Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
CRLP/6183/2026 on 27 July, 2026
HIGHCOURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
MAIN CASE No: Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
PROCEEDING SHEET
Sl. DATE ORDER OFFICE
No. NOTE
02. 27.07.2026 Dr.YLR,J
I.A.No.1 of 2026
This petition is filed to direct the Respondent No.1
Police not to take any coercive steps, including the arrest
of the Petitioners/Accused Nos.5, 6 and 7 in connection
with Crime No.147 of 2026 dated 15.07.2026 on the file
of the Srikakulam Rural Police Station, Srikakulam
District.
Heard C. Raghu, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri Sripathi Ravi Teja, learned
Counsel for the Petitioners, Sri P. Venkateswarlu,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri P.
Akash, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.2, and
the learned Public Prosecutor.
The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners
submits that the allegations in the complaint, FIR, and
remand report do not disclose the essential ingredients
of Section 467 of the I.P.C, and the dispute is purely civil
in nature, with O.S.No.14 of 2024 already pending before
the competent Civil Court. The criminal proceedings
have been initiated belatedly to convert a civil dispute
into a criminal case. Since the case is based entirely on
documentary evidence already available with the
Investigating Agency, custodial interrogation is
Contd…
2
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026 unnecessary, and the petitioners undertake to cooperate
with the investigation. Any coercive action, including
arrest, would cause irreparable prejudice to their
personal liberty and reputation, whereas granting interim
protection would cause no prejudice to the respondents.
The learned Public Prosecutor and the learned
Senior Counsel for the Respondent No.2 opposed to
grant interim relief and that the offences alleged against
the Petitioners are grave in nature. Further, the
petitioners are not cooperating with the investigating
agency to complete the investigation and they have been
absconding since the date of the registration of the case.
At this juncture, if the petitioners granted interim relief
there is every chance in not cooperating with the
investigating agency and would cause serious prejudice
to the investigating agency in complete the investigation.
The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj1. In paragraph
Nos.19, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“19. A close scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions makes it
clear that, Section 463 defines the offence of forgery,
while Section 464 substantiates the same by providing an
answer as to when a false document could be said to
have been made for the purpose of committing an offence
of forgery under Section 463 IPC. Therefore, we can
safely deduce that Section 464 defines one of the
ingredients of forgery i.e. making of a false document.
Further, Section 465 provides punishment for the
commission of the offence of forgery. In order to sustain a
conviction under Section 465, first it has to be proved that
forgery was committed under Section 463, implying that Contd…
1
(2018) 7 SCC 581
3
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.202627.07.2026 ingredients under Section 464 should also be satisfied.
Therefore unless and until ingredients under Section 463
are satisfied a person cannot be convicted under Section
465 by solely relying on the ingredients of Section 464, as
the offence of forgery would remain incomplete.”
The learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar2. In paragraph
Nos.16 and 17 thereof, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
as under:
16. There is a fundamental difference between a person
executing a sale deed claiming that the property
conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale
deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be
authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the
deed on owner’s behalf. When a person executes a
document conveying a property describing it as his, there
are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes
that the property actually belongs to him. The second is
that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to
be his even though he knows that it is not his property.
But to fall under first category of “false documents”, it is
not sufficient that a document has been made or
executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further
requirement that it should have been made with the
intention of causing it to be believed that such document
was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person,
by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not
made or executed.
17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a
property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is
someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by
someone else. Therefore, execution of such document
(purporting to convey some property of which he is not
the owner) is not execution of a false document as
defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is
executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If
there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section
471 of the Code are attracted.
The learned Public Prosecutor relied on the
Contd…
2
(2009) 8 SCC 751
4
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026 judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sekendar
Sheikh v. State of W.B3, wherein at paragraph No.7, it
is held as under:
“7. It was urged, however, that when the Trial Judge
acquitted the two appellants of the offences punishable
under s. 82(c) and 82(d) of the Indian Registration Act –
the offence of false personation and in such assumed
character presenting a document, and abetment thereof –
and that so long as the order of acquittal was not set
aside in an appeal duly presented, the High Court in a
reference under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
was incompetent, relying upon the evidence which was
not regarded as reliable in respect of the offences under
the Registration Act, to convict the appellants of the
offences of forging a valuable security and abetment
thereof. It was submitted that as the offences under s.
