Itd-Itd Cem Joint Venture vs Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation Ltd on 8 May, 2026

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    Calcutta High Court

    Itd-Itd Cem Joint Venture vs Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation Ltd on 8 May, 2026

                         IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                              COMMERCIAL DIVISION                                     2026:CHC-OS:172
    
                                  ORIGINAL SIDE
    
                             RESERVED ON: 10.03.2026
                             DELIVERED ON: 08.05.2026
                                    PRESENT:
                     THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GAURANG KANTH
                                   AP-COM 181 OF 2024
                              [OLD CASE NO. AP 74 OF 2020]
    
                          ITD-ITD CEM JOINT VENTURE
                                    VERSUS
                     KOLKATA METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD.
    Appearance:
    Mr. Jishnu Saha, Sr. Adv.
    Mr. Anal Kumar Ghosh, Adv.
    Ms. Hashnuhana Chakraborty, Adv.
    Ms. Neelina Chatterjee, Adv.
    Ms. Ahana Bhattacharyya, Adv.                            ..... for the petitioner
    
    Mr. Sakya Sen, Sr. Adv.
    Mr. Sunil Gupta, Adv.
    Mr. Ankit Dey, Adv.
    Mr. A. Mandal, Adv.                                    ..... for the respondent
    
    
                                       JUDGMENT
    

    Gaurang Kanth, J.:-

    1. The Petitioner in the present Arbitration Petition is challenging the Arbitral

    Award dated 21.11.2019 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal comprising of Sh.

    Arbind Kumar, (presiding Arbitrator), Sh. A.K Mittal and Sh. B. Narasimha

    SPONSORED

    Rao in connection with the contract dated 10.03.2010. The Petitioner is

    challenging the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal only on account of Claim

    No. 1 and Claim No. 3.

    2. The brief facts leading to the present Petition are as follows:

    3. The Respondent, by Letter of Acceptance dated 09.02.2010, awarded the

    contract for execution of Project UG-2 relating to the “Design and

    Construction of the Underground Section from Central Station to Subhas
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    2026:CHC-OS:172
    Sarobar for the Kolkata East-West Metro Railway Project.” to the Petitioner.

    The contract value was fixed at Rs. 8,156,663,700/- (Rupees Eight Billion

    One Hundred Fifty-Six Million Six Hundred Sixty-Three Thousand and

    Seven Hundred only) together with Euro 13,530,000/- (Euros Thirteen

    Million Five Hundred Thirty Thousand only). The stipulated completion

    period was 217 weeks, commencing from 09.02.2010 and ending on

    08.04.2014. A formal Contract Agreement was thereafter executed between

    the parties on 10.03.2010 at Kolkata.

    4. M/s MYCEL was appointed by the Respondent as the General

    Consultant/Engineer for the said project.

    5. During the course of execution, the project suffered considerable delay due

    to various factors such as late handing over of land, diversion and removal

    of uncharted utilities and obstructions, variations ordered by the Employer

    and local restrictions. On account of these reasons, the Petitioner sought

    extension of time on four occasions, all of which were granted by the

    Respondent as unqualified extensions.

    6. Owing to subsequent alteration in the alignment of the UG-2 tunnel, the

    contract price was revised with the consent of both parties through

    Amendment Order No. KMRC/CEC/758/2016 dated 08.11.2016.

    7. The Petitioner contends that due to the unqualified extensions granted by

    the Respondent for Phase-I of the work covering the period from April 2014

    to February 2019, it incurred substantial additional costs towards idle

    infrastructure, establishment expenses, and other related overheads,

    resulting in cost overrun.

