Allahabad High Court
Ashok Kumar Pandey vs State Of U.P. And Another on 3 July, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
1. Heard Shri I.K. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Sagar Mishra, learned Counsel for the applicant, Shri Somesh Khare, Advocate along with Shri Ravi Kant Shukla, learned Counsel for opposite party no.2 and Shri Sanjeev Singh, learned Additional Government Advocate, assisted by Shri Suresh Bahadur Singh, Advocate on behalf of the State and perused the material on record.
2. This application under Section 528 Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, (in short BNSS), has been filed by the applicant, to quash the entire proceeding of Criminal Case No.1533 of 2022 (State Vs. Ashok Kumar Pandey), arising out of Case Crime No.307 of 2019, under Sections- 420, 463, 465, 467, 468, 415 and 471 I.P.C., Police Station- Colonelganj, District- Prayagraj, as well as charge-sheet No.239 of 2019 dated 11.06.2022 and cognizance/ summoning order dated 05.11.2022, pending in the court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad.
3. Brief facts giving rise to the present application are that opposite party no.2 lodged an FIR against applicant stating therein that the first informant is an I.A.S. Officer of 1991 Batch of Madhya Pradesh Cadre. He has a house No.10, Lowther Road, George Town, Allahabad, adjacent to Kriti Scanning Center and Cancer Hospital. This is the ancestral property of his mother Smt. Beena Srivastava, who died on 31.10.2012. After her death and the death of informants father Dr. L.R. Srivastava, this property is inherited by the informant. Accused Ashok Kumar Pandey, is living in the above house as a tenant and has filed a Civil Suit No. 548 of 1999 against the first informants mother in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Allahabad, which is currently pending before Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate XI, Allahabad. The accused has sought relief to direct the informants mother to sell the disputed house, in his favour, on the basis of alleged oral agreement. There is a suit pending before the competent court, seeking termination of tenancy. The first informant has been arrayed in the Civil Suit as defendant after his parents death.
4. On 20.04.2019, the first informant came to Allahabad and contacted his advocate and inspected the file of Civil Suit No.548 of 1999, then he came to know that the accused in paragraph no.15 of the plaint has levelled allegation that first informants mother has written a registered letter dated 13.09.1999 in which she had accepted that she received Rs.5.60 lakhs, and further demanded additional amount of Rs.3 lakhs. The above letter was allegedly received by the accused on 22.09.1999 and this forged document has been filed by him in the court. The first informants mother, in her written statement, in paragraph no.9, has specifically stated that she has not written any such letter. On the basis of above forged letter the accused has tried to establish that first informants mother has taken an earnest money of Rs.5.6 lakhs and he is further trying to establish that there was an oral agreement. Thus the accused tried to commit fraud with the court by producing forged document before the court. The above letter does not bear his mothers signatures.
5. The above alleged document bear forged signature of the first informants mother and it has many grammatical mistakes whereas the first informants mother was highly educated woman, so it was highly unlikely for her to commit such grammatical mistakes. It is also alleged that the first informants parents were not on any administrative post so a type writer for personal use was not easily available to them and if they had to write a personal letter then it would have been written in their handwriting and not on the typewriter. Upon this information FIR under Sections 420, 468, 415, 467, 465 and 463 IPC was lodged and after investigation charge-sheet has been filed under Sections 463, 465, 468, 467, 415 and 420 IPC, before the competent court which has taken cognizance and summoned the accused.
6. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that the first informants mother late Smt. Beena Srivastava was exclusive owner of House No.10, Lowther Road, George Town, Allahabad and the first informants parents were teachers in Moti Nagar, Ghaziabad and they permanently resided in College Campus, Moti Nagar, Ghaziabad. The above house at Allahabad was lying vacant since long and upon an application under Section 12 of U.P. Rent Control Act, 1972, to the Prescribed Authority, the above house was allotted to the applicant in the year 1995 and possession was handed over to the applicant in the year 1995 itself. The first informants mother late Smt. Beena Srivastava, filed a release Application No. 38 of 1996 before the Prescribed Authority and after entering into the sale agreement with the applicant, she directed her counsel to not press the release application and as such the release application was dismissed in default. The first informants mother entered into agreement with the applicant to sell the aforesaid house to the applicant and in this regard she received Rs.5.60 lakhs from the applicant in the year 1998. So she did not press her release application, which was dismissed in default on 07.07.1999 due to the sale agreement. Then she delivered possession of the aforesaid house to the applicant of her own free will. The applicant gave additional amount of Rs.60,000/- to her to get free hold the above house. She has sent a registered letter to the applicant from Moti Nagar, Ghaziabad on 13.09.1999 which was received by the applicant on 22.09.1999 and as the sale deed could not be executed by the first informants mother, so the applicant filed Civil Suit No. 548 of 1999 for a decree of specific performance of contract against her to execute the sale deed annexing letter dated 13.09.1999 sent by her. The learned court was pleased to grant stay order on 09.12.1999 in favour of the applicant.
