B. Mohanraj vs The State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 7 July, 2026

July 9, 2026

Delhi High Court

B. Mohanraj vs The State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 7 July, 2026

1. By way of the present application under Section 483 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”] (corresponding to
Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“CrPC“]), the
petitioner seeks regular bail in connection with FIR No. 208/2021, dated
07.08.2021, registered at Police Station Special Cell, Delhi, under
Sections 170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 [“IPC“], and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000

SPONSORED

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[“IT Act“]. At the time of filing of the chargesheet, Sections 3 and 4 of
the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 [“MCOCA”],
were also invoked.

2. At the outset, it may be noted that this is the second bail
application filed by the petitioner before this Court. His first bail
application1 was dismissed by a judgment dated 11.07.2023 [hereinafter,
“the 2023 judgment”]. The petitioner had thereafter applied for bail
before the Special Court for the second time. However, the Special Court
rejected his application vide order dated 08.05.2024, which has brought
him back to this Court.

3. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had also filed a Special Leave
Petition2 before the Supreme Court, challenging the observations
contained in paragraph 54 of the 2023 judgment, with regard to the
validity of the sanction under MCOCA. The said Special Leave Petition
was disposed of by the Supreme Court vide order dated 01.04.2026, with
the following observations:

“1. Delay condoned.

2. Having heard Mr. Anand Grover, learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioner as well as Mr. S. D. Sanjay, learned Additional Solicitor
General for the respondent, we dispose of the special leave petition with
the clarification that paragraph 54 of the impugned judgment and order
shall be read as necessary for disposal of the application before the High
Court and any observation made in such paragraph shall have no bearing
insofar as the petition that is pending before the High Court challenging
the order of sanction.

3. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”

BAIL APPLN. 1170/2022.

SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 56122/2024.

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4. I have heard Mr. Anand Grover, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, and Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the State. The
State has also filed a status report, which is on record.

5. I have also recently decided three bail applications arising out of
the same proceedings, filed by co-accused Leena Paulose [hereinafter,
“Leena”], Deepak Ramnani [hereinafter, “Deepak”], and Pradeep
Ramdanee [hereinafter, “Pradeep”]. The application filed by Leena3 was
dismissed, whereas the applications filed by Deepak4 and Pradeep5 were
allowed.

I. PROSECUTION CASE:

6. The prosecution case, as it appears from the material on record, is
as follows:

a. FIR No. 208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, lodged at Police Station
Special Cell, Delhi, under Sections
170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B of the IPC and Section 66D of
the IT Act, was registered at the instance of one Ms. Aditi Singh.
b. According to the complaint, on 15.06.2020, the complainant
received a call on her mobile phone from a landline number. The
caller introduced himself as a senior officer in the Ministry of Law
and offered assistance in securing bail for her husband, who was in
judicial custody in cases related to M/s Religare Enterprises
Limited.

BAIL APPLN. 1802/2024, decided on 05.05.2026 [hereinafter, “Leena Paulose”]. An earlier
application for bail filed by Leena in the State proceedings [BAIL APPLN. 3706/2022] was also
rejected by the 2023 judgment.

BAIL APPLN. 4286/2024, decided on 05.06.2026 [hereinafter, “Deepak Ramnani”].

BAIL APPLN. 4441/2024, decided on 05.06.2026.

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c. It is alleged that the caller demanded Rs. 50 crores in exchange for
facilitating the bail and explained the method of delivering the
money.

d. Subsequently, through his associates, the caller allegedly extorted
money from the complainant on multiple occasions between June
2020 and August 2021, amounting to Rs. 217 crores. There are
further allegations with regard to impersonation of senior officials,
including the Home Secretary, Government of India, and
misrepresenting the involvement of other government
functionaries, including the Home Minister.

