Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Konki Rajamani vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 23 April, 2026
1
APHC010393412024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY,THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF APRIL
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 6457/2024
Between:
1. KONKI RAJAMANI, W/O. JOHN JOQUB, AGED 43 YEARS, SC
MALA, LAZER COLONY, AMBAJIPETA (V), (M),
2. NAVUNDRU SRINIVAS,, S/O. SATYANARAYANA, AGE 35 YEARS,
SC MADIGA, RAKURTIVARIPALEM, H/O. MODEKURRU (V),
KOTHAPETA (M)
3. KUSUMA SUSEELA,, W/O. JOHN, AGE 43 YEARS, SC MALA,
MERAKAPETA, H/O. ISUKAPUDI (V), AMBAJIPETA (M),
4. DASARI BALA SWAMY,, S/O. MARIDI, AGE 50 YEARS, SC MALA,
TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
5. DASARI DANAYYA,, S/O. MARIDI, AGE 56 YEARS, SC MALA,
TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
6. BADUGU NAGARJUNA,, S/O. SATYAM, AGE 39 YEARS, SC MALA,
TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
7. DASARI PRAVEEN,, S/O. BALA SWAMY, AGE 30 YEARS, SC MALA,
TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
8. DASARI CHINARAJU, S/O. SRIRAMULU, AGE 32 YEARS, SC MALA,
TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
9. BADUGU VINOD KUMAR,, S/O. PRASADARAO, AGE 30 YEARS, SC
MALA TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
10. DASARI SRINIVASA RAO,, S/O. SRIRAMULU, AGE 42 YEARS, SC
MALA, TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
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11. DASARI PRASAD, , S/O. ABHADDALU, AGE 39 YEARS, SC MALA,
TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
12. BADUGU DURGA PRASAD,, S/O. SAMPATHARAO, AGE 31 YEARS,
SC MALA, TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
13. BADUGU RAJU,, S/O. SRIRAMULU, AGE 35 YEARS, SC MALA,
TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
14. DASARI GANAPATHI,, S/O. ABHADDALU, AGE 33 YEARS, SC
MALA, TADIKONA (V)ALLAVARAM (M)
15. DASARI SURIBABU,, S/O. ABHADDALU, AGE 34 YEARS, SC MALA,
TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
16. .BADUGU DEEPIKA,, D/O. PRASADA RAO, AGE 28 YEARS, SC
MALA, TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
17. BADUGU PRASADA RAO,, S/O. VEERASWAMY, AGE 52 YEARS,
SC MALA TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
18. DASARI CHALAPATHI RAO,, S/O. SANJEEVARAO, AGE XX, SC
MALA TADIKONA (V), ALLAVARAM (M),
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S)
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH SHO, ALLAVARAM
PS REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATI
2. KATRAVULA VENKATA SATYANARAYANA, VILLAGE REVENUE
OFFICER (VRO), ALLAVARAM (V), (M),DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR
KONASEEMA DISTRICT ERSTWHILE EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S):
1. BHUSARAPU B YESU BABU
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
3
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity „the Cr.P.C.,‟) by the Petitioners/
Accused Nos.1 to 16, 18 and 19, seeking to quash the proceedings against
Petitioners/Accused Nos. 1 to 16, 18 and 19 in C.C.No.822 of 2017 on the file
of Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Amalapuram.
2. Sri Bhusarapu Brahma Yesu babu, learned counsel for the petitioners
submits that LW.1/Village Revenue Officer/Respondent No.2, Allavaram
village submitted a report to the Station House Officer, Allavaram Police
Station, which was registered a case in Cr.No.28 of 2017 on 06.02.2017 for
the alleged offences punishable under sections 188, 341, 506 read with 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (For brevity „the I.P.C‟) and Section 32 of Police
Act is legally unsustainable. It is contended that, as per the mandatory
requirement under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
brevity ” the Cr.P.C.”), no Court can take cognizance of an offence under
Section 188 of the I.P.C. except upon a complaint in writing by the public
servant concerned or by some other public servant to whom he is
administratively subordinate. In the present case, though a report was
submitted by the Village Revenue Officer and an F.I.R. was registered, the
subsequent investigation and filing of charge sheet by the police is contrary to
the procedure prescribed under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. In the absence of a
proper complaint as contemplated under law, the continuation of proceedings
amounts to an abuse of process of law. Therefore, the proceedings in C.C.
