Delhi High Court
Krishan Gopal Aggarwal vs Dalip Singh on 15 July, 2026
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 10th March, 2026
Pronounced on: 15th July, 2026
+ RFA 253/2016
KRISHAN GOPAL AGGARWAL .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Ankur Mahindro, Mr. Rohan
Taneja, Mr. Ankush Satija, Mr.
Raghav Kalra, Mr. Animesh Dubey,
Ms. Geesha Shastri, Ms. Jhanak Setia
and Ms. Radhika Agrawal, Advs.
Mob: 9891051888
Email: [email protected]
versus
DALIP SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sanjay Deewan, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Satvinder Singh, Mr. Yash
Chopra, Mr. Nikhil Goel, Ms. Arshia
Kohli, Advs.
+ RFA 254/2016
RAVINDER KUMAR AGGARWAL .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Ankur Mahindro, Mr. Rohan
Taneja, Mr. Ankush Satija, Mr.
Raghav Kalra, Mr. Animesh Dubey,
Ms. Geesha Shastri, Ms. Jhanak Setia
and Ms. Radhika Agrawal, Advs.
Mob: 9891051888
Email: [email protected]
versus
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Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
Signing Date:15.07.2026
15:58:31
DALIP SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sanjay Deewan, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Satvinder Singh, Mr. Yash
Chopra, Mr. Nikhil Goel, Ms. Arshia
Kohli, Advs.
+ RFA 255/2016
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Ankur Mahindro, Mr. Rohan
Taneja, Mr. Ankush Satija, Mr.
Raghav Kalra, Mr. Animesh Dubey,
Ms. Geesha Shastri, Ms. Jhanak Setia
and Ms. Radhika Agrawal, Advs.
Mob: 9891051888
Email: [email protected]
versus
DALIP SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sanjay Deewan, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Satvinder Singh, Mr. Yash
Chopra, Mr. Nikhil Goel, Ms. Arshia
Kohli, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
JUDGEMENT
INTRODUCTION:
1. The present Regular First Appeals (“RFAs”) have been filed under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC“), thereby
challenging the common judgement dated 21st December, 2015 (“impugned
judgement”), passed by the Court of Additional District Judge – 01Signature Not Verified
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(Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (“ADJ”) in Civil Suit No. 214/14/2009,
titled as “Sh. Krishan Gopal Aggarwal Versus Sh. Dalip Singh”, Civil Suit
No. 213/14/2009, titled as “Ravinder Kumar Aggarwal Versus Dalip
Singh”, and Civil Suit No. 212/14/2009, titled as “Vijay Kumar Aggarwal
Versus Sh. Dalip Singh”, which were in the nature of counter-claims. By
way of the impugned judgement, the Trial Court dismissed the counter-
claims filed by the appellants herein.
2. The plaintiff/respondent had originally instituted three civil suits
against each of the three defendants/appellants. In each suit, the plaintiff
sought a declaration that the Agreement to Sell (“ATS”) dated 29th
September, 1995, had been executed by the plaintiff under undue influence,
and is therefore, illegal, sham, unenforceable, void ab initio, etc., and that
the same stands terminated vide Notice dated 14th August, 2002. There was
further prayer for rendition of accounts with respect of the rent/occupation
charges qua the respective portions of the property bearing No. A-13,
Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi – 110052.
3. The three counter claimants/appellants, on 28th January, 2005, filed
their respective written statements along with counter-claims, to the three
main suits filed by the respondent. Each of the counter-claims had been filed
by the respective appellants seeking specific performance of the ATS dated
29th September, 1995, and Compromise dated 30th April, 2004. A further
prayer was made for a decree of permanent injunction, restraining the
plaintiff/respondent from creating any third-party interests or interfering in
the possession of the property admeasuring 870 sq. yds., bearing No. A-13,Signature Not Verified
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Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi – 110052 (“suit property”).
4. On 09th October, 2009, the plaintiff/respondent unconditionally
withdrew the three main suits; however, the counter claimants/appellants
continued with their respective counter-claims, which subsequently got
registered as three independent suits, being CS Nos. 212/14/2009,
213/14/2009 and 214/14/2009.
5. The Trial Court, vide the impugned judgement, collectively dismissed
the aforementioned counter-claims. Hence, the present appeals have been
filed.
5.1. Before adverting to the facts of the present appeals, it is noted that this
Court, vide order dated 02nd May, 2016, had issued notice in the present
appeals, and the applications filed by the appellants, seeking stay of the
impugned judgement were dismissed as withdrawn.
5.2. The appellants again filed applications, being C.M. APPL.
16436/2022, 16316/2022 and 16312/2022, seeking stay of the impugned
judgement. However, the aforementioned applications were dismissed by
this Court, vide order dated 01st April, 2022, on the ground that the
applications were prima facie abuse of the powers of this Court, and the
appellants cannot be permitted to reagitate their claims with regard to stay of
the impugned judgement, when the earlier applications in this regard had
been withdrawn by the appellants themselves.
RELEVANT FACTS:
6. The facts relevant for adjudication of the present appeals are as
follows:
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6.1. The respondent and his brother, i.e., Sh. Hanwant Singh, were allotted
a plot admeasuring 2300 sq. yds. bearing No. A-13, Wazirpur Industrial
Area, Delhi – 110052, vide a perpetual Lease Deed dated 08th March, 1973,
by the Delhi Development Authority (“DDA”). The respondent and his
brother divided the entire property into two equal parts, whereby the
respondent became exclusively entitled to 1150 sq. yds. in A-13, Wazirpur
Industrial Area, Delhi – 110052.
6.2. The counter claimants/appellants are three brothers. The respondent
had let out a portion of the aforesaid property on rent to Sh. Prem Chand
Aggarwal, i.e., the father of the appellants, on 26th December, 1980.
Subsequent to the demise of Sh. Prem Chand Aggarwal on 31st May, 1985,
the appellants continued as tenants in the portion of the property that had
been initially let out.
6.3. Out of his 1150 sq. yds. share in the property, the respondent intended
to sell a portion measuring 280 sq. yds. to Sh. Naresh Chand Aggarwal, i.e.,
brother of the appellants, vide an ATS dated 18th May, 1989, for a
consideration of Rs. 7 Lacs.
6.4. Subsequently, the respondent herein filed a civil suit, being CS No.
1118/1993 against Sh. Naresh Chand Aggarwal seeking injunction against
carrying out any additions or alterations in the portion of the property
consisting of, inter alia, a tin shed hall. An application filed by the
respondent herein, seeking interim relief in the said suit, was dismissed vide
order dated 25th August, 1993. The respondent herein filed an appeal, being
MCA 171/1993 against the said order dated 25th August, 1993, however, the
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aforesaid appeal was subsequently dismissed as withdrawn/compromised.
6.5. Thereafter, the respondent intended to sell portions measuring 290 sq.
yds. each in his property to the three appellants. In this regard, the
respondent executed a set of documents being ATS, irrevocable General
Power of Attorney (“GPA”), Special Power of Attorney (“SPA”), Will,
Affidavit and Receipt, all dated 29th September, 1995, respectively, in
favour of each of the three appellants. Thus, the respondent executed ATS in
favour of each of the appellants, for a total of 870 sq. yds. in the property of
the respondent.
6.6. As per Clause 1 of the ATS dated 29th September, 1995, the plaintiff
agreed to sell 290 sq. yds. of his property for a consideration of Rs. 5 Lacs.
Out of this, the ATS records that Rs. 35,000/- was already paid, and a
further payment of Rs. 65,000/- had been made at the time of execution of
the said ATS.
6.7. Thus, out of Rs. 5 Lacs, a payment of Rs. 1 Lac had already been
made, and the balance sale consideration of Rs. 4 Lacs was to be paid over a
period of 5 years, in equal monthly instalments, commencing from 07th
November, 1995 till 07th October, 2000, along with an approximate lump-
sum interest of Rs. 2.5 Lacs. Thus, the total sale consideration for sale of
290 sq. yds. of the property was Rs. 7.5 Lacs.
6.8. Under the ATS dated 29th September, 1995, the plaintiff also
undertook to clear the arrears of house tax, electricity dues and arrears of
whatever nature of DDA up to 30th September, 1995, by 31st March, 1998.
6.9. Further, the ATS dated 29th September, 1995, mentioned that the
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property is in use and occupation of a tenant, i.e., Smt. Prem Kanta Jain, and
that the appellants were given symbolic possession of the property, who
were entitled to realize commission amount from her.
6.10. Subsequently, the respondent and his brother, i.e., Sh. Hanwant Singh
received a letter dated 29th January, 1996, from the DDA with respect to
termination of the perpetual Lease Deed in terms of order dated 15 th
October, 1995, passed by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi. Aggrieved by
the said termination, the respondent herein, along with Sh. Naresh Kumar
Aggarwal, filed a civil writ petition before this Court, being CWP No.
843/1996, titled as “Dalip Singh & Anr. Versus Govt. of NCT of Delhi”,
challenging the said order.
6.11. The writ petition was ultimately disposed of vide order dated 13th
October, 2003, wherein the Court noted that the perpetual Lease Deed had
been terminated on two accounts, i.e., due to running of the business of steel
rolling mills in contravention of the master plan, and the allegation that the
brother of the respondent herein, i.e., Sh. Hanwant Singh, had sold his 50%
share in the property to one Smt. Ram Pyari. In view of the statement of the
counsel for the petitioners therein that the property shall be used only for the
purpose permitted in the master plan, the Court directed that upon stoppage
of the misuse of the property and payment of the requisite charges by the
petitioners therein, the perpetual Lease Deed shall be restored and the
petitioners’ case would be considered for conversion of the land from
leasehold to freehold.
6.12. As per the respondent, three Mutual Agreements, each dated 07th
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November, 1996, had also been executed between the respective appellants
and the respondent, for an additional payment of Rs. 10,835/- per month in
cash for a period from 07th November, 1996, to 07th October, 2000, as
additional consideration under the ATS dated 29th September, 1995.
6.13. The respondent also addressed a letter dated 24th July, 1996, to the
Deputy Assessor and Collector, House Tax Department, Municipal
Corporation of Delhi (“MCD”), informing them that he had sold portion of
his property measuring 870 sq. yds. to the three appellants, and that he was
responsible for the house tax dues with respect to the property till 30 th
September, 1995. He further sought full details of the house tax payable, so
that he could clear the dues.
6.14. In February, 1997, officials from the MCD came to the property to
recover house tax arrears of approximately Rs. 19 Lacs. Subsequently, the
appellants also discovered arrears of electricity charges due towards the
Delhi Vidyut Board (“DVB”) to the tune of Rs. 8.7 Lacs. In regard to the
said arrears, the appellants contend that they approached the respondent,
who under the ATS dated 29th September, 1995, was obligated to clear the
arrears of house tax and electricity up to 30th September, 1995. However, as
per the appellants, the respondent failed to take steps to make good the
arrears.
6.15. Till January 1997, the appellants had made a total payment of Rs.
2,62,522/- each to the respondent, with respect to their shares in the suit
property. However, in view of the non-clearance of the house tax and
electricity dues by the respondent, the appellants ceased the payment of
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monthly instalments with respect to the balance sale consideration, without
any notice to the respondent.
6.16. Furthermore, the appellants filed a suit, being CS No. 187/2000 for
permanent injunction against the respondent, however, the said suit was
dismissed vide order dated 19th April, 2002. The appellants preferred a
regular civil appeal, being RCA No. 141/2002 against the aforementioned
order of dismissal.
