Cw / 42514U / 2025Gainwell Security … vs The State Of Rajasthan on 20 May, 2026

Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

Urn: Cw / 42514U / 2025Gainwell Security … vs The State Of Rajasthan on 20 May, 2026

 [2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB]

       HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                        JODHPUR
                 D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 23613/2025

  Gainwell Security Private Limited, Through Its Director Ishanshu
  Soni S/o Shri Shiv Kumar Soni Aged About 28 Years R/o Inside
  Jassusar Gate, Near Binani Niwas, Bikaner (Raj.).
                                                                        ----Petitioner
                                        Versus
  1.      The State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Urban
          Development           Department,            Secretariat,       Govt.    Of
          Rajasthan, Jaipur.
  2.      The    Bikaner        Development            Authority,       Through    Its
          Secretary, Bikaner.
  3.      The Secretary, Bikaner Development Authority, Bikaner.
  4.      The Senior Town Planner, Town Planning Department,
          Bikaner Zone Bikaner.
                                                                     ----Respondents


  For Petitioner(s)           :     Mr. Jitendra Bhaleria
                                    Mr. Manish Dadhich
  For Respondent(s)           :     Mr. Ayush Gehlot
                                    Mr. Ajay Kumar Vyas with
                                    Mr. Jatin Sankhla for B.D.A.



 HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
                 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT

Judgment

1. Date of conclusion of arguments 09.04.2026

2. Date on which judgment was reserved 09.04.2026

3. Whether the full judgment or only the
operative part is pronounced Full Judgment

4. Date of pronouncement 20.05.2026

Reportable

Per Mr. Sanjeet Purohit , J:

1. Present writ petition has been filed with following prayers:

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (2 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

“(i) That the impugned note provided under provision 1.7 in
the Rajasthan Township Policy 2024 through notification
dated 17.07.2025 may kindly be declared illegal and ultra
virus. It may kindly be held that the aforesaid note will
include the layout plans which came to be approved by the
Senior town Planner before issuance of the notification
dated 17.07.2025.

(ii) That the aforesaid note may kindly ordered to be read
that the aforesaid layout plans which became saved in the
aforesaid manner, should be approved by the local body as
per the township policy 2010 and the word “can” be ordered
to be read as “should” for the layout plans. It may also be
ordered that in case the delay is caused by the local body in
approval of the layout plans under the township policy 2010
then the same may kindly be treated to be approved under
the policy of 2010.

(iii) That the Commissioner/Secretary B.D.A., Bikaner may
be directed to issue Patta within 15 days as per Lay-Out
plan already approved by Senior town Planner on
27.12.2024 vide letter no. RAJKAJ Reference No. 12680106
and submitted to U.I.T. Bikaner on dated 27.12.2024 with
technically opinion and approved Lay-out plan of copy of
Vaishali Nagar Jaisalmer Road, Bikaner in favour of Gainwell
Securities Pvt. Ltd., Bikaner.

(iv) That the impugned decision/objection of the BDA in
order Annex. P/7 dated 01.10.2025 qua the lay out plan of
the petitioner may kindly be quashed and set aside.

(v) The BDA may kindly be directed to consider and
approve the lay out plan of the petitioner was approved by
senior town planner Bikaner on 27.12.2024 as per the
township policy 2010 as well as per the orders issued by the
state Government.

(vi) The action of the BDA applying the new township policy
2025 upon the lay out plan of the petitioner vide Annex. p/7
dated 01.10.2025 may kindly be declared illegal.

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (3 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

(vii) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which
this Hon’ble Court deem just and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of
the petitioner.

(viii) Writ Petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be
allowed with cost.”

2. Explaining the background facts, learned counsel for the

petitioner submitted that petitioner is a developer company and

owns land situated at village Nathusar, District Bikaner, bearing

Khasra Nos. 120, 121, 127 and 128, admeasuring 1.2654 hectares

(“land in question”). Petitioner company applied for conversion of

said land under Section 90-A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act,

1956 (“L.R. Act”), and permission for non-agricultural use was

granted by competent authority vide order dated 29.05.2024.