467 I.P. Code and s. 82(c) Indian Registration Act formed
part of the same transaction and the case for the
prosecution for the former offence was substantially
founded on the same evidence which was not accepted
by the trial Court when acquitting the appellants of the
latter offence, the High Court could not act upon that
evidence to record an order of conviction on the charge
for the offence of forging a valuable security. We are
unable to accept this argument. Forging a valuable
security and presentation of that valuable security for
registration are two distinct offences. In support of the
case that the appellants were guilty of forging a valuable
security the material evidence is that relating to the
making dishonestly or fraudulently of a false document of
the nature of a valuable security. That evidence consisted
of the instructions given at the time of writing of the
document, the character of the document, its execution,
and the intention of the accused in fabricating the
document. The offence of false personation for presenting
any document consisted in the presentation of a
document before the registering authority by a person
claiming to be some one else. An item of evidence may
corroborate charges for more offences than one : but
acquittal of the accused for one such offences will not
render that item of evidence inadmissible in assessing the
criminality of the accused for another offence
corroborated thereby. The question in such a case is not
one of admissibility but of weight to be given to that
evidence. The decision of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in Malak Khan v. King Emperor (1945) L.R.
72 IndAp 305., negatives the submission of the
appellants. In Malak Khan‘s case the accused was Contd…
3
MANU/SC/0058/1963
5
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.202627.07.2026 charged before the Court of Session for offences of
murder and robbery. He was acquitted by the Trial Judge
of the offence of robbery and convicted of the offence of
murder. The High Court in appeal against the order of
conviction relied upon the evidence which was material to
both the charges of robbery and murder, as corroborative
of the guilt of the accused for the offence of murder. It
was held by the Judicial Committee that the High Court
could properly accept the evidence as corroborative of
the guilt of the accused for the offence of murder, even
though that evidence was not accepted by the trial Court
on the charge of robbery. In considering the argument
that the evidence could not be relied upon in support of
the charge of murder, the Judicial Committee observed :
“The Sessions Judge, it was said, had acquitted the
appellant of robbery; he was, therefore, not guilty of that
offence; on appeal had been taken against that acquittal
and therefore no Court was entitled to take into
consideration the allegation upon which the accusation of
robbery was founded even as corroborative “evidence” in
another case. Their Lordships cannot accept this
contention. The learned Sessions Judge did no in fact
find the accusation baseless; he only found the crime not
proven. But even if he had disbelieved the whole story of
the recovery of the stolen property from the appellant, his
finding would not prevent the High Court from weighing its
value and if they accepted its substantial truth from taking
it into consideration in determining whether another crime
had been committed or no.”
Another judgment relied on by the learned Public
Prosecutor in Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar4,
wherein at paragraph Nos.30, it is held as under:
“30. We have already held that the power to grant
anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though in
many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that
anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the
question of its grant should be left to the cautious and
judicious discretion by the court depending on the facts
and circumstances of each case. While called upon to
exercise the said power, the court concerned has to be
very cautious as the grant of interim protection or
protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to
miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation
to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering
or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood Contd…
4
(2024) 12 SCC 382
6
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.202627.07.2026 to have held that the court shall not pass an interim
protection pending consideration of such application as
the section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an
individual against unwarranted arrest and we say that
such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases. At any
rate, when warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the
applicant is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary power.
Certainly, this will not deprive the power of the court to
grant pre-arrest bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the
interest of justice. But then, person(s) continuously
defying orders and keeps absconding is not entitled to
such grant.”
The principal allegation against the Petitioners is
that they have committed the offences punishable under
Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 120-B read with Section 34
of the I.P.C. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the Petitioners contends that the dispute is
predominantly civil in nature and that the essential
ingredients constituting the offences of forgery are
absent. In support of the said contention, reliance has
been placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Sheila Sebastian and Ibrahim supra. On the
other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor and the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent
No.2 would submit that the allegations disclose
commission of cognizable offences of serious nature and
that custodial interrogation is necessary for a fair and
effective investigation. They further contend that the
Petitioners have not been cooperating with the
investigation and have remained unavailable since
registration of the crime.
At this interlocutory stage, this Court is not
Contd…
7
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026 expected to undertake a meticulous examination of the
evidence or record any finding on the merits of the rival
contentions. The issues as to whether the ingredients of
the offences alleged are made out and the applicability of
the judgments relied upon by the respective parties are
matters which require detailed examination at the time of
final adjudication of the Criminal Petition.