    8. In consequence, the Petitioner invoked the dispute resolution mechanism

    under the contract. It issued Notices of Dispute in terms of Clause 17.4 of
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    2026:CHC-OS:172
    the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) vide letters dated 25.06.2018

    and 10.07.2018. Since no response was received from the Respondent, the

    Petitioner thereafter issued Notices for Reference to Conciliation under

    Clauses 17.5 and 17.6 of the GCC read with Clause 36 of the Special

    Conditions of Contract, vide letter dated 16.07.2018. Upon receiving no

    reply even thereafter, the Petitioner invoked arbitration by issuing Notices

    of Arbitration dated 20.08.2018 and 29.09.2018.

    9. Pursuant to the aforesaid, both parties appointed their respective nominee

    arbitrators, who in turn appointed the Presiding Arbitrator. The Arbitral

    Tribunal was thus constituted on 07.01.2019.

    10. Before the Tribunal, the Petitioner filed a Statement of Claim raising four

    claims, whereas the Respondent filed one counter-claim. The Tribunal held

    six sittings; the hearings concluded at the fourth sitting, the fifth sitting

    was held for clarification, and the sixth for finalisation of the award.

    11. The Arbitral Tribunal made and published its award on 21.11.2019. By the

    said award, Claim Nos. 2 and 4 of the Petitioner were allowed, while Claim

    Nos. 1 and 3 were rejected. The counter-claim of the Respondent was also

    rejected.

    12. Aggrieved by the rejection of Claim Nos. 1 and 3, the Petitioner has filed the

    present petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

    1996, seeking to set aside the award to that extent.

    Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner

    13. Mr. Jishnu Saha, Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that

    the Arbitral Tribunal has erred in disallowing Claim Nos. 1 and 3. It is

    contended that while rejecting the said claims, the Tribunal failed to
    4
    2026:CHC-OS:172
    properly appreciate the factual matrix, including the continuing and

    successive breaches and defaults on the part of the Respondent. The

    Petitioner further asserts that the Tribunal has misinterpreted Clauses 8.3

    and 2.2 of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) and has failed to give

    effect to their true scope and intent.

    14. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that Claim No. 1

    pertains to cost overrun for a period of 69 months. It is contended that the

    reasons for such overstay were duly set out in the Statement of Claim and

    were not attributable to the Petitioner. The Respondent had, in fact,

    granted extensions of time without imposition of any penalty. However, the

    claim was rejected solely on the basis of Clauses 8.3 and 8.4 of the GCC,

    which, according to the Petitioner, are vague, uncertain, and ambiguous

    within the meaning of Section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

    15. It is further contended that where delay is not attributable to the

    contractor, the Respondent cannot rely upon restrictive contractual

    clauses such as Clause 8.3 to defeat a legitimate claim for actual losses. In

    support of this submission, reliance is placed upon K.N. Sathyapalan v.

    State of Kerala, (2007) 13 SCC 43; Assam SEB v. Buildworth Pvt.

    Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 146; and Union of India v. Suraj Infrastructure,

    2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1373.

    16. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the Tribunal has erred in

    holding that Claim No. 1 is barred by limitation, without assigning any

    cogent or discernible reasons. It is contended that the contractual work is

    still ongoing and no Performance Certificate has been issued;

    consequently, the period of limitation has not yet commenced. The

    Petitioner further submits that the Tribunal has erred in disregarding the
    5

    Chartered Accountant’s Certificate furnished in support of Claim No. 1. 2026:CHC-OS:172
    It

    is contended that, despite having recorded findings that delays in

    completion of the work were attributable to the Respondent, inter alia, on

    account of delay in handing over of sites, imposition of traffic restrictions,

    and execution of additional works arising from employer’s variations, the

    Tribunal nevertheless proceeded to disallow the claim. It is further

    submitted that the Tribunal failed to appoint an independent expert for

    verification of the computations and erroneously disregarded well-

    recognised methods, including the Hudson, Emden, and Eichleay

    formulae, which are widely accepted in the construction industry for

    quantification of time and cost overrun claims.

