recorded

    under compulsion of statutory provisions, once retracted, require the

    authority to examine voluntariness and truthfulness before any reliance

    is placed thereon.

    27.3 Pullangode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala35– An

    admission is an important piece of evidence but is not conclusive; it is

    open to the maker to show that it is incorrect. A fortiori, where the

    maker has himself retracted, the affected third party against whom the

    statement is deployed must have the opportunity to demonstrate its

    falsity, which is possible only through cross-examination.

    27.4 The CBDT has itself, by Instruction F. No. 286/2/2003-IT (Inv. II)

    dated 10.03.2003 and Circular/letter dated 18.12.2014, deprecated

    reliance on confessional statements recorded during search which are

    not supported by credible evidence. The departmental policy itself

    recognizes the frailty of the very species of evidence upon which the

    entire proceeding here has been erected.

    PROPOSITION 4:

    28. The PBPT Act statutorily arms the authorities with the power to

    summon and examine witnesses , refusal to exercise it, despite request,

    is an abdication of statutory duty

    28.1 Section 19(1)(b) of the PBPT Act confers upon the authorities the

    powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in

    respect of summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and

    examining him on oath. Section 26(3) obliges the Adjudicating Authority

    34
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    to provide the parties an opportunity of being heard and to consider all

    relevant materials before passing an order.

    28.2 Where a specific request is made to summon the sole material

    witness, whose statement is both foundational and retracted, the

    refusal to exercise the statutory power under Section 19 is not a matter

    of discretion but a refusal to perform a duty cast by the statute in aid of

    natural justice. The standard of proof for establishing a benami

    transaction is settled to be strict, the burden resting on the party

    alleging benami: Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra36; reiterated in the

    PBPT context by various Tribunals and High Courts. That strict burden

    cannot be discharged by an untested, retracted statement.

    28.3 The gravity of consequences under the PBPT Act, attachment and

    confiscation of property under Section 27 and prosecution under Section

    53, attracts a correspondingly higher content of natural justice. The

    more drastic the civil consequence, the fuller the hearing that must

    precede it: Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India37.

    PROPOSITION 5:

    28.4. There is yet another dimension in the matter i.e. in those cases

    where jurisdiction of civil courts is barred and the adjudicatory process

    is as per the special statute, which is a self-contained code, it becomes

    all the more imperative to accord legitimate right in a given case for

    cross examining the witness, whose statement, particularly a retracted

    one, is being relied upon, as well as observe other principles of natural

    justice. In the case in hand, the PBPT Act is a special statute and

    creates a self-contained adjudicatory mechanism (Initiating Officer →

    Adjudicating Authority → Appellate Tribunal, with limited judicial review

    under writ jurisdiction) and simultaneously bars civil court jurisdiction,

    the constitutional and jurisprudential imperative to afford principles of

    natural justice, including the right to cross-examine witnesses whose

    36
    (1974) 1 SCC 3 (Uploaded on 03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 PM)
    37
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    statements are relied upon, becomes even more compelling. The

    affected party is since deprived of the ordinary civil trial safeguards (full

    discovery, evidence testing, witness examination under the

    CPC/Evidence Act). In such a scenario, the quasi-judicial forum under

    the special statute must internalise those safeguards to satisfy Article

    14 and Article 21 of the Constitution.

    28.5. If we examine the statutory scheme under PBPT Act, it is borne

    out that Section 24 is a preliminary/investigatory stage i.e. the IO

    records “reasons to believe” and may provisionally attach property. At

    this stage cross-examination is not mandatory, as the IO only forms a

    prima facie opinion. Whereas, Section 26 is the adjudicatory stage i.e.