7. After filing of the above suit she got annoyed and filed written statement denying the acceptance of total amount of Rs.5 lakhs and stated that she agreed to sell only 100 yards in her share, and she did not specifically denied letter dated 13.09.1999, stating in her written statement that she never wrote letter dated 13.09.1999 to the applicant or signed over it. However, she accepted that oral agreement was entered into between her and the applicant, with respect to the sale of the above house. The first informant is senior IAS Officer and his wife Smt. Prayga Richa Srivastava is senior, I.P.S. Officer in Madhya Pradesh Cadre. The first informants mother was old and infirm, resided in Moti Nagar Ghaziabad and the first informant was doing pairvi of the case since 1999 till she died on 31.10.2012. Thereafter, the first informant was substituted as party in the suit in place of her mother. It is also submitted that the letter dated 13.09.1999 is suit property and first informants mother has not denied the signature over it, nor she ever lodged any FIR with regard to the letter dated 13.09.1999 nor filed any complaint Section 340 Cr.P.C. before the court concerned.
8. In the above civil suit an application Order VII Rule-11 was filed which was partly allowed on 04.08.2007, against which revision No.333 of 2007 was filed which was allowed on 25.08.2007. Against order dated 25.08.2007 of the revisional court, Smt. Beena Srivastava, filed a Writ Petition No.57700 of 2007 before this Court and it was directed to file appeal. In compliance of the same, Appeal No.83 of 2018 was filed which was allowed on 20.12.2018. In the above appeal the first informant was party, his mother had already died and the first informant was doing pairvi of the above noted case. As he could not get any order in his favour so to harass the applicant he has lodged the FIR after an unexplained long delay of 20 years. The applicant had separate statutory remedy to file application under Section 340 Cr.P.C., before the concerned court. It is the court concerned which has to decide whether the evidence is false or not.
9. The applicant had filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.12101 of 2019 (Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others) in which arrest of the applicant was stayed and the informant was directed to file specific affidavit stating whether since 1999 upto the date of death defendant Smt. Beena Srivastava, ever filed an affidavit in any proceeding challenging her signature or letter or the document. The first informant never complied with order dated 08.05.2019, passed in the aforesaid petition till date and has pressurized the Investigating Officer to file charge-sheet without proper investigation and without recording statement of the first informant or any other person. The above charge-sheet was sent to Circle Officer-IV who returned the charge-sheet to the I.O. to collect the specimen signature of first informants mother and get it compared with the signatures on disputed letter dated 13.09.1999. The Investigating Officer did not attempt to get letter dated 13.09.1999, either from the civil court or from this Court as he was under pressure from the first informant and his wife and thus the Investigating Officer without complying with the direction of the Circle Officer and without collecting any evidence and proper investigation approved the earlier charge-sheet vide his report dated 11.06.2022. Therefore, this is not a proper charge-sheet in the eye of law, which is liable to be quashed.
10. The concerned Magistrate did not apply his judicial mind while taking cognizance and summoning order was passed in mechanical manner on 05.11.2022. The Investigating Officer has not verified the signatures on letter dated 13.09.1999 after collecting it from the court concerned or get the certified copy and match it with signature over the aforesaid letter and without complying order dated 08.05.2019, illegally filed charge-sheet without proper investigation.
11. Learned Counsel for the applicant has submitted that the I.O. has not complied the order dated 22.08.2025 passed by this Court, in letter and spirit. It is also submitted that in Criminal Misc. Application No.12101 of 2019 (Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others) the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 08.05.2019, after considering the written statement of first informants mother in above civil suit directed the first informant to file specific affidavit stating whether since 1990 upto her death, she ever filed affidavit in any proceeding challenging her signature over the disputed letter. It is submitted that the first informant did not comply with the above aforesaid order and pressurized the I.O. to file charge-sheet. Therefore, the FSL report dated 25.09.2025 is no report in the eye of law, because the same was obtained in violation of order dated 22.01.2025 of this Court.
12. Learned Counsel for the applicant has relied upon a decision of Honble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No… of 2025 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8592 of 2024 Rikhab Birani Vs. The State of U.P. (decided on 16.04.2025), where it has been held that, there is distinction between a civil wrong in the form of breach of contract, non payment of money, or disregard to an violation of contractual terms and a criminal offence under Sections 420 and 406 IPC, the ingredients of which are quite different and require mens rea at the time when the contract is entered.
13. The learned counsel for applicant has also submitted that earlier the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Another (2024) 10 SCC 690, has observed that the offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust are antithetical in nature and cannot co-exist simultaneously on same facts. Police Officers and courts must carefully apply their minds to determine whether the allegations genuinely constitute the specific offence alleged. It was also held that the prevalent impression that civil remedies, being time-consuming, do not adequately protect the interests of creditors or lenders, should be discouraged and rejected as criminal procedure cannot be used to apply pressure. Failure to do so results in the breakdown of the rule of law and amounts to misuse and abuse of the legal process.
14. It is further submitted that the offence of cheating is established when the dishonest intention exists at the time when the contract of agreement is entered, and the essential ingredient of the offence of cheating consists of fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him to deliver any property.