2.1 It is stated that at the time of grant of permission for

conversion of the land in question, Township Policy of 2010

(“Policy – 2010”) was in vogue. Clause 4.2 of said Policy stipulates

the requirements in respect of residential colonies of less than 2

hectares and provides for keeping facility area (roads / parks) to a

minimum of 30%. Relevant part of said clause is quoted below for

ready reference: –

“4.02 For Smaller schemes (up to 2 hectares)

(i) For such small schemes of plotted development internal
sub division of 5 acres plot shall be permitted for carving
out smaller plots with minimum 30% of the total plot area
as open/parks/ roads/ facilities, etc. (instead of 40% area
for bigger projects).

(ii) …

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (4 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

(iii) However, in case of plots of size up to 1 acre the above
condition (of leaving 30% as open/park/road etc.) shall not
be applicable and subdivision shall be allowed after leaving
the required road width, where-ever necessary as decided
by the local body.”

2.2 Petitioner company prepared layout plan for development of

residential scheme upon the land in question, in accordance with

the provisions and requirements of Policy – 2010, which was sent

to Senior Town Planner on 22.11.2024 for approval. Although

Town Planning Department approved said layout plan on

27.12.2024, however, matter remained pending for approval

before the Layout Plan Committee (“LPC”) of erstwhile U.I.T.,

Bikaner.

2.3 During pendency of approval of layout plan of petitioner

company, Government of Rajasthan, vide notification dated

09.07.2025, promulgated Bikaner Development Authority Act,

2024, whereby Bikaner Development Authority (“BDA”) came into

existence, and entire land which was earlier at the disposal of

U.I.T., Bikaner, came under the purview of BDA. Learned counsel

submitted that despite several meetings of the LPC of BDA held

between March and July 2025, consideration upon the layout plan

of petitioner company came to be deferred time and again.

2.4 Learned counsel submitted that when BDA did not approve

layout plan of petitioner company for long time, petitioner

company submitted representations in that regard to concerned

authority. However, in the meantime, State Government

introduced the New Township Policy of 2025 (“Policy – 2025”),

which came into operation vide notification dated 17.07.2025, and

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (5 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

applicability of the same is provided under its Clause 1.7. Relevant

portion of said clause is quoted hereinbelow for ready reference: –

“1.7 Applicability of the Policy

The policy shall come into effect from the date it is notified
in the official Gazette and shall apply to all urban areas… It
shall apply to all schemes undertaken by the Government
Bodies, Local Authorities, revenue department and private
developers. This policy may also be adopted by other
departments such as Revenue Department Industries
Department, Panchayati Raj and Rural Development
Department for uniformity in development across the State.

Note: –

In cases where orders have been passed under section 90A/
90B (of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956) before
notification of this policy but layout plan have not been
approved and released to developer, such cases can be
approved by Local Body as per Township Policy –
2010 within 6 months of notification of policy. If there
is delay due to Local Body in approval, applicant may
represent to Government which may ask Local Body to
submit the details with justification. Government will decide
such case on merit.

All Government Bodies, Semi-Government Bodies or Local
Authorities undertaking any urban development schemes in
urban areas shall ensure compliance with planning norms
and planning parameters, development of all internal and
external development works and timelines for completing
schemes…”

2.5 It is contended by counsel for petitioner that as per said

clause, respondent – BDA was under an obligation to consider the

layout plan of petitioner company as per the provisions of Policy –

2010. However, while considering layout plan of petitioner

company as Agenda No. 4, in a meeting held on 11.09.2025,

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (6 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

Respondent – BDA insisted that petitioner must submit a revised

layout plan conforming to the provisions of Policy – 2025,

particularly while maintaining the ratio between Saleable:Facility

Area as 60:40.

3. Challenging said decision dated 11.09.2025, learned counsel

for petitioner contended that consideration of layout plan of

petitioner company in the light of provisions of Policy – 2025 was

ex facie illegal, erroneous and in direct contravention of the saving

clause contained in Clause 1.7 of Policy – 2025. It is stated that

said layout plan was prepared and submitted much prior to

promulgation of Policy – 2025 and, therefore, provisions thereof

cannot be made applicable retrospectively upon application of

petitioner company pending approval of layout plan. On above-

stated grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed for

setting aside impugned decision dated 11.09.2025.

