Delhi District Court
Hvr Solar Pvt Ltd vs Quikpower Industries India Llp on 4 July, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. DEVENDER KUMAR JANGALA,
DISTRICT JUDGE (COMMERCIAL COURT)-01,
NORTH WEST, ROHINI, NEW DELHI
CS (COMM) No.795/22
CNR NO.DLNW010101602022
HVR SOLAR PVT. LTD.
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR/AR,
SHRI RISHABH AGGARWAL
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT: C-9,
PUSHPANJALI ENCLAVE, PITAMPURA,
NEW DELHI-110034
...PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
1) QWIKPOWER INDUSTRIES INDIA LLP
THROUGH ITS PARTNER(S)/AR
2) MR. VIPIN GOYAL
PARTNER, QWIKPOWER INDUSTRIES INDIA LLP
3) MR. CHHOTU RAM GOYAL
PARTNER, QWIKPOWER INDUSTRIES INDIA LLP
4) MS. SANGEETA DEVI
PARTNER, QWIKPOWER INDUSTRIES INDIA LLP
ALL THE DEFENDANTS ARE AT:
7-3, 123/3, OLD KURNOOL ROAD,
TELANAGANA NGOS COLONY,
KATEDAN INDUSTRIAL AREA,
HYDERABAD, TELANGANA-500077
AND ALSO AT: 7-3-123/5/D,
BALAJI NAGAR, GAGAN PAHAD,
RAJENDRA NAGAR MANDAL,
HYDERABAD, TELANGANA-500077
Digitally signed
by DEVENDER
DEVENDER KUMAR
KUMAR CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022
JANGALA HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 1/40
JANGALA Date:
2026.07.04
16:31:05 +0530
SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF RS.84,47,616.38/- (RUPEES EIGHTY
FOUR LAKHS FORTY SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SIXTEEN AND THIRTY EIGHT PAISE ONLY) ALONG WITH
PENDENT LITE AND FUTURE INTEREST
Date of institution of Suit : 13.10.2022
Date of final arguments : 21.05.2026
Date of Judgment : 04.07.2026
JUDGMENT
1. By this judgment, I shall adjudicate upon the suit of the
plaintiff filed for recovery of Rs.84,47,616.38/- alongwith
pendentelite and future interest.
2.1 Brief facts: The facts of the case in brief as per plaint are that
the plaintiff is a private company under the name and style of HVR
Solar Pvt Ltd. That the plaintiff deals in manufacture and trade of
solar modules, batteries and other ancillary items. The present suit
has been filed by the plaintiff through Mr. Rishabh Aggarwal who is
stated to be one of the Director/Authorised representative of the
plaintiff organization.
2.2 It is stated that the defendant no. 1 is a business set up under
the name and style of Qwikpower Industries India LLP and the
defendants no. 2 to 4 are partner(s) and authorized representatives of
defendant no. 1. It is stated that since the year 2020, defendants have
regularly approached the plaintiff and placed multiple orders for
supply of goods i.e., batteries. That the plaintiff sold/supplied the
goods to defendants and upon the sale of goods, plaintiff issued tax
invoices upon the defendants. That the plaintiff regularly generated
E-Way Bills, filed Goods and Services Tax returns including GSTR-1
and paid Goods and Services Tax (GST) to the government as per
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 2/40
law. That the goods supplied by the plaintiff to the defendants were
accepted by the defendants upon their full satisfaction and they have
neither raised any objection nor returned any goods supplied to them
by the plaintiff.
2.3 It is stated that in lieu of supply of goods, the defendants
promised the plaintiff to pay the consideration amount on the date of
generation of corresponding invoice(s). That however, the defendants
have failed to discharge their liability. That the plaintiff regularly
demanded its money. It is stated that on 12.01.2022, the defendants
made their last payment amounting to Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees One
Lakh Fifty Thousand Only) to the plaintiff and thereafter, they have
failed to pay any amount and discharge their liability.
2.4 It is stated that the plaintiff in normal course of business
maintains the ledger account of defendants and as per the ledger
account maintained by the plaintiff, a sum of Rs. 67,33,985.38/-
(Rupees Sixty Seven Lakhs Thirty Three Thousands Nine Hundred
Eighty Five And Thirty Eight Paise Only) remained outstanding. That
the plaintiff repeatedly approached the defendants telephonically and
demanded the remaining amount, however, they have failed to
discharge their liability.
2.5 It is stated that the plaintiff also got a legal notice dated
25.05.2022 served upon the defendants through registered Speed Post
and demanded the outstanding amount along with interest @ 18% per
annum and Rs. 21,000/- (Rupees Twenty One Thousand Only)
towards the legal expenses from the defendants. That the defendants
despite service of legal notice have failed to pay the entire
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 3/40
outstanding amount.
2.6 It is stated that on 19.08.2021, the plaintiff had issued the last
invoice upon the defendants but they have failed to discharge their
entire liability towards the said invoices without any plausible cause
or reason. That as per trade practice, usage prevailing in the market
and as per terms of contract the defendants are liable to pay pre-
litigation interest amounting to Rs.13,63,631/- i.e. @ 18% per
annum.
2.7 It is stated that on 12.01.2022, defendants have made the part
payment to the plaintiff towards the supply of goods and
acknowledged their liability, therefore, the suit of the plaintiff is
within the period of limitation. That the cause of action arose on each
and every occasion when contracts for sale of goods were concluded
between the parties. That it further arose on each and every occasion
when plaintiff supplied the goods upon the defendants and invoices
were issued. That it further arose on each and every occasion when
defendants have failed to make the payment of outstanding dues and
the defendants received the payment reminders and they have failed
to pay the outstanding amount to the plaintiff. That it further arose
when the legal notice dated 25.05.2022, was served upon the
defendants and they have failed to make the payment to the plaintiff.
That the defendants have been failing to pay the outstanding amount
along with interest and other costs, hence the cause of action is still
subsisting and continuing.
2.8 It is stated that the present contract for sale of goods was
concluded telephonically at Pushpanjali, Pitampura, North West,
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 4/40
Delhi between the parties.. That the goods were supplied by the
plaintiff from Delhi to the defendants. That in lieu of supply of
goods, invoices were generated by the plaintiff upon the defendant at
Pushpanjali, Pitampura, North West, Delhi. That the defendants have
made part payment towards the invoices in question to the bank
account of plaintiff maintained at Pushpanjali, Pitampura, North
West, Delhi. That it was orally agreed between the parties that the
dispute, if any arises out of the contract will be subject to Delhi
jurisdiction only and the address of the plaintiff is located within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. That thus, this Court has
jurisdiction to try and entertain the present suit.
2.9 It is prayed that the decree for a sum of Rs.67,33,985.38/-
(Rupees Sixty Seven Lakhs Thirty Three Thousand Nine Hundred
Eighty Five and Thirty Eight Paise Only) towards the outstanding
may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also
prayed for a sum of Rs.13,63,631/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs Sixty
Three Thousand Six Hundred and Thirty One only) towards the pre-
litigation interest calculated @ 18% per annum and further the
pendent lite and future interest @ 18% per annum on the outstanding
amount starting from the date of institution of suit till realization. The
plaintiff has also prayed that for grant of a sum of Rs.3,50,000/-
(Rupees Three Lakhs Fifty Thousand Only) towards the legal
expenses and also for the costs of the suit.