e. Acting on the said information, on 07.08.2021, the police laid a
trap and apprehended Pradeep, while he was receiving the extorted
amount. He was arrested on the same day. During interrogation, he
disclosed that he was acting on the instructions of his brother,
Deepak, who was subsequently arrested on 08.08.2021.
f. Using technical surveillance of the mobile phone used for making
the calls, and the statements of co-accused, the caller was identified
as one Sukesh Chandra Shekhar @ Sukash Chandra Shekhar
[hereinafter, “Sukesh”].

g. At this time, Sukesh was already lodged in Tihar Jail as an
undertrial prisoner in a separate case, involving allegations of
collecting money from a political leader on the pretext of helping
him retain a particular election symbol. He was later shifted to
Rohini Jail.

h. A raid was conducted on the intervening night of 07/08.08.2021 by
the Special Cell, during which two mobile phones were recovered

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from Sukesh, while he was in custody, and he was formally
arrested in connection with the present FIR. His interrogation led to
the identification and arrest of other associates and co-conspirators.
The petitioner was arrested on 05.09.2021.

i. During investigation, it was found that Sukesh was involved in
multiple cases, including attempt to murder, criminal intimidation,
cheating, and extortion, often by impersonating high-ranking
officials.

j. Part of the extorted amount was allegedly transmitted by Sukesh,
through hawala channels, to his wife, Leena, in Chennai.
k. As far as the present petitioner is concerned, his role in the
aforesaid offences is summarised in the chargesheet as follows:

“5. Accused B. Mohanraj:

 B. Mohanraj is an advocate by profession and he has been
close associate of accused Sukash and Leena. Apart of
facilitating the legal matters he has also helped them in
disposing off crime proceeds.

 Accused B. Mohan Raj helped in purchasing property No.
Plot No. 12813 Sneha Garden, Kanathur, ECR Road,
Chennai against payment of Rs. 7.75 Crores and also
purchased two high end carsd make Lambhorgini for Rs. 3
Croroes and BentleeyBehtayaga for Rs. 2 Crore for Leena
Maria Paul from the crime proceeds sent by Sukash.
 B. Mohanraj helped Sukash and Leena in purchasing these
assets in the name of third parties by arranging bank entries
against receipt of cash. B. Mohanraj sought the help of his
friend/contract namely Kamlesh Kothari and Jitender
Kothari to accept the cash and then channelize the same for
making banking transactions.

 The property and the cars were also purchased in the names
of the associates so engaged and then Lease Agreement and
rent Agreement were executed with Leena Paul w/o
SukeshChanderSekha with the the engaged owners of her use.
 The arrangement was made to de-associate themselves with
the properties acquired out of the proceeds of crime by

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procuring these in the name of third parties and then entering
into Lease Agreement /rent Agreement for personal use.
 He received Rs. 15 lakhs and 10 lakhs as his fees cum
consultancy from Sukash Chandra Shekar in purchasing
aforesaid assets and cars respectively.

 Statements U/s 18 (1) MCOCA of Sukash and B. Mohan Raj.”

l. The State relied upon confessional statements under Section 18 of
MCOCA made by Sukesh and the petitioner herein. The relevant
portions of the statements of Sukesh, to the extent they relate to the
present petitioner, and the petitioner himself, have been
summarised in the status report filed on behalf of the State, as
follows:

“CONFESSIONAL STATEMENTS U/S 18 MCOC ACT OF
ACCUSED/APPLICANT B. MOHAN RAJ
During investigation, accused B. Mohan Raj was arrested on
05.09.2021 and his confessional statement u/s 18 MCOC Act was
recorded as per procedure by an independent DCP rank officer.
In his confessional statement, accused B. Mohan Raj had
admitted that while handling cases of Sukash Chandra Shekhar and
Leena Paulose, he found that they were working as a group and
obtaining lot of money from their illegal activities.
He also got into the affairs of management of their funds and joined
their syndicate. He received a lot of commission from them. Over
the period, he became one of the most integral part the syndicate.
Though overtly, he was managing their legal affairs, but covertly he
was managing their funds obtained from their illegal activities and
getting his share too.