3.1 While questioning the vires of note appended to clause 1.7 of

Policy – 2025, it was argued that said provision is essentially in

the nature of a ‘repeal and savings’ clause and the same cannot

be made or read as merely ‘directory’ in nature. It was further

argued that the use of the word ‘can’ in the said clause has

rendered the provision as ‘directory’, which has created scope of

leaving the adherence of the same upon the discretion of the

concerned authorities.

3.2 Referring to Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897

(“Act of 1897”), learned counsel argued that respondents have

misinterpreted the note appended to Clause 1.7. Learned counsel

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (7 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

submitted that rights accrued under a repealed enactment cannot

be extinguished by introduction of a new policy and such ‘repeal

and savings’ clause is required to be read as mandatory in its

application. In support of said contention, reliance was placed on

the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in the case of

Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. v. Shah Sadiq and Sons,

AIR 1987 SC 1217.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the State maintained that the

Policy – 2025, including clause 1.7, is of universal application and

its validity cannot be challenged merely because it adversely

affects certain individuals. It was further contended that while

challenging the validity of clause 1.7, petitioner company has

failed to establish violation of any fundamental right or violation of

any parent statue and therefore, the challenge is not sustainable

in the eyes of law.

4.1 With respect to impugned decision taken by layout

committee of BDA, it was argued that even under Policy – 2010,

only a minimum criterion (30%) for facility area is prescribed and

concerned authority retains the discretion to increase the same.

Thus, the challenge to decision dated 11.09.2025 is also not

maintainable.

5. While supporting impugned decision dated 11.09.2025,

learned counsel for respondent – BDA stated that said decision is

wholly justified and that petitioner’s case was duly considered

under the Policy – 2010. It is further contended that even under

said policy, the prescribed open area can be enhanced in

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (8 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

appropriate cases upon recommendation of competent technical

authority. Therefore, no error of law has been committed in

passing of impugned decision dated 11.09.2025. Learned counsel

also argued that petitioner has failed to demonstrate violation of

any fundamental or vested legal right and, therefore, instant writ

petition is not maintainable.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record.

7. Undisputed facts of the case at hand are that the permission

for conversion of the land in question under Section 90-A of the

L.R. Act was duly granted, pursuant to which petitioner company

prepared and submitted layout plan in accordance with the

provisions of then prevailing Township Policy of 2010. It is also

established from the record that petitioner’s application for

approval of layout plan remained pending at the point of time

when Policy – 2010 was repealed and replaced by Policy – 2025.

7.1 In this background, the core issue which arises for the

consideration of this Court is whether, after such change of regime

of Township Policy, the pending application of petitioner company

was required to be considered under the Policy – 2010 or Policy –

2025.

7.2 This Court finds that there is a substantial difference

between the provisions of Policies of 2010 and 2025. While Clause

4.2 of the Policy – 2010 prescribes minimum 30% facility area in

cases of residential schemes of less than 2 hectares, the Policy –

2025 has augmented the same to 40%.

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (9 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

7.3 Clause 1.7 of the Policy – 2025, particularly the note

appended thereto, provides that in cases where orders under

Section 90-A/90-B of the L.R. Act have been passed prior to

notification of the new policy, but layout plans have not been

approved, such cases are to be considered under the Policy – 2010

within a period of six months.

In the considered opinion of this Court, said provision is

clearly in the nature of a savings clause, intended to protect

pending applications from the application of new policy regime.

The expression “can be approved” used therein cannot be

construed as conferring unfettered discretion upon concerned

authorities; such an interpretation would defeat the very object of

the provision. Thus, it is necessary to construe the provisions of

the said clause in lights of its purpose.

7.4 On the doctrine of purposive interpretation, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna

Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619 observed as follows: –

“31…The principle of “purposive interpretation” or
“purposive construction” is based on the understanding that
the Court is supposed to attach that meaning to the
provisions which serve the “purpose” behind such a
provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it
designed to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by
interpretative process the Court is supposed to realise the
goal that the legal text is designed to realise. As Aharan
Barak puts it:

“Purposive interpretation is based on three
components: language, purpose, and discretion.
Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities
within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (10 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses
the legal meaning of the text from among the
(express or implied) semantic possibilities. The
semantic component thus sets the limits of
interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal
meaning that the text can bear in its (public or
private) language.”