3. Vide order dated 13.10.2022, the summons of the suit
were issued to the defendants. The defendants on being served put
the appearance and filed separate written statements.
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 5/40
WRITTEN STATEMENT
4.1 The defendant no.1 firm has filed the written statement
through its partner Mr. Vipin Goyal. It is stated that the suit has been
filed with malafide and dishonest intention with a sole motive to
cause unlawful gains. That the suit of the plaintiff is based on wrong
concocted story. That the reliefs claimed under the present Suit are
false, vague, misconceived, baseless, frivolous and based on the
whims and surmises of the Plaintiff and as such the present Suit is
liable to be dismissed with heavy cost.
4.2 It is stated that the present suit is an abuse of the process
of law as the amount claimed in the present Suit is unjustified, illegal,
unfair, and untenable in the eyes of law. That the Plaintiff has
concealed a series of facts from the court. That the suit is evidently
vexatious in nature and also reflects the malicious intentions of the
Plaintiff.
4.3 It is stated that the goods provided by the Plaintiff were
defective and of poor quality and therefore, the defendant made
numerous repeated requests with respect to the same and despite the
repeated requests for supply of better products, the plaintiff ignored
them, causing the business relationship to deteriorate between the
parties. That the defendants complained about receiving defective
batteries time and again and the Plaintiff also assured to fix the
situation. That however, the plaintiff did not follow the promises,
leading to cause immense hardship to the defendants. That the
Defendants also attempted to communicate with the Plaintiff multiple
times, expressing their grievances about the continuous supply of
defective batteries and the Plaintiff assured them that they would
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 6/40
resolve the issue, but their actions didn’t match their words. That the
defendants faced significant challenges due to the sub-par goods they
received and these products not only failed to meet industry standards
but also affected their ability to satisfy their own customers.
4.4 It is stated that since the plaintiff did not take any action
on time, the Defendant lost most of its orders and suffered huge
business losses and the said grievance was put forth by the Defendant
to the Plaintiff and it is only when the defendant continuously
followed up and pursued its grievances with the Plaintiff, a
settlement was arrived between the parties in which the Plaintiff
agreed to compensate the Defendant and pay Rs.6.6 lakhs to the
defendant for the losses incurred due to the supply of defective
batteries. That in the WhatsApp chat between the Plaintiff and the
defendant, it can be clearly seen that the plaintiff is not asking for any
money from the Defendant but in fact, the plaintiff is agreeing to pay
to the defendant and this clearly shows that the defendant is not liable
to pay anything to the Plaintiff. The averments on merits are denied
in toto. It is prayed that the suit may kindly be dismissed.
4.5 The perusal of the separate written statements of other
defendants i.e., defendants no.2 to 4 shows that the contentions are
almost same as those of the defendant no.1 firm. The defendants no.2
has further pleaded that he holds a 50 percent contribution in the total
capital of Defendant No.1, which amounts to Rs.1,00,000/- and as an
LLP Partner with a 50 percent capital contribution, the defendant
no.2’s liability is expressly limited to that specific proportion of the
total capital, i.e., Rs.50,000/-.
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 7/40
4.6 It is further stated by the defendants no.2 to 4 that an
LLP is considered a distinct legal entity separate from its Partners,
and this legal separation implies that the Partnership’s obligations and
liabilities should be borne by the LLP itself rather than falling solely
on the partners. That the concept of limited liability shields partners
from bearing liabilities beyond their proportionate contribution, and
this limited liability framework is a core characteristic of LLPs,
ensuring that the partners are not personally liable for any debts or
obligations of the partnership LLP.
4.7 The defendant no.4 has further pleaded that she is not a
partner of Defendant No.1 as of now and the plaintiff has wrongly
impleaded her in the present Suit for the purpose of harassing,
humiliating and victimising.
5. After completion of pleadings of parties, following issues were
framed vide order dated 17.11.2025:-
1. Whether the plaintiff has supplied sub-standard and
defective goods to the defendant? (OPD)
2. Whether a settlement was arrived between the plaintiff and
defendant, whereby the plaintiff has agreed to compensate the
defendant for a sum of Rs.6,60,000/-, if so, its effect ? (OPD)
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of
Rs.67,33,985.38/- towards the goods supplied to the defendant
through invoices? (OPP)
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for pre institution interest of
Rs. 13,63,631/-.
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for pendente-lite and future
interest, if so? At what rate and for which period? (OPP)CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 8/40
6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the legal expenses of the
cost of litigation? (OPP)
7. Relief
6. After framing of issues, the matter was fixed for evidence of
the parties. In view of powers under order XV A Rule 6(o) and (p)
CPC, the evidence of the parties was directed to be recorded on
commission basis by Ms. Yashika Arora, Advocate.
PLAINTIFF EVIDENCE
7. Before the Ld. Local Commissioner, Sh. Rishabh Aggarwal,
AR of the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1. He tendered his
evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. In his affidavit Ex. PW1/A,
the PW-1 has reiterated the averments made in the plaint and relied
upon the following documents:-
1. Copy of Board resolution dated 20.05.2022 Ex.PW-1/1.
2. Copy of Invoices Ex. PW-1/2 (Colly).
3. Copy of Transportation Receipts Mark “A”.
4. Copy of E-way Bills along with the Certificate U/s 65B of Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 Ex. PW-1/4 (Colly).
5. Copy of GSTR-1 (particularly of defendant) downloaded from the
GST portal along with the Certificate U/s 65B of Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 Ex. PW-1/5(Colly).
6. The copy of ledger maintained by the plaintiff along with the
Certificate U/s 65B of India Evidence Act, 1872 Ex. PW-1/6.
7. Copy of legal notice dated 25.05.2022 Ex.PW-1/7.
8. Copy of speed post receipts Ex. PW-1/8 (Colly).
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 9/40
9. Copy of tracking report along with the Certificate U/s 65B of
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Ex. PW-1/9 (Colly).
10. Copy of Non-Starter Report is exhibited as Ex. PW-1/10.
11.Copy of bank account statement of the plaintiff along with the
certificate U/s 65B of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are exhibited as Ex.
PW-1/11 (Colly).
8. PW-1 was cross-examined at length by Ld. Counsel for
defendant. No other witness was examined on behalf of plaintiff and
PE was closed vide statement/order dated 07.01.2026.
DEFENDANT EVIDENCE
9. The defendants in support of their case have examined
Sh. Vipin Goyal as DW1. He tendered his evidence by way of
affidavit Ex. DW1/A. DW1 has relied upon the following
documents:-
a. Authority Letter EX.DW-1/1.
b. Partnership Deed dated 25.06.2019 is marked as Mark-A.
c. Supplementary/Amended Partnership Deed dated 04.03.2021 is
marked as Mark-B.d. WhatsApp Chat Screenshots are exhibited as EX-DW-1/2.
10. DW1 was cross-examined at length by Ld.counsel for
plaintiff. No other witness was examined on behalf of defendant. In
view of submissions and statement dated 30.01.2026, DE was closed.