15. Learned Counsel for the applicant has further relied on the case of Ram Chandra And Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 381, which relates to a case of conviction of appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC where ransom letter were sent.
16. Learned Counsel for the applicant has also relied upon a decision of Honble Supreme Court in AIR 1980 SC 531 Murari Lal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, where it has been held, that it is a far cry from doubting that opinion of a handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever the opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. Evidence given by experts can never be conclusive, because after all it is opinion evidence. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted hereinbelow:-
So, there was acceptable direct testimony which was destructive of the expert’s opinion; there are other features also which made the expert’s opinion unreliable. The observation regarding corroboration must be read in that context and it is worthy of note that even so the expression used was ‘it is usual’ and not “it is necessary.
In Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh. (4) Hidayatullah, J. said:
“Both under s. 45 and s. 47 the evidence is an opinion, in the former by a scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting from frequent observations and experience. In either case the Court must satisfy itself by such means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon. One such means open to the Court is to apply its own observation to the admitted or proved writings and to compare them with the disputed one, not to become an handwriting expert but to verify the premises of the expert in the one case and to comparison depends on an analysis of the characteristics in appraise the value of the opinion in the other case. This the admitted or proved writing and the finding of the same characteristics in large measure in the disputed writing. In this way the opinion of the deponent whether expert or other is subjected to scrutiny and although relevant to start with becomes probative. Where an expert’s opinion is given, the Court must see for itself and with the assistance of the expert come to its own conclusion whether it can safely be held that the two writings are by the same person. This is not to say that the Court must play the role of an expert but to say that the Court may accept the fact proved only when it has satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe to accept the opinion whether of the expert or other witness.”
These observations lend no support to any requirement as to corroboration of expert testimony. On the other hand, the facts show that the Court ultimately did act upon the uncorroborated testimony of the expert though these Judges took the precaution of comparing the writings themselves.
17. Learned Counsel for the applicant has further placed reliance upon a judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Md. Ibrahim and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Another 2009 (3) SCC (CRI), wherein it is stated that it is growing tendency to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity or to cause harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not misused on this ground. Relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereinbelow:-
This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. But at the same, it should be noted that several disputes of a civil nature may also contain the ingredients of criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal offences, even if they also amount to civil disputes. [See: G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. (2000 (2) SCC 636] and Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. [2006 (6) SCC 736]. Let us examine the matter keeping the said principles in mind.
18. Learned Counsel for the applicant has relied upon another judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr. AIR 2005 Supreme Court 2199, the relevant portion of judgment is extracted as below:-
12. A Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Emperor vs. Kushal Pal Singh AIR 1931 All 443 considered the scope of the aforesaid provision and held, that clause (c) of Section 195 applies only to cases where an offence is committed by a party, as such, to a proceeding to any Court in respect of a document which has been produced or given in evidence in such proceeding. It was held that an offence which has already been committed by a person who does not become a party till, say, 30 years after the commission of the offence, cannot be said to have been committed by a party within the meaning of clause (c). A three Judge Bench of this Court in Patel Lalji Bhai Somabhai vs. The State of Gujarat 1971(2) SCC 376 after examination of the controversy in considerable detail observed that as a general rule the Courts consider it expedient in the interest of justice to start prosecutions as contemplated by Section 476 (of the old Code which now corresponds to Section 340 Cr.P.C.) only if there is a reasonable foundation for the charge and there is a reasonable likelihood of conviction. The requirement of a finding as to the expediency is understandable in case of an offence alleged to have been committed either in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court in case of offences specified in clause (b) [of the old Code corresponding to clause (b)(i) Cr.P.C.] because of the close nexus between the offence and the proceeding. In case of offences specified in clause (c) they are required to be committed by a party to a proceeding in that Court with respect to a document produced or given in evidence in that Court. The Court approved the view taken by Allahabad High Court in Emperor vs. Kushal Pal Singh (supra) and held as under in para 7 of the report :—–
“(i) The underlying purpose of enacting Section 195(1)(b) and (c) Section 476 seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolous vexations or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court’s control because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It is the judicial process or the administration of public justice which is the direct and immediate object or the victim of these offences. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party who might ultimately suffer can persuade the Civil Court to file complaint.
(ii) the offences about which the court alone is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceeding in that court so that it can without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It, therefore, appears to be more appropriate to adopt the strict construction of confirming the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceeding in character as such party. The Legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) to the offences mentioned therein, when committed by a party to a proceeding in that court prior to his becoming such party.”
19. Learned Counsel for the applicant has relied upon a decision of Allahabad High Court in Emperor Vs. Raja Kushal Pal Singh, AIR 1931 Allahabad 443, where the matter was referred for decision whether Section 195(1)(c) is applicable so as to render a complaint of a court necessary before a prosecution case for abetment of forgery can be lodged in respect of High Court Exs. 4 to 7 or any of them and in this regard it was held that it is barred when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to a proceeding in any court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding.