32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language,
purpose and discretion “of the Court”, insofar as purposive
component is concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose
at the core of the text. This purpose is the values, goals,
interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to
actualize. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfil.

33. We may also emphasize that the statutory
interpretation of a provision is never static but is always
dynamic. Though literal rule of interpretation, till some time
ago, was treated as the “golden rule”, it is now the doctrine
of purposive interpretation which is predominant,
particularly in those cases where literal interpretation may
not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity. If it brings
about an end which is at variance with the purpose of
statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal
process thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected
intentionalism as a grand strategy for statutory
interpretation, and in its place they offered purposivism,
this principle is now widely applied by the Courts not only in
this country but in many other legal systems as well.”

7.5 This creative role of the judge was further emphasized in

Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133, where the

Hon’ble Supreme Court observed thus: –

“62. I have referred to the aforesaid authorities to highlight
that legislative intention and the purpose of the legislation
regard being had to the fact that context has to be
appositely appreciated. It is the foremost duty of the Court
while construing a provision to ascertain the intention of the
legislature, for it is an accepted principle that the legislature

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (11 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

expresses itself with use of correct words and in the
absence of any ambiguity or the resultant consequence
does not lead to any absurdity, there is no room to look for
any other aid in the name of creativity. There is no quarrel
over the proposition that the method of purposive
construction has been adopted keeping in view the text
and the context of the legislation, the mischief it intends to
obliterate and the fundamental intention of the legislature
when it comes to social welfare legislations. If the purpose
is defeated, absurd result is arrived at. The Court need not
be miserly and should have the broad attitude to take
recourse to in supplying a word wherever necessary.
Authorities referred to hereinabove encompass various
legislations wherein the legislature intended to cover
various fields and address the issues. While interpreting a
social welfare or beneficent legislation one has to be guided
by the ‘colour’, ‘content’ and the ‘context of statutes’ and if
it involves human rights, the conceptions of Procrustean
justice and Lilliputian hollowness approach should be
abandoned. The Judge has to release himself from the
chains of strict linguistic interpretation and pave the path
that serves the soul of the legislative intention and in that
event, he becomes a real creative constructionist Judge.”

7.6 Further, it is well settled that the use of the expression “may”

or “can” does not necessarily denote discretion. In Bachahan

Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur, (2008) 12 SCC 372, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: –

“20…Though the power is conferred upon the statutory body
by the use of the word ‘may’ that power must be construed
as a statutory duty. Conversely, the use of the term ‘shall’
may indicate the use in optional or permissive sense.
Although in general sense ‘may’ is enabling or discretional
and ‘shall’ is obligatory, the connotation is not inelastic and
inviolate. Where to interpret the word ‘may’ as directory
would render the very object of the Act as nugatory, the
word ‘may’ must mean ‘shall’.

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (12 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

21. The ultimate rule in construing auxiliary verbs like ‘may’
and ‘shall’ is to discover the legislative intent; and the use
of words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ is not decisive of its discretion or
mandates. The use of the words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ may help
the courts in ascertaining the legislative intent without
giving to either a controlling or a determinative effect. The
courts have further to consider the subject matter, the
purpose of the provisions, the object intended to be secured
by the statute which is of prime importance, as also the
actual words employed.

22. (Quoting from Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi
Narayan Gupta, (1985) 3 SCC 53, p. 59, para 9)
“9. …Obviously where the legislature uses two words
‘may’ and ‘shall’ in two different parts of the same
provision prima facie it would appear that the
legislature manifested its intent to make one part
directory and another mandatory. But that by itself
is not decisive.”

The power of court to find out whether the provision is
directory or mandatory remains unimpaired.”
7.7 The purpose underlying said clause is to ensure that

applications prepared and submitted under the regime of the

Policy – 2010 are not subjected to the amended requirements

under the Policy – 2025, so as to avoid prejudice to applicants

whose proposals were processed under the earlier regime but

remained pending due to administrative reasons.

7.8 It is evident from the record that petitioner company had

duly prepared and submitted its layout plan well prior to the

enforcement of the Policy – 2025, and that the pendency of its

application when the regime changed is not attributable to any

fault on its part, but rather to administrative delay within the BDA.