FINAL ARGUMENTS:
11. I have already heard the arguments at length advanced by Sh.
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 10/40
Ishu Bansal, Ld.counsel for plaintiff and Sh. Shubham Jain,
Ld.counsel for defendant.
12. It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendants have
failed to discharge their admitted liability towards the goods duly
supplied against tax invoices, E Way Bills and GST returns, all of
which stand corroborated by the defendants’ own admissions in cross
examination regarding receipt of goods, availing of input tax credit
and payments running into over Rs. 6.5 crores. That the defence of
defective supply is a bald and belated afterthought, unsupported by
any written complaint, debit note or laboratory report, and that the
alleged settlement rests solely upon an uncertified WhatsApp chat
which the defendants’ own witness was unable to locate on the
judicial record, rendering it both inadmissible and unreliable. It is
prayed that the plaintiff be granted a decree for the principal amount
along with pre suit, pendente lite and future interest, and the legal
expenses and costs of the suit, as claimed.
13. On the other hand, it is argued on behalf of defendants that the
batteries supplied by the plaintiff were repeatedly defective,
substandard, and failed to meet industry standards. That despite
several complaints and requests for replacement or supply of better-
quality products, the plaintiff allegedly failed to rectify the defects,
causing deterioration of business relations between the parties. That
the defective batteries resulted in customer dissatisfaction, loss of
business orders, and substantial financial losses. It is further argued
that after continuous follow-up, a settlement was reached whereby
the plaintiff agreed to compensate the defendants for the losses
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 11/40
suffered and pay a sum of Rs. 6.60 lakhs and the said fact is
established from the WhatsApp record. That the defendants deny any
outstanding liability towards the plaintiff and pray for dismissal of
the suit.
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS:
14. I have considered the submissions made by Ld. Counsel
for plaintiffs and perused the entire material on record.
15. It is settled position of law that in civil proceedings, the
standard of proof is governed by the principle of preponderance of
probabilities. The court is not required to attain absolute certainty,
rather, it must assess whether, on the basis of the material on record,
one version appears more probable than the other. If the evidence
leads the court to conclude that a fact is more likely than not to have
occurred, the burden of proof stands discharged. However, where the
probabilities are evenly balanced, the party bearing the burden must
fail.
16. This standard is not uniform in its application and may
admit of varying degrees depending upon the nature and gravity of
the subject-matter involved. In cases involving serious allegations or
grave consequences, the court is expected to exercise greater caution
and require a higher degree of probability, though still within the civil
standard. Thus, while proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required,
the evidence must inspire sufficient confidence to persuade the court
that the version advanced is reasonably probable and worthy of
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 12/40
acceptance.
17. Thus, proof of a fact depends upon the probability of its
existence. The finding of the court must be based on the test of a
prudent person, who acts under the supposition that a fact exists and
in the context and circumstances of a particular case. (See “proved”
under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 2(1)(j)
of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023).
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha
Ranjan Debbarma, decided on 04.01.2023, reported as (2023) 19
SCC 782 stated that the proving of a fact is to be based on the person
who asserts it in terms of Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (Section 104 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023). The
relevant porition of Smriti Debbarma (supra) is reproduced below:
“37. The burden of proof to establish a title in the present case lies
upon the plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who asserts the
existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which she claims
relief. (See Addagada Raghavamma (supra). This is mandated in terms of
Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which states that burden of proving the
fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative and not
on the party which is denying it. This rule may not be universal and has
exceptions, but in the factual background of the present case, the general
principle is applicable. In terms of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, if
both parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail. Onus of proof, no
doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of
evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the
plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the
onus on the defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of
proof lies on the plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to
prove title. (See Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami &
V.P. Temple, (2003) 8 SCC 752). The weakness of the defence cannot be
a justification to decree the suit. (See Union of India v. Vasavi Coop.
Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 66).”
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 13/40
19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chowdamma v. Venkatappa,
decided on 25.08.2025, reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1814
discussed the difference between burden of proof and onus of proof.
The relevant paras of Chowdamma (supra) are extracted as follows:
“BURDEN OF PROOF AND ONUS OF PROOF
43. This Court in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh (2006) 5 SCC 558,
observed thus:
“19. There is another aspect of the matter which should be
borne in mind. A distinction exists between burden of proof and
onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It
assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of
onus of proof has greater force, where the question is, which party
is to begin. Burden of proof is used in three ways: (i) to indicate
the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition
at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a
proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an
indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the
others. The elementary rule in Section 101 is inflexible. In terms
of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he
discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a
relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those
circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the
same.”
44. Also, in Addagada Raghavamma (supra), this Court observed
as follows:
“12. … There is an essential distinction between burden of
proof and onus of proof : burden of proof lies upon the person
who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof
shifts. …Such considerations, having regard to the circumstances
of a particular case, may shift the onus of proof. Such a shifting of
onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. …” ”
(Emphasis supplied in bold)
20. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Ashish Tewari vs. G.P. Tewari
& Anr., decided on 24.04.2026, reported as 2026:DHC:3411 on
Section 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act, 1872 observed as under:
“59. In terms of Sections 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(hereinafter ‘Evidence Act‘), the burden of proof lies on the party who
asserts the existence of a fact and seeks relief on that basis. The initial
onus, therefore, was on the plaintiff to establish his entitlement toCS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 14/40
rendition of accounts by placing on record cogent evidence in support of
his claim that the suit properties were purchased by Sh. J.P. Tewari from
the sale of ancestral lands in the village which he has failed to discharge.
It is only upon discharge of such initial burden that the onus would shift
to the defendants to rebut the same. Consequently, the burden never
shifted upon the defendants. It was not for the defendants to prove that
the suit properties were purchased from the personal income and savings
of Sh. J.P. Tewari. Reference in this regard may be to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558 .”
(Emphasis supplied in Bold)
21. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Smt. Chaman Lata Bhardwaj
& Ors. vs. Smt. Nirmal Devi, decided on 12.05.2026, reported as
2026:DHC:4173 laid down as under:
“38. A mere plea of forgery taken by the Appellants, without any
particulars, proof, or even an attempt at cross-examination, cannot
displace documentary evidence proved through primary witnesses and
supported by bank records and cheque return memos. Once execution of
Loan Agreement and issuance of cheques, to establish the friendly loans
advanced, are proved, the burden shifted squarely on the Defendant to
rebut the presumption that such cheques were not issued or were not
towards a legally enforceable liability. If the defendant fails, the Plaintiff
is entitled to a decree, on the standard of preponderance of probabilities.”
(Emphasis supplied in Bold)
22. Thus, as can be observed from various landmark judicial
pronouncements of Hon’ble Apex Court in Smriti Debbarma (supra)
and Chowdamma (supra), and recent pronouncements of our own
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Ashish Tewari (supra) and Chaman
Lata Bhardwaj (supra), the burden of proof lies upon the party
asserting a fact and never shifts, though the onus of proof shifts
continuously in the evaluation of evidence. There exists an essential
distinction between the two, inasmuch as the initial onus is always
upon the Plaintiff, and it is only upon discharge thereof the onus
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 15/40
shifts upon the Defendant to rebut the same.