    the Adjudicating Authority conducts a hearing, considers evidence, and

    decides whether the property is benami. Here, the principles of natural

    justice apply in full force, including the right to cross-examine witnesses

    whose statements are relied upon for the adverse finding, given that

    there is no provision under the PBPT Act to provide an opportunity to

    the appellant to cross examine the witnesses at the preliminary stage

    under section 24. Section 26(3) requires the Adjudicating Authority to

    give the affected person a reasonable opportunity of being heard before

    passing an order of confiscation. While the PBPT Act does not explicitly

    mention “cross-examination,” the right to a fair hearing under Section

    26(3) necessarily includes the right to test adverse evidence, especially

    when the order relies on third-party statements (in present case

    recorded under Section 131/32 of the Income-tax Act during

    search/survey). Thus, denial of cross-examination at the Section 26

    stage, where the Authority decides rights, appears to be a fatal flaw in

    present case in light of the retraction of the confessional statement

    made before third party by the witness.

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    SUMMATION

    29. The tests laid down by the line of authority relied upon by the

    Department, Telestar Travels, K.L. Tripathi, and Vallabh Textiles, are

    conditional: cross-examination may be declined only where (i) the

    statement is merely corroborative of independent, undisputed material,

    and (ii) no prejudice is demonstrated.

    29.1 In the present case: (a) the Section 132 statement is the sole

    foundation of the proceedings, not corroboration; (b) the statement

    stands retracted by its maker, destroying any claim that the material is

    “undisputed”; (c) the Respondent made a specific, reasoned request for

    summoning and cross-examination of a specific witness, satisfying even

    the standard in para 19 of Vallabh Textiles; (d) prejudice is manifest: a

    confiscatory finding is sought to be rested on evidence the Respondent

    has had no opportunity to test, and which its own maker disowns; (e)

    the statutory power to summon under Section 19 PBPT Act was

    available and was not exercised, without recording any tenable reasons.

    29.2 The cumulative position is thus: an untested statement is weak

    evidence; a retracted statement is weaker still; an untested and

    retracted statement, standing alone, is no evidence at all in the eyes of

    law for sustaining a finding as grave as that of a benami transaction,

    which carries confiscatory and penal consequences.

    29.3 Consequently, the reliance upon the said statement without cross-

    examination vitiates the proceedings, and the impugned order passed

    by Adjudicating Authority deserves to be set aside and the third party

    statement of the witness namely Sh. Anil Sanklecha deserves to be

    eschewed from consideration, without affording the Appellant an

    opportunity of cross-examination.

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    F. Overlapping and Contradictory Findings :

    By the Initiating Officer (BPU) and the Assessing Officer

    (Income Tax)

    30. A comparison of the overlapping findings returned by the

    Initiating Officer (BPU) and the Assessing Officer under the Income Tax

    Act reveals that both of them have relied upon same material and same

    set of facts.

    The apparent contradictions :

    30.1 It so appears that the Initiating Officer, BPU/ Respondent passed

    the order in a rather hurried manner. Whereas the Assessing Officer

    under the Income Tax Act, 1961 who has a primary jurisdiction to verify

    the genuineness and source of transaction of acquisition of properties

    made detailed examination during assessment proceedings found that

    the sources are genuine. The Assessment Order dated 27.03.2026

    passed by the Assessing Officer Assessment Order, which has been

    passed on the basis of the very same material and financial records

    already forming part of the record before both the Respondent

    authorities and the Income Tax Department. The said Assessment Order

    has substantial relevance in the present proceedings, in as much as it

    contains specific findings regarding the genuineness of the transactions,

    source of funds, and banking trail pertaining to the acquisition of the

    subject properties. Accordingly, we feel that the matter warrants fresh

    consideration by the Ld. Initiating Officer/Respondent in light of the

    aforesaid subsequent findings recorded by the competent Income Tax

    Authority on the same set of facts and material.

    30.2 Pertinently, the Initiating Officer, BPU / Respondent does not hold

    primary jurisdiction to hold findings with regards of sources and

    genuineness of acquisition of subject properties. Therefore, he cannot

    blindly disregard and contradict the order of the primary jurisdictional
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    for AY 2018-19 dated 27.03.2026 as well as entire material in his

    possession including factual and legal pleadings as maybe raised during

    the proceedings in the light of findings recorded by the Income Tax

    Department.

