Himachal Pradesh High Court
Arnav Saviraj Chauhan vs State Of Hp Rt on 14 July, 2026
2026:HHC:28395
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1098 of 2026
.
Reserved on : 13.7.2026
Decided on: 14.7.2026
Arnav Saviraj Chauhan .... Petitioner
of
Versus
State of HP rt .... Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr Ankit Dhiman, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (oral)
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 204 of 2025, dated 22.09.2025,
registered for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NDPS Act‘) at
Police Station Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a law
student aged 20 years. He is a permanent resident of Shimla,
.
having roots in the society. The petitioner was arrested in F.I.R.
No. 204 of 2025 and was unable to appear in his examination
because of his incarceration. The petitioner was arrayed as an
accused because of his presence in the vehicle from which 1 kg
of
174 grams of charas was recovered. Co-accused Kashin Kashyap,
Ayansh and Srivastav were the financiers of the purchase. Kashin
rt
Kashyap transferred ₹50,000/- through Google Pay, and Ayansh
transferred ₹14,200/- through UPI to Rewat Ram, who was
subsequently arrested. The police have also filed the charge
sheet. The petitioner has remained in prison for more than five
months. No recovery is to be effected from the petitioner. Money
transactions do not connect the petitioner to any of the co-
accused. The mobile phone of Kashin Kashyap was also found in
the laptop bag, which connects him to the commission of the
crime. As per the prosecution’s case, the petitioner had not
visited Kullu, H.P. He was not seen in CCTV footage and had not
purchased the charas. He was the only occupant of the vehicle
and was not connected to the charas. The other co-accused has
been released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the
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principle of parity. The petitioner has been in custody since
22.09.2025. The prosecution has cited 49 witnesses, which shows
.
that the trial is likely to take a considerable time before its
conclusion. The charges have not yet been framed. The petitioner
is a young student, and his continued incarceration would
adversely affect his career prospects. The grounds of arrest were
of
not communicated to the petitioner. The co-accused Nakul
Mittal has been released on bail by the Court, and the petitioner
rt
is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. The petitioner would
abide by the terms and conditions that the court may impose.
Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police had set up a nakka at Pungh four-lane
and were checking the vehicles on 22.09.2025. They intercepted a
vehicle bearing registration No. UP-16AX-2143. The driver and
occupants of the vehicle got frightened after seeing the police.
The police associated Kuldeep Kumar and Mukesh Kumar as
independent witnesses. The police inquired about the names of
the occupants of the vehicle. The driver identified himself as
Devayas Patel, the person sitting beside him identified himself as
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Nakul Mittal, and the persons sitting in the rear seat, identified
themselves as Arnav Chauhan (present petitioner), Saksham
.
Bharti and Rohit Kumar. The police searched the vehicle and
recovered a carry bag containing 1.174 kilograms of charas. The
police seized the charas and arrested the occupants of the
vehicle. The charas was sent to SFSL, Junga, and as per the report
of
of analysis, it was confirmed to be a sample of charas. The
occupants revealed during interrogation that they had handed
rt
over ₹5000/- each to Kashin Kashyap, who had also
accompanied the accused on his motorcycle. They identified the
room where they had stayed in Kullu. The petitioner had gone to
Kullu from Solan to purchase Charas on 21.09.2025, but had
stayed in a hotel at 9 miles Pandoh, with his friends Nakul Mittal,
Rohit Kumar and Aditya Kumar. Petitioner waited for his friends
at Pandoh. He boarded the vehicle bearing registration no. UP-
16AX-2143. The police completed the investigation and filed the
charge sheet before the Court of learned Special Judge, Mandi, on
17.01.2026. Hence, the status report.
4. I have heard. Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate for the respondent/State.
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5. Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
.
implicated. He had not gone to Kullu and had stayed at Pandoh.
His mere presence in the vehicle is not sufficient to connect him
to the commission of the crime. The co-accused Nakul Mitttal
has also been released on bail by this Court, and the petitioner is
of
entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
rt
released on bail.
6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner
was found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas and
the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present
case. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid
down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner had
earlier filed a bail petition, which was dismissed by this Court. A
subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the
circumstances. The petitioner has failed to show any change in
the circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition
be dismissed.
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7. I have given a considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
.
carefully.
8. It is understood that the petitioner had filed a bail
petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 293 of 2026 and
was dismissed on 30.03.2026. It was rightly submitted on behalf
of
of the State that a subsequent bail petition only lies when there is
a change in the circumstances. It was held in the State of
rt
Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC
605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a
subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a
change of circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of
granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlierdecision without there being a change in the fact situation. And
when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has
a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmeticchanges, which are of little or no consequence. ‘Between the
two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody’s
case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken
place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail.
Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the
impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all
earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a
couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change
in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with
restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is
not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground
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selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded
him.
9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
of
It was held:
rt
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been
rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the
subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the groundson which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after
such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to
be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons
why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bailapplication should be granted.”
10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied
bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order wasunsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without
there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh
application should not have been dealt with within a short span
of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable
case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not
applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail
applications without there being any change of circumstances
would lead to bad precedents.