23. The Court shall first decide whether the present suit has
been filed within the prescribed period of limitation as per the
Limitation Act, 1963. The law of limitation is not a mere technicality
but a substantive principle of law designed to ensure legal certainty.
As the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held in Popat and Kotecha
Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, decided on
29.08.2005,, reported as (2005) 7 SCC 510:
“Bar of limitation does not obstruct the execution. It bars the
remedy. (See V. Subba Rao and Ors. v. Secretary to Govt.
Panchayat Raj and Rural Development, Govt. of A.P. and Ors.
(1996 (7) SCC 626.) Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy
the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The
object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage
caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a
life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury
so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never
revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up
necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by
approaching the courts. So, a life-span must be fixed for each
remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to
unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of
limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the
maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every
legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of
time. (See N. Balakrishanan v. M. Krishna Murthy (1998 (7)
SCC 123).”
(Emphasis supplied in bold)
24. Thus, the law of limitation does not extinguish the
underlying right, it merely restricts the enforceability of the remedy
through courts after the prescribed period. Its purpose is not to defeat
legitimate claims, but to ensure that parties act with reasonable
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 16/40
diligence and do not indulge in unnecessary delay. The legal system
provides remedies to redress injuries, but such remedies cannot be
kept open indefinitely. Thus, limitation law is grounded in
considerations of public policy, encapsulated in the maxim interest
republicae ut sit finis litium, meaning that it is in the interest of the
State that litigation must come to an end. The legislative intent is to
ensure that every legal remedy is pursued within a fixed and
reasonable time.
25. It is the plaintiff’s case that the last payment of Rs.1,50,000/- was
made by the defendants on 12.01.2022, constituting an
acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act,
1963, and that the last invoice was raised on 19.08.2021. The present
suit was instituted on 13.10.2022, well within the three-year period
prescribed under Article 1 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
1963, whether reckoned from the date of the last invoice or from the
date of the said acknowledgment. Thus, the present suit is within
limitation period and not barred by the law of limitation.
26. Now the Court shall decide whether it has territorial jurisdiction
to entertain the present suit. It is the unrebutted case of the plaintiff
that the contract for sale of goods was concluded telephonically at
Pitampura, Delhi, that the goods were supplied and invoices raised by
the plaintiff from its office at Pitampura, and that part-payments
made by the defendants were credited to the plaintiff’s bank account
maintained there, thereby furnishing sufficient connecting factors
under Section 20(c) CPC independent of the oral understanding
pleaded between the parties for Delhi jurisdiction. Moreover, it is a
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 17/40
settled principle of law that where a contract does not specify the
place of payment, the debtor is obliged to seek out the creditor and
make payment at the creditor’s place of business or residence.
Consequently, a suit for recovery is maintainable at that place as
well, since a part of the cause of action arises there within the
meaning of Section 20(c) CPC. As the cause of action, in material
part arose within the territorial limits of this Court, this Court holds
that it has the requisite territorial jurisdiction to try the present suit.
27. After careful perusal of the record and considering the relevant
laws, my issue wise findings are as under:
ISSUE NO.1
1. Whether the plaintiff has supplied sub-standard and
defective goods to the defendant? (OPD)
28. The onus to prove the present issue lies on the Defendants. The
defendants have to prove that the goods supplied to them by the
plaintiff were defective and were of sub-standard quality. Now, it
becomes relevant to discuss the relevant provisions of the Sale of
Goods Act, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SOGA’).
29. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Lohmann Rausher Gmbh
v. Medisphere Marketing (P) Ltd., decided on 13.01.2005, reported
as 2005 SCC OnLine Del 39 while explaining Section 41 and 42 of
the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as “SOGA”)
observed that the defendant has a right to inspect the goods and
report defect if the goods are of inferior quality or if the defendant
wants to return the goods. As per Section 42 SOGA, If reporting of
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 18/40
defect by the defendant is not done within a reasonable period of
time, the defendant is deemed to have accepted the goods. The
relevant portion is reproduced below:
“20. Section 41 and Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 reads as
under:–
“41. Buyer’s right of examining the goods.–
(1) Where goods are delivered to the buyer which he has not
previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them
unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining
them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in
conformity with the contract.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller tenders delivery of
goods to the buyer, he is bound, on request, to afford the buyer a
reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the purpose of
ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract.
42. Acceptance.–The buyer is deemed to have accepted the
goods when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them, or
when the goods have been delivered to him and he does any act in
relation to them which is inconsistent with the ownership of the
seller, or when, after the lapse of a reasonable time, he retains the
goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected them.”
21. As per the mandate of Section 41 of the Sale of Goods Act, the
defendant not having inspected the goods in question prior to delivery,
had a right to inspect the case on delivery and report defects within a
reasonable time of delivery. If not rejected within reasonable time,
mandate of Section 42 stipulates that the defendant would be deemed to
have accepted the goods.”
(Emphasis supplied in bold)
30. Thus the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Lohmann Rausher
Gmbh (supra) explained that a buyer who has not inspected goods
prior to delivery has a right to inspect them upon delivery and report
defects within a reasonable time. As per the mandate of Section 41,
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 19/40
of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 the defendant not having inspected
the goods prior to delivery had a right to inspect the same on delivery
and report defects within a reasonable time of delivery. If not rejected
within reasonable time the mandate of Section 42 stipulates that the
defendant would be deemed to have accepted the goods. If reporting
of defect by the defendant is not done within a reasonable period of
time the defendant is deemed to have accepted the goods and
becomes liable to pay the price thereof.
31. The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Godrej & Boyce
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Remi Sales & Engineering Ltd., decided
on 24.12.2025, reported as 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 5334 while
discussing Section 42 SOGA explained the concept of deemed
acceptance in case the buyer does not send any intimation to seller of
rejection. The relevant portion is provided as follows:
“34. Ordinarily, once the goods are accepted by the buyer, he
becomes liable to pay for the goods sold. Therefore, the act of
acceptance of goods is an important step which needs to be
proved for claiming the price of the goods sold. The concept of
acceptance is dealt with in Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act,
which provides thus :–
“42. Acceptance
The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when
he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them, or
when the goods have been delivered to him and he does
any act in relation to them which is inconsistent with the
ownership of the seller, or when, after the lapse of a
reasonable time, he retains the goods without intimating
to the seller that he has rejected them.”
35. Thus, Section 42 creates a deeming fiction where the goods
are deemed to have been accepted when the buyer intimates to
the seller that he has accepted them or when the goods have
been delivered to the buyer, who acts in relation to them which
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 20/40
is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, or when the
buyer retains the goods without issuing intimation of rejection
after lapse of reasonable time. In the present case, since the
Petitioner has used the tubes in the heat exchangers, such act is
construed as an act which is inconsistent with the ownership of
the seller. Thus, the Petitioner’s act of using the tubes in heat
exchangers is treated as an acceptance of the tubes.”