20. In another decision of Vesa Holdings Private Limited and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, (2015) 8 SCC 293, it was held that the criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice.
21. In 2013 (11) SCC 673, Paramjeet Batra Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others, it was held that, if a civil remedy is available and is adopted by the complainant then the High Court should not hesitate to quash the proceeding to prevent the abuse of process of the court. In the above case the appellant claimed tenancy of the business premises and filed injunction suit, in which the civil court observed that documents produced for evidence have to be proved and directed status quo pending suit. The complainant started criminal proceeding allegedly that documents filed by the appellant in civil suit are fabricated then it was held that the grievance of the complainant about forgery of the documents will be considered by the civil court and the appellant can be dealt with about such forgery in the said civil suit.
22. In 1998 (5) SCC 694 Nageshwar Prasad Singh Vs. Narayan Singh, there was agreement to sale of the land and earnest money was paid to the appellant towards part payment of sale consideration and possession of land was also transferred. It was found that no criminal liability is made out against the appellant and the dispute was essentially civil in nature, and the entire proceeding were quashed.
23. In Criminal Appeal No. 256 of 2022, arising out of SLP (Crl) No.9556 of 2021, Luckose Zachariah @ Zak Vs. Joseph Joseph and Others, decided on 08.02.2022, it was held that, that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed and the police retain power, subject, of course, to the Magistrates nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate, who will exercise such discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law.
24. In Criminal Appeal No.2040-2041 of 2012, arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos.9185-9186-2009, Vinay Tyagi Vs. Irshad Ali @ Deepak and Others, decided on 13.12.2012, the Honble Supreme Court discussed about further investigation and re-investigation:-
13. Having noticed the provisions and relevant part of the scheme of the Code, now we must examine the powers of the Court to direct investigation. Investigation can be ordered in varied forms and at different stages. Right at the initial stage of receiving the FIR or a complaint, the Court can direct investigation in accordance with the provisions of Section156 (1) in exercise of its powers under Section 156(3) of the Code. Investigation can be of the following kinds :(i) Initial Investigation.(ii) Further Investigation.(iii) Fresh or de novo or re-investigation.
14. The initial investigation is the one which the empowered police officer shall conduct in furtherance to registration of an FIR. Such investigation itself can lead to filing of a final report under Section173(2) of the Code and shall take within its ambit the investigation which the empowered officer shall conduct in furtherance of an order for investigation passed by the court of competent jurisdiction in terms of Section 156(3) of the Code.
15. ‘Further investigation’ is where the Investigating Officer obtains further oral or documentary evidence after the final report has been filed before the Court in terms of Section 173(8). This power is vested with the Executive. It is the continuation of a previous investigation and, therefore, is understood and described as a ‘further investigation’. Scope of such investigation is restricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its purpose is to bring the true facts before the Court even if they are discovered at a subsequent stage to the primary investigation. It is commonly described as ‘supplementary report’.’Supplementary report’ would be the correct expression as the subsequent investigation is meant and intended to supplement the primary investigation conducted by the empowered police officer. Another significant feature of further investigation is that it does not have the effect of wiping out directly or impliedly the initial investigation conducted by the investigating agency. This is a kind of continuation of the previous investigation. The basis is discovery of fresh evidence and in continuation of the same offence and chain of events relating to the same occurrence incidental thereto. In other words, it has to be understood incomplete contradistinction to a ‘re investigation’, ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ investigation.
16. However, in the case of a ‘fresh investigation’, ‘re investigation’ or’ de novo investigation’ there has to be a definite order of the court. The order of the Court unambiguously should state as to whether the previous investigation, for reasons to be recorded, is incapable of being acted upon. Neither the Investigating agency nor the Magistrate has any power to order or conduct ‘fresh investigation’. This is primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code. It is essential that even an order of ‘fresh’/’de novo’ investigation passed by the higher judiciary should always be coupled with a specific direction as to the fate of the investigation already conducted. The cases where such direction can be issued are few and far between. This is based upon a fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence which is that it is the right of a suspect or an accused to have a just and fair investigation and trial. This principle flows from the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Where the investigation ex facie is unfair, tainted, mala fide and smacks of foul play, the courts would set aside such an investigation and direct fresh or de novo investigation and, if necessary, even by another independent investigating agency. As already noticed, this is a power of wide plenitude and, therefore, has to be exercised sparingly. The principle of rarest of rare cases would squarely apply to such cases. Unless the unfairness of the investigation is such that it pricks the judicial conscience of the Court, the Court should be reluctant to interfere in such matters to the extent of quashing an investigation and directing a ‘fresh investigation’. In the case of Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2010) 6 SCC 1], the Court stated that it is not only the responsibility of the investigating agency, but also that of the courts to ensure that investigation is fair and does not in any way hamper the freedom of an individual except in accordance with law. An equally enforceable canon of the criminal law is that high responsibility lies upon the investigating agency not to conduct an investigation in a tainted or unfair manner. The investigation should not prima facie be indicative of a biased mind and every effort should be made to bring the guilty to law as nobody stands above law dehors his position and influence in the society. The maxim contra veritatem lex nunquamaliquid permit it applies to exercise of powers by the courts while granting approval or declining to accept the report. In the case of Gudalure M.J. Cherian & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1992) 1 SCC 397],this Court stated the principle that in cases where charge-sheets have been filed after completion of investigation and request is made belatedly to reopen the investigation, such investigation being entrusted to a specialized agency would normally be declined by the court of competent jurisdiction but nevertheless in a given situation to do justice between the parties and to instill confidence in public mind, it may become necessary to pass such orders. Further, in the case of R.S. Sodhi, Advocate v. State of U.P. [1994 SCC Supp. (1) 142], where allegations were made against a police officer, the Court ordered the investigation to be transferred to CBI with an intent to maintain credibility of investigation, public confidence and in the interest of justice. Ordinarily, the courts would not exercise such jurisdiction but the expression ‘ordinarily’ means normally and it is used where there can be an exception. It means in the large majority of cases but not invariably. ‘Ordinarily’ excludes extra-ordinary or special circumstances. In other words, if special circumstances exist, the court may exercise its jurisdiction to direct ‘fresh investigation’ and even transfer cases to courts of higher jurisdiction which may pass such directions.