In the year 2017, Sukash Chandra was arrested by Delhi Crime
Branch in connection with the Election Commission bribery case. In
that case, Sukash Chandra Shekhar made a phone call to accused
M. Mohan Raj and informed that he had struck a deal with TTV
Dinakaran, a politician of AIADMK party for Rs. 50 Cr. and since
then, Sukash Chandra Shekhar was lodged in Tihar Jail, Delhi.
Accused B. Mohan Raj was continuously in contact with Sukash
Chandra Shekhar and Leena Paulose. In 2019, Sukash Chandra
Shekhar came out on interim bail for 4 months. Accused B. Mohan
Raj met him in Leena’s parlour Nail Artistry, Alwarpet, Chennai
and also met them at their house. He was introduced to one Arun
Muthu, who is a friend of Sukash Chandra Shekhar and Leena

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Paulose. B. Mohan Raj came to know that Arun Muthu was running
a Garment business in the name of Stash Wear, in Chennai.
In January, 2020, a case was registered against Sukash Chandra
Shekhar while he was in Tihar Jail, by the C.B.I, Hyderabad
wherein he came to know that Sukash Chandra Shekhar
impersonated himself as a senior CBI officer and extorted money
from the victim. CBI raided the house of Leena Paulose in Boat
Club, Chennai which was taken on rent in the name of Arun Muthu
for Leena. He has facilitated the rent deal in which Arun Muthu
used to receive cash with huge commission. In June 2020, B. Mohan
Raj got a call from Sukash Chandra Shekhar on Telegram App on
his mobile number. Sukesh asked him to buy cars for Leena. He
introduced his friend Kamlesh Kothari, a high-end car dealer in
Chennai to Leena Paulose. Then, Leena Paulose bought three cars,
Range Rover Sport, Bentley and Fortuner from Kamlesh Kothari in
connivance with B Mohan Raj. Kamlesh Kothari and B. Mohan Raj
himself arranged all these transactions and got huge commission.
During August 2020, Sukash Chandra Shekhar called B. Mohan Raj
on Telegram and asked him to buy a house for Leena Paulose in
some other person’s name. He discussed it with Kamlesh Kothari
who suggested a house, Plot No.12&13, Sneha Garden, Kanathur,
ECR Road, Chennai. They finalized the deal. Sukash Chandra
Shekhar sent cash Rs.7.75 Crores through Sudheer and Joel Daniel
and handed over the money to accused Kamlesh Kothari at his
office at Chennai in his presence. The house was registered in the
name of Shri Jai Jinendra Constructions Company in which
Kamlesh Kothari’s cousin brother Jitender Kothari is a director.
The cost of the house was Rs.6.5 crores out of which Rs.4.5 crores
was paid in Demand Draft by Jitender Kothari to the seller and Rs.2
crores cash was paid to the seller by Kamlesh Kothari. Rs.50 Lakhs
was the cost of registration. Out of the remaining Rs.75 Lakh,
Jitender Kothari got Rs.45 Lakhs, Kamlesh Kothari got Rs.15 Lakhs
and B. Mohan Raj got Rs.15 Lakh as his share.

Leena Paulose occupied the said house and got the
renovation work done and interior work and bought all the
interiors. A rental agreement for this house was executed between
Leena Paulose and Jitender Kothari for Rs.2.5 Lakhs per month
from January 2021. Leena used to send the monthly rent through
RTGS to Jitender Kothari and he in turn used to deduct the tax
amount and return the balance amount to Kamlesh Kothari and he
used to get that amount and handed it over to Leena Paulose.

The original documents of the house property were handed
over to Leena Paulose by accused B. Mohan Raj in the presence of
Sukash Chandra Shekhar at his TVH House, Adyar, Chennai, when
Sukash Chandra Shekhar came on interim bail in October, 2020.