(Emphasis supplied in bold)
32. The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Godrej & Boyce (supra)
while discussing Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 explained
the concept of deemed acceptance and held that the deeming fiction
of acceptance is attracted in three circumstances namely first when
the buyer expressly intimates to the seller that he has accepted the
goods, second when the goods have been delivered to the buyer and
he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent with the
ownership of the seller and third when after the lapse of a reasonable
time the buyer retains the goods without intimating to the seller that
he has rejected them. The court further held that the act of using the
delivered goods in the buyer’s own works or manufacturing process
constitutes an act inconsistent with the ownership of the seller and
therefore amounts to deemed acceptance binding the buyer to pay the
price of the goods so used.
33. The Hon’ble Madras High Court in S.M.S. Traders v. Official
Liquidator of the High Court, Madras, 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 2214,
relied upon Section 43 SOGA while observing that when the buyer
refuses to accept the goods, it is sufficient to intimate to seller about
his refusal to accept the goods. The relevant para is as follows:
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 21/40
“14. As per Section 43 of Sale of Goods Act, 1930, it is not the duty
of the purchaser who refuses to take delivery to return the goods to the
seller from the place of delivery at his cost. Section 43 reads as under:
“43. Buyer not bound to return rejected goods.–Unless otherwise
agreed, where goods are delivered to the buyer and he refuses to
accept them, having the right so to do, he is not bound to return
them to the seller, but it is sufficient if he intimates to the seller
that he refuses to accept them.”
When the buyer refuses to accept the goods, it is sufficient if he intimates
to the seller about his refusal to accept the goods. By a reading of Section
43 of Sale of Goods Act read with Clause 16 of the Purchase Order, it
cannot be said that the Company in liquidation is bound to pay the
amount for the rejected pulpwood.”
(Emphasis supplied)
34. Thus the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in S.M.S. Traders
(supra) relying upon Section 43 observed that when a buyer refuses
to accept the goods it is sufficient if he intimates the seller about his
refusal to accept and he is not bound to physically return the goods to
the seller from the place of delivery at his own cost. The court
clarified that the obligation of the buyer upon rejection is limited to
timely intimation of rejection to the seller and that the absence of
such timely intimation disentitles the buyer from taking the defence
of rejection of goods so as to avoid payment of the price.
35. Coming to the facts of the present case, the defendants’ case, as
set out in the written statement, is that the batteries supplied by the
plaintiff were repeatedly defective and sub-standard, that repeated
complaints were made to the plaintiff, and that the same resulted in
business losses to the defendants. This defence, upon careful
examination of the evidence, is found to be wholly unsubstantiated
for the following reasons:
(i) No written complaint, debit note, or credit note was ever
raised. DW-1 admitted that no written complaint was made toCS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 22/40
the plaintiff regarding the alleged defective goods. His only
claim was that he had “informed about the defective goods to
the plaintiff on WhatsApp.” However, when specifically
confronted in cross-examination and called upon to point out
the relevant chat from the judicial record, DW-1 was unable to
do so, stating: “I have seen the judicial file and I could not find
the relevant chat on record.” He further admitted that no debit
note was ever issued by defendant no.1 to the plaintiff qua the
alleged defective goods, and that he was unable to point to any
written communication by which the defendants requested
replacement of the goods or demanded their return. In ordinary
commercial practice, particularly in a running trade
relationship governed by tax invoices and GST compliance, a
genuine grievance of defective supply running into lakhs of
rupees would ordinarily be accompanied by a debit note, a
credit note, or at the least a written protest, none of which
exists on record.
(ii) The alleged loss was never quantified or demanded. DW-1
could not produce any calculation substantiating the loss
allegedly suffered on account of defective goods, nor any legal
notice or written demand addressed to the plaintiff claiming
such loss. When asked to state the exact value of the allegedly
defective goods, DW-1 could only offer a vague estimate of
“around Rs. 55-60 lacs,” a figure for which, admittedly, no
written demand was ever issued.
(iii) No independent evidence of defect was placed on record.
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 23/40
No test report or certificate from any government-approved or
accredited laboratory establishing that the batteries or panels
failed to meet applicable quality standards was produced by the
defendants. The defence rests entirely on the defendants’ own
unproved assertions.
(iv) The defendants’ conduct is inconsistent with a genuine
claim of defective supply. It stands admitted that the
defendants availed the entire input tax credit of GST on the
goods supplied by the plaintiff and never reversed the same,
and that substantial payments admittedly over Rs. 6.5 crores
between 01.04.2021 and 12.01.2022 continued to be made to
the plaintiff throughout the relevant period without any
contemporaneous written protest regarding quality. Such
conduct, in terms of Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930,
is inconsistent with the seller’s ownership having been rejected
and amounts to deemed acceptance of the goods.
(v) The plaintiff’s witness specifically denied the allegation.
PW-1, Sh. Rishabh Aggarwal, was directly confronted in cross-
examination with the suggestion that the plaintiff had supplied
poor quality goods resulting in business loss to the defendants,
and categorically answered: “It is incorrect.” It was further put
to him, and denied, that the defendants had lodged any protest
with respect to deficiency in quality or delay in supply. No
document was shown to PW-1 in cross-examination to
dislodge this denial.
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 24/40
36. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
defendants have failed to discharge the onus of proving that the
plaintiff supplied sub-standard or defective goods to them. The
defence is found to be an unsubstantiated assertion, contradicted by
the defendants’ own conduct in availing GST input tax credit without
reversal and in continuing to make substantial payments without
protest.
Accordingly, Issue No.1 is decided against the defendants and in
favour of the plaintiff.
ISSUE NO.2
2. Whether a settlement was arrived between the plaintiff and
defendant, whereby the plaintiff has agreed to compensate the
defendant for a sum of Rs.6,60,000/-, if so, its effect? (OPD)
37. The onus to prove this issue lies upon the defendants. It is for the
defendants to establish that the plaintiff agreed to pay Rs. 6,60,000/-
to the defendants by way of settlement, and further to establish the
legal effect of such settlement upon the plaintiff’s claim.
38. At the outset, it is necessary to examine the admissibility of the
sole document relied upon by the defendants to prove this issue, the
WhatsApp chat screenshots exhibited as Ex. DW-1/2. It is a settled
position of law that secondary electronic evidence, such as
WhatsApp chat screenshots, is inadmissible in evidence unless
accompanied by a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 25/40
Evidence Act, 1872 (now Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya
Adhiniyam, 2023). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anvar P.V. v. P.K.
Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, held that such a certificate is a
mandatory pre-condition for the admissibility of electronic records
produced as secondary evidence, and this position was reaffirmed
and clarified by a larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7
SCC 1, which held that the requirement of a Section 65B certificate
is mandatory for the admissibility of electronic evidence and cannot
be dispensed with, save in the limited circumstance where the party is
unable to produce such a certificate despite best efforts and the same
is beyond its control.
39. In the present case, unlike the plaintiff whose entire electronic
evidence, including the E-Way Bills, the GSTR-1 downloaded from
the GST portal, the ledger account, the tracking report, and the bank
statement, was duly accompanied by certificates under Section 65B,
the WhatsApp chat screenshots exhibited by the defendants as Ex.