    30.3 As regards the invocation of Section 67 and of the non-obstante

    principle, while correct so far as it goes, answers a question the

    appellant is not asking. The appellant does not contend that the

    Income-tax Act overrides the PBPT Act; it advances an evidentiary-

    consistency argument, that the same Department, on the same

    material, ought not to reach opposite factual conclusions unless the

    difference is explained by the different statutory question each authority

    was answering. Non-obstante priority resolves a conflict of legal

    operation; it does not resolve factual incoherence. The respondents’

    stronger answer is the different-question point: the Assessing Officer

    examined recording in the books; the Initiating Officer examined the

    genesis of the recorded source, and if that distinction holds on the

    record, both findings can stand without embarrassment.

    30.4 Prima facie, from the perusal of the entire Attachment Order u/s

    24(4)(a)(i) dated 28.07.2023 (Annexure-3), no independent material

    has been brought on record to establish the essential ingredients of a

    benami transaction, namely the source of consideration, beneficial

    ownership, or existence of any real beneficiary behind the subject

    properties. That the mandatory twin conditions stipulated under section

    2(9)(A) of PBPT Act, 1988 has not been shown to be fulfil at all in the

    present proceedings.

    30.5 We are thus of the view that it would not be legally permissible for

    the Respondents to adopt a contrary position based on the same facts

    and premises of the case, unless the same is corroborated and

    supplemented with concrete objective facts.

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    G. The Cumulative Infirmities

    31. On a cumulative reading of Show cause notice dated 28.04.2023,

    order dated 28.07.2023 passed Initiating Officer, order dated

    30.08.2024 passed by Adjudicating Authority and order dated

    01.04.2026 passed by Appellate Tribunal, in light of the subsequent

    assessment order dated 27.03.2026, three infirmities emerge which, in

    our considered opinion, go to the root of the fact, finding exercise

    undertaken by the Initiating Officer and affirmed by the Adjudicating

    Authority and the Tribunal, and which warrant interference.

    31.1 First, the finding that the consideration for the properties was

    “routed through Sh. Anil Sankhlecha, CA”, which forms the very

    foundation of parameters (i), (iii) and, indirectly, (v) of the six-fold test

    laid down in Valliammal v. Subramaniam 38 , as applied by the

    Adjudicating Authority at para 5.7 of its order (para 9.2 above), and

    again relied upon by the Tribunal at para 42 of its order (para 10 above),

    rests substantially on the statement of Sh. Anil Sanklecha recorded

    during the search on 17/18.06.2022 (Item III, para 3 above). It is not

    in dispute that this statement was subsequently retracted, and that the

    appellant’s request to cross-examine Sh. Sanklecha was declined at the

    stage of adjudication. It is well settled that where an adverse finding is

    founded substantially on the statement of a witness, the denial of an

    opportunity to cross-examine that witness, more so where the

    statement stands retracted, constitutes a serious infirmity going to the

    root of the matter and renders the resultant finding vulnerable, being in

    breach of the principles of natural justice. (See M/s Andaman Timber

    Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-II 39 ,

    Supreme Court of India, decided on 02.09.2015, where it was held that

    failure to allow cross-examination of witnesses whose statements are

    relied upon to pass an adverse order is a serious flaw rendering the

    38
    (2004) 7 SCC 233 : AIR 2004 SC 4187 (Supreme
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    order a nullity). Evidence relied upon to the extent of documentary may

    not require cross but oral statements which seems to have weighted on

    the mind of Appellate Authority and Appellate Tribunal. This infirmity

    has not been cured at any stage, neither before the Adjudicating

    Authority nor before the Tribunal, and, in our view, cannot be cured for

    the first time before this Court either, since it necessarily requires a

    fresh exercise of fact-finding at first instance.