    17. Insofar as Claim No. 3 is concerned, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner

    submits that the original contract value was Rs. 908.63 crores, out of

    which a sum of Rs. 45,46,15,500/- was recovered as retention money

    (being 5% of the contract value). Subsequently, the contract value was

    reduced to Rs. 657.95 crores, thereby reducing the retention amount

    payable to Rs. 32.90 crores. Since the Petitioner had already paid Rs.

    45.46 crores, the Respondent was liable to refund a sum of Rs. 12.53

    crores. However, only Rs. 10 crores was refunded, leaving an outstanding

    balance of Rs. 2.53 crores. It is contended that the Tribunal has rejected

    the said claim, as well as the claim for interest thereon, without furnishing

    any cogent reasons, thereby failing to discharge its adjudicatory function.

    It is further submitted that the Respondent was entitled to retain the

    retention amount only until issuance of the Taking Over Certificate, which

    has not been issued till date, despite the contractual completion date of
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    2026:CHC-OS:172
    April 2013 for Phase-I of the project. The delay in issuance of such

    certificate is stated to be solely attributable to the Respondent.

    18. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance is placed upon Delhi

    Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd.,

    (2024) 6 SCC 357, to contend that contractual interpretation must be

    holistic and clause-wise. Further reliance is placed on OPG Power

    Generation Pvt. Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Pvt.

    Ltd., (2025) 2 SCC 417, and Ssangyong Engineering & Construction

    Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 16 SCC 131, to submit that the Tribunal has

    ignored material contractual provisions, including Clause 8.4, thereby

    rendering the Award unsustainable in law.

    Submissions on behalf of the Respondent

    19. Mr. Sakya Sen, Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent, at the outset,

    raises a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the present

    petition before this Court. It is contended that the Petition is devoid of

    specific pleadings establishing that the subject matter of the dispute falls

    within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in terms of Section 2(1)(e) of

    the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or that the Petition satisfies the

    pecuniary jurisdictional requirements under the said Act.It is further

    submitted that in the absence of foundational averments with respect to

    jurisdiction, the present Petition is liable to be dismissed as not

    maintainable. In support of the aforesaid objection, Learned Counsel

    places reliance upon Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S.

    Infraspace LLP, (2020) 15 SCC 585, and Laxmi Polyfab Pvt. Ltd. v.

    Eden Realty Ventures Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 1457.
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    2026:CHC-OS:172

    20. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent supports the findings of the

    Arbitral Tribunal and submits that the Award is well-reasoned, founded

    upon a proper appreciation of evidence, and in accordance with the

    contractual provisions governing the parties. It is contended that no

    perversity, patent illegality, or violation of public policy is made out so as

    to warrant interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

    Conciliation Act, 1996.

    21. It is further submitted on behalf of the Respondent that the various

    grounds relied upon by the Petitioner for claiming additional establishment

    costs are squarely covered by Clause 8.3 of the General Conditions of

    Contract (GCC). The extensions of time were granted strictly in terms of

    Clause 8.4 of the GCC, which were accepted by the Petitioner without any

    reservation of its alleged right to claim damages. In such circumstances,

    the Petitioner is estopped from assailing the applicability of the said

    clauses, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

    Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. Rail Vikas Nigam Ltd. (OMP (Comm.)

    278/2017).

    22. With respect to Claim No. 1, Learned Senior Counsel submits that the

    Arbitral Tribunal has rightly rejected the same. Clauses 8.3 and 8.4 of the

    GCC expressly exclude any entitlement to variation, compensation, or

    damages on account of delay in execution of the works. The impugned

    Award is, therefore, in consonance with the principles laid down by the

    Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Marappan v. Tamil Nadu Board for

    Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, (2020) 15 SCC 401, and

    Ramnath International Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2007) 2 SCC 453.

    Reliance is also placed on Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co.
    8

    Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 16 SCC 131, to contend that interpretation 2026:CHC-OS:172
    of

    contractual clauses falls squarely within the domain of the Arbitral

    Tribunal and does not warrant judicial interference unless the view taken

    is patently unreasonable.