18. Next question that comes up for consideration of this Court is whether the empowered Magistrate has the jurisdiction to direct ‘further investigation’ or ‘fresh investigation’. As far as the latter is concerned, the law declared by this Court consistently is that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to direct ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo ‘investigation. However, once the report is filed, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to accept the report or reject the same right at the threshold. Even after accepting the report, it has the jurisdiction to discharge the accused or frame the charge and put him to trial. But there are no provisions in the Code which empower the Magistrate to disturb the status of an accused pending investigation or when report is, filed to wipe out the report and its effects in law. Reference in this regard can be made to K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala [(1998) 5 SCC 223];Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar [(2008) 5 SCC 413], Nirmal Singh Kahlon v State of Punjab & Ors. [(2009) 1 SCC 441]; Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel & Ors .v. State of Gujarat [(2009) 6 SCC 332]; and Babubhai v. State of Gujarat[(2010) 12 SCC 254].
31. Having discussed the scope of power of the Magistrate under Section173 of the Code, now we have to examine the kind of reports that are contemplated under the provisions of the Code and/or as per the judgments of this Court. The first and the foremost document that reaches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is the First Information Report. Then, upon completion of the investigation, the police are required to file a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will be appropriate to term this report as a primary report, as it is the very foundation of the case of the prosecution before the Court. It is the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, which are considered by the Court and then the Court of the Magistrate is expected to exercise any of the three options afore-noticed. Out of the stated options with the Court, the jurisdiction it would exercise has to be in strict consonance with the settled principles of law. The power of the magistrate to direct ‘further investigation’ is a significant power which has to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to achieve the ends of justice. To provide fair, proper and unquestionable investigation is the obligation of the investigating agency and the Court in its supervisory capacity is required to ensure the same. Further investigation conducted under the orders of the Court, including that of the Magistrate or by the police of its own accord and, for valid reasons, would lead to the filing of a supplementary report. Such supplementary report shall be dealt with as part of the primary report. This is clear from the fact that the provisions of Sections 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code.
32. Both these reports have to be read conjointly and it is the cumulative effect of the reports and the documents annexed thereto to which the Court would be expected to apply its mind to determine whether there exist grounds to presume that the accused has committed the offence. If the answer is in the negative, on the basis of these reports, the Court shall discharge an accused in compliance with the provisions of Section 227 of the Code.
And it was held that the trial court has to consider the entire record including the police report filed under Section 173(2) B.N.S. as well as the closure report and the documents filed along with these reports and in para 51 and 52 it was held that:-
51. In our considered view, the trial court has to consider the entire record, including both the Delhi Police Report filed under Section 173(2) of the Code as well as the Closure Report filed by the CBI and the documents filed along with these reports.
52. It appears, the trial court may have three options, and firstly, it may accept the application of accused for discharge. Secondly, it may direct that the trial may proceed further in accordance with law and thirdly, if it is dissatisfied on any important aspect of investigation already conducted and in its considered opinion, it is just, proper and necessary in the interest of justice to direct ‘further investigation’, it may do so.
25. In another decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Sheila Sebastian Vs. R. Jawaharaj and Another (2108) 7 SCC 581, relating to making of false document, it was observed that the charge of forgery cannot be imposed on a person who is not the maker of the same. As held in plethora of cases, making of a document is different from causing it to be made. As explanation of 2 to Section 464 further clarifies that, for constituting an offence under Section 464, it is imperative that a false document is made and the accused person is the maker of the same, otherwise the accused person is not liable for the offence of forgery.