    31.2 Second, the assessment order dated 27.03.2026, even though it

    does not by itself conclude the question of benami ownership, a

    question which, as the Tribunal correctly observed at para 40 (para 7

    above), is not automatically resolved either way by the fate of income,

    tax proceedings, nevertheless examines, on the very same set of facts

    and seized material, the identical investment of Rs. 11,16,06,000/- in

    immovable property, the identical reduction in loans and advances

    treated by the Tribunal at para 42 as a device for infusing unaccounted

    cash, and the identical bank transactions, and records a specific,

    reasoned finding that all of these stand duly reconciled with the books

    of account and bank statements and are not unexplained. This is

    precisely the factual premise, unexplained source of funds routed as

    repayment of advances, on which para 42 of the Tribunal’s order

    proceeds. Since this assessment order was neither placed before the

    Adjudicating Authority nor before the Tribunal, its bearing on the finding

    of benami transaction has never been examined by any authority under

    the PBPT Act. Being a subsequent development going to the very

    foundation of the finding under challenge, it is a matter that must be

    considered in the first instance by the fact-finding authority, namely the

    Initiating Officer, and not for the first time in appeal or in these

    proceedings.

    31.3 Third, the appellant’s specific defence, i.e., that its reserves, as

    reflected in the financial statements for financial years 2006-07 to
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    2021-22 , remained materially static at approximately Rs. 8.89 to 9.05

    crore throughout this period, including in the years preceding the Lunia

    family’s acquisition of shareholding control in FY 2016-17, and that the

    properties were purchased in FY 2017-18 out of the company’s own

    capital, reserves and recycled loans and advances, has not been

    specifically dealt with at any stage. The Adjudicating Authority’s finding

    that D-1 to D-3 “did not have creditworthiness or wherewithal” (para

    5.6) and the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant “could not support the

    source of funds” (para 42) do not engage with this specific chronological

    point: namely, that the bulk of the reserves said to fund the purchase

    had already existed for roughly a decade before Sh. Mahaveer Lunia’s

    family had any shareholding interest in the company at all. Under

    Section 24 of the PBPT Act, it is for the Initiating Officer to record

    “reasons to believe” on credible material, and once the noticee

    furnishes a specific, document-backed explanation of source, that

    explanation must be specifically examined and either accepted or

    rejected with reasons, it cannot simply be treated as discharged by

    requiring the noticee to additionally establish the ultimate origin, years

    earlier, of monies since repaid and reflected in audited accounts

    accepted year after year by the Registrar of Companies and the Income

    Tax Department (para 5, points 3 and 22 above).

    VII FINDINGS

    32. To sum up, the cumulative discussion leads us to the following

    findings :

    (i) There is no absolute immunity to a company from being

    a benamidar merely because it is a corporate entity, provided,

    the relevant conditions under the PBPT Act read with

    parameters laid down in Valliamal (supra) are met;

    
          (ii)     In the case in hand, the finding of benami transaction
    
          rests substantially(Uploaded
                               on theonstatement       of Sh.PM)
                                        03/08/2026 at 04:57:43 Anil Sanklecha, CA,
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    which was retracted and never subjected to cross-examination

    despite request. It is held to be in breach of the principles of

    natural justice;

    (iii) The assessment order dated 27.03.2026, which

    examines and accepts as explained, the very investment and

    fund-flow has been treated as unexplained under the impugned

    orders, though it was never placed before or considered by any

    authority under the PBPT Act, but it requires to be taken into

    account, whatever be its evidentiary worth found to be once it is

    gone into.

    (iv) The appellant-company’s specific, document-backed

    explanation regarding the exact year/month and source of its

    reserves (predating the change in shareholding by nearly a

    decade) has not been specifically examined and dealt with by

    reasoned findings at any stage.

    VIII. ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF LAW

    33. In light of the above findings in preceding para, the sub-questions

    of law i.e. (i) and (ii) are answered in the negative but the question no.