DW-1/2 were placed on record without any such certificate. No plea
was even taken by the defendants that they were unable to obtain
such a certificate despite best efforts. Ex. DW-1/2, being uncertified
secondary electronic evidence, is therefore not admissible in
evidence and cannot be relied upon to prove the alleged settlement.
40. Even otherwise, the evidence on record does not establish the
settlement pleaded by the defendants. DW-1 who himself exhibited
the chat along with his affidavit, was unable to identify or locate it
from the judicial record when specifically called upon to do so in
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 26/40
cross-examination, stating that he could not find the relevant chat on
record, a circumstance that, quite apart from admissibility, renders
the document of no evidentiary value. Nor does the defendants’ own
case, even taken at face value, establish a concluded settlement in the
legal sense. At its highest, DW-1’s evidence alleges only that the
plaintiff “agreed to pay” a sum “after mutual consent and mutual
discussion” with no signed settlement deed, memorandum, or written
acknowledgment of any such agreement placed on record, and it is
not even the defendants’ case that the sum of Rs. 6,60,000/- was ever
actually paid to them so that even assuming an accord, there is no
satisfaction to discharge the liability. This claimed figure of Rs. 6.6
lakhs further sits unexplained against DW-1’s own separate and
inconsistent estimate of the alleged defect-related loss at Rs. 55-60
lakhs, with no written demand for either figure ever having been
addressed to the plaintiff. PW-1, for his part, was at no stage
confronted with, nor did he admit, any such settlement in his cross-
examination, and the suggestion of settlement therefore stands
merely put and denied, without any independent corroboration on the
record.
41. In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the sole document
relied upon by the defendants to prove the alleged settlement, being
uncertified secondary electronic evidence, is inadmissible under
Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and that even on
merits, the defendants have failed to establish any concluded and
performed settlement between the parties. The defence of settlement
is accordingly rejected.
Issue No.2 is decided against the defendants and in favour of the
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 27/40
plaintiff.
ISSUE NO.3
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of
Rs.67,33,985.38/- towards the goods supplied to the defendant
through invoices? (OPP)
42. The onus to prove this issue lies upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff is
required to establish, through cogent and reliable evidence, that
goods of the claimed value were in fact supplied to the defendants,
that invoices were duly raised in respect thereof, and that the said
amount remains outstanding and payable.
43. In support of this claim, the plaintiff has placed on record the tax
invoices exhibited as Ex. PW1/2 (Colly), the E Way Bills
accompanied by a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 as Ex. PW1/4 (Colly), the GSTR 1 returns
downloaded from the GST portal along with a like certificate as Ex.
PW1/5 (Colly), the ledger account maintained by the plaintiff in the
ordinary course of business along with a certificate under Section
65B as Ex. PW1/6, and the bank account statement of the plaintiff as
Ex. PW1/11 (Colly). PW1 has, in his affidavit and in his deposition,
reiterated that the goods were supplied against oral purchase orders
placed by the defendants over a continuous course of dealing, and
that the said supplies were duly reflected in the plaintiff’s regularly
maintained accounts, GST filings and banking records.
44. The genuineness and probative value of this documentary
evidence stands considerably reinforced by the admissions extracted
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 28/40
from DW1 in cross examination. DW1 admitted that defendant no.1
has taken the entire input tax credit of GST on the goods supplied by
the plaintiff, that GST returns were duly filed and maintained by
defendant no.1 for the relevant financial years, and that a sum in
excess of Rs. 6.5 crores was paid by the defendants to the plaintiff
between 01.04.2021 and 12.01.2022 towards the purchase of goods.
DW1 further admitted that the goods supplied by the plaintiff were
received by defendant no.1. These admissions, coming as they do
from the defendants’ own witness, corroborate the plaintiff’s case that
a running commercial relationship existed between the parties, that
goods were regularly supplied and received, and that payments were
made against such supplies through banking channels.
45. As already discussed in detail while dealing with Issues No.1 and
2 above, the defendants’ principal defence to the plaintiff’s claim,
namely that the goods supplied were sub standard and defective and
that the resulting liability stood settled and discharged through an
agreed payment of Rs. 6.6 lakhs, has been found to be wholly
unsubstantiated. The plea of defective supply was found to be
unaccompanied by any written complaint, debit note, credit note,
laboratory report or quantified demand, and was found to be
inconsistent with the defendants’ own conduct in availing and never
reversing the input tax credit on the very goods now alleged to be
defective, and in continuing to make substantial payments without
protest. The plea of settlement was found to rest solely upon an
uncertified and inadmissible WhatsApp chat that the defendants’ own
witness was unable to locate or identify from the judicial record, and
was in any event found not to disclose any concluded or performed
agreement capable of discharging the plaintiff’s claim. Having failed
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 29/40
on both these counts, the defendants are left with no defence on
record capable of displacing the plaintiff’s documentary and admitted
case for recovery.
46. The principles governing the burden of proof and the evidentiary
value of admissions have already been discussed in detail
hereinabove. As noted while discussing the general position of law
on burden of proof, it is settled that the burden of proving a fact lies
upon the party who asserts it and shifts only once that party has led
evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case, and that a party in
possession of the best evidence bearing on a fact especially within its
knowledge cannot avoid its consequence by withholding or
professing ignorance of the same, as held in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh
Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558, and Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan
Debbarma, (2023) 19 SCC 782, referred to supra. It has further been
noticed, referring to Ashish Tewari v. G.P. Tewari, 2026:DHC:3411,
and Smt. Chaman Lata Bhardwaj & Ors. v. Smt. Nirmal Devi,
2026:DHC:4173, referred to supra, that an admission made by a
party, whether in pleadings or in the course of deposition, constitutes
the best evidence against the maker thereof and requires no further
corroboration once it is shown to be clear, unequivocal, and
unexplained. These principles bear directly upon the present issue
and are applied to the facts discussed hereunder.
47. It would also be relevant to note that the defendants, in their own
audited financial statements for the year 2021-22, prepared by their
own Chartered Accountant, Ravi Ladia & Co., reflected an
outstanding liability towards the plaintiff, a fact that DW-1 did not
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 30/40
seriously dispute once confronted with the document. In this regard,
it is a settled principle under Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 that the burden of proving a fact lies upon the person who
asserts it, and Section 106 further provides that where a fact is
especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving
that fact lies upon him. The audited financial statements, the ledger
account, and the internal record of drawings, salary, and profit
withdrawals of the partners of defendant no.1 are matters squarely
and exclusively within the knowledge of the defendants, being their
own books of account maintained through their own auditor. Once
such a document is placed before a witness and its ownership and
authenticity are admitted, the burden shifts to the defendants to
explain the entries contained therein, and a bare denial or an evasive
“I do not know” cannot discharge that burden. The relevant questions
from cross – examination of DW – 1 are as follows:
“Q12. Are financial of defendant no.1 subject to audit by the
Chartered Accountants?
Ans. Yes, and Ravi Ladia & Co. are the auditors of defendant no.1
from financial year 2020-21 till today.
Q13. Is it correct that report on Audited Financial Statement
(including Balance Sheet, PNL Account, Capital Account of Partner)
of defendant no.1 was prepared for financial year 2021-2022, 2022-
2023, 2023-2024?