    23. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further submits that the

    original contract was awarded for execution of the entire stretch from

    Subhas Sarobar to Central Station at a contract value of approximately Rs.

    908.61 crores, and the establishment costs were contemplated for the

    project as a whole. Subsequently, pursuant to a policy decision of the

    Government of West Bengal, the alignment was revised from Sealdah-

    Central to Sealdah-Esplanade. The Petitioner thereafter submitted a

    techno-commercial offer taking into account all financial and technical

    implications, including establishment costs. The said offer was accepted,

    and an Employer’s Variation dated 08.11.2016 was issued, revising the

    contract price from Rs. 908.61 crores to Rs. 1279.81 crores. It is

    submitted that the Petitioner unconditionally accepted the said variation,

    which was not unilaterally imposed but was based on the Petitioner’s own

    proposal duly approved by the Respondent. The additional costs now

    sought to be claimed were, therefore, already subsumed within the scope

    of the said variation.

    24. The Respondent further submits that during periods of reduced progress in

    the main works, the Petitioner’s establishment and resources were

    concurrently deployed in the execution of variation works, and therefore,

    no independent or additional establishment cost can be said to have been

    incurred without corresponding productive output. It is also contended

    that the Petitioner had, of its own volition, submitted a techno-commercial
    9
    2026:CHC-OS:172
    offer amounting to Rs. 695 crores for completion of the UG-2 contract,

    which inherently included establishment and overhead costs now sought

    to be claimed separately. Additionally, the claim for cost overrun

    commencing from April 2012 is ex facie barred by limitation, inasmuch as

    the notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration and

    Conciliation Act, 1996 was issued only on 20.08.2018, thereby rendering

    all claims beyond the preceding three-year period as time-barred.

    25. Insofar as Claim No. 3 is concerned, Learned Counsel submits that the

    Tribunal has rightly rejected the same, as the retention amount was

    deducted strictly in terms of the contractual provisions. The refund of Rs.

    10 crores was made upon reconciliation on a without-prejudice basis, and

    the balance amount pertains to incomplete or defective works. It is further

    contended that the Taking Over Certificate could not be issued on account

    of delays attributable to the Petitioner, and no fault can be ascribed to the

    Respondent in this regard. In support of the aforesaid submissions,

    reliance is placed upon Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton

    Greaves Ltd., reported as (2019) 20 SCC 1, and OPG Power Generation

    Pvt. Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Pvt. Ltd., reported as

    (2025) 2 SCC 417.

    Legal Analysis

    26. This Court has heard the arguments advance by both the parties and has

    examined the materials placed on record.

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    Findings of the Court on the Preliminary Objection as to Jurisdiction and
    Maintainability

    27. The Respondent has raised a preliminary objection assailing the

    maintainability of the present petition on the ground of absence of specific

    pleadings with respect to territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction.

    28. This Court is unable to accept the said objection. At the outset, it is an

    admitted position that the present petition has been instituted under

    Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging an

    arbitral award arising out of a commercial contract executed between the

    parties. The nature of the dispute, therefore, unmistakably brings the

    matter within the ambit of a “commercial dispute” as contemplated under

    the governing statutory framework.

    29. The record further reveals that the petition was, in fact, presented before

    the Commercial Division of this Court. The incorrect numbering of the

    matter as a non-commercial case is demonstrably an administrative or

    clerical lapse, which stands conclusively clarified by the report of the

    learned Registrar (Original) dated 31.07.2023. This Court finds no reason

    whatsoever to disbelieve or disregard the said report, which carries due

    official sanctity. A procedural irregularity of this nature, attributable to the

    registry, cannot be permitted to defeat substantive rights or render the

    proceedings non-maintainable.