4
No. 822 of 2017 on the file of the learned Additional Judicial First Class
Magistrate, Amalapuram are liable to be quashed.
3. Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, in refutation of
the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, would
contend that the allegations in the FIR clearly disclose the commission of
cognizable offences. It is urged that the Petitioners, being political
sympathizers, had deliberately congregated on a public thoroughfare and
staged a Rasta Roko, thereby obstructing the free flow of traffic and causing
inconvenience to the general public. Such conduct squarely attracts the
mischief contemplated under Section 341 of „the I.P.C.,‟ inasmuch as the
voluntary obstruction of the road constitutes wrongful restraint within the
meaning of Section 339 of „the I.P.C.‟ Further, the act of forming an unlawful
assembly and raising slogans in defiance of lawful authority amounts to
disobedience of public order, thereby invoking Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟
irrespective of whether a specific written order is produced, since the very
nature of the act demonstrates conscious disregard of lawful directions
intended to preserve public tranquillity. The learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor would therefore submit that the FIR is not bereft of essential
ingredients, but rather prima facie establishes the offences alleged, and that
the Petitioners cannot seek to quash the proceedings at the threshold by
invoking technicalities, as the matter requires full-fledged trial and appreciation
of evidence.
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4. Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Assistant
Public Prosecutor.
5. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by
the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.
6. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the
learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is:
“Whether the proceedings in C.C.No.822 of 2017 on the file of the
learned Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Amalapuram is liable
to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court
under Section 482 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟/Section 528 of „the BNSS‟?”
7. In this regard it is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.,1 wherein at paragraph Nos.28 & 29,
it is held as under:
“28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of
any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC or abetment or attempt to
commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public
servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this
provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of
the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to
take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The
legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual
should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds
by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to
save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless
prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the
general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set
the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from
taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has
been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in
CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure,
rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are
complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence
described in those sections. (Vide Govind Mehta v. State of
Bihar [(1971) 3 SCC 329, Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of
Gujarat [(1971) 2 SCC 376, Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [(1996) 3 SCC
533 : State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 391 : K.
Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy [(2005) 7 SCC 352 : and Iqbal
Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370)1
(2010) 9 SCC 567
6
29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section
195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially
an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is
required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. [(1953) 1 SCC 637
and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1775 : this Court
held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing
the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC,
though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned
in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be
taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.”
8. Thus, in C. Muniappan supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the
Cr.P.C.,‟ bars courts from taking cognizance of offences like Section 188 of
„the IPC‟ unless there is a written complaint by the concerned public servant,
in order to prevent frivolous or malicious prosecutions and to ensure
adherence to the prescribed procedure. This bar cannot be circumvented by
misdescribing the offence under other provisions, as the true nature of the
offence determines the applicability of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C‟.
9. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar 2 , at
paragraph No.12 it is held as under:
“12. According to Mr Jyoti Narayan, the point of time at which the legality
of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate to be adjudged, is the time
when cognizance is actually taken under Section 190 of the Code and
applying that test in the present case, it will be seen that there has been
a breach of Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 of the Code. The
proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance
taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is
laid down by this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528 :.
The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under
Section 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein.
Section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a
Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code.
Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under
Section 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and
determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190
has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of
Section 195(1). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non-
compliance with the provisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated
therein.”
2
(1971) 3 SCC 329
7
10. Therefore, in Govind Mehta supra, it is held that the legality of
cognizance must be assessed at the time the Magistrate takes cognizance
under Section 190 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and Section 195 operates as a limitation on
such power. If there is non-compliance with Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ the
Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the specified offences.
11. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh3, at paragraph
No.6 it is held as under:
“6. The object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment
by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial
process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of
the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to
pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally
when the act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful
authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences
relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice
demands absolute bar of private prosecution and that power be given to
the court to lay complaint under Section 340 of the Code as per the
procedure prescribed therein. In Patel Laljibhai case [(1971) 2 SCC 376
the main controversy was as to when the accused had become a party
to the proceedings. However, after the Code came into force in 1974
replacing the earlier Code of 1898 it was omitted and so it is no longer of
any relevance. It is seen that the appellants therein had filed a civil suit
on the basis of a cheque dated 22-11-1963 and the civil suit had come
to be dismissed on 30-1-1965. Thereafter, the private complaint was
filed on 16-11-1965. In the light of those facts it was held that the
respondent was a party to the proceedings in the suit and that, therefore,
the private complaint was not maintainable.”
12. In light of the above, in Surjit Singh supra, it is held that the provision
aims to prevent private vendetta, protect the integrity of judicial proceedings,
and avoid harassment or misuse of criminal process, especially in matters
affecting public justice. Accordingly, in such cases, private prosecution is
barred and only the court is empowered to initiate proceedings under Section
340 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ as illustrated in Patel Laljibhai case.
3
(1996) 3 SCC 533
8
13. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh4, at paragraph
No.2 held as under:
“2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court
quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission
of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 IPC by them in
course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section
195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the
same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is
manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends
to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has
nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an
FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter
XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in,
or in relation to, any proceeding in court. In other words, the statutory
power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way
controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is of course true that
upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the
investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to
take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b)
CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the
offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and
the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the
requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340
CrPC. The judgment of this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja
Reddy [(1983) 4 SCC 240 on which the High Court relied, has no
manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there
cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of
forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the
civil court and hence it was held that the court could not take cognizance
on such a complaint in view of Section 195 CrPC.”
14. Thus, in Raj Singh supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟
applies only at the stage of taking cognizance by the court and does not
restrict the statutory power of the police to investigate an FIR disclosing a
cognizable offence. However, after investigation, the court cannot take
cognizance in view of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ unless a complaint is filed
by the competent authority under Section 340 of „the Cr.P.C‟.
15. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy5, at
paragraph Nos.3 & 4 held as under:
4
(1998) 2 SCC 391
5
(2005) 7 SCC 352
9“3. By the impugned order, the High Court of Madras quashed the
prosecution of the respondents, which was launched under Sections
467, 468, 471, 472 and 477-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code
(for short “IPC“) on the ground that the complaint was barred under
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
“CrPC“). Undisputedly, the forgery is said to have been committed
before the document was filed. Earlier, there was diverse opinion of this
Court as to whether protection of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC was
available in relation to forgery committed prior to the filing of document
or after its filing. A Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case
of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. MeenakshiMarwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 has
categorically laid down in para 33 of the judgment that protection
engrafted under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when
the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with
respect to a document after it had been produced or given in evidence in
a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was
in custodia legis. This being the position, in our view, the High Court was
not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents on the ground
that provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC were applicable.
4. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents submitted that the respondents are entitled to claim
protection under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, which enumerates the
offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC. It has been pointed
out that according to the petition of complainant, the accused persons
had falsely filed a complaint before the Deputy Registrar, Chits, who
dismissed the matter finally. The said complaint was not dismissed by
the Deputy Registrar on merits, but without any adjudication, inasmuch
as there was no finding that the complainant had lodged a false
complaint before the Deputy Registrar. The present complaint does not
relate to falsity or otherwise of the complaint before the Deputy
Registrar; rather according to the prosecution case, the accused
persons are said to have forged the document. This being the position,
in our view, the provisions of Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, shall have no
application to the case in hand. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the
view that the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the
respondents.”