The Petitioners have not filed an application for
anticipatory bail, in the first instance, before the learned
Sessions Judge concerned. Instead, they have directly
approached this Court by filing the present petition. The
Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohammed Rasal.C v. State of
Kerala5, at paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9 held as follows:-
“7. The Sessions Judge exercises powers under Section
438 Cr.P.C in relation to all cases registered with the
police stations in the particular District. This area-wise
distribution of work would make it much more convenient
and facilitate expeditious disposal, if the application for
pre-arrest bail is first filed before the Sessions Court
which would have a direct and first-hand assistance of the
concerned Public Prosecutor appointed for that particular
District. The Sessions Court would also have an
immediate access to the Case Diary thereby facilitating a
better appreciation of facts of the case.
8. We further feel that if the practice of entertaining the
applications for pre-arrest bail directly in the High Court is
encouraged, and the parties concerned are not relegated
to first approach the Sessions Court concerned, the High
Court would be flooded with a spate of pre-arrest bail
applications thereby creating a chaotic situation. We say
so, because if the parties are required to approach the
Sessions Court concerned for seeking remedy of pre-
arrest bail, there is a strong probability that significant
number of applications would be allowed at that level only
thereby acting as a filtration process before the process
reaches the High Court.
Contd…
5
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) Nos. 6588 of 2025, dated 08.09.2025.
8
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.202627.07.2026 9. It is trite that in most of the States, there is a consistent
practice requiring the litigant concerned to first approach
the Sessions Court for seeking relief of pre-arrest bail and
only in the event of denial of such relief, the litigant would
be granted access to approach the High Court for seeking
such relief. This is, of course, subject to just exceptions
and the High Court, for reasons to be recorded, may
entertain an application for pre-arrest bail directly in
special/ extra-ordinary circumstances.”
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jagdeo Prasad v.
State of Bihar and others6, supra wherein at para No. 6
as under:
“6. However, before parting, we do wish to express our
sincere concern with the haste at which the High Court
has dealt with this matter. While the scheme of Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023) provides concurrent jurisdiction to the
High Court and Sessions Court for entertaining
applications for anticipatory bail, this Court has time and
again observed that High Court should always encourage
exhausting an alternative/concurrent remedy before
directly interfering itself. This approach balances the
interests of all the stakeholders, first by giving the
aggrieved party a round of challenge before the High
Court. Second, this approach provides the High Court an
opportunity to assess the judicial perspective so applied
by the Sessions Court, in concurrent jurisdiction, instead
of independently applying its mind from the first go.
Further, the High Court fails to record any reason for
directly granting anticipatory bail without impleading the
appellant-complainant as a party.”
However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
celebrating of the Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of
Punjab7, wherein at paragraph Nos.34 to 39, it is held as
under:
“34. This should be the end of the matter, but it is
necessary to clarify a few points which have given rise to
certain misgivings.
35. Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition Contd…
which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be6
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 17805 of 2024 etc.
7
(1980) 2 SCC 565
9
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.202627.07.2026 granted. The applicant must show that he has “reason to
believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable
offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe”
shows that the belief that the applicant may be so
arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere
„fear‟ is not „belief”, for which reason it is not enough for
the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague
apprehension that some one is going to make an
accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be
arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant
is based that he may be arrested for a non-bailable
offence, must be capable of being examined by the court
objectively, because it is then alone that the court can
determine whether the applicant has reason to believe
that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore,
cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general
allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a
possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for
anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult
populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the
individuals liberty; it is neither a passport to the
commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all
kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely
36. Secondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is
made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must
apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a
case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot
leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate
concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when
an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very
object of Section 438.
37. Thirdly, the filing of a first information report is not a
condition precedent to the exercise of the power under
Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on
a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an FIR
is not yet filed.
38. Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after
an FIR is filed, so long as the applicant has not been
arrested.
39. Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be
invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of
“anticipatory bail” to an accused who is under arrest
involves a contradiction in terms, insofar as the offence or
offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After
arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section
437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be
released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for
which he is arrested.” Contd…
10
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026
In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi)8, the
Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.85 and 85.6, it is
held as under:
“85. Having regard to the above discussion, it is clarified
that the court should keep the following points as guiding
principles, in dealing with applications under Section 438
CrPC:
85.1. As held in Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of
Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , when
a person apprehends arrest and approaches a court for
anticipatory bail, his apprehension (of arrest), has to be
based on concrete facts (and not vague or general
allegations) relatable to a specific offence or particular
offences. Applications for anticipatory bail should contain
clear and essential facts relating to the offence, and why
the applicant reasonably apprehends his or her arrest, as
well as his version of the facts. These are important for
the court which is considering the application, the extent
and reasonableness of the threat or apprehension, its
gravity or seriousness and the appropriateness of any
condition that may have to be imposed. It is not a
necessary condition that an application should be moved
only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier, so long
as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for
apprehending arrest.