Any interpretation that leaves the application of said savings

clause to the discretion of the concerned authorities would result

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (13 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

in penalizing the petitioner for such administrative inaction, which

would be manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution.

7.9 This Court further finds that the note appended to Clause

1.7, when construed in light of its object, is indicative of the

legislative intent that Policy – 2025 is to operate prospectively. If

the expression “can” is interpreted as directory, it would lead to an

anomalous situation where similarly situated applicants are

treated differently – some being governed by the Policy – 2010 and

others by the Policy – 2025, depending solely upon the discretion

of the authority. Such a construction would introduce arbitrariness

and uncertainty, which cannot be countenanced in law.

7.10 In this context, Section 6(c) of the Act of 1897 assumes

significance, which reads as under: –

“6. Effect of repeal.– Where this Act, or any [Central Act]
or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act,
repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be
made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal
shall not-

(a) ******

(b) ******

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed;…”

A plain reading of aforementioned provision makes it clear

that repeal of an enactment does not affect rights accrued under

the repealed regime unless a contrary intention is expressly

manifested.

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (14 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

7.11 Gammon India Ltd. v. Special Chief Secretary & Ors.

reported in (2006) 3 SCC 354 is a leading authority on the

interpretation of section 6 of the Act of 1897, particularly in the

context of cases where there is a repeal of an enactment and a

simultaneous re-enactment. Relevant observations are extracted

hereinbelow: –

“46. The principle which has been laid down in this case is
that whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the
consequences laid down in Section 6 or the corresponding
sections will follow unless, as the section itself says, a
different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal
there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary
opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation
on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to
the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of
determining whether they indicate a different intention. The
line of enquiry would be not whether the new Act
expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but
whether it manifests an intention to destroy them.

47. In Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Janardan
Ramchandra Kulkarni, it was observed as under:

“Section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that
where an Act is repealed, then, unless a different
intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any
right or liability acquired or incurred under the
repealed enactment or any legal proceeding in
respect of such right or liability and the legal
proceeding may be continued as if the repealing Act
had not been passed. There is no dispute that
Section 153- C of the Act of 1913 gave certain rights
to the share-holders of a company and put the
company as also its directors and managing agents
under certain liabilities. The application under that
section was for enforcement of these rights and

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (15 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

liabilities. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
would therefore preserve the rights and liabilities
created by Section 153-C of the Act of 1913 and a
continuance of the proceeding in respect thereof
would be competent in spite of the repeal of the Act
of 1913, unless of course a different intention could
be gathered.”

48. …

49. In M.A. Tulloch case the Court aptly observed that we
have to inquire the principle on which the saving clause in
Section 6 is based. It is manifest that every later
enactment which supersedes an earlier one or puts
an end to an earlier state of the law is presumed to
intend the continuance of rights accrued and
liabilities incurred under the superseded enactment
unless there were sufficient indications – express or
implied – in the later enactment designed to
completely obliterate the earlier state of the law.

And again in paras 52 and 53: –

“52. …In other words, whenever there is a repeal of an
enactment the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself
says, a different intention appears in the repealing statute.

53. In case the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the
same subject the court has to look to the provisions of the
new Act for the purpose of determining whether they
indicate a different intention. The question is not whether
the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities
but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The
application of this principle is not limited to cases where a
particular form of words is used to indicate that the earlier
law has been repealed. As this Court has said, it is both
logical as well as in accordance with the principle, upon
which the rule as to implied repeal rests, to attribute to that
legislature which effects a repeal by necessary implication
the same intention as that which would attend the case of

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (16 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

an express repeal. Where an intention to effect a repeal is
attributed to a legislature then the same would attract the
incident of saving found in Section 6.”

Aforesaid decision make it clear that even in cases of repeal

followed by fresh legislation, accrued rights and pending

proceedings are preserved unless the subsequent enactment

manifests a clear intention to the contrary.