    30. Insofar as the objection regarding the absence of specific jurisdictional

    pleadings is concerned, the same is hyper-technical and devoid of merit. It

    is well settled that jurisdiction is to be ascertained from the substance of

    the pleadings and the nature of the proceedings, and not on the basis of

    any purported deficiency in form. The present petition, on a plain reading,
    11

    unequivocally discloses that it arises out of an arbitral award rendered 2026:CHC-OS:172
    in

    the context of a commercial contract. The necessary jurisdictional facts

    are, therefore, implicit and evident from the record. The absence of a

    specific or formal recital, in such circumstances, cannot be elevated to a

    ground for non-suiting the Petitioner.

    31. The reliance placed by the Respondent on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises

    Ltd. (supra) and Laxmi Polyfab Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is wholly misplaced. The

    said decisions arise in the context of civil suits and the requirement of

    pleadings therein. The present proceedings, however, arise under Section

    34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which operate in a

    distinct statutory domain with a limited and well-defined scope of judicial

    interference. Significantly, neither of the aforesaid decisions pertains to a

    challenge to an arbitral award. The ratio of the said judgments, therefore,

    has no application to the facts of the present case.

    32. This Court is of the considered view that the objection raised by the

    Respondent is not only untenable in law but also appears to be an attempt

    to thwart adjudication on merits by resorting to technicalities. Such an

    objection, in the facts of the present case, cannot be countenanced.

    Accordingly, the preliminary objection as to maintainability and

    jurisdiction is rejected.

    Legal Analysis on Merits

    33. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to reiterate that the scope of

    judicial interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

    Act, 1996 is extremely limited. The Court does not sit in appeal over the

    findings of the Arbitral Tribunal nor is it permitted to reassess or

    reappreciate the evidence as if in a regular appeal. Interference is
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    warranted only when the award suffers from the vices enumerated under

    the statute, such as patent illegality on the face of the award, perversity in

    findings, violation of the principles of natural justice, or conflict with the

    fundamental policy of Indian law. Mere errors in interpretation of contract

    or appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal, even if another view is

    possible, do not constitute grounds for setting aside an arbitral award.

    Unless the conclusions reached are so irrational or unreasonable as to

    shock the conscience of the Court, the arbitral award must be sustained in

    deference to the legislative intent of minimal judicial intervention in

    arbitral proceedings.

    34. In the above legal backdrop, and bearing in mind the limited scope of

    judicial review under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

    1996, this Court now proceeds to examine the impugned Arbitral Award

    dated 21.11.2019.

    35. The present petition confines its challenge to the findings of the Arbitral

    Tribunal in respect of Claim No. 1 pertaining to unrecovered establishment

    costs and Claim No. 3 relating to interest on alleged excess recovery and

    prolonged withholding of retention money.

    Claim No.1

    36. Claim No. 1 relates to the Petitioner’s claim for unrecovered additional

    establishment costs allegedly incurred on account of the prolongation of

    the Phase-I works. The Petitioner contended before the Arbitral Tribunal

    that there was substantial delay in handing over work fronts and in

    execution, attributable to the Respondent, which led to extension of time

    on four occasions. It was urged that such prolongation resulted in

    financial loss by way of cost overrun. In support, the Petitioner relied upon
    13
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    a Chartered Accountant certified statement reflecting the average monthly

    establishment cost, comprising manpower, machinery, site transportation,

    travel, depreciation, and allied overheads, quantified at Rs. 266.29 lakhs

    for the period from April 2010 to December 2017 (95 months), and

    submitted that compensation for the extended period ought to be

    computed on that basis.

    37. The Respondent opposed the claim, contending that Clauses 8.3 and 8.4 of

    the General Conditions of Contract do not permit any variation or

    compensation on account of delay. It was further submitted that the

    Petitioner’s establishment was concurrently engaged in the execution of

    variation works during periods of reduced activity in the main contract.

    The Respondent also pointed out that the Petitioner’s techno-commercial

    offer of Rs. 695 crores had already factored in establishment costs.