16. Accordingly, in K. Vengadachalam supra, it is held that Section
195(1)(b)(ii) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ applies only when forgery is committed after a
document is produced in court; hence, it does not bar prosecution for forgery
committed prior to its filing. Similarly, Section 195(1)(a) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ is
inapplicable where the allegation is of forgery and not of filing a false
complaint, and therefore, the High Court erred in quashing the prosecution.
10
17. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of W.B., 6 at
paragraph No.12 held as under:
“12. Section 195 CrPC, on which the question raised is grounded,
provides, inter alia, that no court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under Sections 172 to 188IPC, except on the complaint in
writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to
whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a
complaint in writing of the public servant concerned no prosecution for
an offence under Section 182 can be taken cognizance of. It does not
further provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence
other distinct offences are committed, the Magistrate is debarred from
taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well. The allegations
made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand
these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public
servant or public justice, and on the other hand, they may also constitute
the offence of defamation or some other distinct offence. The section
does not per se bar the cognizance by the Magistrate of that offence,
even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report
has been made. It was however argued that if on the same facts an
offence of which no cognizance can be taken under the provisions of
Section 195 is disclosed and the same facts disclose another offence as
well which is outside the purview of the section and prosecution for that
other offence is taken cognizance of without the requirements of Section
195 having been fulfilled, then the provisions of that section would
become nugatory and if such a course was permitted those provisions
will stand defeated. It was further said that it is not permissible for the
prosecution to ignore the provisions of this section by describing the
offence as being punishable under some other section of the Penal
Code.”
18. Thus, in Basir-Ul-Huq supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟
mandates a written complaint by the concerned public servant for offences
under Sections 172-188 of „the IPC‟, but it does not bar cognizance of other
distinct offences arising from the same facts. However, its provisions cannot
be circumvented by disguising an offence covered under Section 195 as a
different offence to avoid the statutory bar.
19. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh7, wherein at
paragraph Nos.15 & 16 it is held as under:
6
(1953) 1 SCC 637
7
(1994) 4 SCC 95
11“15. On a scrutiny of Section 195(1)(a), we are of the view that a
successor in office of a public servant concerned will also fall within the
ambit of the expression „public servant concerned‟. Any other view
contrary to it will only create difficulties in certain situations. For
example, in a case where a public servant concerned promulgates a
preliminary order under Section 133, 145 or 146 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and is transferred or retires or ceases to be in office on any
account before a final order is passed, would it mean that the successor
who is under the law to continue the same proceeding has no right to file
a complaint if the preliminary order is disobeyed. The answer would be
that the successor in office can file a complaint. In every such situation,
one cannot expect the superior officer to whom the public servant is
administratively subordinate to file a complaint against the wrongdoers
disobeying either the preliminary order or the final order promulgated by
the public servant concerned.
16. Therefore, in the light of the dictum laid down in Ajaib Singh [AIR
1968 SC 1422 we are of the view that the successor in office of the
public servant gets into the same position of the public servant
concerned and he is in law eligible to file a complaint against
wrongdoers. To say in other words, the successor in office falls within
the ambit of the expression „public servant concerned‟. The view taken
by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and
accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal
is allowed.”
20. Consequently, in Mata Bhikh supra, it is held that a successor in office
of a public servant is also covered within the expression “public servant
concerned” under Section 195(1)(a) of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and is competent to file a
complaint. Therefore, the successor has the same legal authority as the
original officer, and the contrary view of the High Court is unsustainable.
21. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy 8 , at
paragraph No.8 it is held as under:
“8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold
that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for
which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of
a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not
possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the
offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure should be upheld.”
8
(1981) 2 SCC 185
12
22. Thus, in Hemareddy supra, it is held that where in the same
transaction, offences both covered and not covered under Section 195(1)(b) of
„the Cr.P.C.,‟ are committed, they cannot be split up for separate prosecution.
Accordingly, prosecution for offences outside Section 195(1)(b) cannot be
sustained independently when they are inseparably connected with offences
requiring a court complaint.
23. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh 9 , at
paragraph No.5 it is held as under:
“5. The learned counsel next contends that the complaint could only be
filed by the Magistrate before whom the original proceedings were taken.
He says that according to Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint in respect
of Sections 193, 195 and 211 IPC, can only be made by the Court in
which the proceedings out of which the offences arose took place. We
see no force in this contention. Section 559 enables a successor-in-
office of a Magistrate to file a complaint. The relevant portion of Section
559 reads as follows:
“559. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and
duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his
successor in office.
(2) When there is any doubt as to who is the successor in office of any
Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate in a Presidency town, and
the District Magistrate outside such towns, shall determine by order in
writing the Magistrate who shall, for the purposes of this Code or of any
proceedings or order thereunder, be deemed to be the successor in
office of such Magistrate.”
This section was substituted for the original Section 559 by the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (18 of 1923). Since the
amendment it has been held, and we think rightly, that a successor in
office of a Magistrate can file a complaint under Section 476, CrPC, in
respect of an offence under Section 195 IPC, committed before his
predecessor. (See Behram v. Beparor [27 Cr LJ 776] Bara
KanonManjhi v. GopiManjhi [AIR 1927 Pat 327] ; and In re
SubramaniamChettiar [AIR 1957 Mad 442] . This section applies to all
Magistrates and there is no reason why the plain terms of the section
should be cut down to limit it, as suggested by the learned counsel for
the appellant, to Magistrates whose courts are permanent. It seems to
us further clear that sub-section (2) has not the effect of limiting Section
559(1) Section 559(2) applies when there is a doubt as to who the
successor is, and that doubt can be resolved in the manner laid down in
sub-section (2). The sub-section does not mean, as contended by the
learned counsel, that until a successor is determined under sub-section
(2) there is no successor for the purposes of sub-section (1). If there is
9
1968 SCC OnLine SC 253
13
no doubt about who the successor is, then that person can exercise the
powers under sub-section (1). We accordingly hold that the complaint
was properly filed by Shri Joginder Singh “Karangarhia”, Magistrate.”
24. In light of the above, in Ajaib Singh supra, it is held that a successor
Magistrate is competent to file a complaint under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟
as Section 559 empowers a successor-in-office to exercise the powers and
duties of the predecessor. Therefore, a complaint filed by a successor
Magistrate is valid, and the contention that only the original Magistrate can file
it has no merit.
25. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni10, wherein at
para No.48, it is held as under:
“48. Equally important to remember is that if in the course of the same
transaction two separate offences are made out, for one of which
Section 195 CrPC is not attracted, and it is not possible to split them
up, the drill of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC must be followed. Thus, in State
of Karnataka v. Hemareddy [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981)
2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , this Court referred to a judgment of
the Madras High Court (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy, In re [V.V.L.
Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955
Mad 237] ) and approved its ratio as follows : (Hemareddy case [State
of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] ,
SCC pp. 190-91, paras 7-8)
“7. … In the third case, Somasundaram, J., has observed : (V.V.L.
Narasimhamurthy case [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC
OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955 Mad 237] , SCC OnLine Mad)
„The main point on which Mr JayaramaAyyar appearing for the
petitioner seeks to quash this committal is that on the facts an offence
under Section 193 IPC is disclosed for which the court cannot take
cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under Section
195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The first question which
arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the
complaint, an offence under Section 193 IPC is revealed. Section 193
reads as follows:
“193. Punishment for false evidence.–Whoever intentionally gives
false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false
evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial
proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description10
(2020) 20 SCC 1
14for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to
fine.”
“Fabrication of false evidence” is defined in Section 192. The relevant
portion of it is:
“Whoever causes any circumstance to exist intending that such
circumstance may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and that
such circumstance may cause any person who in such proceeding is to
form an opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion
touching any point material to the result of such proceeding is said “to
fabricate false evidence”.”