Ans. Yes.
Q38. Is it correct that defendant no.1 has categorically admitted the
outstanding sum of Rs. 67,46,736/- as on 31.03.2022 towards the
plaintiff in its balance sheet?
Ans. No.
At this stage, the witness is shown the financials of defendant no.1
duly signed by the defendants for the financial year 2021-22.
Q.39. Is the said financials belongs to defendant no.1?
Ans. Yes. Vol. As I said above, I do not remember the date and as I
told between me and plaintiff all the transactions are the clear.
Q40. Can you now answer question no.38?
Ans. I have to check my records and answer the question after 12th
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 31/40
February 2026, when I reached to Hyderabad.
Q51. Is it correct that defendant no.2 withdrew Rs. 2,13,410/- and
Rs. 3,40,508/- (Total Rs. 5,53,918/-) as profit from defendant no.1 in
financial year 2021-22 and 2023-24 respectively as mentioned in
balance sheet of defendant no.1?
Ans. I do not know.
Q53. Is it correct that defendant no.2 withdrawn Rs. 5,40,283/-, Rs.
2,25,509/-, Rs. 8,54,887/- (Total Rs. 1,620,679) as salary from
defendant no.1 for financial year 2021-2022, 22-23 and 2023-2024
respectively as mentioned in balance sheet of defendant no.1?
Ans. I do not know.
Q55. Is it correct that defendant no.2 withdrawn Rs. 2,05,95,039/-,
Rs. 1,40,03,426/-, Rs. 3,39,97,710/- from defendant no.1 as drawings
financial year 2021-22, 2022-23 and 2023-24 respectively as
mentioned in balance sheet of defendant no.1?
Ans. I do not know.
Q58. Is it correct partners contribution has been dropped from Rs.
1,27,11,615/- to Rs. 31,39,852/- in the financial year 2021-2022 as
mentioned in the balance sheet of defendant no.1?
Ans. I do not know.
Q60. Is it correct that inventory of defendant no.1 has been reduced
from Rs.4,55,22,768/- to Rs. 80,96,779/- in the financial year 2021-
2022 as mentioned in the balance sheet of defendant no.1?
Ans. I do not know.
Q61. Is it correct that current assets of defendant no.1 has been
reduced from Rs. 1,30,15,556/- to Rs. 5,03,114/- in the financial year
2021-2022 as mentioned in the balance sheet of defendant no.1?
Ans. I do not know.
At this stage, witness is shown the audited financial of defendant
no.1 for the financial year 2021-22, 2022-23 and 2023-24. The same
is taken on record and marked as Mark-D-1 for the purpose of
identification. (consisting 40 pages).
Q62. Are the said financials belongs to defendant no.1 and duly
signed by you? Ans. Yes.
Q63. Do you wish to change any of your answer given in reply to
question no. 51 to 61?
Ans. I do not know because I do not remember any figure and
accounts right now.”
48. DW-1 admitted in cross-examination that Ravi Ladia & Co. have
been the auditors of defendant no.1 since financial year 2020-21, and
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 32/40
that audited financial statements, including the Balance Sheet, Profit
and Loss Account, and Capital Account of Partners, were duly
prepared for financial years 2021-22, 2022-23, and 2023-24.
49. The evidentiary value of this admission is considerable. It is a
settled position, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagindas
Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242, that admissions,
if clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous, are the best evidence of the
facts admitted and can be relied upon by the party in whose favour
they operate without further proof, notwithstanding that the party
making the admission is not confronted with an opportunity to
explain it away, unless a satisfactory explanation is in fact furnished.
The relevant portion is as follows:
“27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that
emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some
material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima
facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it
will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for
eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would
be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or
produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an
express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself.
Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts
admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible
under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents
at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than
evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding
on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by
themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the
other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as
evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be
wrong.”
(Emphasis supplied in bold)
50. In the present case, DW-1’s identification of the balance sheet as
belonging to defendant no.1, coupled with his failure to furnish any
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 33/40
explanation, correction, or denial when specifically confronted with
the outstanding figure of Rs. 67,46,736/- reflected therein, and his
conduct in repeatedly evading direct questions on the same, amounts
to a constructive admission of the outstanding liability, which stands
unrebutted on record.
51. This pattern of evasion is not confined to the balance sheet figure
alone. When confronted in cross-examination with a series of specific
and pointed questions regarding entries in the very balance sheet he
had identified as belonging to defendant no.1, including the amounts
withdrawn by defendants no.2 to 4 as profit, salary, and drawings for
the financial years 2021-22 to 2023-24, and the corresponding fall in
the partners’ capital contribution, inventory, and current assets of
defendant no.1 over the same period, DW-1 answered “I do not
know” to virtually every such question, despite being a partner of
defendant no.1 and the very person who had earlier identified the
document as belonging to the firm. Where a party, who is otherwise
best placed to explain entries in his own audited books of account,
feigns ignorance of the contents of a document he has himself
identified and adopted, an adverse inference is liable to be drawn
against him in terms of Section 114, Illustration (g) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, that the evidence, if produced, would have gone
against his own case. This conduct, taken together with the failure to
rebut the balance sheet figure of Rs. 67,46,736/-, further reinforces
the plaintiff’s case rather than assisting the defence.
52. Accordingly, the outstanding sum as per the plaintiff’s ledger
stands independently corroborated by the invoices, E-Way Bills, and
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 34/40
GSTR-1 filings on the plaintiff’s side, and by the defendants’ own
audited balance sheet and the admissions extracted from DW-1 on the
defendants’ side, none of which have been shown to be fabricated,
inflated, or inconsistent with the defendants’ own GST and financial
records.
53. In view of the foregoing, and having regard to the findings
recorded while deciding Issues No.1 and 2 that the defendants have
failed to establish either the defence of defective supply or the plea of
settlement, this Court holds that the plaintiff has successfully
discharged the burden of proof cast upon it and has established its
entitlement to recover the sum of Rs. 67,33,985.38/- towards the
goods supplied to the defendants through invoices.
Issue No.3 is accordingly decided in favour of the plaintiff and
against the defendants.
ISSUE NO.4
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for pre institution interest of
Rs.13,63,631/-?
54. The onus to prove this issue lies upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff
has claimed pre litigation interest of Rs. 13,63,631/- calculated at the
rate of 18% per annum on the principal outstanding amount, on the
ground that as per trade practice and the terms of the contract, the
defendants were liable to pay interest at the said rate on delayed
payments.
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 35/40
55. It is a settled position of law that the grant of pre suit interest, in
the absence of an express written stipulation to that effect in the
contract, lies within the discretion of the Court, to be exercised
having regard to the nature of the transaction, the prevailing market
rate of interest, and the conduct of the parties.
56. In the present case, the contract between the parties is
admittedly an oral one, arrived at telephonically, and no written
agreement stipulating a specific rate of interest has been placed on
record. There is no document on record which stipulates that the
plaintiff should be rewarded pre suit interest. Thus, without any
sufficient evidence, the plaintiff cannot be granted pre suit interest.
Issue No.4 is accordingly held against the plaintiff and in favour of
the defendants.
