Gyan Prakash Agarwal vs State Of U.P. And Another on 15 May, 2026

Allahabad High Court

Gyan Prakash Agarwal vs State Of U.P. And Another on 15 May, 2026

Author: Samit Gopal

Bench: Samit Gopal

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:114211
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 
 
APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 11311 of 2020   
 
   Gyan Prakash Agarwal    
 
  .....Applicant(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   State of U.P. and Another    
 
  .....Opposite Party(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Applicant(s)   
 
:   
 
Vikas Srivastava   
 
  
 
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)   
 
:   
 
G.A., Ram Prakash Dwivedi   
 
     
 
 Court No. - 75
 
   
 
 HON'BLE SAMIT GOPAL, J.    

Order on Amendment Application No. 11 of 2026

1. List revised.2. This is an application for amendment filed on behalf of the applicant for permitting amendment in the prayer of the petition.

3. At the very outset, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the said amendment application be dismissed as not pressed.

4. The prayer is allowed. The amendment application is dismissed as not pressed.

Order on petition

5. Heard Sri Vikas Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Ram Prakash Dwivedi, learned counsel for the informant-opposite party No.2 and Sri Ajay Singh, learned AGA-1 for the State, and perused the record.

6. This application under section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicant Gyan Prakash Agarwal for the following prayers:-

“It is therefore Most Respectfully prayed, that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to allow this application and set-aside the impugned order dated 06.04.2019, passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad, wherein the discharge application moved by the applicant in case crime no. 2600 of 2009, registered U/s. 420, 467, 468, 471 I.P.C. Police Station Indirapuram, District Ghaziabad, otherwise the applicant would suffer irreparable loss and injury.

It is further prayed that during pendency of the present application further proceeding of the criminal case no. 9306 of 2010, (State Vs. Gyan Prakash Agarwal and others), before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad, arising out of F.I.R. dated 27.10.2009, bearing case crime no. 2600 of 2009, registered U/s. 420, 467, 468, 471 I.P.C., Police Station Indirapuram, District Ghaziabad, may kindly be remain stayed.”

7. Jaipal Yadav had filed a petition before the Supreme Court being Writ Petition(Criminal) No. 504/2024 (Jaipal Yadav vs. State of UP and another), with the prayer that all the petitions be clubbed or consolidated and decided most expeditiously and the said petition was disposed of by order dated 16.12.2024 by the Honourable Apex Court, permitting him to approach Honourable the Chief Justice with an application, with the direction that it is expected that the same would be considered looking to the roster and pendency of the old cases. The said order reads as under:-

“……. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

Seven quashing petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are said to be pending before the Allahabad High Court.

The petitioner, by way of the present writ petition, seeks a direction that all those petitions to be clubbed or consolidate together and decided most expeditiously.

The petitioner for the above purpose may approach Hon’ble the Chief Justice of concerned High Court in accordance with the rules of the High Court.

Once, such an application is moved, it is expected that the Chief Justice would do the needful looking to the roster and the pendency of the other the other old cases.

The present petition is disposed of accordingly.Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”

8. In compliance of the order of the Apex Court, an application dated 7.1.2025 was moved by learned counsel for the applicant with the prayer to club or consolidate the application under section 482 petitions which were numbered to be nominated to a bench for its expeditious disposal. The said application was placed by the office along with its office report dated 15.1.2025 before Hon’ble the Chief Justice and by an order of the said date, the matters were directed to be clubbed and placed before this bench in the light of the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court dated 16.12.2024. This matter is thus before this court.

9. The facts of the case are that an FIR was lodged on 27.10.2009 by Smt. Sachina Sharma as case crime number 2600 of 2009 under section 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC, Police Station Indirapuram, District Ghaziabad against Gyan Prakash Agarwal, Alok Tyagi, Anuj Goel, Sandeep Manikala and Rakesh Shekhkaran with the allegation that they have made a forged and fictitious society and have got her deposited Rs. 2,50,000.00/- on the pretext of giving her a plot, but they have sold the plot at market rate to other person. The matter was investigated and a charge sheet number 1783 dated 29.12.2009 under section 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC was filed against all the accused, on which the court concerned took cognizance by the order dated 9.3.2010. The accused applicant then filed an application dated 22-11-2018 under section 239 Cr.P.C. for his discharge. The same was rejected vide order dated 6.4.2019 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad. Then, present application under section 482 Cr.P.C has thus been filed challenging the said order dated 6.4.2019.

10. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant has been falsely implicated in the present case. The dispute between the parties is purely civil in nature. It is further submitted that the applicant has no role in the society. Paragraph 12 of the affidavit has been placed before the court. Further, while placing paragraph 16 of the affidavit, it is submitted that FIR had been lodged on total false and fictitious ground by the opposite party No.2, just for harassment of the applicant. It is submitted that membership of the opposite party number 2 was terminated and she was suspended from primary membership of the society since 24.04.2006, as she had given wrong declaration and information while taking the membership. It is submitted further that the amount deposited by the opposite party No.2 has been returned to her vide cheque No. 412674 dated 24.4.2026, along with the letter of termination.

11. Judgment and order dated 31.7.2025 in the case of Urmilla Devi and others versus Balram & another, 2025 1NSC 915 of the Apex Court, order dated 15.10.2025 passed in application U/S 482 No. 10137 of 2019 (Gyan Prakash Agarwal versus State of UP & another), order dated 15.10.2025 passed in Application U/S 482 No.11304 of 2020(Virendra Prakash Upadhyaya and two others versus State of UP and another), order dated 15.10.2025 passed in Application U/S 482 No. 23970 of 2018 (Jai Pal Yadav and two others versus State of UP and another) and order dated 15.10.2025 passed in Application U/S 482 No. 23967 of 2018 (Jai Pal Yadav and 2 others vs. State of U.P. & another) by this court have been placed to buttress his said submissions. It is submitted that the instant application be allowed and the order impugned be set aside and applicant be discharged.

12. Learned counsel for opposite party No.2 opposed the present petition vehemently and submitted while placing paragraph 23 of his counter affidavit dated 14.9.2025 that no money was returned to the opposite party No.2 as has been mentioned in paragraph 16 of the affidavit. It is further submitted that in paragraph 21 of the counter affidavit, the content that the applicant is never concerned in any manner with the case in paragraph 12 of the affidavit in support of application U/S 482, is denied. Further it is submitted that insofar as the argument regarding the dispute being civil in nature is concerned, same was considered by another bench of this court in Criminal Misc. Application U/S 482 No. 11251 of 2010 (Gyan Prakash Agarwal and others versus State of UP and others) and vide order dated 17.04.2019 prayer for quashing all the proceedings of the said case was refused. It is submitted that said petition was filed to quash proceedings of the present case. The said order has been placed before the Court, which is CA-2 to the counter-affidavit. The said order reads as under:

“Heard learned counsel for the parties and learned AGA appearing for the State.

The applicants, through the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court with the prayer that the proceeding of case no. 9306/2010, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 I.P.C., P.S. Indrapuram, District Ghaziabad, pending before the Court below, be quashed.

It is contended by learned counsel for the applicants that the matter pertains to purely civil dispute and the applicants have been dragged maliciously into criminal offence and the police without proper investigation charge sheeted the applicants.It is next contended that report has been lodged after a lapse of about 6 years of the alleged incident for which no plausible explanation has been given by the prosecution. The opposite party no.2 had fraudulently obtained membership of Cooperative Society by furnishing wrong declaration and information and the Management Committee had terminated her membership. It is further contended that in a very similar and identical matter the charge sheet was challenged before this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No.10913 of 2008 in which the Court had stayed the proceeding vide order dated 4.7.2008, which is annexed as Annexure-6 to the affidavit.

The contention of learned counsel for the applicants is that no offence against the applicants is disclosed and the present prosecution has been instituted with a malafide intention for the purposes of harassment. He pointed out certain documents and statements in support of his contention.