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Later on, in August 2020, Sukash Chandra Shekhar wanted to buy
two cars for his wife Leena Paulose. Sukash Chandra Shekhar
informed accused B. Mohan Raj that he had spoken to the sellers of
the car and Sukash wanted it to be bought in some other’s names.
Kamlesh Kothari arranged two buyers for the same. Sukash
Chandra Shekhar sent cash through Sudheer to them and they
bought two cars (1) Lamborghini Urus for Rs. 3.5 crores, and (2)
Bentley Bentayga for Rs. 2 crores for which B. Mohan Raj received
Rs.10 Lakhs and Kamlesh Kothari got Rs.10 Lakhs. For buying
these cars, the cash was handed over by Sudheer to Kamlesh
Kothari at Kamlesh’s office. Kamlesh Kothari gave it to the owners
and they sent it to the sellers through RTGS and bought the cars.

CONFESSIONAL STATEMENTS U/S 18 MCOC ACT OF
ACCUSED SUKASH CHANDRA SHEKHAR
The accused Sukash Chandra Shekhar confessed that “I told her
(Leena Paulose) to brief each of our aid. The said cash was received
at sow carpet Chennai and collected by Sudheer and Joel. Cash was
delivered to B. Mohan Raj and further delivered to Kamlesh Kothari
and Arun Muthu. Arun Muthu deals in providing bank entries and
Kamlesh Kothari deals in high end cars and house. For me and
Leena, it was B. Mohan Raj who looked after all the affairs. All
members were paid hefty commissions for their respective works. B.
Mohan Raj also arranged some entity for purchasing house also. B.
Mohan Raj and Kamlesh Kothari connected us to Jitender Kothari
and bought house at 12/13, Kannathur village, opposite Mayajaal
Cinemas, ECR, Chennai in name of Jitender Kothari in August
2020.”

II. JUDGMENT DATED 11.07.2023:

7. As noted above, an earlier bail application preferred by the present
petitioner before this Court was dismissed by the 2023 judgment. Mr.
Grover submitted that the Court ought to reconsider the petitioner’s
entitlement to bail, in view of the lapse of approximately three years since
the said decision. As the 2023 judgment deals with the same FIR and the
same petitioner, it is necessary to summarise the following prima facie
factual findings and legal conclusions contained therein:

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a. After noticing the case of the prosecution and the contents of
various statements recorded in the course of investigation, the
Court considered the submissions made on behalf of the present
petitioner, including as to the petitioner’s limited role.
b. In order to satisfy the ingredients of Sections 2(1)(d) of MCOCA,
it is not necessary that the chargesheet should be against an
individual, but a chargesheet against the syndicate as a whole,
would also suffice6.

c. Individual members of the syndicate may have different roles in the
commission of the crime. Channelising the money obtained
through the foundational crime of extortion is, in fact, sufficient to
make out an offence under MCOCA7.

d. Membership of the syndicate itself constitutes an offence under
Sections 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(e) of MCOCA8.

e. The question of whether confessional statements recorded under
Section 18 of MCOCA can be read into evidence in the absence of
independent corroboration is a matter of trial9. Confessional
statement may also be attributable to the co-accused10.
f. Objections with regard to validity of the sanction under Sections
23(1)(a) and 23(2) of MCOCA can only be examined at trial,
except when they touch upon inherent lack of jurisdiction, which
was not argued in this case11.

2023 judgment, paragraph 45.

2023 judgment, paragraph 46.

2023 judgment, paragraph 47.

2023 judgment, paragraph 49.

2023 judgment, paragraph 50.

2023 judgment, paragraph 54. This conclusion has been referred to in the order of the Supreme Court

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g. The twin conditions for grant of bail incorporated in Section 21(4)
of MCOCA requires the Court to be satisfied that there are
“reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of
such offence”, which is “something more than prima facie
grounds”12.

h. The present petitioner played an active role in assisting the crime
syndicate led by accused Sukesh and Leena in managing the
proceeds of crime derived from cheated and extorted funds. He was
also a member and an integral part of the group headed by Sukesh
and Leena. The petitioner admitted that, while he was overtly
managing their legal affairs, he was covertly managing funds
derived from their illegal activities. He not only facilitated the
purchase of vehicles but also handled the delivery of cash. Further,
he played an instrumental role in the purchase of a property worth
several crores in Chennai, which was a benami property of Leena.
The said property was purchased in the name of Jitender Kothari
on the instructions of accused Kamlesh Kothari [hereinafter,
“Kamlesh”]13. Investigation further revealed that the petitioner had
introduced Kamlesh to Leena14.

i. The present petitioner was involved in aiding and abetting the
foundational crime by channelising the proceeds of crime, and his
role was not limited to that of a lawyer15.

dated 01.04.2026 in SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 56122/2024, extracted in paragraph 3 above.