26. Per contra, learned A.G.A. for the State has opposed and submitted that the act of the applicant has criminal element in it and has thus defended the entire proceeding and the charge sheet. He has also submitted that the disputed forged document was prepared outside the court and then produced in court, so the criminal proceedings is not barred by Section 195(1)(c) of the Cr.P.C. He has relied upon a decision of Karnataka High Court in Vasanthi Vs. Umesh G.D. 2024 SCC Online (Kar) 15256, a question arose whether merely because of an allegedly forged document is used in a Court proceeding the bar under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. would come into operation or could a complaint be filed by the aggrieved party before the Police Station alleging the fabrication and forgery of documents or could both actions be taken and after discussing various laws, it was held by the Karnataka High Court that an aggrieved party against whom if forged or fabricated document is made use of in a Court of law would have a right to file a criminal complaint and for such forgery and fabrication bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. does not apply. It was also held that the court before which the forged document is produced could also take action against such a person under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C., both the prosecution by the private party under regular criminal law and the prosecution by the trial court would not amount to double jeopardy. Thus, the person against whom said document is used can always complain about and seek for action being taken, as regards the document which has been forged or fabricated.
27. Learned Counsel for opposite party no.2 has submitted that the FSL report collected by the I.O. shows that the signature on the impugned letter is forged which constitutes incriminating material pointing at the criminality of the applicant. It is also submitted that the applicant had submitted photo copy of the letter in the aforesaid Civil Case No.548 of 1999 on 02.11.1999 and much later in the year 2025, the impugned original letter was filed in the said case. It is also submitted that cognizance has been taken against the applicant and he has evaded and has not appeared before the learned trial court.
28. During investigation also he did not appear before the police and his statement was recorded on phone, therefore, this petition has no force and is liable to be dismissed. It is also submitted that the civil suit is about, whether a contract of sale of property was entered into and whether the relief for specific performance of contract be granted, whereas in the criminal proceeding, it has to be seen that the document, which the applicant used in the suit for specific performance, was a forged and fabricated document. It is also submitted that the said act amounts to a criminal act.
29. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 has relied upon a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2026 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Cri.) No. 397 of 2025) C.S. Prasad Vs. C. Satyakumar and Others, dated 8.1.2026, where it was observed that Adjudication of forgery, cheating or use of forged documents in relation to a settlement deed will always carry a civil element. Therefore, there cannot be any general proposition that whenever dispute involves a civil element, a criminal proceeding cannot go on. Criminal liability must be examined independently. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 were entitled to acquittal only upon failure of proof in the trial and not at the threshold jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. To permit quashing on the sole ground of a civil suit would encourage unscrupulous litigants to defeat criminal prosecution by instituting civil proceedings.
30. It has been held in M.S. Sheriff Vs. State of Madras, (1954) 1 SCC 524 by a 5-judge bench that between the civil and the criminal proceedings, the criminal matters should be given precedence.
31. The judicial principle that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Vs. State of Maharashtra (2005 SCC 2 673). Since the principle laid down by a 5-judge bench in M.S. Sheriff Vs. State of Madras (supra) has not been overruled by a larger bench, it is the law of the land that has to be followed by all courts.
32. It is further submitted on behalf of opposite party no.2 that the contention on behalf of the applicant that a proper remedy was to file an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. before the court concerned is untenable because Section 340 Cr.P.C. is invoked where there is an allegation of an offence committed in, or any relation to a proceeding in a court.
33. In this regard the learned Counsel for opposite party no.2 has relied upon a decision of Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370, where the Honble Supreme Court held that if the forgery of a document is committed, before it is produced in court, the bar under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. does not apply, and the aggrieved party may file a private complaint or, as in the present case, a police complaint directly.
34. It is further submitted that the letter dated 13.09.1999 was allegedly forged by the applicant prior to the institution of any court proceeding. The Petitioner fabricated the letter privately and then chose to produce it as Annexure to the plaint in the Civil Suit. The forgery was committed outside the Court, and it was then used in the Court.
35. Another decision AIR 1998 Supreme Court 1121, Sachida Nand Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. has been referred wherein the scope of Section 195(1)(b) was discussed and it held that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court.
36. With regard to the delay in lodging the FIR, it is further submitted on behalf of opposite party no.2 that the delay in registration of FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation and in this regard the learned Counsel for opposite party no.2 has relied upon a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwal Vs. NCT Delhi (2025 INSC 582) where it was held that It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation Even otherwise, as the learned senior counsel for the Appellant has rightly pointed out, in terms of Section 468 Cr.P.C., there is no period of limitation for offences which are punishable with imprisonment of more than three years.
37. He has also relied upon a decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2021) 5 SCC 795 that The mere delay on the part of the third Respondent-complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents (Para 19). The Honble Supreme Court in CS Prasad Vs. C. Satyakumar (2026 INSC 39) has specifically held that Delay in filing a complaint, by itself, is never a ground for quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold. Whether the delay stands satisfactorily explained or whether it impacts the credibility of the prosecution, is a matter of appreciation of evidence before the Trial Court and not for summary determination by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
38. It is further submitted on behalf of opposite party no.2 that the contention of applicant that the opposite party no.2 and his wife are influencing the case also has no force. Civil proceedings have been instituted since 1996 and during investigation the police could not record the statement of the applicant, even summons have not been served upon him. Therefore, it shows that opposite party no.2 and his wife are law-abiding persons and the judicial system has been grossly misused by the applicant.