6.17. During the pendency of the regular civil appeal, the respondent issued
Notices dated 14th August, 2002 to the appellants, stating that vide
Cancellation Deeds dated 07th May, 2002, the Will, GPA and SPA dated 29th
September, 1995, executed by the respondent in favour of each of the
appellants for transfer of the suit property, have been cancelled. Further, by
way of the Notice dated 14th August, 2002, the respondent also sought to
cancel the ATS dated 29th September, 1995, as executed in favour of each of
the appellants.
6.18. Thereafter, on 06th January, 2003, the respondent filed three civil
suits against each of the three appellants, seeking declaration that the ATS
dated 29th September, 1995, had been executed under undue influence and
had been terminated vide the Notices dated 14th August, 2002, issued by
him. He further sought rendition of account of rent/commission/occupation
charges in respect of the suit property. The three suits were originally filed
before the High Court, however, pursuant to enhancement of the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the District Courts, the three suits were transferred to the
District Court.
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Signing Date:15.07.2026
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6.19. In the meanwhile, the appellants contend that they had issued a Notice
dated 05th July, 2003, seeking the respondent to specifically perform his
obligations under the ATS dated 29th September, 1995.
6.20. During the pendency of the three suits, a compromise application
under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC was filed by the parties in RCA No.
141/2002 on 29th April, 2004, and accordingly RCA No. 141/2002 was
withdrawn as compromised vide order dated 30th April, 2004, after recording
the joint statement of the parties in this regard.
6.21. Under the aforementioned Compromise, the respondent agreed to
clear the entire arrears till 30th September, 1995, and get the perpetual Lease
Deed restored from the DDA, at his own expense. Thereafter, the appellants
were to bear all expenses for the conversion of the suit property from
freehold to leasehold, and pay the entire balance consideration to the
respondent, within three days of clearance of arrears by the respondent.
Additionally, the respondent was to withdraw all suits in relation to the suit
property, and not file any suit or proceeding in the future.
6.22. Suit bearing CS No. 275/02/01, that had been filed by the
plaintiff/respondent against the appellants herein, seeking possession,
perpetual injunction and recovery of money was also withdrawn as
compromised by way of order dated 27 th May, 2004. The civil suit bearing
nos. 972/2002 as well as 708/2002, between the parties to the present appeal,
were also dismissed as withdrawn by orders dated 04 th July, 2004 and 27th
May, 2004, respectively.
6.23. As per the appellants, they had prepared drafts/pay orders, each for
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Rs. 4,87,475/-, drawn on Union Bank of India in order to fulfil their
obligations under the Compromise. However, since the respondent failed to
perform his part of the Compromise, the pay orders/drafts had to be
cancelled to save the amount from the 06 month expiration period of the pay
orders. The money in the pay orders was refunded to the appellants.
6.24. Thereafter, the appellants on filed their respective written statements
and counter-claims seeking specific performance of the ATS dated 29 th
September, 1995, and the Compromise dated 30th April, 2004. There is a
further prayer seeking permanent injunction against the respondent
restraining him from creating any third-party interest and/or, in any manner,
interfering with the possession and management of the suit property.
6.25. On 09th October, 2009, the respondent unconditionally withdrew the
three main suits for declaration against the appellants, and the main suits
were dismissed as withdrawn, subject to costs of Rs. 500 in each suit.
However, the appellants pursued their respective counter-claims, which
were registered as separate suits, being CS Nos. 212/14/2009, 213/14/2009
and 214/14/2009.
6.26. The Trial Court vide order dated 16th February, 2012, re-framed the
issues in the aforesaid counter-claims, which read as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
1. Whether the instant counter claim is barred by principle of res-
judiceta? OPR
2. Whether the instant counter claim is barred u/s 38 & 41 of Specific
Relief Act as the counter claimant has other efficacious remedy
available to him? OPRSignature Not Verified
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3. Whether the agreement dated 29.09.1995 was got signed from the
respondent / plaintiff under undue influence? If so, to what effect?
OPR
4. Whether the agreement dated 29.09.1995 has been validly
rescinded / revoked / terminated vide notice dated 14.08.2002?
OPR
5. Whether the counter claimant / defendant is entitled to a decree of
specific performance of the contract dated 29.09.1995 and
compromise deed dated 30.04.2004? OPCC.
6. Whether the counter claimant / defendant is entitled to a decree of
permanent injunction as prayed for? OPCC
7. Relief.
xxx xxx xxx”
6.27. The Trial Court vide order dated 16th July, 2012, consolidated the
three counter-claims for the purpose of recording of evidence, and treated
Suit No. 124/09 as the main case, while the other two suits, viz., Suit Nos.
125/09 and 126/09, were treated as connected matters.
6.28. By way of order dated 20th December, 2012, the Trial Court recorded
that the respondent does not wish to lead any evidence, and the right of the
respondent to lead evidence was closed.
6.29. The Trial Court, vide the impugned judgement, dismissed the counter-
claims of the appellants, rejecting the prayer of the appellants for specific
performance of the ATS dated 29th September, 1995, and the Compromise
dated 30th April, 2004. The Trial Court also dismissed the prayer of the
appellants for permanent injunction against the plaintiff/respondent.
6.30. Thus, the present appeals have been filed by the appellants/counter
claimants seeking to set aside the impugned judgement and decree.
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Signing Date:15.07.2026
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SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS:
7. Before this Court, the appellants have raised the following contentions
seeking the setting aside of the impugned judgement:
7.1. It is the case of the appellants that the Trial Court has grossly erred in
deciding issue no. 5 against the appellants. The performance of the contract
has not been rendered impossible due to lack of permission from the
government authority, i.e., DDA. Merely because the property was a
leasehold property does not serve as an absolute bar for the relief of specific
performance.
7.2. The appellants had drawn drafts/pay orders of Rs. 4,87,475/- each, in
furtherance of the Compromise dated 30th April, 2004. However, the pay
orders/drafts had to be cancelled as the respondent kept on procrastinating
compliance with his part of promise under the Compromise. Furthermore,
the appellants have always been, and continue to be, ready and willing to
pay the aforesaid amount due as sale consideration, provided the respondent
complies with his part of promise, as encapsulated in the terms of the ATS
dated 29th September, 1995, and the Compromise dated 30th April, 2004.
7.3. The respondent had issued Notices dated 14th August, 2002 cancelling
the ATS dated 29th September, 1995, executed in favour of each of the
appellants. In the said notice, the respondent admits the receipt of
consideration in respect of the documents dated 29th September, 1995,
however, he states to have cancelled the said documents. A First Information
Report (“F.I.R”) bearing No. 890/2006 was lodged at Police Station Sihani
Gate, Ghaziabad, under Sections 420 and 477 of the Indian Penal Code,Signature Not Verified
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1860, against the respondent, by the appellants. Furthermore, the respondent
was arrested and remained in custody from 01st October, 2006, till sometime
in December, 2006.
7.4. The Trial Court failed to appreciate that civil suits need to be decided
on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, and once the Court has
recorded that the respondent has failed to lead any evidence, it ought to have
exercised its discretion based on sound judicial principles.
7.5. The Trial Court has failed to appreciate the terms of the Compromise
between the parties, according to which, the respondent was first obligated
to clear the arrears relating to the suit property and get the perpetual Lease
Deed restored, subsequent to which the appellants were to make payment of
the balance consideration to the respondent. The Trial Court had no
authority to change the agreed sequence of obligations between the parties.
Therefore, the impugned judgement is contrary to the terms of the ATS
and/or the Compromise between the parties.
7.6. The Trial Court has erred in holding that the appellants’ witness could
not establish that he had made any payment to the authorities and that he had
admitted the continuance of misuse of the property. The said observation is
based on truncated reading of the witness testimony. Furthermore, much
importance has been placed on the criminal complaint filed by the appellants
being dismissed for non-prosecution in the year 2008. The appellants could
not have perfected their title over the suit property in a criminal court and
that the complaint was only dismissed on the grounds of non-prosecution
and not on merits.
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7.7. The Trial Court erred in placing reliance upon the Mutual Agreements
dated 07th November, 1996, allegedly executed between the parties,
whereby, each of the appellants were to pay cash amount of Rs. 10,835/- per
month towards the consideration for the purchase of the suit property. Even
otherwise, the terms of the aforementioned Mutual Agreements stood
altered, varied, and suspended by the compromises arrived at between the
parties before different courts.
7.8. The Trial Court has erroneously observed that the appellants have
failed to establish breach of obligations on the part of the respondent and
that they could not produce documentary evidence showing payments made
to the respondent as per schedule. However, there was no question of
payments by the appellants until the respondent cleared the arrears on the
suit property and got the perpetual Lease Deed restored. Thus, the impugned
judgement incorrectly holds that the appellants have failed to discharge the
onus under issue no. 5.
7.9. The Trial Court has erred in observing that the appellants’ witness
tried to claim that he had attempted to deposit house tax and other amounts
with MCD and DDA, but was unable to produce any documentary evidence.
No such obligation was placed upon the appellants, therefore, no adverse
inference can be drawn against the appellants. The terms of the Compromise
clearly set out that the aforesaid obligations had been placed upon the
respondent. Furthermore, a premium has been given to the wrongs of the
respondent by rejecting the appellants’ claim for specific performance on the
grounds of non-production of documentary evidence with regard to the
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aforesaid payments.
7.10. Trial Court has erroneously observed that the appellants had made no
attempt to deposit the money before the concerned Court where the
Compromise has been arrived at. However, as per the terms of the
Compromise, no such obligation has been placed upon the appellants.
Furthermore, the appellants did not file execution proceedings in respect of
the Compromise nor moved any application for contempt against the
respondent, before the said Court because the said Court was not competent
to grant a decree of specific performance and/or perfect the title of the
applicants over the suit property.
7.11. The impugned judgement assumes the misuse of property from the
fact that the appellants are carrying on business of steel fabrication and
plastic cables on the suit property. However, the appellants’ witness, in his
cross-examination, had duly submitted that they have a licence from the
MCD in the name of M/s. Prime Industries. However, the licence was
neither ever called for during the cross-examination nor any notice was
issued for its production. Therefore, any adverse inference drawn against the
appellants, in this regard, is against the law.
7.12. The Trial Court erred in observing that the perpetual Lease Deed of
the suit property was cancelled due to the acts of the appellants, and the
conditional order passed by this Court in CWP No. 843/1996, was not
complied by the appellants. The Trial Court failed to appreciate that various
other portions of the suit property were in occupation of tenants, and nothing
on record indicates that the misuse of the suit property is attributable to the
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appellants. Moreover, the respondent was obligated to get the perpetual
Lease Deed restored, however, nothing has been placed on record by the
respondent to state that any attempt was made on his behalf in this regard.
7.13. The Trial Court has erred to hold that no arguments were addressed
by the counter claimants/appellants despite sufficient opportunities. The
counter-claims were clubbed and listed before the Trial Court on 13 th April,
2015, when an adjournment was sought on behalf of the respondent and the
matters were adjourned to 16th May, 2015, for final arguments. However, the
presiding officer was unavailable on the said date, and the matters were
further adjourned to 05th August, 2015, when the counsels for the parties
were unable to appear due to a strike by the lawyers. However, the Trial
Court reserved the matters for judgement on the basis of material on record.
7.14. The appellants had filed their written submissions/synopsis, but from
a bare perusal of the impugned judgement, it is clear that the Trial Court has
failed to take the same into account. Therefore, the impugned judgement
fails to take all the material on record into consideration.