2023 judgment, paragraph 55.

2023 judgment, paragraphs 67, 68, and 69.

2023 judgment, paragraph 77.

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III. SUBMISSIONS BY LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES:

8. In support of the present application, Mr. Grover submitted that the
petitioner has remained incarcerated for nearly 4 years and 10 months. It
was pointed out that charges have only recently been framed by the
Special Court vide order dated 03.06.2026. Despite the prolonged period
of custody, the trial is not likely to conclude within a reasonable
timeframe, as the State has cited 403 witnesses and the chargesheets
collectively run into more than 10,000 pages. It was further submitted
that one of the co-accused, Navas KI, has been arrested only recently, and
it is likely that a supplementary chargesheet will be filed in relation to his
case, which would occasion further delay in the conclusion of the trial.
Mr. Grover relied upon Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb16, and several later
judgments of the Supreme Court, in support of this contention, which
have been considered later in this judgment.

9. It was further submitted that the allegations against the petitioner
do not attribute any role to him in the alleged coercion or extortion
activities of Sukesh. The prosecution case against him, namely, that he
facilitated the purchase of cars and property for Leena and parked funds
on behalf of Sukesh and Leena, rests primarily on confessional statements
recorded under Section 18 of MCOCA, which have since been retracted.
There is no independent documentary evidence or money trail, linking the
petitioner to the alleged offences. In these circumstances, it was
submitted that there is no material to establish that the petitioner was a
member of the OCS.

2023 judgment, paragraph 69.

(2021) 3 SCC 713 [hereinafter, “K.A. Najeeb”].

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10. Mr. Grover further submitted that the confessional statements
under Section 18 of the MCOCA were recorded contrary to the statutory
procedure. He contended that Section 18(3) mandates that the police
officer certify his satisfaction that the confession was made voluntarily,
which is a precondition for recording the confession. However, in the
present case, no such certification was recorded. He further submitted that
the validity of the confessional statements was undermined by the
absence of a cooling-off period between the petitioner being in police
custody, and the recording of the confession. In support of this
contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab17.

11. Lastly, Mr. Grover submitted that the petitioner is a practising
Advocate18 with deep roots in society. The petitioner is married, has two
minor daughters, and is also responsible for the care of his paralysed
father. He stated that the petitioner has no criminal antecedents apart from
the present case, and the connected proceedings19 under the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 [hereinafter, “PMLA”], wherein he has
already been granted bail20.

12. Mr. Jain, on the other hand, submitted that the issues now sought to
be raised have already been raised21 and dealt with in the 2023 judgment,
which specifically considered the petitioner’s role in light of his

17
(1994) 3 SCC 569, paragraph 390.

Mr. Grover placed on record a compilation to show that the petitioner was engaged in regular legal
practice during the relevant period.

ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021, dated 08.08.2021, under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA.

Order of the Special Court dated 16.12.2025.

2023 judgment, paragraphs 12 to 17.

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confessional statement22. It was observed that a sum of Rs. 21 crores was
remitted to Leena by the petitioner, co-accused Arun Muthu, and other
persons, in exchange for cash provided by Leena and Sukesh23. The
petitioner made arrangement for the purchase of cars and property, as
well as for the delivery of cash, despite his knowledge that the funds had
been derived from the activities of the OCS. Further, call data from the
Hushed App showed communication between the petitioner and Sukesh.
The petitioner’s involvement, therefore, demonstrates his active
membership in the OCS.