39. Learned Counsel for opposite party no. 2 has also relied upon the decision of Honble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335), a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court considered in detail, the provisions of section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Supreme Court summarized the legal position by laying the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint:
“1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which, no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or, where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
40. The learned Counsel for the opposite party no.2 has relied upon a decision of a Honble Supreme Court in Sukh Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2016) 14 SCC 183, with regard to giving specimen signatures of the handwriting and the relevant portion is extracted hereinafter:-
19. After referring to Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1980 in Ram Babu Misras case, this Court suggested that a suitable legislation be made along its lines to provide for investiture of Magistrates with powers to issue directions to any person including an accused person to give specimen signatures and handwriting. Accordingly, a new Section 311-A was inserted in the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 311-A Cr.P.C. reads as under:-
Section 311A. Power of Magistrate to order person to give specimen signatures or handwriting.-If a Magistrate of the first class is satisfied that, for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under this Code, it is expedient to direct any person, including an accused person, to give specimen signatures or handwriting, he may make an order to that effect and in that case the person to whom the order relates shall be produced or shall attend at the time and place specified in such order and shall give his specimen signatures or handwriting:
Provided that no order shall be made under this section unless the person has at some time been arrested in connection with such investigation or proceeding.
The said amendment is prospective in nature and not retrospective and it was held that power to direct or order any person to give specimen signature or handwriting is distinct from authority to take specific signature or handwriting when voluntarily given by any person.
41. The opposite party no.2 has further relied upon a judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Lalmuni Devi Vs. State of Bihar and Others, 2001 (2) SCC 17, it is held that, it is settled law that facts may given rise to a civil claim, merely, because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
42. He has further relied upon a decision of Honble Supreme Court in Lee Kun Hee, President, Samsung Corporation, South Korea and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 2012 SC 1007, the relevant portion of the judgment is quoted hereinbelow:-
73. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the last contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants. We are of the considered view, that in offences of the nature contemplated under the summoning order, there can be civil liability coupled with criminal culpability. What a party has been deprived of by an act of cheating, can be claimed through a civil action. The same deprivation based on denial by way of deception, emerging from an act of cheating, would also attract criminal liability. In the course of criminal prosecution, a complainant cannot seek a reciprocal relief, for the actions of the accused. As in the instant case, the monetary consideration under the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2001, cannot be claimed in the criminal proceedings, for that relief the remedy would be only through a civil suit. It is therefore not possible for us to accept, that since a civil claim has been raised by the complainant-JCE Consultancy, based on the alleged breach of the agreement dated 1.12.2001, it can be prevented from initiating proceedings for penal consequences for the alleged offences committed by the accused under the Indian Penal Code.
43. Lastly, in the judgment of P. Swaroopa Rani Vs. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu, AIR 2008 Supreme Court, 1884 it was held that, it is well settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously, whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant portion is of the judgment is quoted hereinafter:-
“32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein”
It was concluded:
“33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)( b )( ii ) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.”
15. Filing of an independent criminal proceeding, although initiated in terms of some observations made by the civil court, is not barred under any statute.
44. In view of the submission of learned Counsel for both the parties and material on record, it is not in dispute that House No.10 Lowther Road, George Town, Allahabad was owned by late Smt. Beena Srivastava, the mother of the first informant. It is also not in dispute that she died on 31.10.2012 and the applicant was inducted in the above house as a tenant and he filed a Civil Suit No. 548 of 1999 against Smt. Beena Srivastava, seeking relief to direct her to execute sale deed of the disputed house in his favour on the basis of oral agreement to sale. It is also not in dispute that the applicant has filed a letter dated 13.09.1999, purporting to have been written and sent by Smt. Beena Srivastava, alongwith the plaint in the above suit, showing that Smt. Beena Srivastava accepted of receiving Rs.5.60 lakhs from the applicant as part payment for sale of the dispute house in his favour. It is also not in dispute that opposite party no.2/ first informant is an IAS Officer and his wife is an IPS Officer in Madhya Pradesh Cadre.
45. It is the case of the first informant that the applicant has prepared the forged letter dated 13.09.1999 of his mother and thereafter, filed it in the court. It is not in dispute that Smt. Beena Srivastava, in her written statement, filed in the above civil suit, has denied of sending any such letter to the applicant and after her death the first informant has been substituted in the above civil suit.
46. The first contention on behalf of the applicant is that the dispute is essentially civil in nature and criminal colour has been given to it by the first informant with ulterior motive. Relying upon the decision of Honble Supreme Court in Lalmuni Devi (supra), the learned Counsel for the applicant has submitted that where the dispute is purely civil in nature, then criminal proceeding in that regard is nothing but an abuse of process of law.