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11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit
v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was
.
observed:
30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has
a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the
court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty
to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail
applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has aof
duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a
view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.
12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
rt
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail
applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence
of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non
for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change
in circumstances. A material change in circumstancessettled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that
requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the
earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in
circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of
judicial propriety that successive bail applications need to
be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at
the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the
power of a judge to consider the application and a person’s
right based on a material change in circumstances. A
material change in circumstance creates in a person
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application. But the power to decide such a subsequent
application operates in a completely different sphere,
unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based
on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that.
if successive bail applications on the same subject are
permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there
would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be
pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking
resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence
of the other side being put in issue and there would be
of
wastage of Court’s time and that judicial discipline
requires that such matter must be placed before the same
Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of
material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated
rt
by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application.
Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether
there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the
applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail
application.”
13. The Court had held earlier that the petitioner was
travelling in the vehicle from which the recovery was effected
and he was, prima facie, found in possession of a commercial
quantity of charas. This consideration has not changed.
14. It was submitted that the police have filed a charge
sheet before the Court, which amounts to a change in the
circumstances. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Virupakshappa Gouda v.
State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406: (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 542: 2017
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SCC OnLine SC 295 that the filing of a charge sheet does not
amount to a change in circumstances. It was observed:
.
“12. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge,
we find that he has been swayed by the fact that when a charge
sheet is filed, it amounts to a change of circumstance. Needlessto say, the filing of the charge sheet does not in any manner
lessen the allegations made by the prosecution. On the contrary,
filing of the charge sheet establishes that after due
investigation, the investigating agency, having foundof
materials, has placed the charge sheet for the trial of the
accused persons.”
15. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim bail on the ground
rt
that the charge sheet has been filed.
16. It was submitted that the co-accused Kashin Kashyap
and Nakul Mittal have been enlarged on bail, and the petitioner is
entitled to bail on the principle of parity. The submission cannot
be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2584, that a person
cannot be released on bail after applying the principle of parity
without examining his role. It was observed:
“14. What flows from the above judgments, which have been
referred to, only to the limited extent indicated above, is that
the High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole
ground on which bail can be granted. That, undoubtedly, is the
correct position in law. The word ‘parity’ is defined by the
Cambridge Dictionary as “equality, especially of pay or position.”
When weighing an application on parity, it is the ‘position’ that
is the clincher. The requirement of ‘position’ is not met only by
involvement in the same offence. Position means what the
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person whose application is being weighed, his position in
crime, i.e., his role, etc. There can be different roles played –
someone part of a large group, intending to intimidate; an
instigator of violence; someone who throws hands at the other
.
side, instigated by such words spoken by another, someone who
fired a weapon or swung a machete – parity of these people will
be with those who have performed similar acts, and not with
someone who was part of the group to intimidate the other by
the sheer size of the gathering, with another who attempted to
hack away at the opposer’s limbs with a weapon.”
17. Kashin Kashyap was not found on the spot, and he
of
was arrested during the investigation based on a disclosure
statement and the financial transaction, whereas the petitioner
rt
was apprehended on the spot. Therefore, the petitioner cannot
claim parity with Kashin Kashyap. The co-accused, Nakul Mittal,
rode the motorcycle with the petitioner and the co-accused. He
was scheduled to leave on the motorcycle and not in the vehicle.
However, the co-accused, Kashin Kashyap, told him at the last
moment that he would ride the motorcycle and Nakul Mittal
should travel in the vehicle. Therefore, this fortuitous
circumstance put him in the vehicle, otherwise he would have
ridden the motorcycle. The Court held in these circumstances
that he could not be construed to be in possession.
18. The petitioner’s case is entirely different. He had
travelled with the co-accused from Solan in the vehicle from
which the recovery was effected. He was returning in the same
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vehicle with the co-accused from Pandoh. Thus, the petitioner’s
case is clearly distinguishable from the case of Nakul Mittal, and
.
the petitioner cannot claim bail on the principle of parity.
19. It was submitted that the petitioner had not gone to
Kullu from where the charas is stated to have been purchased. He
had only stayed at Pandoh, and this circumstance is similar to
of
Nakul Mittal. This submission will not help the petitioner. The
Court had already considered this circumstance and held that it
rt
was not sufficient to, prima facie, hold that the petitioner is not
involved in the possession of a commercial quantity of charas. It
was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v.
Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070, that it is
impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the
subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the
change in circumstances. It was observed at page 676:
8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of
his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052
of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent.
Successive bail applications are indeed permissible under the
changed circumstances. But without the change in the
circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be
seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not
permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court
in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169:
2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments.
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20. Therefore, it is impermissible to hold that the
petitioner has not committed the crime in the present
.
proceedings when the Court had earlier held that, prima facie,
material existed against the petitioner for the commission of the
crime.
21. The petitioner is primarily involved in the possession
of
of a commercial quantity of charas, and he has failed to satisfy
the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
rt
Therefore, he cannot be released on bail.