From the perusal of the material on record and looking into the facts of the case at this stage it cannot be said that no offence is made out against the applicants. All the submission made at the bar relates to the disputed question of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon by this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. At this stage only prima facie case is to be seen in the light of the law laid down by Supreme Court in cases of R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866, State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426, State of Bihar Vs. P.P.Sharma, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 192 and lastly Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Vs. Mohd. Saraful Haq and another (Para-10) 2005 SCC (Cr.) 283. The disputed defence of the accused cannot be considered at this stage.

Moreover, the applicants have got a right of discharge under section 239 or 227/228 Cr.P.C. through their counsel as the case may be by moving a proper application for the said purpose and they are free to take all the submissions in the said discharge application before the trial court.

The prayer for quashing the proceedings of the aforesaid case pending before the court concerned is refused.

With the aforesaid directions, this application is finally disposed off.”

13. It is submitted by learned counsel for opposite party No.2 that since the argument regarding matter being of civil dispute is concerned, was considered by another coordinate bench of this court, and it is found that the same cannot be considered at this stage, it is submitted that the present petition be dismissed.

14. Learned AGA for the State also opposed the present petition.

15. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, it is evident that this petition has been filed against an order rejecting the discharge application of the applicant. Earlier, the applicant and other co-accused had filed a petition U/S 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of proceedings on the same ground which was refused. The law with regards to discharge of accused and framing of charge is well settled. An accused can also be discharged as per Section 227, 239 Cr.P.C. They reads as under:

?Section 227. Discharge – If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.?

?Section 239. Discharge ? If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for doing so.?

16. The Apex Court, in the case of Sajjan Kumar Vs. C.B.I. : (2010) 9 SCC 368, held that at the time of framing of charge, the Court has to look at all the material placed before it and determine whether a prima faciecase is made out or not, and the court is not required to consider the evidentiary value of the evidence as any question of admissibility or reliability of evidence is a matter of trial. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:

?21. On consideration of the authorities about scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”

17. In Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander : (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Apex Court enlisted certain principles with reference to exercise of power under Section 397 and Section 482 of Cr.P.C. by the Courts while deciding as to whether the charges framed against an accused be quashed or not. The principles listed are as under:

?27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ?civil wrong? with no ?element of criminality? and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.

27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed with by the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.

27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance to the requirements of the offence.?

18. In the case of Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency : (2019) 7 SCC 148, it was reiterated by the Apex Court that the trial court is not supposed to divulge the evidence on the record to determine whether the accused would get acquitted or convicted if a particular charge is framed against an accused. The relevant portion of the observation of the court in the case is as under:

?18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.?

19. Further, in the case of Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 the Apex Court has reiterated that during the stage of charge, the court must not conduct a mini-trial and the decision should be based on the prima facie appreciation of the materials placed on record. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as under:

?19. It is, thus, clear that while considering the discharge application, the Court is to exercise its judicial mind to determine whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the Court is not to hold the mini trial by marshalling the evidence.?

20. The Apex Court in Bhawna Bai Vs. Ghanshyam : (2020) 2 SCC 217, has observed as under:?

?13. ?At the time of framing the charges, only prima facie case is to be seen; whether case is beyond reasonable doubt, is not to be seen at this stage. At the stage of framing the charge, the court has to see if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. While evaluating the materials, strict standard of proof is not required; only prima facie case against the accused is to be seen.?

21. In M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs. CBI : (2020) 2 SCC 768, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while discussing the principles to be followed while dealing with an application seeking discharge, observed as under:

?i. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.

ii. The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.

iii. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court.

iv. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, ?cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.

v. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.

vi. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.

vii. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.

viii. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused??

22. The Apex Court, in the case of Tarun Jit Tejpal v. State of Goa : (2020) 17 SCC 556 has considered the scope and law with regards to discharge of an accused and held as under:

?8. Now, so far as the prayer of the appellant to discharge him and the submissions made by Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Advocate on merits are concerned, the law on the scope at the stage of Sections 227/228 CrPC is required to be considered.

8.1. In N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] this Court had an occasion to consider in detail the scope of the proceedings at the stage of framing of the charge under Sections 227/228 CrPC. After considering earlier decisions of this Court on the point, thereafter in paras 29 to 31 this Court has observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 721-23)

?29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.