7.12 Reliance may also be placed upon judgment passed by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income

Tax, U.P. v. Shah Sadiq and Sons (supra), wherein the Hon’ble

Court, observed as under:

“In this case the ‘savings’ provision in the repealing statute
is not exhaustive of the rights which are saved or which
survive the repeal of the statute under which such rights
had accrued. In other words, whatever rights are expressly
saved by the ‘savings’ provision stand saved. But, that does
not mean that rights which are not saved by the ‘savings’
provision are extinguished or stand ipso facto terminated by
the mere fact that a new statute repealing the old statute is
enacted. Rights which have accrued are saved unless they
are taken away expressly. This is the principle behind
section 6(c), General Clauses Act, 1897. The right to carry
forward losses which had accrued under the repealed
Income-tax Act of 1922 is not saved expressly by section
297, Income-tax Act, 1961. But, it is not necessary to save
a right expressly in order to keep it alive after the repeal of
the Old Act of 1922. Section 6(c) saves accrued rights
unless they are taken away by the repealing statute. We do
not find any such taking away of the rights by S. 297 either
expressly or by implication.”

7.13 Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court finds no

indication, either express or implied, in Policy – 2025 to suggest

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (17 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

that rights accrued in favour of applicants under the Policy – 2010

are intended to be extinguished.

7.14 Consequently, adopting a purposive interpretation of Clause

1.7, this Court holds that the expression “can be approved”

occurring therein must be read as “shall be approved”, thereby

making it obligatory upon the authorities to consider all such

pending applications under the provisions of the Policy – 2010

within the stipulated period.

7.15 Insofar as the challenge to the vires of Clause 1.7 of the

Rajasthan Township Policy, 2025 is concerned, this Court finds that

the said provision itself does not suffer from any such infirmity so

as to render it ultra vires. As observed hereinabove, the provision,

when interpreted in light of its object and purpose, functions as a

savings clause intended to protect pending applications. The

difficulty highlighted by the petitioner arises on account of the

interpretation of the expression “can be approved” and not from

any inherent defect in the provision itself. Once the said

expression is construed in its proper context as mandatory in

nature, the foundation of the challenge ceases to exist. The

provision, therefore, cannot be said to suffer from arbitrariness or

unconstitutionality, and the challenge to its vires is accordingly

rejected.

8. Considering the challenge laid to decision of respondent –

BDA on Agenda No. 4 contained in the minutes of meeting dated

11.09.2025, this Court finds that BDA directed petitioner company

to submit a revised layout plan in accordance with the Policy –

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (18 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

2025 solely on the ground that said Policy had come into force and

governs the field.

8.1 Relevant portion of the decision of the committee on Agenda

No. 4 as taken in the minutes of meeting dated 11.09.2025 is

quoted below: –

“समिति द्वारा मानचित्र का अवलोकन कीया गया ऐवम यह नोट कीया की प्रकरण
में प्रस्तावित योजना में आन्तरिक सडको का मार्गाधिकार सड़कों की लंबाई के
अनुरूप टाउनशिप पॉलिसी के प्रावधान अनुसार रखा जाना अपे क्षित है , योजना में
कोई पार्क / ओपन / ग्रीन प्रस्तावित नही किया गया। अतः प्रस्तावित मानचित्र में
टाऊनशिप पॉलिसी – 2010 एवं विभागीय अधिसूचना दिनां क – 10.08.2020 के
प्रावधानों एवं समय-समय पर राज्य सरकार द्वारा जारी दिशा-निर्देशों / आदे शों /
परिपत्रों / अधिसू चना के अनुसार सं शोधन कर अधिकतम विक्रय योग्य क्षेत्रफल
60% रखते हुए पुनः समिति के समक्ष प्रस्तुत करने का निर्णय लिया गया है ।

साथ ही समिति द्वारा यह नोट कीया गया की वर्तमान में राज्य सरकार द्वारा दिनां क
17.07.2025 को नवीन टाउनशिप पॉलिसी-2025 लागू की गई है , उक्त पॉलिसी में
अन्य प्रावधानों के साथ साथ समस्त क्षेत्रफल की आवासीय योजनाओं में पॉलिसी के
बिन्दु संख्या 3.2 अनु सार अधिकतम विक्रय योग्य क्षेत्रफल 60 प्रतिशत ही रखा गया
है । समिति द्वारा यह नीतिगत निर्णय लिया गया है की प्राधिकरण को प्राप्त होने वाले
प्रकरणों में जो आवासीय योजनाए टाउनशिप पॉलिसी 2010 के अं तर्गत आवेदित हैं
में भी अधिकतम विक्रय योग्य क्षेत्रफल 60 प्रतिशत ही रखा जावे।”