13. Mr. Jain also submitted that the benefit of Article 21 cannot be
granted in a case where the delay in trial is attributable to the accused. He
contended that the judgment in K.A. Najeeb does not foreclose such
considerations. According to him, the grant of bail in cases where
statutory restrictions, such as those under Section 21(4) of MCOCA,
apply cannot be determined solely on the basis of the length of custody.
In support of this contention, he reiterated the submissions recorded in
Leena Paulose24 and Deepak Ramnani25.

14. In rejoinder, Mr. Grover reiterated his reliance upon K.A. Najeeb,
to submit that statutory restrictions “melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time”26. He also
submitted that the Hushed App call data between the petitioner and
Sukesh consists of only a single call of 36 seconds and, in any event, is of

22
2023 judgment, paragraphs 67 to 69.

2023 judgment, paragraphs 60 and 61.

Paragraphs 15, 16, 24, and 25.

Paragraphs 9(a)-(c), 25, and 26.

Paragraph 17.

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no probative value in the absence of any material pertaining to the
contents of the conversation.

IV. ANALYSIS:

15. As noted above, this Court has, in the 2023 judgment, considered
the petitioner’s application for bail, in the course of which the prosecution
case against the petitioner was discussed in detail. The role ascribed to the
petitioner, as described in the 2023 judgment, has been summarised in
paragraphs 7(h) and 7(i) above. As this Court has already analysed the
material on record, albeit on a prima facie basis, I do not consider it
appropriate to revisit that question at this stage.

16. However, in view of the lapse of a further period of three years
since the 2023 judgment, this case raises a question of the interplay
between the constitutional rights of an undertrial, who remains in custody
for a prolonged period, with the statutory restrictions on grant of bail
found in several special statutes such as the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 [hereinafter, “UAPA”]27, the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 198528, MCOCA29, and PMLA30. I have
had the opportunity to consider the legal position governing this question,
both in Leena Paulose and Deepak Ramnani.

17. In Leena Paulose, upon consideration of the interpretation of the
three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)31,which had interpreted an earlier three-

Section 43-D (5).

Section 37.

Section 21(4).

Section 45.

2026 SCC OnLine SC 10 [hereinafter, “Gulfisha Fatima”].

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judge bench judgment in K.A. Najeeb, I had proceeded on the following
basis:

“29. The decision in Gulfisha Fatima, in my view, provides guidance on
the approach to be adopted while adjudicating bail application under
MCOCA also. Section 21(4) of MCOCA being on a “higher pedestal”

than Section 43D(5) of UAPA, I agree with Mr. Jain that, at the very least,
the same principles would govern the interplay between Section 21(4) of
MCOCA and the Article 21 rights of an accused. The apparently distinct
lines of authority cited above can, in my view, be reconciled, by applying
the ratio of Gulfisha Fatima.

30. The position which emerges therefrom is that statutory restrictions on
grant of bail cannot preclude constitutionally protected claims,
referrable to Article 21 of the Constitution. The ground of prolonged pre-
trial incarceration without likelihood of culmination of proceedings must
therefore be considered, even in cases involving special statutes. However,
these are not stand-alone considerations, but require to be analysed
alongwith the nature of the offence and the prima facie material on
record. Conversely, while adjudicating the satisfaction required in terms
of the statutory conditions, the material must be assessed through the lens
of the right under Article 21 of the Constitution. In order to adjudicate
such a question, the factors to be borne in mind include the length of
custody already undergone, the possible sentence for the offence, the
possibility of concluding the proceedings within a reasonable time,
whether delay in proceedings is attributable to the prosecution or the
defence, and the nature of the prima facie case made out against the
accused.

31. Haris Nisar Langoo, in my view, does not depart from the above
principles, but provides an example in which the Court was satisfied that
the petitioner was entitled to bail, even after applying Section 43D(5) of
UAPA. In fact, it may be noted that, even in Gulfisha Fatima, some of the
accused were granted bail, having regard to the specific facts of their
32
cases.”