85.2. The court, before which an application under
Section 438 is filed, depending on the seriousness of the
threat (of arrest) as a measure of caution, may issue
notice to the Public Prosecutor and obtain facts, even
while granting limited interim anticipatory bail.
85.3. Section 438 CrPC does not compel or oblige courts
to impose conditions limiting relief in terms of time, or
upon filing of FIR, or recording of statement of any
witness, by the police, during investigation or inquiry, etc.
While weighing and considering an application (for grant
of anticipatory bail) the court has to consider the nature of
the offence, the role of the person, the likelihood of his
influencing the course of investigation, or tampering with
evidence (including intimidating witnesses), likelihood of
fleeing justice (such as leaving the country), etc. The
courts would be justified — and ought to impose
conditions spelt out in Section 437(3) CrPC [by virtue of
Section 438(2)]. The necessity to impose other restrictive
conditions, would have to be weighed on a case-by-case
basis, and depending upon the materials produced by the
State or the investigating agency. Such special or other
restrictive conditions may be imposed if the case or cases Contd…
8
(2020) 5 SCC 1
11
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026 warrant, but should not be imposed in a routine manner,
in all cases. Likewise, conditions which limit the grant of
anticipatory bail may be granted, if they are required in
the facts of any case or cases; however, such limiting
conditions may not be invariably imposed.
85.4. Courts ought to be generally guided by the
considerations such as nature and gravity of the offences,
the role attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the
case, while assessing whether to grant anticipatory bail,
or refusing it. Whether to grant or not is a matter of
discretion; equally whether, and if so, what kind of special
conditions are to be imposed (or not imposed) are
dependent on facts of the case, and subject to the
discretion of the court.
85.5. Anticipatory bail granted can, depending on the
conduct and behaviour of the accused, continue after
filing of the charge-sheet till end of trial. Also orders of
anticipatory bail should not be “blanket” in the sense that
it should not enable the accused to commit further
offences and claim relief. It should be confined to the
offence or incident, for which apprehension of arrest is
sought, in relation to a specific incident. It cannot operate
in respect of a future incident that involves commission of
an offence.
85.6. Orders of anticipatory bail do not in any manner limit
or restrict the rights or duties of the police or investigating
agency, to investigate into the charges against the person
who seeks and is granted pre-arrest bail.”
In view of the specific allegations and overt acts
attributed to the Petitioner No.1/Accused No.5, this Court
is not inclined to grant pre-arrest bail as it would amount
to granting protection or shield to the persons against
whom specific allegations are levelled, as per the
judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab9 and Sushila Aggarwal v.
State (NCT of Delhi)10. Hence, the interlocutory
application against the Petitioner No.1/Accused No.5 is
dismissed.
Contd…
9
(1980) 2 SCC 565
10
(2020) 5 SCC 1
12
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026 It is the case of the de-facto complainant that
Petitioner No.1/Accused No.5 entered into sale
transactions with Accused No.1, Adabla Rajini, for the
purchase of three plots by fraudulently creating the death
certificate of one Andavarapu Govindarajulu and a fake
legal heir certificate was also created showing Accused
No.1, Adabala Rajini, as the legal heir of Andavarapu
Govindarajulu, and, on the strength of such forged
documents, the three plots were registered in favour of
Petitioner No.1/Accused No.5. The further allegation is
that Accused No.1, in collusion with the other accused,
including the Petitioners, fabricated the legal heir
certificate showing herself to be the daughter of
Andavarapu Govindarajulu.
The allegation against Petitioner Nos.2 and
3/Accused Nos.6 and 7 is that they were present during
the deliberations in which the alleged conspiracy to
create the forged documents was hatched. Some of the
witnesses to the transaction, who are stated to be
employees of the Petitioners, have also stated in their
statements that the conspiracy took place in the
presence of Petitioner Nos.2 and 3/Accused Nos.6 and
7.