The effect of the allegations in the complaint preferred by the
complainant is that the petitioner has caused this will to come into
existence intending that such will may cause the Judge before whom
the suit is filed to form an opinion that the will is a genuine one and,
therefore, his minor daughter is entitled to the property. The allegation,
therefore, in the complaint will undoubtedly fall under Section 192 IPC.
It will, therefore, amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC i.e.
fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the judicial
proceeding. There is no doubt that the facts disclosed will also amount
to an offence under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. For prosecuting this
petitioner for an offence under Sections 467 and 471, a complaint by
the court may not be necessary as under Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a
complaint may be made only when it is committed by a party to any
proceeding in any court.
Mr JayaramaAyyar does not give up his contention that the petitioner,
though he appears only a guardian of the minor girl, is still a party to
the proceeding. But it is unnecessary to go into the question at the
present moment and I reserve my opinion on the question whether the
guardian can be a party to a proceeding or not, as this case can be
disposed of on the other point viz. that when the allegations amount to
an offence under Section 193 IPC, a complaint of court is necessary
under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC and this cannot be evaded by
prosecuting the accused for an offence for which a complaint of court is
not necessary.‟
8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold
that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence
for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a
complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are
committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of
the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.””
26. Therefore, in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd., supra, it is held that where, in
the same transaction, offences both attracting and not attracting Section 195
of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ arise and are inseparable, the mandate of Section 195(1)(b) of
„the Cr.P.C.,‟ must be followed. Such requirement cannot be avoided by
15prosecuting the accused for other offences for which a court complaint is not
required.
27. This Court in Kantamaneni Ravishankar v. State of A.P., 11 at para
No.86 held as under:
“86. Therefore, to register a crime against a person, who disobeyed the
ordinance, there must be a complaint from public servant about the
disobedience of ordinance. Hence, the very registration of crime for the
offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. is contrary to the
settled law laid down by the Apex Court and other High Courts
(referred supra) and the police officer is incompetent to register a crime
for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. on the complaint
of any other person other than a public servant and any other person,
who is authorized by pubic servant. Consequently, registration of crime
against the petitioner is vitiated by irregularity.”
28. Thus, in Kantamaneni Ravishankar supra, it is held that registration of
an offence under Section 188 of „the IPC‟ requires a complaint by the
concerned public servant, and any FIR registered by police on a complaint
from others is legally unsustainable and vitiated.
29. This Court, in Kollu Ravindra v. State of A.P12 has categorically held
that a complaint invoking offences under Sections 172 to 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟
must emanate from a “public servant” as envisaged under Sections 190 and
200 of „the Cr.P.C.‟ In the absence of such a statutory complaint, the learned
Magistrate is divested of the competence to take cognizance of the alleged
offence. The bar contained in Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ therefore, operates
as a clear embargo on the assumption of cognizance based merely on a
police report.
11
2020 SCC OnLine AP 726
12
2025 SCC OnLine AP 3870
16
30. This Court, further also held in Kanakamedala Ravindra Kumar v.
State of A.P 13 that when the allegations arise out of a single, indivisible
transaction giving rise to multiple offences, one falling squarely within the
ambit of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and another ostensibly outside its
sweep, such offences, being inextricably interwoven, cannot be artificially
segregated to bypass the statutory embargo. The Court has categorically held
that mere deletion of Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ from the charge sheet does
not efface the bar, for the factual substratum of the alleged act continues to be
integrally connected with the disobedience of a promulgated order, thereby
mandating a complaint by the competent public servant as required under
Section 195(1)(a) of „the Cr.P.C.‟
31. Considering the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in
C. Muniappan supra, the learned II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate,
Machilipatnam was not authorized to take cognizance in view of the embargo
under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.‟
32. Further, as per Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ there is a bar for taking
cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, both
inclusive of, „the I.P.C.,‟ unless there is a complaint in writing by the public
servant concerned.