18. Soon after the judgment in Leena Paulose was delivered, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National
Investigation Agency33 expressed reservations, with regard to the
correctness of Gulfisha Fatima. This has led to a reference to a larger

32
Emphasis supplied.

2026 SCC OnLine SC 881 [hereinafter, “Andrabi”].

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bench of the Supreme Court in Tasleem Ahmad v. State Govt. of NCT of
Delhi34. Pending resolution of the issue by the larger bench, this Court, in
Deepak Ramnani, considered it appropriate to adopt the following
approach:

“22. The question that arises before this Court, in light of the aforesaid
decisions, is to determine the approach which must be adopted in
adjudication of the present applications. Needless to say, the differing
approaches expounded by the Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima and
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, are both binding upon this Court. Although the
question has been referred to a larger bench in Tasleem Ahmed 2, the
factum of reference itself does not denude a Supreme Court decision of its
binding authority35.

23. The possible course of awaiting an authoritative decision by the larger
bench of the Supreme Court does not commend to me, in the context of
these applications for bail, which by their very nature require expeditious
resolution. Instead, having considered the judgments cited by both sides,
which were rendered after Gulfisha Fatima, I am of the view that a
practical approach must be adopted, at least until the reference is
answered by a larger bench. In the present case, such an approach
requires this Court first to adjudicate upon Mr. Malik’s submission that,
even in terms of the interpretation of K.A. Najeeb in Gulfisha Fatima, as
understood by this Court in Leena Palouse-II, the petitioners are entitled
to bail. If this contention is accepted, it is unnecessary to delve further
into the exercise of reconciliation between the views expressed in Gulfisha
Fatima and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, with regard to the competing
interpretation of K.A. Najeeb.

24. Before embarking upon this exercise, I may only add that this course
is also not, in my view, inconsistent with the interpretation of K.A. Najeeb
in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi. The position of law laid down in Gulfisha
Fatima, as I have understood it in Leena Paulose-II, was that the
ground of prolonged incarceration without likelihood of culmination of
proceedings, must be considered even in cases involving statutory
restrictions on grant of bail. However, these must be analysed,
alongwith the nature of offence, and the prima-facie material available
against the accused. The articulation in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, is that
the statutory limitation on the grant of bail cannot override rights under
Article 21, but that “of course, in an appropriate case, bail can be

34
SLP (CRL.) No. 3867/2026, dated 22.05.2026 [hereinafter, “Tasleem Ahmad”].

Harbhajan Singh and Another v. State of Punjab, (2009) 13 SCC 608, paragraph 15; National
Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors.
v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and Anr., (2024) 18 SCC 643, paragraph 35.

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denied having regard to the facts of that particular case”36. Syed
Iftikhar Andrabi therefore also requires a factual examination, to
determine whether a particular accused is to be granted bail, despite an
argument based upon his/her Article 21 rights. It may be noted that, both
in Gulfisha Fatima and in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, the Supreme Court
examined the case of accused on merits, in the backdrop of period of
incarceration and the likely length of trial. In Gulfisha Fatima, five of the
seven accused were granted bail, as was the sole accused in Syed Iftikhar
37
Andrabi.”

19. I propose to adopt the same approach in the present case also. I
may also note that, in Khuram Parvez v. National Investigation Agency38,
which was rendered after the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court,
including the reference order in Tasleem Ahmad, a Division Bench of this
Court has adopted a similar approach. The case concerned an application
for bail in a UAPA offence. The Court’s approach is indicated by the
following observations:

“61. Keeping in view the above, we have proceeded to consider the case
of the appellant for releasing him on bail.

62. For the same, we would note that the appellant was taken into custody
in the present case on 22.11.2021, and has, therefore, undergone
prolonged incarceration of almost 4½ years. The stage of the trial is at
the arguments for framing of charge. We are further informed that the
prosecution intends to examine 197 witnesses in case the charge is
framed against the appellant.