7.15. The Trial Court has also erroneously held that the appellants stopped
making payment without any notice to the respondent and thereby
committed breach of the ATS dated 29th September, 1995. Additionally, the
reliance placed by the Trial Court upon letters dated 29 th January, 1996, 18th
January, 2007, and 03rd February, 2009, along with the Inspection Report for
the inspection carried out on 06th May, 2013, is not as per law, as the said
documents had been filed by the respondent only with the written
submissions, and were never entered as evidence. Even otherwise, the said
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Inspection Report attributes the misuse of property to activities being
conducted on the first floor of the suit property, which does not fall under
the occupation of the appellants.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:
8. Per contra, the submissions put forth by the respondent are as
follows:
8.1. The present RFAs are not maintainable as the supporting affidavit is
not attested by an Oath Commissioner as required under the CPC.
8.2. The appellants have played a fraud on the Court by concealing the
three Mutual Agreements dated 07th November, 1996, at the time of filing
the counter-claims. As per the said three Mutual Agreements dated 07th
November, 1996, a sum of Rs. 10,835/- per month was to be paid by the
appellants to the respondent from 07th November, 1996, to 07th October,
2000, in cash, amounting to a total of Rs. 5,20,080/-. Through the said
concealment, the appellants intended to circumvent the payment of the
requisite Court Fee, causing pecuniary loss to the government exchequer.
The aforementioned concealment continues in the present RFAs as well.
8.3. The perpetual Lease Deed issued by the DDA for the entire property
was cancelled due to the misuse of the suit property by the appellants, and
there continues a huge outstanding amount due from the appellants to the
DDA in this regard. This factum has also been concealed by the appellants
in the present RFAs. The counter claimants/appellants, in their cross-
examination, admit to carrying on a business of steel fabrication in the name
of M/s. Bright Steels. However, the licence from the MCD is in the name of
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M/s. Prime Industries in favour of Sh. Krishan Gopal Aggarwal, i.e., one of
the appellants, for the manufacturing of plastic cables.
8.4. The appellants have committed breach of the ATS dated 29 th
September, 1995, by stopping payments of monthly instalments in February,
1997. Until then, a payment of only Rs. 2,62,522/- was made by each
appellant, out of Rs. 7,50,000/-, i.e., approximately 30% of the total sale
consideration. Admittedly, the appellants never served any legal notice upon
the respondent disclosing the reasons for stopping the payment of the
instalments.
8.5. No sale deed has been executed in favour of the appellants, till date.
The appellants cannot seek specific performance of the ATS dated 29th
September, 1995, as the appellants themselves committed the breach of the
aforementioned ATS in February, 1997, by stopping payment of monthly
instalments.
8.6. It is submitted that the payments of 30% of the total sale consideration
for the suit property stood forfeited by the respondent, on account of the
breach of ATS dated 29th September, 1995, by the appellants. Therefore, the
appellants are without any title or deed and thus, are unauthorised occupants
of the suit property who continue to enjoy the possession of the property and
earn mesne profits from it. The appellants are not making payments to the
DDA and the MCD, while the total outstanding amount is to the tune of
several lacs of rupees.
8.7. It is submitted that the Compromise dated 30th April, 2004, is vague,
void ab initio, and illegal for non-fulfilment of Sections 10, 17, 24, 28, 32,
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34 and 36 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“Contract Act“). It is also in
violation of the order dated 13th October, 2003, passed by this Court in
C.W.P No. 843/1996, in relation to the suit property. Moreover, the
aforementioned Compromise fails to implead the competent parties, viz., the
DDA, i.e., owner of the suit property.
8.8. The ATS, exhibited as CCW-1/1 by the appellants in their counter-
claims before the Trial Court has been tampered with, as admitted by the
appellants’ witness during his cross-examination on 27th September, 2012.
The tampered ATS has lost its legal sanctity and proves dishonesty on the
part of the appellants.
8.9. The appellants’ witness has admitted in his cross-examination that no
site plan was ever executed between the parties, due to there being no need
for the same. However, the appellants have filed a purported site plan along
with the counter-claims which does not bear any signatures and therefore
has no legal sanctity and fails to satisfy the requirements prescribed under
Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC, to identify the suit property.
8.10. Admittedly, the appellants were shown the perpetual Lease Deed
executed by the DDA in favour of the respondent and his brother. Despite
that, the appellants failed to implead DDA as the necessary party to
conceal/hide the huge outstanding misuse charges accumulated over the suit
property. The appellants have also opposed the respondent’s application
dated 15th October, 2013, under Order I Rule 9 of the CPC, seeking the
impleadment of the DDA as necessary party before the Trial Court.
8.11. The appellants have made a false statement in the cross-examination
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dated 27th September, 2012, by stating that symbolic possession, along with
the actual possession, of the suit property was given to them. However, in
the same cross-examination, the appellants admit that there is a tenant,
namely Smt. Prem Kanta Jain, in the suit property and that the appellants
have not executed any tenancy agreement with Smt. Prem Kanta Jain. The
judgement in Eviction Petition bearing No. E-71/2009, titled as “Dalip
Singh Versus Smt. Prem Kanta Jain and Others”, dated 18th December,
2014, read with order dated 22nd August, 2015, along with order dated 19th
August, 2017, in the case, being RCT No. 17/2016, titled as “Prem Kanta
Jain Versus Dalip Singh & Ors.”, clearly show that the rear portion of the
suit property has always been in possession of Smt. Prem Kanta Jain, i.e.,
the tenant of the respondent. Moreover, the respondent had executed a
tenancy agreement with Smt. Prem Kanta Jain, back on 01st May, 1992, with
respect to the rear portion of the suit property.
8.12. The respondent also submits that no F.I.R. bearing No. 890/2006 has
been registered by the appellants against the respondent and they fail to
produce any document to substantiate their allegation.
8.13. That Sh. Krishan Gopal Aggarwal, i.e., one of the appellants, has
committed fraud upon the MCD as he had filed an application thereto
seeking grant of licence in the name of M/s Prime Industries, which is a
partnership firm, supported by an Undertaking dated 06 th January, 1999,
attested by the Oath Commissioner as well as by the Notary. He represented
himself as a tenant, wherein, Sh. Kishan Gopal Aggarwal claims himself to
be a partner in firm, in the area of 500 sq. feet, run by Mr. Hanwant Singh
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and Dalip Singh. However, the appellant has also annexed therewith a self-
attested rent receipt as a tenant for an amount of Rs. 2,000/- per month for
the period of 01st August, 1997, to 31st August, 1997, signed by Sh. Hanwant
Singh. The appellant on one hand claims to be the owner of the suit
property, but, on the other hand, admits himself as a tenant of the respondent
and his brother.
8.14. The respondent has his office in the suit property, as is evident from
the Local Commissioner Report dated 04th July, 1996, in Suit No. 372/96
titled as “Smt. Prem Kanta Jain Versus S. Dalip Singh”. The appellants,
along with some criminal elements, had stopped the entry of the respondent
to his office, pursuant to which, the respondent had filed a Complaint Case
bearing No. 128/1/14 against such persons. The appellants have taken law
into their hands and have adopted all means to harass the respondent, who is
a senior citizen.
8.15. The appellants have failed to point out any illegality in the impugned
judgement. The counter-claims of the appellants have been dismissed due to
the defaults on the part of the appellants. The appellants had cancelled the
pay orders of Rs. 4,87,450/- each, for the balance sale consideration, at their
own volition without any due permission of the Court. Furthermore, the
amount in the pay orders by the appellants did not include the amount of
Mutual Agreement dated 07th November, 1996, which totalled to Rs.
5,20,080/- for each appellant.
8.16. Even though the appellants now show their willingness to pay the
balance consideration, at present, the price of the property has increased
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enormously, thus, there is no question of payment of balance amount in
accordance with the ATS dated 29th September, 1995.
8.17. The appellants, in Suit No. 53/2006, filed by them seeking eviction of
Smt. Prem Kanta Jain on bona fide requirement under Section 25B of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“Delhi Rent Control Act“), fraudulently
claim themselves as the owner of the suit property. Moreover, another
fraudulent claim of ownership was made in the Eviction Petition No.
57/2011 filed by the appellants against Smt. Prem Kanta Jain, claiming
themselves, including Sh. Naresh Kumar Aggarwal, to be the owners of the
suit property.
8.18. It is submitted that the respondent has never sold the suit property to
the appellants and has never executed any sale deed in the said regard. The
respondent, vide Public Notices dated 13th May, 2002, had revoked the GPA,
SPA and Will of the suit property in the names of the appellants because
they breached the obligations of the ATS dated 29 th September, 1995, by
stopping the payments of monthly instalments. The ATS clearly states that
the appellants shall become the sole owner of the suit property only from the
date of execution of the sale deed, which has not been executed till date.
8.19. Furthermore, the appellants are not parties to the Writ Petition, being
CWP No. 843/1996, filed before this Court against the cancellation of the
perpetual Lease Deed and the appellants cannot take advantage of the
pleadings without making themselves co-petitioners. The appellants are
silent on measures undertaken in compliance of the order dated 13th October,
2003, passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. The appellants
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never stopped the misuse of the suit property due to which the respondent
could not undertake compliance of the order dated 13th October, 2003, of
this Court in the aforementioned writ petition. Thus, the perpetual Lease
Deed, cancelled by the DDA, could not be restored by the respondent.
8.20. The appellants also failed to disclose that in the rejoinder filed by Sh.
Naresh Kumar Aggarwal, i.e., the brother of the appellants, in the said writ
petition, he has stated that the respondent herein has not sold or transferred
any portion of the plot, i.e., the suit property, in violation of Clause II (4) of
the perpetual Lease Deed dated 08th March, 1973.
8.21. The appellants in their cross-examination admit the outstanding
electricity dues of Rs. 22,000/-, however, later they claim the said dues to be
to the tune of Rs. 8,70,000/-. It is mysterious how the appellants got a new
electricity connection without liquidating the outstanding dues.
8.22. The letter dated 24th July, 1996, by the respondent to the Deputy
Assessor and Collector, House Tax Department, New Delhi, as referred to
by the appellants, was only written by the respondent for the purpose of
deposit of property tax of the suit property being used by the appellants. The
appellants are in use of the property since year 1995 till date, and are silent
on the quantum of property tax paid by them. Furthermore, there is no
question of transfer of the suit property, as no sale deed has ever been
executed owing to the breach of the ATS, on part of the appellants.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
9. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record.
10. At the outset, this Court notes that issue nos. 1, 3 and 4 have been
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decided against the respondent herein. However, no appeal has been filed by
the respondent and accordingly the findings on the said issues, have attained
finality. Further, issue no. 2 was held to be infructuous in view of the finding
of the Court on issue no. 5. Since there is no appeal by the respondent
thereto, the finding as regard issue no. 2 has also attained finality.
11. Accordingly, only issue nos. 5 and 6 are subject matter of
adjudication before this Court. Issue no. 5 pertains to the claim of the
appellants as to whether they are entitled to a decree of Specific
Performance of the ATS dated 29th September, 1995, and Compromise dated
30th April, 2004, read with the Compromise Application dated 29th April,
2004. Issue no. 6 pertains to the claim of the appellants herein as to whether
they are entitled to a decree of permanent injunction against the respondent
herein. Both the issues have been decided against the appellants, who are in
appeal before this Court.
12. Since the Trial Court has decided issue no. 6 on the basis of findings
on issue no. 5, and arguments before this Court have been advanced
comprehensively on the said issues by both the parties, this Court would
deal with both the issues together.