However, it is pertinent to note that more than two
and a half years prior to the registration of the present
crime, the de facto complainant had instituted a civil suit
against Petitioner No.1/Accused No.5 seeking the reliefs
Contd…
13
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026 of declaration of title, eviction, recovery of possession of
the subject property, and a direction to dismantle the
compound wall allegedly constructed therein.
Significantly, in the said suit, the de facto complainant
did not array Petitioner Nos.2 and 3/Accused Nos.6 and
7 as party defendants. Further, Petitioner Nos.2 and
3/Accused Nos.6 and 7 are neither executants, attesting
witnesses, nor identifying witnesses to the impugned
registered sale deeds.
It is also noteworthy that although FIR is not an
encyclopedia of all allegations of the offences, there is
no reference whatsoever in the complaint lodged before
the police regarding the pendency or institution of the
aforesaid civil suit. Thus, the de facto complainant
suppressed the material fact of having instituted the civil
suit against Petitioner No.1/Accused No.5. As noticed
supra, only after a lapse of more than two and a half
years the de facto complainant had approached the
police, resulting in the registration of FIR in Crime
No.147 of 2016. Further, even in the complaint, the de
facto complainant did not specifically mention the names
of Petitioner Nos.2 and 3/Accused Nos.6 and 7. It is also
pertinent to note that Petitioner No.1/Accused No.5 has
not produced any convincing and substantial material to
prima facie establish total payment of the sale
considerations to Accused No.1, Adabala Rajini, towards
the purchase of the three plots.
Contd…
14
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026 This Court has concurrent jurisdiction to entertain
an application for grant of anticipatory bail. Upon a
consideration of the entire material available on record,
this Court is satisfied that there exist certain special
circumstances warranting the entertainment of the
present application for anticipatory bail. Petitioner
No.2/Accused No.6 is aged about 71 years. He served
as the Speaker of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative
Assembly during the previous regime. Petitioner
No.3/Accused No.7 is aged of 65 years, she is the wife
of Petitioner No.2/Accused No.6. Petitioner
No.1/Accused No.5 is the son of Petitioner Nos.2 and
3/Accused Nos.6 and 7. In view of the above mentioned
reasons and circumstances, this Court is inclined to
entertain the present application and pass some orders.
Considering the entire facts and circumstances of
the case, gravity and nature of allegations against the
Petitioner No.1/Accused No.5 and in order to balance the
competing interests of both parties, this Court is not
inclined to grant any relief to Petitioner No.1/Accused
No.5.
However, upon considering the role attributed to
each of the Petitioner Nos.2 and 3/Accused Nos.6 and 7,
the nature of the allegations, the stage of investigation
and the necessity of balancing the individual liberty of the
accused with the requirement of a fair investigation, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the
Contd…
15
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026 Petitioners/Accused Nos.6 and 7 can be granted limited
interim protection. So far as the Petitioner No.1/Accused
No.5 is concerned, having regard to the allegations
attributed to him and the present stage of investigation,
this Court is not inclined to grant any benefit of interim
protection at this stage.
Accordingly, the Interlocutory Application is partly
allowed insofar as Petitioner Nos.2 and 3/Accused Nos.6
and 7 are concerned, directing the Investigating Agency
not to arrest Petitioner Nos.2 and 3/Accused Nos.6 and 7
until the next date of hearing. For Petitioner
No.1/Accused No.5, the Interlocutory Application is
dismissed.
However, Petitioner No.2/Accused No.6 shall
appear before the Investigating Officer on 29.07.2026 at
10:00 A.M, and on subsequent dates, if any, as per the
directions of Investigating Officer. Petitioner
No.2/Accused No.6 shall cooperate with the Investigating
Officer in completing the investigation. Petitioner
No.2/Accused No.6 shall thereafter appear before the
Investigating Officer as and when required, in
accordance with the instructions of the Investigating
Officer, until the conclusion of the investigation insofar as
the alleged role of Accused No.6 is concerned.
Insofar as Petitioner No.3/Accused No.7 is
concerned, she being a woman aged about 65 years, the
Investigating Officer shall conduct the investigation in
Contd…
16
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
27.07.2026 accordance with law, and Petitioner No.3/Accused No.7
shall cooperate with the Investigating Officer in
completing the investigation.
_________
Dr.YLR,J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
List on 17.08.2026 for filing counter of the
Respondent No.2.
_________
Dr.YLR,J
KMS
17
Dr.YLR, J
Crl.P.No.6183 of 2026
Dated 27.06.2026