63. We shall also conduct a surface evaluation of the case alleged by the
prosecution against the appellant.

xxx xxx xxx

71. We have taken note of the above allegations and the defence of the
appellant, only to highlight that they must be tested against the long
period of incarceration of the appellant and the fact that there is no
likelihood of the trial ending soon as also against the yardstick of bail
being the rule, while denial thereof being an exception. The appellant’s
rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India need to be balanced

36
Andrabi, paragraph 35.

Emphasis supplied.

CRL.A. 1234/2024, decided on 10.06.2026.

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and may even trump the restriction imposed under Section 43D(5) of the
UAPA.

72. We are also mindful of the fact that one of the co-accused, namely,
Zafar Abbas (A-4), has been denied bail by this Court and the said order
has been upheld by the Supreme Court, however, we find that the
allegations against the said co-accused were very different from the one
39
against the appellant herein.”

20. Applying the same benchmark to the present case, it may be noted
that the petitioner is not accused of participation in the alleged acts of
extortion, against the complainant or any other person. Even as per the
prosecution case, as noted in the 2023 judgment, the role attributed to him
concerns planning and management of funds transferred by Sukesh to
Leena, including the facilitation of bank entries, and acquisition of
immovable properties and luxury cars in the names of other individuals or
entities. The alleged confessional statements, of the petitioner and
Sukesh, relied upon by the prosecution, do not prima facie accord any
higher role to the petitioner than this.

21. As against this, the petitioner has already spent approximately 4
years and 10 months in custody as an undertrial. The offence under
Section 3(4) of MCOCA carries a sentence which may extend to
imprisonment of five years to life imprisonment. However, the factors
indicated above, including the number of accused [24], number of
witnesses [403], and the complexity of the case, make expeditious
conclusion of the proceedings unlikely. Having regard to the role ascribed
to the petitioner by the prosecution, I am of the view that his further
incarceration as an undertrial, is inappropriate. Although I have held, in

39
Emphasis supplied.

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Leena Paulose40, that the delay in the present case cannot be attributed to
prosecutorial delays or court inaction alone, I am nonetheless of the view
that the facts of each case have to be examined on their own merits, with
due consideration of the specific roles ascribed to the individual in
question.

22. As I have held that the petitioner is entitled to bail even if the
prosecution case is taken at its highest, I do not consider it necessary to
address the other contentions raised by Mr. Grover.

V. CONCLUSION:

23. For the aforesaid reasons, the application is allowed, and it is
directed that the petitioner be released on bail in connection with FIR No.
208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, registered at Police Station Special Cell,
Delhi, subject to furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 2,50,000/-, alongwith
two sureties in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the concerned
Special Court/Duty Magistrate, and subject to the following further
conditions:

a. The petitioner shall appear before the Special Court on each and
every date of hearing;

b. The petitioner shall surrender his passport before the Special Court,
and shall not leave the country without prior permission of the
concerned Court;

c. The petitioner shall provide his permanent address to the concerned
Court, as also the address where he is residing during the pendency
of the case. The petitioner shall intimate the Investigating Officer
[“IO”], and file an affidavit before the Special Court, regarding any

40
Paragraph 37.

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change in residential address;

d. The petitioner shall provide his mobile number to the concerned
IO/Station House Officer, which shall be kept in working condition
at all times. The mobile number shall not be switched off or
changed without prior intimation to the IO during the pendency of
the trial;

e. The petitioner shall not, directly or indirectly, make any
inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the
facts of the case or tamper with the evidence of the case, in any
manner whatsoever;

f. The petitioner shall not commit any offence during the period of
his release.

24. The bail application is disposed of in terms of the above.

25. It is clarified that any observations made in the present judgment
are solely for the purpose of deciding the present bail application, and
shall neither influence the trial proceedings, nor be construed as an
expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

26. Copy of the judgment be communicated to the concerned Jail
Superintendent electronically for information and necessary compliance.

PRATEEK JALAN, J
JULY 7, 2026
PV/AD/KA/

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