13. By way of the impugned judgement, the Trial Court has dismissed the
counter-claims of the appellants seeking specific performance of the ATS
dated 29th September, 1995, and Compromise dated 30th April, 2004, for the
property admeasuring 870 sq. yds. bearing No. A-13, Wazirpur Industrial
Area, Delhi – 110052, i.e., the suit property.
14. As noted hereinabove, by way of a perpetual Lease Deed dated 08th
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March, 1973, DDA allotted a plot admeasuring 2300 sq. yds. bearing No. A-
13, Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi – 110052 to the plaintiff and his
brother, Sh. Hanwant Singh. The entire property was divided into two equal
shares by the respondent and his brother, and consequently, the
plaintiff/respondent became entitled to 1150 sq. yds. of the entire property.
15. The plaintiff/respondent had let out the property to the father of the
appellants on rent. After the death of the father of the appellants, the
respondent intended to sell a portion measuring 280 sq. yds. of his share in
the entire property to one Sh. Naresh Chand Aggarwal, who is the elder
brother of the three appellants, by way of an ATS in the year 1989, along
with other contemporaneous documents.
16. The appellants are three real brothers. The plaintiff had executed a
separate set of documents being ATS, Will, irrevocable GPA, and SPA, all
dated 29th September, 1995, in favour of each of the three brothers, whereby,
the plaintiff/respondent intended to sell separate portions measuring 290 sq.
yds., to each of the three brothers. Thus, the total area that the plaintiff
intended to sell to the three appellants, by way of said set of documents, is
870 sq. yds. It is also to be noted that under the aforesaid set of documents,
all the three appellants agreed to pay Rs. 7.5 Lacs each to the
plaintiff/respondent.
17. The dispute between the parties purportedly arose when the
respondent failed to clear the arrears of house tax and electricity dues with
respect to the property, and failed to get the perpetual Lease Deed restored.
On account of this failure, the appellants/counter claimants did not make
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payment of the balance sale consideration.
18. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the perpetual Lease Deed in favour
of the plaintiff was terminated by DDA by way of a letter dated 29 th January,
1996, in terms of order dated 15th October, 1995, passed by the Lieutenant
Governor of Delhi. The said order was challenged by the respondent herein,
and Sh. Naresh Chand Aggarwal in a civil writ petition, being CWP No.
843/1996, titled as “Dalip Singh & Anr Versus Govt. of NCT of Delhi”. It is
to be noted that the appellants in the present case were not a party to the said
writ petition.
19. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of by order dated 13th
October, 2003, wherein, this Court directed that subject to the respondent
herein paying the requisite charges, the perpetual Lease Deed for the
property in question shall be restored. Further, there was also direction that
the misuse in the property shall also be stopped, and the plot shall be used
only for the purpose as permitted in the master plan.
20. Further, the Court also directed that upon stoppage of the misuse of
the property and payment of the requisite charges by the respondent herein,
the lease of the respondent shall be restored, and the respondent’s case
would be considered for conversion from leasehold into freehold. However,
the lease of the respondent for the premises in question is yet to be restored.
21. It is to be noted that on account of the disputes between the parties,
the plaintiff/respondent and the appellants/counter claimants have filed
multiple cases against one another. Out of these, it is important to take note
of a suit being CS No. 187/2000, filed by the appellants herein against the
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respondent herein for permanent injunction. The said suit was dismissed
vide order dated 19th April, 2002.
22. The appellants preferred a Regular Civil Appeal bearing No.
141/2002, titled as “Shri Vijay Kumar Aggarwal & Others Versus S. Dalip
Singh”, against the aforementioned order of dismissal. A compromise
application under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC was filed by the parties in
RCA No. 141/2002 on 29th April, 2004, and accordingly RCA No. 141/2002
was withdrawn as compromised vide order dated 30th April, 2004.
23. Under the Compromise, the respondent agreed to clear the entire
arrears till 30th September, 1995, and get the lease restored from the DDA, at
his own expense. Thereafter, the appellants were to bear all expenses of the
conversion of the suit property from leasehold to freehold, and pay the entire
balance sale consideration to the respondent, within three days of clearance
of arrears by the respondent.
24. Despite the Compromise between the parties, the plaintiff/respondent
has contended that although he took steps for the restoration of the perpetual
Lease Deed, the same was rejected on account of continued misuse of the
property and non-payment of misuser charges.
25. It is an admitted position that the perpetual Lease Deed does not stand
restored. Further, the respondent herein has filed a civil suit against DDA,
being CS SCJ No. 609/2017, titled as “Dalip Singh Versus DDA and Ors.”,
and the same is sub-judice.
26. As per the case put forth by the appellants, under the terms of the said
Compromise, the respondent was obligated to clear all arrears over the suit
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property, and get the lease restored at his own expense, and only thereafter,
the appellants were to make the balance payment to the respondent.
27. It is the case of the appellants that erroneous reliance has been placed
upon letters dated 29th January, 1996, 18th January, 2007 and 03rd February,
2009, and the Inspection Report for the inspection carried out on 06th May,
2013, by the Trial Court to attribute the termination of lease upon the
appellants. These documents were never placed on record during the
proceedings, and were introduced by the plaintiff/respondent for the first
time in his written synopsis, which had been filed after the judgement was
reserved.
28. It is further the case of the appellants that the Trial Court has erred in
placing reliance on the Mutual Agreements. The terms of the Mutual
Agreements dated 07th November, 1996, between the parties, whereby, each
of the appellants were to pay cash amounts of Rs. 10,835/- per month
towards consideration for the purchase of the suit property, stand superseded
by the compromises between the parties.
29. Per contra, it is the case of the respondent that he never sold the suit
property to the appellants, and no sale deed has ever been executed in favour
of appellants.
30. Furthermore, it is the case of the respondent that the perpetual Lease
Deed was cancelled by DDA due to the misuse of the suit property by the
appellants. The appellants, in their cross-examination, admit to carrying on
business in the name of M/s. Bright Steels for steel fabrication. However,
the licence from the MCD is in the name of M/s. Prime Industries favouring
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Sh. Krishan Gopal Aggarwal, i.e., one of the appellants, for the
manufacturing of plastic cables.
31. The fundamental question that arises before this Court in the present
appeals is whether the Trial Court was correct in denying the relief of
specific performance to the appellants/counter-claimants.
32. In this regard, reference may be made to Section 16 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 (“SRA”), which deals with specific performance of
contracts. It is to be noted that Section 16 of the SRA was amended by the
Specific Relief (Amendment Act), 2018.
33. In the judgement of Pydi Ramana Alias Ramulu Versus Davarasety
Manmadha Rao, (2024) 7 SCC 515, the Supreme Court has held that the
said amendment is prospective in nature. In view thereof, the amendment
shall not be applicable to the present appeal as the present appeal is of the
year 2016, with transactions being prior to the amendment. The relevant
excerpts from the judgement are as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
11. At the outset, it requires to be clarified and made clear that in the
instant case the amendment brought to the Specific Relief Act by Act
18 of 2018 would be inapplicable. The amendment is prospective in
nature and cannot be applied to those transactions which took place
prior to amendment. [Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra
Projects (P) Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 355 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 201] In
order to prove [Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC
512 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 239] that the plaintiff is entitled to the
specific performance as per the law existing prior to amendment, the
plaintiff has to establish:
(a) That a valid agreement of sale was entered into by the defendant
in his favour;
(b) That the defendant committed breach of the agreement; and
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(c) That he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the
obligations in terms of the agreement.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
34. Since the transactions in question, that is the execution of the ATS
and the Compromise between the parties, are of the years 1995 and 2004
respectively, the unamended Section 16 of the SRA will be applicable to the
present disputes, which reads as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
16. Personal bars to relief.–Specific performance of a contract cannot
be enforced in favour of a person–
(a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach;
or
(b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential
term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts
in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in
subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract;
or
(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always
been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract
which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance
of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
Explanation.–For the purposes of clause (c),–
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential
for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court
any money except when so directed by the court;
(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and
willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
35. A reading of the aforesaid provision shows that as per Section 16(b)
of the SRA, specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour
of a person who violates any essential term of the contract that on his part
remains to be fulfilled, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of,
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the relation intended to be established by the contract.
36. In the present case, it is evident from the terms of the ATS that the
pending balance sale consideration of Rs. 6.5 Lacs, inclusive of interest, had
to be paid by each of the appellants to the respondent in monthly instalments
from 07th November, 1995, till 07th October, 2000. Further, the respondent
was obligated to clear the entire arrears of house tax, electricity bill and
arrears of whatever nature of DDA up to 30th September, 1995, by 31st
March, 1998. The ATS further provided that in case of failure of the
respondent to clear the dues by the prescribed time, the appellants would
stop paying future instalments with effect from 07th April, 1998.
37. However, it is an admitted case that the appellants paid the last
instalment in January, 1997, and stopped making further payments of the
instalments. Thus, no instalments for balance sale consideration were paid in
February, 1997, and thereafter. The appellants stopped the payment of
instalments, despite the stipulation in the ATS that the respondent had time
till 31st March, 1998, to make good the arrears.
38. It is to be noted that out of the three appellants, only one of the
appellants, i.e., Sh. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal entered the witness box and
deposed before the Trial Court. The said appellant duly admitted during the
course of his examination that there was no authority in writing in his favour
from his brothers, i.e., the other two appellants, to depose on their behalf.
Thus, it is clear that no evidence was led on behalf of the other two
appellants, except Sh. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal.
39. Sh. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal, as CCW-1 before the Trial Court,
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categorically deposed that the last payment of instalment as per the ATS was
made in January, 1997, and thereafter he stopped making further payments.
He further deposed that no legal notice intimating the respondent regarding
stopping of the payment of instalments was issued to the respondent. The
deposition of the said witness clearly brings forth that the appellants were
unable to establish their willingness and readiness to make payment of
amounts to the respondent pursuant to the ATS. The relevant extracts from
the deposition of CCW-1 on 27th September, 2012 and 01st November, 2012
respectively, are reproduced as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
……I made the last payment of installment on January 1997,
thereafter I stopped payment of further installments. I stopped the
payment due to clearance of necessary dues etc. Sh. Dalip Singh was
to provide the clearance of dues on 30.9.1995. I had not issued any
legal notice intimating Sh. Dalip Singh that me and my brothers
have stopped the payment of installments in compliance with the
agreement to sell…….
xxx xxx xxx
………Regarding deposit of house tax by Sh. Dalip Singh in
compliance with the agreement to sell and the compromise dated
30.04.2004, I tried to contact MCD office to know the details of the
amount of arrears to be deposited by Sh. Dalip Singh but I could not
got the details of arrears of amount to be deposited by Sh. Dalip
Singh. However, I deposited the amount in DDA office but I do not
recollect that how much amount I deposited there. I have not filed
any receipt also in the subject suits. As regards dues of DESU, Rs.
4000/- were deposited. There were no arrears. Again said, there were
arrears of Rs. 22000/- approx……
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
40. Thus, clearly it was the defendants/appellants who wilfully breached
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the essential terms of the ATS, in the first instance, by intentionally refusing
to pay the monthly instalment amounts, even before the time period for the
plaintiff to make good the arrears could expire. In view of such conduct of
the appellants, they cannot be held entitled to the relief of specific
performance of the ATS in terms of Section 16(b) of the SRA.
41. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in the
case of Pradeep Batra Versus Kuldip Singh Verma, 2025 SCC OnLine Del
9669, wherein the Court held as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
80. Section 16(b) of the Act of 1963 stipulates that a specific
performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of the
person who violates any essential term or wilfully acts in
variance. Section 16(b) reads as under:
16. Personal bars to relief. –Specific performance of a
contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person–
……
(b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any
essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be
performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or willfully acts at
variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be
established by the contract; or
…..”
81. The Plaintiff’s endeavour to seek a reduction in the sale
consideration of Rs. 12.40 crores bars him in law from seeking
specific performance of the oral ATS dated 29.10.2023. Section
16(b) of the Act of 1963, stipulates that the performance can only be
granted when the Plaintiff/purchaser has not violated the essential
term of the agreement. This conduct of the Plaintiff disentitling him
under Section 16(b) of the Act of 1963 is evident from the statements
in the plaint, accompanying application and therefore, the suit is
barred under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
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42. It would also be fruitful to refer to the judgment in the case of Sri
Chhaya Dey & Anr. Versus K.I.C. Resources Ltd., 2003 SCC OnLine Cal
547, wherein, the Calcutta High Court has held as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
23. It is settled law that specific performance of a contract cannot be
enforced in favour of a person who violates any essential term of the
contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of
the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in sub-version of
the relation intended to be established by the contract or who fails to
aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and
willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be
performed by him. Section 16(b) and (c) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 can be referred to in this context.
24. It is curious to note that in spite of the promise to pay Rs. 35 lakhs
by the end of June, 1993 in terms of the agreement marked as Ext. 1
the plaintiff did not pay the sum on a plea that there was an order of
status quo. R.W. 1 Pukhraj Baid one of the directors of the plaintiff
company has stated in his evidence that they were ready to pay Rs. 35
lakhs, but on account of the order of status quo they did not pay the
amount. As mentioned hereinabove, the plaintiff/respondent was quite
aware of the said order of status quo when the agreement (Ext. 1) was
executed and as such the plea taken on behalf of the
plaintiff/respondent for non-payment of the said sum of Rs. 35 lakhs in
terms of the agreement because of the order of status quo is
untenable. That apart, the said order of status quo cannot prevent the
plaintiff from making any such payment.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
43. Reference is also made to the decision in the case of All India Tea
and Trading Company Limited Versus Loobah Company Limited, 2021
SCC OnLine Cal 2917, wherein, the Calcutta High Court held that an order
directing specific performance is premised on a clean slate, where the party
seeking relief must establish on irrefutable facts, complete performance of
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its part of the bargain. A grainy picture consisting of unresolved charges of
non-performance does not commend to an order of specific performance.
Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
11. Specific performance of contracts and enforcement of negative
covenants are woven into the fabric of the Specific Relief Act and
included in the amended provisions. Although Section 10 has done
away with the discretionary powers of a court in the matter of specific
performance of a contract, the mandatory nature thereof is diluted by
Sections 11(2), 14 and 16 of the Act. This indicates that specific
performance in respect of contracts is not absolute, as explained by
the Supreme Court in B. Santoshamma, wherein the exceptions to an
absolute grant were discussed. Further, Section 42 of the Act which
empowers the court to grant an injunction for performing a negative
agreement is also subject to the proviso to Section 42 which casts an
obligation on the plaintiff to perform the contract as far as it is
binding on the plaintiff. The effect of the proviso was clearly brought
out in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co.; (1995) 5 SCC 545,
where the Supreme Court held that the court is not bound to grant an
injunction in every case and can refuse an injunction for enforcing a
negative covenant on the existence of certain conditions. The
conditions which would persuade a court to refuse performance of a
negative covenant were also stated in Percept D’ Mark (India) (P)
Ltd. v. Zaheer Khan; (2006) 4 SCC 227. The view of the Supreme
Court in Gujarat Bottling was followed in a Single Bench decision
of this Court in Farinni v. Dream Food Products; (2008) 2 CHN
689. Although Gujarat Bottling was decided before the amendment
of 2018, the principles enunciated therein have now been
incorporated in the proviso to Section 10 of the Act. Besides the
situations where a contract cannot specifically be enforced (Section
14), Section 16 disentitles a person from claiming specific
performance of a contract if that person becomes incapable of
performing or violates any essential term of the contract or willfully
acts at variance with the relation intended to be established by the
contract (Section 16(b)). Section 16(c) further requires the personSignature Not Verified
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seeking specific performance to prove that he has performed or has
always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the
contract which are to be performed by him. Explanation (ii) to
Section 16 has been amended to the effect that the plaintiff must
aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform the
contract according to its true construction.
12. The conclusion, as would be evident from a combined reading of
the provisions, is that Specific Performance of a contract, even in
the diminished landscape of Section 10 post-amendment, must segue
into Sections 11, 14 and 16 of the Act, without discordance, for the
‘shall be enforced’ in Section 10 to be in harmonious sync with the
import of the amendment.
13. The question whether the petitioner would be entitled to Specific
Performance of the Agreement, including the negative covenant
therein, would hence turn on the petitioner’s obligations in respect
of the Agreement.
i) Failure on the part of the petitioner to perform the contract and its
part of the bargain:
14. The Clauses in the Agreement dated 14th December, 2017 indicate
the obligations of the parties in terms of their performance as well as
continuing obligations in that regard. Clause 4 of the Agreement
relates to the obligations on the part of the petitioner to make payment
towards Provident Fund dues within specific time frames outlined
under the said Clause. The fact that the petitioner failed in its
obligations of payment within 90 days i.e. 31st March, 2018 as
stipulated under Clause 4.2 would appear from the petitioner’s
averments in the affidavit-in-reply which clearly shows that the
petitioner made occasional payments towards Provident Fund dues
but defaulted thereafter. The delayed payments made by the
petitioner from Season 2018 to Season 2021 have been tabulated by
the respondent in its affidavit-in-opposition and have not been
refuted by the petitioner. The Supplementary Agreement entered
into between the parties on 16th October, 2019 also makes it evident
that such Agreement was necessary to extend the time for making
payments as provided in the Agreement dated 14th December, 2017.
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15. The defaults on the part of the petitioner would also appear from
the letters written to the petitioner by the Provident Fund Authorities
whereby the parties were directed to appear before the Authorities on
20th September, 2021 and an order was passed by the PF Authorities
on the same date. These documents form part of the supplementary
affidavit of the petitioner.
16. Under Clause 7 of the Agreement, the petitioner was also to
make payment for the green leaves produced in the Tea Estate and
sold by the respondent to the petitioner at the rates specified in
Clause 7.1. The allegation that the petitioner has failed to make
payment as provided under Clause 7 has not been controverted by
the petitioner in evidence. The dispute with regard to the segregation
of fine count and coarse tea would appear from the method of
calculation prescribed by the Tea Research Authority which forms
part of the pleadings of both the parties. The alleged discrepancy in
relation to the method, raised by the petitioner, is not acceptable since
there is no deviation in the relevant part of the prescribed
methodology.
17. The dispute raised by the respondent of the petitioner failing to
make payments for purchase of green leaves at the rates agreed by
the parties would dilute the case for specific performance of the
Agreement by reason of the fact that an order directing specific
performance is premised on a clean slate where the party seeking
relief must establish on irrefutable facts, complete performance of
its part of the bargain. A grainy picture consisting of unresolved
charges of non-performance does not commend to an order of
specific performance. Section 10 read with Section 16 of the Specific
Relief Act lends to this view as the onus of disproving the sequence
of failure and non-performance rests on the person who seeks
specific performance. The construction which emerges from these
provisions is that a petitioner who seeks such relief must prove and
aver that none of the personal bars to relief under Section 16 will
operate against it for denying the relief sought for. The failure on
the part of the petitioner to perform its part of the bargain would
result in a bar to the relief claimed under sub-sections (b) and (c) of
Section 16 which involve incapacity to perform or violation of an
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essential term of a contract as well as a failure to prove and aver
readiness and willingness by the party who seeks specific
performance of the contract.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
44. Section 16(b) of the SRA also provides that no specific performance
can be granted in favour of a person who wilfully acts at variance with, or in
subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract.
Further, Section 16(c) of the SRA provides that no specific relief can be
granted in favour of a party that is not ready and willing to perform the
essential terms of the contract. Explanation (ii) to Section 16(c) of the SRA
further clarifies that the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and
willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.
45. In the present case, admittedly, the appellants/purchasers were in
knowledge of the existence and terms of the perpetual Lease Deed. The
appellants were shown the perpetual Lease Deed before the execution of the
set of documents in the year 1995.
46. This Court notes that as per the terms of the Compromise
encapsulated in the application dated 29th April, 2004, the obligation was on
the respondent to get the perpetual Lease Deed restored from DDA, at his
own expense. This Court also notes that by way of order dated 13 th October,
2003, in the writ petition being CWP No. 843/1996, the Court had directed
the respondent herein to pay the misuser charges and stop the misuse of the
property, in order to get the perpetual Lease Deed restored.
47. The said order duly notes that there was misuse of the property by
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of the original master plan, which did not allow such use of the property.
The order dated 13th October, 2003 passed in the writ petition is reproduced
as under:
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48. It is to be noted that the appellants’ witness, i.e., CCW-1, who is the
appellant in RFA 255/2016, in his cross-examination, admitted that the
appellants were carrying on a business of steel fabrication at the suit
property. The relevant portion from the cross-examination of the appellants’
witness dated 01st November, 2012, is as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
It is correct that we are carrying on business on the site in reference
under the name and style of M/s Bright Steels. We are into steel
fabrication. It is correct that we also have a licence from MCD in the
name of M/s Prime Industries favouring Sh. Krishan Gopal. This is a
business of manufacturing plastic cables.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
49. Thus, the misuse of the property by way of running business with
respect to steel fabrication has been admitted by the CCW-1, appellant in
RFA 255/2016, in his cross-examination. In view thereof, the appellants
admit to the misuse of the suit property. It is pertinent to note that as per
terms of the compromise between the parties of the year 2004, as contained
in application dated 29th April, 2004 in RCA 141/2002, the respondent herein
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was to firstly get the lease restored from the DDA, before the liability of the
appellants arose for payment of balance sale consideration. Clearly, till the
time the misuse of the property was not stopped, the perpetual Lease Deed
cannot be restored by the DDA and the terms of the Compromise cannot be
given any effect. By continuing to misuse the property for running the
business of steel fabrication, the appellants themselves wilfully acted at
variance with, and in subversion of the relation intended to be established by
the set of documents of the year 1995 and the Compromise, for the sale of
the suit property.
50. It is pertinent to note that the appellant in RFA 255/2016, i.e., CCW-1
categorically deposed that the appellants took no steps for getting the
Compromise Settlement between the parties, implemented. This again points
out to the unwillingness and non-readiness of the appellants to fulfil the
ATS and the Compromise. The relevant deposition dated 01st November,
2012, in this regard, is extracted as below:
“xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did you serve any notice upon S Dalip Singh to specifically
perform the agreement to sell and the consequent compromise?
A. No. We did not do so as he filed the present suit.
We did not file any application for execution in the suit in which the
compromise as arrived at in the court of Sh. Daya Prakash, the then
Ld. SCJ, Delhi.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
51. Thus, the appellants, by way of their conduct, i.e., continuing misuse
of the suit property, have shown that they were not willing to fulfil the
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essential terms of the Compromise, in their true construction. The conduct of
the appellants does not inspire confidence in granting them the relief of
specific performance.