ISSUE NO.5
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for pendente-lite and future
interest, if so, at what rate and for which period? (OPP)
57. Under Section 34 CPC, pendente lite and future interest can be
awarded only on the principal sum adjudged. Post-suit interest cannot
be awarded on the interest component of a decretal amount. The
ancient Rule of Damdupat prevalent in Hindu common law,
recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court provides that the interest
recoverable at any one time cannot exceed the principal amount. This
rule acts as a check on the accumulation of interest beyond equitable
limits. It is a fundamental principle that the right to claim compound
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 36/40
interest must be founded on a contract expressly stipulating
compound interest or on a usage/custom of trade. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in M/s D. Khosla and Company vs. Union of India,
decided on 07.08.2024, reported as 2024 INSC 587 while observing
on the term interest on interest or compound interest under Section
3(3) of the Interest Act, 1978 held that the courts are not empowered
to grant compound interest unless specifically provided in a contract
or a statute. The Court observed that:
“17. Section 34 of the CPC provides that where the decree is for payment
of money, the court may order interest at such rate as the court deems
reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged. Again, the reading
of the aforesaid Sub-Section (1) of Section 34 CPC would reveal that the
interest is payable on the principal sum adjudged and not on interest part
of the award.
18. The Interest Act, 1978 vide Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 specifically
lays down that nothing in Section 3 which permits the court to award
interest shall empower the court to award interest upon interest. It means
that ordinarily the courts are not entitled to award interest upon interest
unless specifically provided either under any statute or under the terms
and conditions of the contract
19. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. M.C. Clelland Engineers
S.A., (1999) 4 SCC 327, which was also a case under the Act, this Court
observed that there cannot be any doubt that the Arbitrators have power
to grant interest akin to Section 34 CPC and it is clear that interest is not
permissible upon interest awarded but only upon the claim made. In the
aforesaid case, the claim made was in two parts, and in the second part,
interest on delayed payment was also claimed. In that situation, the court
held that the interest awarded would form part of the damages or
compensation for delayed payment and would become part of the
principal amount and thus, in that circumstances, Arbitrator has the power
to grant interest on interest which partakes the compensation awarded.
20. In State of Haryana and Others vs. S.L. Arora and Company, (2010) 3
SCC 690, it was observed that interest, unless otherwise specified, refers
to simple interest and that interest is payable only on principal amount
and not on any accrued interest. It was further held that the compound
interest can be awarded if there is a specific provision under the statute or
in the contract for compounding of interest but no general discretion lies
with the courts or tribunals to award compound interest or interest upon
interest.
21. In Hyder Consulting (UK) Limited vs. Governor, State of Orissa,
(2015) 2 SCC 189, this Court was dealing with Section 31(7) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, wherein for the purposes ofCS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 37/40
payment of post-award interest, the phrase ‘sum directed to be paid by
award’ was used and it was held that it includes the pre-award interest
and, therefore, post-award interest is payable on the sum awarded which
includes pre-award interest. However, a distinction was made between
Section 31(7) which simply uses the word ‘sum’ and Section 34 CPC
wherein the phrase ‘on principal sum adjudged’ has been used. The
departure in the use of the language in the two provisions was held to be
of great significance which clearly showed that the term ‘sum’ under
Section 31(7) refers to aggregate amount of the award and the pre-award
interest whereas ‘principal sum adjudged’ under Section 34 CPC refers
only to the amount awarded.
22. The case of UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh, (2022) 4 SCC 116, is again in relation to interpretation of
Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, wherein the
principal laid down in Hyder Consulting (UK) Limited (supra) has been
accepted.
23. In the light of the above legal provisions and the case law on the
subject, it is evident that ordinarily courts are not supposed to grant
interest on interest except where it has been specifically provided under
the statute or where there is specific stipulation to that effect under the
terms and conditions of the contract. There is no dispute as to the power
of the courts to award interest on interest or compound interest in a given
case subject to the power conferred under the statutes or under the terms
and conditions of the contract but where no such power is conferred
ordinarily, the courts do not award interest on interest.”
58. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D. Khosla (supra) while
referring to Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. M.C. Clelland
Engineers S.A., (1999) 4 SCC 327, State of Haryana v. S.L. Arora
and Company, (2010) 3 SCC 690, and Hyder Consulting (UK)
Limited v. Governor, State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189, observed
that held that interest is payable only on the principal amount and that
compound interest or interest upon interest can be awarded only
where there is a specific statutory provision or an express contractual
stipulation to that effect. In the absence of any such provision or
stipulation in the present case, this Court is not empowered to award
interest upon interest, and accordingly, the pendente lite and future
interest shall be calculated only on the principal sum adjudged and
not on any pre-suit interest component.
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59. In the present case, the claim of pendente lite and future interest
at 18% per annum, being founded on the same unacknowledged
invoice rate discussed while deciding Issue No.4, is on the higher
side. Having regard to the nature of the transaction and the overall
facts and circumstances of the case, including the period for which
the defendants have withheld payment, this Court deems it
appropriate to award pendente lite and future interest at the rate of
9% per annum on the principal amount adjudged, from the date of
institution of the suit till the date of actual realisation.
Issue No.5 is accordingly decided in favour of the plaintiff and
against the defendants.
ISSUE NO.6
6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the legal expenses of the
cost of litigation ? (OPP)
60. The plaintiff has claimed a sum of Rs. 3,50,000/- towards legal
expenses and the costs of litigation, as set out in the prayer clause of
the plaint. Having regard to the findings recorded while deciding
Issues No.1 to 3 above, whereby the defendants have been found to
have wrongfully withheld payment of an admitted commercial
liability without establishing any tenable defence of defective supply
or settlement, this Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to be
compensated for the expenses reasonably incurred in prosecuting the
present litigation. However, the claimed sum of Rs. 3,50,000/- has
not been supported by any itemised bill of costs, retainer agreement,
receipt, or other material placed on record to substantiate the actual
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expenditure incurred, and an award of costs, even where a party has
substantially succeeded, cannot be granted mechanically in the sum
claimed in the absence of such proof. In these circumstances, this
Court deems it appropriate to award only nominal cost of Rs.
1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) towards legal expenses, in
addition to the costs of the suit in terms of Section 35 CPC.
Issue No.6 is accordingly decided in favour of the defendants and
against the plaintiff.
ISSUE NO.7
7. Relief
61. In view of the findings recorded on Issues No.1 to 6 above, the
plaintiff is held entitled to a decree for recovery of the principal sum
of Rs. 67,33,985.38/- towards the goods supplied to the defendants
with pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 9% per annum on
the principal amount from the date of institution of suit till the date of
actual realisation. The plaintiff is further entitled to litigation
expenses of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) and the cost of
the suit.
Decree sheet be drawn accordingly.
File be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Announced in the open Court today
on this 04th day of July, 2026
(DEVENDER KUMAR JANGALA)
District Judge (Commercial Court)-01
North-West/Rohini/New Delhi.
04.07.2026
CS (Comm.) No. 795/2022 HVR Solar Pvt. Ltd. v. Quikpower Industries India LLP and Ors. 40/40