47. On the other hand, learned Counsel for opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State have submitted that the dispute also has criminal element. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegation against the applicant is that he prepared a forged letter, dated 13.09.1999, of Smt. Beena Srivastava and on that basis filed a Civil Suit No.548 of 1999 against her. Preparing a forged document and filing it in court cannot be said to be a dispute of purely civil in nature and criminal element is involved in it. Thus, the dispute in the present case is not purely of civil nature, and in view of the decision of Honble Supreme Court in C.S. Prasad (supra), P. Swaroopa Rani (supra) and M.S. Sheriff (supra), where the dispute has both a civil and criminal element in it then mere pendency of civil suit is not a bar to criminal proceeding. Therefore, the contention on behalf of the applicant in this regard has no force.
48. The another contention on behalf of the applicant is that the FIR has been lodged after a gap of almost 20 years without any reasonable explanation of delay and as the first informant failed in getting any order in his favour in the above suit, he has lodged this FIR only to put pressure upon the applicant in the aforesaid civil suit. Therefore, the criminal proceeding is nothing but an abuse of process of law. I do not agree with this submission of learned Counsel for the applicant. Looking into the Sections under which the charge-sheet has been filed, the offence is punishable upto the imprisonment for life, so in view of Section 468 of Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no limitation to lodge the FIR for such an offence. In view of C.S. Prasad (supra), the effect of delay in lodging the FIR cannot be looked into and considered in this proceeding and it is a matter for the trial court to consider this point after the evidence is led by both the parties. Therefore, this submission on behalf of the applicant has no force.
49. It is also submitted on behalf of the applicant that the first informant is an IAS Officer and his wife is an IPS Officer, both, in Madhya Pradesh, Cadre, therefore, under their pressure the Investigating Officer has filed the charge-sheet without proper investigation and therefore, the entire proceeding is liable to be quashed. Whether the first informant or his wife have put any pressure upon the I.O., and if not and what is its effect, is a matter of appreciation of evidence which is not permissible in this proceeding. Beside that, the applicant could not prima facie show any material in this regard. The applicant is at liberty to raise this issue before the trial court which may decide it after evidence.
50. It is also submitted by learned Counsel for the applicant that the Investigating Officer has collected expert evidence in violation of direction of this Court so the FSL report dated 25.09.2025 is no report in the eye of law. In this regard learned Counsel for the applicant has drawn attention of this Court of order dated 22.08.2025, where certain directions were given to the trial court to permit the I.O. to examine the original document for its handwriting examination. Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the expert opinion was not obtained in compliance of the above direction, therefore the expert report/ FSL report dated 25.09.2025 is no report in the eye of law. Learned Counsel for the applicant has filed rejoinder affidavit annexing therewith copies of applications and orders passed by the court in this regard, which, prima facie, shows that the concerned court after consideration passed orders for expert opinion, in view of direction passed by this Court vide order dated 22.08.2025. Whether the order dated 22.08.2025 was not complied in letter and spirit and what is its effect on the FSL report, is a matter for consideration by the trial court at the stage of trial. Therefore, the contention of the applicant in this regard has no relevance in this proceeding.
51. It is also submitted by learned Counsel for the applicant that whether the alleged letter is admissible in evidence or not is to be decided by the trial court where the civil suit is pending and the applicant had remedy under Section 340 Cr.P.C. to initiate the proceeding in this matter. Section 195(1) (c) specifically bars lodging of the FIR, therefore, the entire proceeding is an abuse of process of law.
52. Learned Counsel for the applicant has relied upon a decision of Vasanthi (supra) in this regard.
53. On the other hand, learned Counsel for opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State have submitted that Section 195(1)(c) Cr.P.C. is not applicable in this case, because the disputed letter was prepared outside court and thereafter, produced before the court so in view of Iqbal Marwah (supra) Section (1) (c) Cr.P.C. is not applicable and therefore, lodging of the FIR and the subsequent proceeding is perfectly legal. In view of submissions of both the parties, I do not agree with the submission of learned Counsel for the applicant as it is the prosecution case that the alleged forged letter was prepared outside the court and thereafter, filed in the court, therefore, Section 195(1) (c) Cr.P.C. is not applicable in this case. Although, the court could have initiated proceeding under Section 340 Cr.P.C. for filing forged document before the court, but the first informant also had remedy to lodge an FIR, therefore, the contention on behalf of the applicant is has no force.
54. It is submitted by learned Counsel for the applicant that civil wrong and criminal wrong are different and for a criminal wrong mens rea is an essential ingredient. In the present case, there is a civil suit between the parties and civil case is pending before the court and there is no ground and in view of Lalmani Devi (supra), this criminal proceeding is nothing but an abuse of process of law. I do not agree with the submission of learned Counsel for the applicant, in view of the content of the FIR preparing a forged document and filing it in a court is not a purely civil matter and by the alleged forged letter the applicant has tried to affirm that Smt. Beena Srivastava indirectly accepted that there was an agreement to sale between the parties.
55. In view of the above discussion, I come to the conclusion that there is no good ground to interfere in the criminal proceeding and thus this applicant has no force and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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