    (iii) is answered in affirmative.

    33.1 Adverting now to the substantial question of law, as an upshot of

    the foregoing discussion and analysis of the position of law, we hold

    that the PBPT Act operates independently of the outcome under the

    Income-tax Act, the two enactments occupying distinct domains. The

    “source of the source” is examinable in benami proceedings, and a

    clearance under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act does not, of itself,

    foreclose a finding of benami. At the same time, findings returned under

    Section 69, though not conclusive, carry evidentiary value in

    proceedings under the PBPT Act and are required to be considered.

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    33.2 Proceedings under the PBPT Act are not per se barred merely

    because no addition was made under Section 69, since the two

    enactments operate in distinct though overlapping spheres. However,

    findings of the adjudicating authority resting foundationally on a

    confessional statement of a witness, later retracted, and made in third-

    party proceedings, without affording an opportunity of cross-

    examination in the PBPT proceedings, do not advance the case of the

    revenue. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly: i.e.

    answer to the question (a) is in the affirmative and question (b) is in

    the negative.

    IX. CONCLUSION / ORDER

    34. As an upshot, we are of the view that the proper course is to

    remand the matter to the Initiating Officer, the authority statutorily

    entrusted the functions under Section 24 of the PBPT Act for recording

    the “reasons to believe” and conducting the necessary inquiry in the

    first instance, for a fresh and reasoned determination in accordance

    with law.

    35. In view of the foregoing, we pass the following order:

    (a) The order dated 01.04.2026 passed by the learned Appellate

    Tribunal under Section 46 of the PBPT Act, 1988, and the order

    dated 30.08.2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority and

    consequently the final attachment order dated 28.07.2023 are set

    aside with a direction to the Initiating officer (IO) to proceed

    afresh .

    (b) The matter is thus remanded to the Initiating officer (BPU) at

    the stage of passing of provisional attachment order dated

    01.05.2023 under section 24(3) of the PBPT Act.

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    (c) The IO shall proceed further to either continue or revoke the

    provisional attachment under section 24(4)/(5) of the PBPT Act in

    accordance with law.

    (d) The IO, before passing a fresh order shall:

    (i) take the assessment order dated 27.03.2026 on record

    and specifically deal with its bearing, if any, on the question

    of benami transaction;

    (ii) specifically consider and record reasons on the

    appellant-company’s explanation regarding the source and

    vintage of its reserves and the recycling of loans and

    advances;

    and

    (iii) afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the

    appellant-company before passing a fresh, reasoned order

    under Section 24(4)/(5) of the PBPT Act.

    (e) The fresh order shall be passed as per the statutory period

    provided under section 24 of the PBPT Act with effect from the

    date instant order is uploaded on the website of this court.

    (f) All contentions of both parties are kept open and nothing

    stated in the orders now set aside, shall be treated as an

    expression of opinion on the merits of determination to be made

    by IO, by passing proposed fresh order, either way.

    (g) Should the IO, after reconsideration, pass a fresh order under

    section 24(5) of the PBPT Act and refer the matter to the

    adjudicating authority, in that event, the adjudicating authority

    shall afford the appellant-company an opportunity to cross-

    examine Sh. Anil Sanklecha, CA, if the respondent wishes to rely

    upon his statement made in third party proceedings under the

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    Income Tax Act, 1961, provided the appellant-company also

    wishes to rely on the retraction of his statement;

    (h) The instant appeal stands disposed of in the above terms.

    Any pending application also stands disposed of. No order as to

    costs.

    36. In the parting, it is made clear that, pending passing of the fresh

    order, either way by the IO, the provisional attachment of the properties

    shall continue to operate, in order to protect the interest of the Revenue,

    but this is without expressing any final opinion on the merits of the

    controversy i.e. whether the properties are benami or not, which

    decision is kept open for determination in accordance with law.

                                       (SANDEEP SHAH),J                                                    (ARUN MONGA),J
    
    
    
    
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