30. Reference in this connection can be made to a recent decision of this Court in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P. [Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21] , in which, after analysing various decisions on the point, this Court endorsed the following view taken in Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507] : (Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat case [Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21] , SCC p. 482, para 15)

?15. ? ?11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.? (Onkar Nath case [Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507] , SCC p. 565, para 11).?

31. Now reverting to the decisions of this Court in Sajjan Kumar [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] and Dilawar Balu Kurane [Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310] , relied on by the respondents, we are of the opinion that they do not advance their case. The aforesaid decisions consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial. It is worth mentioning that the Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is evident that they contain somewhat different provisions with regard to discharge of an accused:

31.1. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to discharge the accused if it ?considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused?. However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when ?the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless?. The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, ?the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction?.

31.2. Sections 227 and 239 provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. However, the stage of discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken.

31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these provisions. But, in our opinion, notwithstanding these differences, and whichever provision may be applicable, the court is required at this stage to see that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. Reference in this connection can be made to a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1986) 2 SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 256] . The same reads as follows: (SCC pp. 755-56, para 43)

?43. ? Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of ?prima facie? case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections, the legal position is that if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.? ?

(emphasis in original)

8.2. In the subsequent decision in S. Selvi [State v. S. Selvi, (2018) 13 SCC 455 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 710] this Court has summarised the principles while framing of the charge at the stage of Sections 227/228 CrPC. This Court has observed and held in paras 6 and 7 as under: (SCC pp. 458-59)

?6. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of judgments including Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra [Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310] , Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , State v. A. Arun Kumar [State v. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC 417 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 96 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 505] , Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta [Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265] , State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2003) 2 SCC 711 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 688] , Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya [Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47] and Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 of the Code in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his rights to discharge the accused. The Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the statements and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the materials as if he was conducting a trial.

7. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] , this Court on consideration of the various decisions about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, laid down the following principles: (SCC pp. 376-77, para 21)

?(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.? ?

8.3. In Mauvin Godinho [Mauvin Godinho v. State of Goa, (2018) 3 SCC 358 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 63 : (2018) 1 SCC (L&S) 591] this Court had an occasion to consider how to determine prima facie case while framing the charge under Sections 227/228 CrPC. In the same decision this Court observed and held that while considering the prima facie case at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227 CrPC there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

8.4. At this stage the decision of this Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad [Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] is also required to be referred to. In that aforesaid decision this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of enquiry at the stage of deciding the matter under Sections 227/228 CrPC. In paras 11 to 14 observations of this Court in the aforesaid decision are as under: (SCC pp. 719-21)

?11. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having bearing on the contentions urged for the parties, provides:

?227. Discharge.?If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.?

12. Section 228 requires the Judge to frame charge if he considers that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The interaction of these two sections has already been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] , Untwalia, J., while explaining the scope of the said sections observed : [SCC pp. 41-42, para 4 : SCC (Cri) pp. 535-36 : SCR p. 259]

?4. ? Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.?

13. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , Fazal Ali, J., summarised some of the principles : [SCC p. 9, para 10 : SCC (Cri) pp. 613-14 : SCR pp. 234-35]

?(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused had been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.?

14. These two decisions do not lay down different principles. Prafulla Kumar case [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] has only reiterated what has been stated in Ramesh Singh case [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] . In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that ?the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused?. The ?ground? in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into.?

8.5. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and considering the scope of enquiry at the stage of framing of the charge under Sections 227/228 CrPC, we are of the opinion that the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on merits, at this stage, are not required to be considered. Whatever submissions are made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant are on merits are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the course of the trial. Some of the submissions may be considered to be the defence of the accused. Some of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the trial. The same are not required to be considered at this stage of framing of the charge. On considering the material on record, we are of the opinion that there is more than a prima facie case against the accused for which he is required to be tried. There is sufficient ample material against the accused and therefore the learned trial court has rightly framed the charge against the accused and the same is rightly confirmed by the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for.?