52. In this regard, it shall be fruitful to refer to the decision in the case of
Jamuni and Others Versus Bhagauti and Others, 2012 SCC OnLine All
175, wherein, the Allahabad High Court held that the plaintiffs therein had
acted in fraud of the agreement for sale, wilfully acted at variance with that,
and in subversion of the relation intended to be established by the
agreement/contract, by filing objections in proceedings for grant of
bhumidhari rights to deny the title of the defendant therein. The relevant
paragraphs of the said decision are as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
2. This is defendants’ second appeal arising out of a suit (O.S. No. 20
of 1969) for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated
14.02.1966 alleged to have been executed by defendant appellant No.
1, Smt. Jamuni in favour of plaintiffs respondents. The suit was
dismissed by Munsif, Basti on 29.01.1972 with special cost of Rs.
500/- to be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant No. 2 in addition to
the normal cost of the suit.
3. It was pleaded in the plaint that through the alleged agreement
dated 14.2.1966, Smt. Jamuni agreed to sell all her property
consisting of bhoomidhari and sirdari agricultural land as well as
house for Rs. 3000/- in favour of plaintiffs out of which Rs. 1500/- was
paid as earnest money. It was further pleaded that talks of agreement
had started six months before. Defendant appellant No. 1 gifted her
entire property through registered gift deed to her daughter defendant
appellant No. 2 on 13.09.1968. Defendant No. 1, Smt. Jamuni died on
21.01.1969 just after filing of the suit and was substituted by the
defendant No. 2 her daughter.
xxx xxx xxx
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5. The trial court specifically mentioned that against the application
which Smt. Jamuni had filed for acquiring bhoomidhari rights the
plaintiffs filed objections stating therein that the land was given to her
only by way of guzara (maintenance) and that she had no right to
acquire bhoomidhari right therein. The proceedings for acquisition of
bhoomidhari right took place in 1968. In objections plaintiffs nowhere
stated that some agreement for sale had been executed in their favour
by Smt. Jamuni. Plaintiff Bhagwati in his oral statement could not
give any explanation that why he filed objections questioning the very
right of Smt. Jamuni and why he did not say anything about the
agreement in the said proceedings. He pleaded ignorance about the
said proceedings. Trial court also held that alleged thumb mark of
Smt. Jamuni on the agreement was not got examined by any expert.
Trial court mentioned that even from the naked eye the undisputed
thumb impression of Smt. Jamuni and thumb impression on the
alleged agreement for sale were quite different and “it was conceded
even by the plaintiffs’ counsel that the two marks were not of one and
the same thumb impression.”
xxx xxx xxx
13. The suit was barred by Section 16(b) of Specific Relief Act,
which is quoted below:
“16. Personal bars to relief.- Specific performance of a
contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person-
(b) who has become incabale of performing, or violates any
essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be
eprformed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at
variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be
established by the contract; or”
14. The plaintiffs acted in fraud of the agreement for sale and
wilfully acted at variance with that and in subversion of the relation
intended to be established by the agreement/contract. By filing
objections in proceedings for grant of bhumidhari sanad to Smt.
Jamuni they denied title of Smt. Jamuni.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
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53. At this stage, it would also be apposite to refer to the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) and Others
Versus T.R.K. Sarawathy and Another, (2025) 3 SCC 513, wherein, the
Supreme Court held that the relief of specific performance is a discretionary
and equitable relief, and the Court has to adjudge the willingness and
readiness of the party from the attending circumstances, and take into
consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing
of the suit. Thus, the Supreme Court held as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
15. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Prakash Chandra v.
Angadlal held, the ordinary rule is that specific performance should
be granted. It ought to be denied only when equitable considerations
point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damages would
constitute an adequate relief.
16. This Court in N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao while
reiterating that the remedy of specific performance is equitable in
nature and that granting or refusing specific performance is within
the discretion of the court, had the occasion to observe: (SCC pp.
117-18, para 5)
“5. It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an
equitable remedy and is in the discretion of the court, which
discretion requires to be exercised according to settled
principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act’).
Under Section 20, the court is not bound to grant the relief just
because there was a valid agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of
the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had
performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the
essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by
him, other than those terms the performance of which has been
prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous
readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a
condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance.
This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to
be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant
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the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same,
he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take
into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and
subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending
circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to
pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available.
Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he
must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to
perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his
readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is
to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and
the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the
facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and
was always ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract.” (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
54. Reference is also made to the decision in the case of Aniglase
Yohannan Versus Ramlatha and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 534, wherein, the
Supreme Court has held that the conduct of the plaintiff seeking relief for
specific performance has to be blemishless. The relevant excerpt is as
follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
12. The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read with Explanation
(ii) is that any person seeking benefit of the specific performance of
contract must manifest that his conduct has been blemishless
throughout entitling him to the specific relief. The provision imposes
a personal bar. The Court is to grant relief on the basis of the
conduct of the person seeking relief. If the pleadings manifest that the
conduct of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the
plaint he should not be denied the relief.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
55. Thus, keeping in mind the attending circumstances of the present
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case, it is evident that the conduct of the appellants, particularly, with regard
to continuing misuse of the property, is not blemishless, and therefore, the
appellants are not entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance.
56. This Court further notes that the appellants have contended that they
have always been, and are still ready and willing to perform/pay/fulfil the
terms of the ATS and the Compromise between the parties. The appellants
contend that they had prepared drafts/pay orders dated 26th June, 2004, 28th
June, 2004, and 05th July, 2004, of Rs. 4,87,475/- each, drawn on Union
Bank of India. However, as the respondent did not fulfil his part of the
promise in due time, the drafts/pay orders had to be cancelled to save the
amount from the 06 months expiration period of the pay orders.
57. In this regard, the question that arises before this Court is whether the
appellants have been able to prove their readiness and willingness to
perform the ATS and the Compromise.
58. Before delving into the factual context in the present matter, it would
be apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Kamal Kumar Versus Premlata Joshi and Others, (2019) 3 SCC 704,
wherein, while discussing the scope of Section 16 of the SRA, the Court laid
down the material questions to be dealt with for the grant of relief of specific
performance, in the following manner:
“xxx xxx xxx
7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific
performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material
questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief
of specific performance, are:
7.1 First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract
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between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property.
7.2 Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to
perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing
to perform his part as mentioned in the contract.
7.3 Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of
the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner
he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity
with the terms of the contract;
7.4 Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of
specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in
relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the
defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such
relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff;
7.5 Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other
alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money etc. and, if so, on
what grounds.
8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the
statutory requirements [See Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendices A to C of the
Code of Civil Procedure]. These requirements have to be properly
pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings and proved
with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It is only then the
Court is entitled to exercise its discretion and accordingly grant or
refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the case
made out by the parties on facts.
9. In the case at hand, we find that the two courts below have gone
into these questions in the light of pleadings and evidence and
recorded a categorical finding against the plaintiff holding that the
plaintiff was neither ready nor willing to perform his part of the
contract and, therefore, he was not entitled to claim the relief of
specific performance of the contract against the defendants in
relation to the suit land. It was also held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to claim any relief of refund of earnest money because it was
liable to be adjusted as agreed between them.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
59. The Supreme Court in the judgement of His Holiness Acharya
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Swami Ganesh Dassji Versus Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526, has
drawn a distinction between ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’. Readiness has
been defined as to include the financial capacity of the plaintiff to perform
the contract, while willingness is determined from the conduct of the party.
The relevant portion of the said judgment has been reproduced as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract
and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant
the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes
his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his
willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be
properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff
had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he
had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of
the contract. According to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff
was to supply the draft sale deed to the defendant within 7 days of the
execution of the agreement, i.e., by 27-2-1975. The draft sale deed
was not returned after being duly approved by the petitioner. The
factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff’s part of the
contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party
and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the
facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was
always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The
facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the
petitioner/plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to perform his
part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay
the consideration in cash as contracted and intended to bide for the
time which disentitles him as time is of the essence of the contract.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
60. Likewise, the Supreme Court in the judgement of Man Kaur (Dead)
by LRs. Versus Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512, held that to
adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract, the amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant
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must of necessity be proved to be available right from the date of the
execution till date of the decree. The relevant portion of the said decision is
reproduced as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
13. In the first case, this Court held: (N.P. Thirugnanam case [(1995)
5 SCC 115 : AIR 1996 SC 116], SCC p. 118, para 5)
“5. … The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of
the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of
specific performance. This circumstance is material and
relevant and is required to be considered by the court while
granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails
to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge
whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of
the contract, the court must take into consideration the
conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of
the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount
of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of
necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the
execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready
and has always been willing to perform his part of the
contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness
to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with
reference to the conduct of the party and the attending
circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and
circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.”
xxx xxx xxx
40. This contention has no merit. There are two distinct issues. The
first issue is the breach by the defendant vendor which gives a cause
of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance. The
second issue relates to the personal bar to enforcement of a specific
performance by persons enumerated in section 16 of the Act. A person
who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always
been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract
which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the
performance of which has been prevented or waived by the
defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore,
even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the
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plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always
ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which
are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the
performance of which has been prevented or waived by the
plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour.
Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and
willingness on the part of plaintiff is something which need not be
proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused
to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not
correct. Let us give an example. Take a case where there is a
contract for sale for a consideration of ₹10 lakhs and earnest money
of ₹1 lakh was paid and the vendor wrongly refuses to execute the
sale deed unless the purchaser is ready to pay ₹15 lakhs. In such a
case there is a clear breach by defendant. But in that case, if
plaintiff did not have the balance ₹9 lakhs (and the money required
for stamp duty and registration) or the capacity to arrange and pay
such money, when the contract had to be performed, the plaintiff
will not be entitled to specific performance, even if he proves
breach by defendant, as he was not “ready and willing” to perform
his obligations.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
61. Thus, it is a settled principle of law that the party seeking specific
performance has to prove its readiness and willingness to perform the
contract in continuum, from the date of execution of the contract till the final
date of disposal of the suit.
62. Merely stating that the party is ready and willing to perform the
contract is not sufficient to establish the same. The averment has to be
substantiated with proof and documents. A continuous financial capacity has
to be shown from the date of execution of the contract, till the final date of
disposal of the suit.
63. In the present case, the appellants have submitted that they had drawn
three pay orders/bank drafts dated 26th June, 2004, 28th June, 2004, and 05thSignature Not Verified
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July, 2004, of Rs. 4,87,475/- each, in furtherance of the balance sale
consideration, due to be paid to the respondent. However, significantly, the
said pay orders were not adduced as evidence by the appellants before the
Trial Court. Therefore, as per the settled principles of law, this Court cannot
consider them as they are not on the record of the Trial Court.
64. Even otherwise, if the pay orders/bank drafts were on record and were
exhibited, they still could not have fructified the appellants’ case of showing
continuous financial capacity to perform the ATS and the Compromise as
the said pay orders/bank drafts were, admittedly, cancelled by the appellants
in 04 to 05 months of their execution. The appellants reasoned that the
cancellation was done to save the amount as the pay orders/bank drafts were
set to expire within 06 months of their issuance, and that the respondent had
failed to comply with his part of promise in that period.