    Additionally, it was urged that the claim, having been raised prior to the

    notice dated 20.08.2018 under Section 21 of the Arbitration and

    Conciliation Act, 1996, was barred by limitation to the extent it pertained

    to a period beyond three years therefrom.

    38. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected

    Claim No. 1, inter alia, on the grounds that: (i) the extensions of time were

    granted under Clause 8.3 of the GCC, and Clauses 2.2 and 2.3 expressly

    excluded any claim for damages or compensation arising from delay; and

    (ii) the claim was, in part, barred by limitation. The Tribunal also found the

    methodology adopted by the Petitioner for quantification to be

    unsustainable. It observed that the computation of Rs. 266.29 lakhs per

    month, derived as an average over 95 months, was disproportionately high

    in relation to the total contract value of Rs. 657.95 crores. The baseline
    14
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    programme did not specify resource deployment, and the Petitioner

    retained discretion to mobilise and demobilise resources in accordance

    with site availability. The Tribunal further noted that the bidders were

    aware of the site conditions at the time of tender and had factored

    attendant risks in their pricing.

    39. In law, a claim for unrecovered additional establishment costs falls to be

    considered under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which

    permits compensation for loss or damage that naturally arises in the usual

    course of things from a breach of contract. Where delay is attributable to

    the Employer, prolongation of the contract is a foreseeable consequence,

    and, in principle, the contractor may recover additional establishment or

    overhead expenses incurred during such extended period. However, such

    entitlement is confined to actual loss proved and remaining unrecovered,

    and cannot result in duplication of recovery or confer an unwarranted

    gain. The claimant must, therefore, establish through cogent and

    contemporaneous material that the establishment was maintained during

    the period of delay, that identifiable expenditure was actually incurred on

    account of such prolongation, and that such costs were not otherwise

    absorbed or compensated under the contract, including through

    escalation, variation works, or redeployment of resources. Proof ordinarily

    requires primary records such as wage registers, muster rolls, site

    accounts, invoices, and audited financial statements, evidencing a clear

    nexus between the delay and the expenditure incurred. A notional or

    averaged computation, even if certified, cannot, in the absence of

    supporting material, constitute sufficient proof of actual and unrecovered

    loss.

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    40. In the present case, while delay in completion is not disputed and is not

    attributable to the Petitioner, the evidentiary basis for the claim remains

    deficient. The Petitioner relied primarily on a Chartered Accountant

    certified average monthly establishment cost. The Tribunal noted that this

    figure represented an average over a prolonged period encompassing both

    low and peak activity phases, without any supporting material

    demonstrating actual deployment of manpower or machinery during the

    extended period. The claim was not one of idling but of unrecovered

    establishment cost; however, no material was produced to establish that

    such expenditure was in fact incurred and remained uncompensated.

    41. The Tribunal further took note of the Respondent’s case that there was no

    idle establishment at any stage and that resources were deployed in a

    phased manner in accordance with site requirements. It was asserted that

    manpower and machinery were utilised across Phase-I and the realigned

    portions of the project, and that equipment, including TBMs, was

    redeployed upon completion of certain segments. No separate or exclusive

    deployment for the prolonged Phase-I works was demonstrated. In the

    absence of proof of continued and exclusive establishment for the delayed

    works, the claim for additional overheads could not be sustained.

    42. The Tribunal thus concluded that the Petitioner failed to substantiate its

    claim through reliable and contemporaneous records evidencing actual

    additional expenditure. No material was placed to show that the costs

    claimed were incurred exclusively for the extended period of Phase-I or

    that they were not absorbed in other ongoing works. In the absence of

    verifiable data, reliance on averaged figures or theoretical formulations

    cannot substitute proof of loss.