22. It was submitted that the petitioner remained in
custody for about one year, and his trial has not commenced. The
trial is not likely to conclude soon. Therefore, the petitioner’s
right to a speedy trial is being violated. The submission will not
help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025: INSC:1316 that
bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged incarceration
without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section
37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: –
“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and::: Downloaded on – 14/07/2026 20:34:01 :::CIS
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likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold
under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest.
on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion
of this nature, if returned without addressing the
prosecution’s assertions of operative control andantecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
of
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity
of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
rt
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twinrequirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegationregarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only daysprior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role inarranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”
23. A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
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“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the.
recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but
the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities
ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the
contraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an
of
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act is made out in the present matter.”
24.
rt
This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v.
Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671, wherein it was
observed: –
9. It is well-settled that in matters involving recovery of
contraband in commercial quantity, the twin conditions under
Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are mandatory and entail no
relaxation merely on the ground that the accused hasundergone prolonged incarceration during the pendency of
trial. The provision casts upon the Court a duty to record, beforeenlarging an accused on bail, its satisfaction on two cumulative
conditions, first, that there exist reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged;
and second, that he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality
but a mandatory precondition, the non-observance of which
vitiates the grant of bail. This Court, in Kashif (supra), has held
in no uncertain terms that the recording of satisfaction on the
twin conditions under Section 37 is mandatory and not merely
directory, and that an order granting bail without such recorded
satisfaction stands vitiated and cannot be sustained. The same
view stands reiterated in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra).
10. The impugned order, on its own showing, does not record
the satisfaction mandated under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
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NDPS Act. Far from recording such satisfaction, the High Court
has gone on to observe that ‘the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy
trial.’ Such an approach is plainly contrary to the settled law
.
laid down by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this
ground alone. The right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of
the Constitution, is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional right.
That said, in matters governed by a special enactment such as
the NDPS Act, particularly where the recovery is of a
commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be
exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be
of
pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override it.
The constitutional right under Article 21 and the special
provision of law under Section 37, NDPS Act, are to be read
harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other. The
rt
High Court, by failing to record its satisfaction on the twin
conditions under Section 37, has, in this Court’s view,
committed an error.
****
9. The position of law on the grant of bail in matters involving
the recovery of a commercial quantity of contraband under the
NDPS Act is well settled. Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act is
cast in mandatory terms. Where the Public Prosecutor opposes
the bail application, the Court can enlarge an accused on bail
only upon recording its satisfaction on two cumulative
conditions: first, that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence; and
second, that the accused is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere
formality but a jurisdictional requirement. This Court in Kashif
(supra) has held, in plain terms, that the non-recording of the
twin satisfaction, being mandatory in nature, renders an order
granting bail unsustainable. A similar view has been expressed
in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra) and Ajay Kumar Singh (supra).
10. When the impugned order is tested against that settled
position, it becomes apparent that paragraph 8 of the impugned
order, which carries the weight of the reasoning, does not
contain a finding on either of the twin conditions prescribed by
Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. What the High Court has,
instead, proceeded on is the proposition that “the rigours of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the
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right to a speedy trial”. The right to speedy trial under Article 21
of the Constitution is undoubtedly a valuable constitutional
guarantee, but in the context of a special statute such as the
NDPS Act dealing with commercial quantity, that right has to be
.
read alongside, and not in displacement of, the mandate of
Section 37. The omission to record the twin satisfaction
prescribed by the statute, it appears, may have escaped the
attention of the High Court.
25. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim bail because of the
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
of
26. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not
rt
communicated to the petitioner, and the petitioner is entitled to
bail on this consideration. This submission is only stated to be
rejected. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State
of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 that the communication
of the grounds of the arrests in all the offences would apply
prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the
judgment. It was observed:
“58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or
binding requirement mandating the written
communication of the grounds of arrest for all the
offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure
implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an
arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution
of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation
would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal
justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore,
demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern
arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied)::: Downloaded on – 14/07/2026 20:34:01 :::CIS
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27. This judgment was followed by a co-ordinate bench
of this Court in Kabir Khan vs State 2025:HHC:39246, wherein it
.
was observed:
“7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as
previously there existed no consistent or binding
requirements mandating written communication of theof
grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairness
and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this
procedure as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth,
this means that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been
rt
pleased to make directions issued therein prospective.”
28. This Court held in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of
HP CrMP (M) no. 2329 of 2025, decided on 13.11.2025, that the
requirement of providing the grounds of arrests is prospective.
This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed in Arvind Kumar
@Chahna vs State of HP SLP (Criminal) no. 797 of 2026. Therefore,
the petitioner cannot get bail because the grounds of arrest were
not communicated to him.
29. A reference was made to the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dr. Rajinder Rajan vs. Union of India and anr,
SLP Criminal 3326 of 2026, decided on 01.04.2026, however, in the
said case, it has been nowhere stated that the provisions of
supplying the grounds of arrest laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs
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State of Maharashtra, SLP (Crl.) 17132 of 2024, would be
retrospective, therefore, no advantage can be derived from the
.
cited judgment.
30. No other point was urged.
31. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
of
is dismissed.
32. The observation made hereinbefore shall remain
rt
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
14th July, 2026
(Chander)
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