23. The Apex Court decision in State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok Kumar Kashyap : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 314, held that the at the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, a mini trial is not permissible. The Court observed that the position of law that emerges is that at the stage of discharge/framing of charge, the Judge is merely required to take note of the material on record in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

24. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok Kumar Kashyap : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 314, the Apex Court held that the evaluation of evidence on merits is not permissible at the stage of considering the application for discharge. At the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, a mini trial is not permissible. It has been held as under:

?23. In the case of P. Vijayan (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 Cr.P.C., if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.?

25. Further the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Pratima Mohanty : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1222 decided on 11 December 2021, has comprehensively dealt with the powers exercisable and extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court while deciding a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. It has been held as under:

?16. It is trite that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and in rare cases. As per settled proposition of law while examining an FIR/complaint quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of allegations made in the FIR/complaint. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than any ordinary rule. Normally the criminal proceedings should not be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when after a thorough investigation the charge-sheet has been filed. At the stage of discharge and/or considering the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the courts are not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or evidence in detail as if conducing the mini-trial. As held by this Court the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.?

26. In the case of State Through Deputy Superintendentof Police Vs. R. Soundirarasu : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1150 the Apex Court has held as under:

?75. The ambit and scope of exercise of power under Sections 239 and 240 of the CrPC, are therefore fairly well settled. The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be ?groundless?. The Section mandates that the Magistrate shall discharge the accused recording reasons, if after (i) considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173, (ii) examining the accused, if necessary, and (iii) giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, he considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, i.e., either there is no legal evidence or that the facts are such that no offence is made out at all. No detailed evaluation of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences need be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be undertaken at this stage – the only consideration at the stage of Section 239/240 is as to whether the allegation/charge is groundless.

76. This would not be the stage for weighing the pros and cons of all the implications of the materials, nor for sifting the materials placed by the prosecution the exercise at this stage is to be confined to considering the police report and the documents to decide whether the allegations against the accused can be said to be ?groundless?.

77. The word ?ground? according to the Black’s Law Dictionary connotes foundation or basis, and in the context of prosecution in a criminal case, it would be held to mean the basis for charging the accused or foundation for the admissibility of evidence. Seen in the context, the word ?groundless? would connote no basis or foundation in evidence. The test which may, therefore, be applied for determining whether the charge should be considered groundless is that where the materials are such that even if unrebutted, would make out no case whatsoever.?

27. In the case of Manendra Prasad Tiwari Vs. Amit Kumar Tiwari : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1057, the Apex Court has explained the well-settled law on exercise of powers under Section 397 and 482 Cr.P.C. as under:

?21. The law is well settled that although it is open to a High Court entertaining a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC or a revision application under Section 397 of the CrPC to quash the charges framed by the trial court, yet the same cannot be done by weighing the correctness or sufficiency of the evidence. In a case praying for quashing of the charge, the principle to be adopted by the High Court should be that if the entire evidence produced by the prosecution is to be believed, would it constitute an offence or not. The truthfulness, the sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced at the time of framing of a charge can be done only at the stage of trial. To put it more succinctly, at the stage of charge the Court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused person. It is also well settled that when the petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 CrPC or a revision Petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the CrPC seeking for the quashing of charge framed against him, the Court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the process of the Court a charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the trial court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans exceptional cases.

22. The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC has been time and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to focus on the material and form an opinion whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which if put to trial, could prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at which stage the final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure

23. Section 397 CrPC vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding.?

28. In the case of Kanchan Kumar Vs. State of Bihar : (2022) 9 SCC 577 the Apex Court while considering the judgement in the case of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel Vs. State of Gujarat summarised the principles on discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. and held as follows:

?15. Summarising the principles on discharge under Section 227 CrPC, in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat [Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361] , this Court recapitulated : (SCC p. 561, para 23)

?23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence.?

(emphasis supplied)?

29. Thus, the position of law that emerges is that at the stage of discharge/framing of charge, the Court is merely required to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused i.e. whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused. The defence of the accused cannot be looked into at this stage.

30. Looking to the facts of the case, the prima facie allegation against the applicant and the law as stated above, no case for interference is made out. The present application under Section 528 BNS/482 Cr.P.C. is thus dismissed.

31. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

(Samit Gopal,J.)

May 15, 2026

P.P.