65. However, the appellants had to prove a continuous trail of financial
capacity from the date of execution of the ATS, and a single deposit, at one
point of time, cannot constitute to prove such requirement. Additionally, as
per the appellants’ own case, even though the amounts mentioned in the pay
orders were refunded to the appellants, they made no attempts to execute
other pay orders, or similar instruments, to prove their readiness to perform
the ATS and the Compromise. Further, it is the admitted case of the
appellants that they made no attempts to deposit the money before the Court
where the Compromise was arrived at.
66. In this regard, the relevant extract from the deposition of Sh. Vijay
Kumar Aggarwal, i.e., CCW-1 on 01st November, 2011, is reproduced asSignature Not Verified
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under:
“xxx xxx xxx
The pay orders referred in para (k) of my affidavit were tendered in
court. Vol. They were handed over to Ld. Presiding Officer but I do
not know whether they were taken on record or not. As far as I
remember, we have tendered these pay orders alongwith the counter
claim and not in terms of any order passed by the Ld. Judge. Again
said, it was tendered before Sh. Rakesh Kapoor, the then Ld. Judge
seized of the matters. The pay orders were got cancelled after 4 or 5
months and the amount was refunded to us by the bank. I made no
attempt to deposit this money in the court of Sh. Daya Prakash,
where the compromise was arrived at.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
67. Thus, the appellants have failed to prove their readiness, and present
any credible proof of assured financial availability throughout the relevant
period. The counter claimants/appellants have not produced any evidence
with respect to their financial capacity to pay the balance sale consideration.
No proof as to the bank account statements, income or Income Tax Returns
have been placed before the Trial Court or this Court, to show continuous
financial readiness of the appellants to perform their obligations.
68. In this regard, reference is made to the decision in the case of Ritu
Saxena Versus J.S. Grover and Another, (2019) 9 SCC 132, wherein the
Supreme Court has held that mere statements citing financial capacity
without proof are not sufficient to prove readiness on part of the plaintiff, in
the following manner:
“xxx xxx xxx
15. Coming to the facts of the present case, the sole document relied
upon by the appellant to prove her readiness and willingness is the
approval of loan on 30-7-2004 by ICICI. Such approval was subject to
two conditions viz. furnishing of income tax documents of theSignature Not Verified
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appellant and the property documents. M/s ICICI has sent an email on
12-5-2005 to the husband of the appellant requiring an agreement to
sell on a stamp paper of Rs 50 to be executed between the parties, as
per the legal opinion sought from the empanelled lawyer, without
which ICICI will not be able to disburse the loan. Admittedly, no
agreement was executed on stamp paper, therefore, the appellant
could not avail loan of Rs 50 lakhs from ICICI. Independent of such
loan, there is mere statement that the appellant and her husband have
income of Rs 80 lakhs per annum unsupported by any documentary
evidence. Such statement will be in the nature of ipse dixit of the
appellant and/or her husband and is without any corroborating
evidence. Such self-serving statements without any proof of
financial resources cannot be relied upon to return a finding that
the appellant was ready and willing to perform her part of the
contract. The appellant has not produced any income tax record or
the bank statement in support of her plea of financial capacity so as
to be ready and willing to perform the contract. Therefore, mere fact
that the bank has assessed the financial capacity of the appellant
while granting loan earlier in respect of another property is not
sufficient to discharge of proof of financial capacity in the facts of the
present case to hold that the appellant was ready and willing to
perform her part of the contract. Such is the finding recorded by both
the courts below as well.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
69. In view of the detailed discussion hereinabove, this Court holds that
the appellants have been unable to prove their readiness to perform their
financial obligations under the ATS and the Compromise, and therefore, no
relief of specific performance can be granted in favour of the appellants in
terms of Section 16(c) of the SRA.
70. The contention of the appellants that since no issue had been framed
with respect to willingness and readiness of the appellants to perform their
part of the contract, and therefore, they had no obligation to prove the same,
has to be rejected. In this regard, reliance is placed on the case of J.P.
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Builders and Another Versus A. Ramadas Rao and Another, (2011) 1 SCC
429, wherein, the Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff seeking grant of
specific relief shall prove a continuous readiness and willingness to perform
the contract on his part from the date of the contract, till the date of decree of
the suit. Further, the Court held that even if the opposite party has not raised
a plea, the plaintiff has to comply with the mandate of the statute to prove
his readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The relevant excerpts
from the said decision have been reproduced as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
25. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates “readiness
and willingness” on the part of the plaintiff and it is a condition
precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific performance. It is
also clear that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must
allege and prove a continuous “readiness and willingness” to
perform the contract on his part from the date of the contract.
The onus is on the plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the
opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to
comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there
is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the court is not
bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other
alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to
perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time.
“Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract has
to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
71. As regards the contention of the appellants that pursuant to the ATS,
symbolic and actual possession had been handed over to them, the same
does not inspire any confidence. The appellant, Sh. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal,
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while deposing before the Trial Court admitted that he had not mentioned in
his affidavit of evidence that actual possession was given to him and his
brothers. Further, the said witness also admitted that his father was a tenant
in the specified portion of the property in question, before the appellants
entered into ATS with the respondent for purchase of the property. Further,
the said witness also clearly deposed that though there was a tenant in some
portions of the property, they had not executed any agreement of tenancy
with the said tenant.
72. Accordingly, it is apparent that the actual possession of the property
remained with the respondent and that the appellants continued in the
possession of the property, as they had taken possession of the same earlier
after the death of their father, who was a tenant in the specified portions of
the property. This is further buttressed by the testimony of CCW-1 who
deposed that no site plan was executed between the parties and there was no
demarcation of the property for which the ATS was executed between the
parties. Accordingly, no leverage can be claimed by the appellants on the
basis of their assertion regarding possession of some portions of the suit
property, as the said possession was on the basis of tenancy of their father. It
is undisputed that the respondent had let out a portion of the suit property to
father of the appellants on 26th December, 1980. Further, the father of the
appellants expired on 31st May, 1985, while the ATS was entered into by the
appellants subsequently on 29th September, 1995. The relevant portions of
the deposition of Sh. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal, CCW-1 on 27th September,
2012 and 01st November, 2012 respectively, are reproduced as under:
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“xxx xxx xxx
……No site plan was executed between the parties as there was no
need to execute the same. There was no demarcation of property for
which the agreement to sell was executed between the parties. No
date is mentioned in the agreement on which the impugned agreement
between the parties was executed however the agreement bear the
stamp and signatures of Notary dated 29.9.1995. The agreement was
signed by me and my brothers after reading the same. Sh. Dalip
Singh handed over symbolic possession as well as actual possession
of the property for which the agreement to sell was executed between
the parties. However, I have not mentioned that actual possession
was given to me and my brothers in the affidavit of evidence. No sale
deed was executed by Sh. Dalip Singh in furtherance of the agreement
to sell in favour of me or in favour of my brothers. It is correct that in
para 6 of the agreement, it is mentioned that symbolic possession of
the suit property was given while today I have stated in my cross
examination that symbolic possession coupled with actual
possession was given. However my agreement does not carry
incorrect assertions since only due to typographical lapse the word
‘actual’ possession got omitted. It is correct that in the property in
question, there is a tenant in the name of Smt. Premkanta Jain……..
xxx xxx xxx
The business carried on at the site in reference is our own business
and we have not sublet or assigned the property in reference to
anybody. It is correct that my father late Sh. Prem Chand Aggarwal
was a tenant in a specified portion of this property before we entered
into the agreement to sell. Vol. He was a tenant in front portion. At
the time of agreement to sell / compromise, S. Dalip Singh did not
have any office in the premises in reference.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
73. As regards the Trial Court placing reliance on the letter dated 29th
January, 1996, along with the Inspection Report for the inspection carried
out on 06th May, 2013, this Court is of the view that the Trial Court has
erred in placing reliance on the same. The said letter and report have not
been proved, and were filed only with the written submissions before the
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Trial Court.
74. Similarly, the impugned judgement has erred in considering the
admission of signatures on the Mutual Agreements, as an admission of the
contents of the document itself. In view of the said, the Trial Court has
incorrectly placed reliance upon the terms of the said Mutual Agreements
between the parties. Mere admission of signatures on the documents by
CCW-1 does not translate into the proof of contents contained in the said
documents.
75. The plaintiff never led evidence before the Trial Court, and the
Mutual Agreements were only placed before the Trial Court during the
cross-examination of CCW-1. The witness recognised his and the other
appellants’ signatures, but did not confirm the existence or execution of the
said documents. The Mutual Agreements were marked as exhibits, however
the same does not absolve the respondent herein from the onus of proof,
with respect to the said documents. It is only after proof of documents, that
the documents could have been treated as substantive evidence, and could be
relied upon by the Trial Court.
76. Thus, this Court in the case of Sudir Engineering Company Versus
Nitco Roadways Ltd., 1995 SCC OnLine Del 251, has held that mere
marking of an exhibit does not dispense with the onus to prove such
documents. The relevant excerpts from the said decision are as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
6. Let me now look at the law. Any document filed by either party
passes through three stages before it is held proved or disproved.
These are:
First stage: when the documents are filed by either party in the
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Court; these documents though on file, do not become part of the
judicial record;
Second stage: when the documents are tendered or produced in
evidence by a party and the Court admits the documents in evidence.
A document admitted in evidence becomes a part of the judicial
record of the case and constitutes evidence;
Third stage: the documents which are held ‘proved, not proved or
disproved’ when the Court is called upon to apply its judicial mind
by reference to Section 3 of the Evidence Act. Usually this stage
arrives at the final hearing of the suit or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
8. I am firmly of the opinion that mere admission of document in
evidence does not amount to its proof.
xxx xxx xxx
9. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sait Taraji
Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam (AIR 1971 SC 1865) is:
‘The mere marking of an exhibit does not dispense with the
proof of documents.’
xxx xxx xxx
12. In Baldeo Sahai v. Ram Chander, AIR 1931 Lahore 546 it was said:
There are two stages relating to documents. One is the stage when
all the documents on which the parties rely are filed by them in
Court. The next stage is when the documents are proved and
formally tendered in evidence. It is at this later stage that the Court
has to decide whether they should be admitted or rejected. If they are
admitted and proved then the seal of the Court is put on them giving
certain details laid down by law, otherwise the documents are
returned to the party who produced them with an endorsement
thereon to that effect.”
A reading of the report shows that it was the practice of the Court to
endorse the documents soon on their filing which practice was
deprecated and hence stopped. The word “proved” has been used by
the Division Bench in the sense of proposed to be proved as is clear
from its having been used along with the word “tendered” or
“admitted” in evidence The word proved has been loosely used forSignature Not Verified
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describing the stage after filing of the documents, when the Court
would decide only whether they should be admitted or rejected. The
Division Bench cannot be read as holding that the document is not to
be endorsed with an Exhibit number unless and until proved. As stated
in para 6 hereinabove, the stages of tendering/admitting/rejecting in
evidence and holding a document proved–are two distinct and
different stages, not one. They are respectively the second and third
stages.