33. In the instant case, there is no „complaint‟ by the public servant, and
there was only chargesheet filed under Section 188 of „the Cr.P.C.‟ The
„complaint‟ as contemplated under Section 190 read with 200 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟
13
Criminal Petition No: 987/2020
17
was not filed. When such a complaint was not filed, but based on the police
report, the learned Magistrate was not authorized to take cognizance of the
alleged offences, inasmuch as, under Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,‟ there is an
embargo for taking cognizance.
34. The Court, upon meticulous scrutiny of the record, found that the very
substratum of the prosecution rested upon an impermissible foundation.
Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ erects a jurisdictional bar against cognizance of
offences under Sections 172 to 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ except upon a written
complaint by the public servant concerned. In the present case, no such
statutory complaint was lodged, instead, cognizance was sought to be
assumed upon a police report. This procedural infirmity strikes at the root of
the prosecution, rendering the initiation of criminal proceedings wholly
incompetent and vitiated in law. The embargo under Section 195 of „the
Cr.P.C.,‟ is not a mere technicality but a substantive safeguard against
frivolous or malicious prosecutions, and its breach deprives the Magistrate of
jurisdiction ab initio.
35. It is manifest that the allegations contained in the FIR do not satisfy the
sine qua non of wrongful restraint as contemplated under Section 339 of „the
I.P.C.‟ The gravamen of the offence under Section 341 of „the I.P.C.,‟ is the
voluntary obstruction of a determinate individual from proceeding in a direction
in which he is legally entitled to move. A mere averment of inconvenience to
the public or disruption of traffic, without specification of any person so
restrained, falls short of the statutory requirement. In the absence of such
18
particulars, the invocation of Section 341 of „the I.P.C.,‟ is legally untenable
and cannot be sustained.
36. The inherent jurisdiction vested in this Court under Section 482 of „the
Cr.P.C.,‟ is designed to obviate abuse of the process of law and to secure the
ends of justice. Where cognizance is assumed upon a procedurally
impermissible foundation, as in the present case where the statutory embargo
under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ has been disregarded, the continuation of
proceedings would amount to oppressive harassment of the accused. The
Court is therefore enjoined to exercise its inherent powers to interdict such
proceedings at the incipient stage, lest the criminal process itself be reduced
to an instrument of injustice.
37. Undoubtedly, the preservation of public order and the regulation of civic
life are matters of paramount importance. Yet, the invocation of penal
consequences must be circumscribed by the statutory safeguards enacted by
the legislature. Demonstrations or political expressions, even if inconvenient,
cannot ipso facto be criminalized unless they fall squarely within the four
corners of the penal provisions. In the absence of a promulgated order by a
competent public servant and a complaint in writing as mandated under
Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ the liberty of the citizen must prevail over
prosecutorial zeal. The majesty of the rule of law demands scrupulous
adherence to these statutory preconditions before subjecting individuals to the
rigours of criminal trial.
19
38. Further, the Court observed that the allegations in the FIR, even if taken
at face value, do not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences
invoked. Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ requires disobedience of a lawful order
promulgated by a competent authority. Thus, the FIR is bereft of the sine qua
non for these offences, and continuation of proceedings would amount to an
abuse of process.
39. In culmination, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution was
unsustainable both on jurisdictional and substantive grounds. The absence of
a statutory complaint under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ the lack of
foundational ingredients for the alleged offences, and the taint of mala fides
collectively render the proceedings in FIR No.28 of 2017 an abuse of the
process of law.
40. Therefore, the proceedings against the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to
16, 18 and 19 in C.C.No. 822 of 2017 on the file of the learned Additional
Judicial First Class Magistrate, Amalapuram, are liable to be interfered and
quashed.
41. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed. Accordingly, the
proceedings against the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 16, 18 and 19 in
C.C.No. 822 of 2017 on the file of the learned Additional Judicial First Class
Magistrate, Amalapuram, are hereby quashed.
42. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed. There shall be no order as
to costs.
20
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
________________________
Dr.Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Date: 23.04.2026
SSA
21
176
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 6457 of 2024
Date: 23.04.2026
SSA