A perusal of aforementioned decision makes it clear that

although reference has been made to the Policy – 2010, the

requirement of maintaining 40% open area has been imposed

solely on account of enforcement of the Policy – 2025. No

independent or case-specific reasons, recording any peculiar

circumstances or location-specific concerns, have been assigned to

justify such enhancement in the facts of present case. Said

decision thus reflects that the new policy has been applied to the

case of petitioner company in the garb of exercise of discretion,

which, as held hereinabove, is impermissible.

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (19 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

8.2 The contention of respondents that even Clause 4.2 of the

Policy – 2010 is merely directory and permits enhancement at the

discretion of the authority cannot be accepted. This Court finds

that said clause only requires adherence of minimum prescribed

limit for maintaining open / facility area. Although, an applicant

may voluntarily provide a higher percentage of open area, there is

no provision under said clause which confers upon concerned

authorities any discretionary powers to impose a higher

percentage of open / facility area. Accepting such an

interpretation would vest the authority with unguided and

unbridled discretion, enabling it to impose varying standards in

identical situations, which is neither the intent of the policy nor

permissible in law. The said contention is, therefore, rejected.

8.3 This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that

respondent – BDA has, in effect, applied the provisions of Policy –

2025 to the case of petitioner company under the guise of

exercising discretion under the Policy – 2010, which is legally

unsustainable.

9. As an upshot of the foregoing discussion, this Court arrives

at the following conclusions:

I. Clause 1.7 of the Rajasthan Township Policy, 2025,

particularly the note appended thereto, is in the nature of a

savings clause, intended to protect pending applications from

the application of the new policy regime. On a purposive

interpretation, so as to prevent leaving the adherence to said

clause to the discretion of authorities, the expression “can be

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (20 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

approved” occurring therein must be read as “shall be

approved”, thereby making it obligatory upon the authorities

to consider such applications under the provisions of Policy –

2010.

II. Challenge to the vires of Clause 1.7 of the Policy – 2025

is found to be without merit, as the provision, when construed

in light of its object and purpose, does not suffer from

arbitrariness or unconstitutionality. The perceived infirmity

arises only from the expression “can be approved”, which

stands resolved by adopting a purposive construction.

III. Impugned decision dated 11.09.2025 of respondent –

BDA on Agenda 4 is held to be arbitrary and legally

unsustainable, inasmuch as the provisions of Policy – 2025

have been applied to the case of petitioner under the guise of

exercising discretion under Policy – 2010, without any

independent or case-specific justification.

IV. Clause 4.2 of 2010 – Policy merely prescribes a

minimum requirement for open/facility area and does not

confer any power upon the authority to enhance the same at

its discretion. Any interpretation to the contrary would vest

the authority with unguided and unbridled discretion, which is

impermissible in law.

10. Consequently, this Court holds that respondent – BDA was

under a legal obligation to consider petitioner’s application strictly

in accordance with the provisions of Policy – 2010 and their failure

to do so vitiates the impugned action. Accordingly, impugned

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)
[2026:RJ-JD:16768-DB] (21 of 21) [CW-23613/2025]

decision on Agenda 4, as contained in minutes of meeting dated

11.09.2025, being arbitrary and contrary to Clause 1.7 of the

Rajasthan Township Policy, 2025, as interpreted hereinabove, is

hereby declared invalid and is quashed and set aside.

11. Respondents are directed to consider and process the

petitioner’s layout plan strictly in accordance with the provisions of

the Rajasthan Township Policy, 2010. Said exercise shall be

completed forthwith.

12. With the aforesaid observations and directions, present writ

petition stands disposed of.

13. Stay application and all other pending applications, if any,

also stand disposed of.

(SANJEET PUROHIT),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),ACJ

14-Shashikant/-

(Uploaded on 21/05/2026 at 04:41:47 PM)
(Downloaded on 21/05/2026 at 10:52:23 PM)

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)