13. Admission of a document in evidence is not to be confused with
proof of a document.
xxx xxx xxx
15. The marking of a document as an exhibit, be it in any manner
whatsoever either by use of alphabets or by use of numbers, is only for
the purpose of identification. While reading the record the parties and
the Court should be able to know which was the document before the
witness when it was deposing. Absence of putting an endorsement for
the purpose of identification no sooner a document is placed before a
witness would cause serious confusion as one would be left simply
guessing or wondering while was the document to which the witness
was refering to which deposing. Endorsement of an exhibit number on
a document has no relation with its proof. Neither the marking of an
exhibit number can be postponed till the document has been held
proved; nor the document can be held to have been proved merely
because it has been marked as an exhibit.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
77. Further, reference in this regard is also made to the decision of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Mahalaxmi Shikshan Samiti, Goa and
Others Versus Manikrao Krishnarao Dessai and Others, 2021 SCC
OnLine Bom 13898, wherein, it was held as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
27. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to
its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not
dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in
accordance with law. When a document is merely exhibited, while
exhibiting the same, it does not finally decide the right of the party or
form any opinion or express any opinion on the document. TheSignature Not Verified
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document will have to be proved qua its contents in terms of section
61 of the Indian Evidence Act as the said provision contemplate
proof of contents of the documents, either by primary or secondary
evidence. In absence of such a burden being discharged while
exhibiting the documents as Exhibit 76-C collectively, the Appellate
Court has clearly erred in accepting the documents qua its contents,
particularly when, no evidence has been adduced on behalf of the
plaintiff, throwing any light on its contents and this was the reason
why the document came to be exhibited while P.W. 1 was being
cross-examined.
28. In light of the aforesaid settled position of law, the substantial
question of law framed above, is answered in the affirmative by
holding that the reliance by the Appellate Court on the documents
marked as Exhibit 76-C collectively as erroneous, since the contents
of the documents are not proved and they are exhibited in cross-
examination of P.W. 1.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
78. Further, while holding that admission as to signature does not amount
to admission as to execution of a document, the Supreme Court in the case
of Veena Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representative Versus District
Registrar/Additional Collector (F/R) and Another, (2022) 7 SCC 1, has
held as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
59. Similarly, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s treatise on the law of evidence
states as follows [ N. Vijayraghavan and Sharath Chandran, Ratanlal
& Dhirajlal : The Law of Evidence (LexisNexis, 2021).] :
“[s 67.3] Execution of Document — Meaning
* * *
Execution of a document is something different from mere
signing of the document. The term execution is not defined
…The ordinary meaning of executing a document is signing it
as a consenting party thereto … Execution of the document
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mark/impression, only after the contents of the document have
been fully stated and read by the executant before he put his
signature thereon. Mere admission of the initial by the
executant would not be tantamount to an admission of
execution of the document.”
xxx xxx xxx
63. In Sayyapparaju Surayya v. Koduri Kondamma [Sayyapparaju
Surayya v. Koduri Kondamma, 1949 SCC OnLine Mad 227], a
Division Bench of the Madras High Court, while construing the
provisions of Sections 35(1)(a) and (b) of the Registration Act,
observed : (SCC OnLine Mad)
“The admission required therefore is admission of the
execution of the document. … It is not enough for the person,
who is the ostensible executant, to admit his signature on a
paper on which, it may be, the document is ultimately
engrossed. The identity of the papers on which the signature
occurs is not sufficient. If a man says that he signed a blank
paper on the representation that it was required for presenting
a petition, as in the present case or if a man signs a completed
document on the representation that his signature or thumb
impression is required as an attesting witness, that admission
of the signature or thumb impression in those circumstances
cannot be construed to be an admission of the execution of the
document. Far from its being an admission, it is a clear and
unambiguous denial of the execution of the document. He
must admit, in order to attract the provisions of Section 35(1)
that he signed the document … The admission of execution
therefore must amount to an admission that the person
admitting entered into an obligation under the instrument; in
other words, that he had executed the document, signed it as a
sale deed, mortgage deed, or a lease deed, as the case may be.”
64. In Jogesh Prasad Singh v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh [Jogesh
Prasad Singh v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh, 1950 SCC OnLine Pat
31] (“Jogesh Prasad Singh”), a Division Bench of the Patna High
Court noted that the meaning of the phrase “execution” of a
document had been well settled by another Division Bench of the High
Court in Ebadut Ali v. Mohd. Fareed [Ebadut Ali v. Mohd. Fareed,
1916 SCC OnLine Pat 99 : AIR 1916 Pat 206 : 35 IC 56] (“Ebadut
Ali”). The decision of the Division Bench in Ebadut Ali [Ebadut
Ali v. Mohd. Fareed, 1916 SCC OnLine Pat 99 : AIR 1916 Pat 206 :
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35 IC 56], which was cited with approval in Jogesh Prasad
Singh [Jogesh Prasad Singh v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh, 1950 SCC
OnLine Pat 31], held : (Ebadut Ali case [Ebadut Ali v. Mohd. Fareed,
1916 SCC OnLine Pat 99 : AIR 1916 Pat 206 : 35 IC 56], SCC
OnLine Pat para 11)
“11. … In our view, execution consists in signing a document
written out and read over and understood, and does not consist
of merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of paper. To be
executed a document must be in existence; where there is no
document in existence, there cannot be execution. … Where an
executant clearly says that he signed on blank paper and that
the document which he had authorised is not the document
which he contemplated, the statement is a denial not an
admission, of execution.”
65. Adverting to the above decisions and to the views of the Calcutta
[Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhuttacharji1881 SCC
OnLine Cal 1 : ILR (1881) 7 Cal 736] , Orissa [Uma Devi v. Narayan
Nayak, 1984 SCC OnLine Ori 94] and Assam High Court [Bhutkani
Nath v. Kamaleswari Nath, 1971 SCC OnLine Gau 53 : AIR 1972
Assam & Nagaland 15] , the Single Judge of the Karnataka High
Court in N.M. Ramachandraiah [N.M. Ramachandraiah v. State of
Karnataka, 2007 SCC OnLine Kar 192] emphasised that the execution
of the document does not mean merely signing it, but signing it after
having understood its contents in their entirety : (N.M.
Ramachandraiah case [N.M. Ramachandraiah v. State of Karnataka,
2007 SCC OnLine Kar 192] , SCC OnLine Kar para 15)
“15. Therefore, the law is well settled. Execution of a
document does not mean merely signing, but signing by way of
assent to the terms of the contract embodied in the document.
Execution consists in signing a document written out and read
over and understood, and does not consist of merely signing a
name upon a blank sheet of paper. It is a solemn act of the
executant who must own up the recitals in the instrument and
there must be clear evidence that he put the signature after
knowing the contents of document fully. To be executed, a
document must be in existence; where there is no document in
existence there cannot be execution. Mere proof or admission
that a person’s signature appears on a document cannot by
itself amount to execution of a document. Registration does not
dispense with the necessity of proof of execution when the same
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is denied. Thus, execution of document is not mere signing of
it.”
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
67. In Ghasita Ram Bajaj v. Raj Kamal Radio Electronic [Ghasita
Ram Bajaj v. Raj Kamal Radio Electronic, 1973 SCC OnLine Del
109] , a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, while differentiating
between signatures on ordinary documents and documents stamped in
accordance with the law relating to negotiation of instruments,
observed that in the case of ordinary documents : (SCC OnLine Del
para 8)
“8. … The meaning of execution of a document ordinarily
implies that a person making his signature by way of
execution knew or should have known the nature of the
document which he was signing.”
68. In Kamlabai v. Shantirai [Kamlabai v. Shantirai, 1980 SCC
OnLine Bom 152] , a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in
the context of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, held : (SCC OnLine
Bom paras 30-31)
“30. … In Sarkar’s Evidence Act, p. 639, the meaning and the
proof of the word “execution” has been set out. It
says “executed” means completed. “Execution” is the last act
or series of acts which completes it. Execution consists in
signing a document written out and read over and understood
and does not consist of merely signing a name upon a blank
sheet of paper. To be executed, a document must be in
existence; where there is no document in existence, there can be
no execution.”
31. It seems to us plain that a person cannot be said to execute a
document where he does not do so with the intention of making
it. This may appear to be simple, but it is clearly, in our opinion,
full of meaning and import. The word “execution” in a sense
means the making of a document, and a person can be said to
have made or authorised a document where with the intention
and knowledge of bringing into existence a particular kind of
document he prepares or gets prepared, such a document and
signs it in token of his having accepted that document, with a
desire to bring it into existence. Mere signing of a document
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without the intention of bringing that document into existence,
meaning thereby giving effect to it would not properly
speaking attract the expression “execution”.”
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
71. While interpreting the provisions of the Evidence Act, Kuttadan
Velayudhan, In re [Kuttadan Velayudhan, In re, 2001 SCC OnLine
Ker 14], a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court determined
whether the admission of signature on a document was tantamount
to admission of its execution. After perusing the decisions of the
Kerala High Court and other High Court across India, the Division
Bench held : (Kuttadan Velayudhan, In re case [Kuttadan
Velayudhan, In re, 2001 SCC OnLine Ker 14] , SCC OnLine Ker para
9)
“9. To sign means to affix the signature. But when it comes to
the signing of a written instrument, it implies more than the
act of affixing a signature. It implies more than the clerical act
of writing the name. The intention of the person signing is
important. The person should have affixed the signature to the
instrument in token of an intention to be bound by its
conditions. It has been said that for a signing consists of both
the act of writing a person’s name and the intention in doing
this to execute, authenticate or to sign as a witness. The
execution of a deed or other instrument includes the
performance of all acts which may be necessary to render it
complete as a deed or an instrument importing the intended
obligation of every act required to give the instrument validity,
or to carry it into effect or to give it the forms required to
render it valid. Thus, the signature is an acknowledgment that
the person signing has agreed to the terms of the document.
This can be achieved only if a person signs after the
documents is prepared and the terms are known to the person
signing. In that view of the matter, mere putting of signature
cannot be said to be execution of the document.”
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
73. The “execution” of a document does not stand admitted merely
because a person admits to having signed the document. Such an
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interpretation accounts for circumstances where an individual signs
a blank paper and it is later converted into a different document, or
when an individual is made to sign a document without fully
understanding its contents. Adopting a contrary interpretation would
unfairly put the burden upon the person denying execution to
challenge the registration before a civil court or a writ court, since
registration will have to be allowed once the signature has been
admitted.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
79. The respondent herein had not led any evidence before the Trial Court
for proving the Mutual Agreements. The Mutual Agreements were only
produced for the first time during the cross-examination of CCW-1. The
documents were exhibited and marked as Ex. P-1/R2 to Ex. P-1/R4. The said
witness, i.e., CCW-1, had identified his signature and those of his brothers,
but did not confirm them. The witness never admitted the contents of the
said documents.
80. It is a settled principle of law that merely acknowledging signatures
on a document does not amount to proof of the contents of the document.
Thus, in view of the law as discussed hereinabove, since the Mutual
Agreements could not be proved as per law, the same ought not to have been
read as evidence by the Trial Court.
CONCLUSION:
81. Thus, while there are some errors in the findings arrived at by the
Trial Court, the errors do not displace the ultimate conclusion reached by the
Trial Court, on the following grounds, which have been elucidated in detail
in the preceding paragraphs:
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a. Breach of the essential terms of the ATS by the appellants;
b. Breach of the Compromise by the appellants;
c. Non-readiness and unwillingness of the appellants to perform the
ATS and the compromise.
82. In view of the detailed discussion hereinabove, issue no. 5, i.e.,
whether the appellants herein are entitled to a decree of specific performance
of the ATS dated 29th September, 1995 and Compromise dated 30th April,
2004, has rightly been decided against the appellants herein.
83. Since the issue no. 5 has been decided against the appellants, they are
also not entitled to a decree of permanent injunction, as prayed in their
counter-claims. Accordingly, issue no. 6 also has rightly been decided
against the appellants.
84. No merit is found in the present appeals. The same are accordingly
dismissed.
MINI PUSHKARNA
(JUDGE)
JULY 15, 2026
sk
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