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    43. The reliance placed by the Petitioner on K.N. Sathyapalan (supra), Assam

    SEB (Supra), and Union of India v. Suraj Infrastructure (supra) does not

    advance its case beyond the settled proposition that delay attributable to

    the Employer may, in principle, entitle a contractor to compensation. Such

    entitlement, however, remains subject to proof of actual loss. In the

    absence of such proof, no award can be made on this count.

    44. This Court finds no infirmity in the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal on

    Claim No. 1. The conclusions are based on a proper construction of the

    contractual provisions and a reasoned appreciation of the evidence on

    record. The view taken is a plausible one and does not suffer from

    perversity, patent illegality, or contravention of public policy so as to

    warrant interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

    Act, 1996.

    Claim No. 3

    45. Claim No. 3 pertains to the alleged loss of interest arising out of the excess

    recovery and prolonged withholding of the retention sum in respect of the

    Phase-I portion of the work. The case of the Petitioner before the Arbitral

    Tribunal was that retention money at the rate of 5% of the original

    contract value of Rs. 908.63 crores, amounting to Rs. 45,43,15,500/-, had

    been recovered by the Respondent by 13.07.2013. However, the actual

    retention amount payable at 5% of the modified contract value of Rs.

    657.95 crores ought to have been Rs. 32.90 crores only. The Respondent

    refunded Rs. 10 crores on 28.08.2015. It was contended that the

    Respondent ought to have refunded the said retention amount as on the

    stipulated date of issuance of the Taking Over Certificate for the Phase-I

    portion, i.e., 09.04.2013, and that the delay in issuing the certificate was
    17
    2026:CHC-OS:172
    attributable to the Respondent. The Petitioner, therefore, claimed

    entitlement to interest on the excess amount withheld by the Respondent.

    It was further submitted that, after repeated requests, the Respondent

    refunded Rs. 35 crores on 11.02.2018 against submission of a Bank

    Guarantee of equivalent value, subject to recovery of simple interest at the

    rate of 4% per annum.

    46. The Respondent, on the other hand, contended that under Clause 27 of the

    Special Conditions of Contract (SCC), the refund of retention money is

    conditional upon the actual issuance of the Taking Over Certificate. It was

    further submitted that the Petitioner had voluntarily agreed, vide letters

    dated 17.07.2017 and 01.09.2017, to pay interest at the rate of 4.5% per

    annum and to furnish a Bank Guarantee for refund of the retained

    amount. The Respondent thus argued that the retention and subsequent

    refund were strictly in accordance with the contractual provisions and the

    mutual agreement between the parties.

    47. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected

    Claim No. 3 on the following grounds:

    (i) Both parties had agreed that retention money up to 5% of the contract

    value was to be retained in accordance with Clause 25 of the GCC.

    (ii) The contract value of Rs. 908.63 crores remained in force until

    approval of the variation order dated 08.11.2016, and even thereafter,

    the contract continued as a revised contract and was not concluded.

    (iii) The Petitioner had admitted that the Respondent initially refunded

    Rs. 10 crores on account of reduction in contract value and

    subsequently converted the entire cash retention amount into a Bank

    Guarantee on mutual consent.

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    48. This Court finds no ground to interfere with the findings of the Arbitral

    Tribunal on Claim No. 3. The Tribunal has rightly concluded that the

    Petitioner is not entitled to any compensation or interest on the alleged

    excess recovery or withholding of retention money. The relevant

    contractual provisions, particularly Clauses 25 and 27 of the GCC and

    SCC, clearly stipulate that retention money is to be retained up to 5% of

    the contract value and is refundable only upon issuance of the Taking

    Over Certificate. The issuance of such certificate is a condition precedent

    to refund, and until such event occurs, the Respondent is contractually

    justified in retaining the amount. The record further demonstrates that the

    Petitioner itself had acknowledged and agreed to the terms governing

    refund of retention, including the furnishing of a Bank Guarantee and

    payment of simple interest at 4.5% per annum, as evidenced from its

    letters dated 17.07.2017 and 01.09.2017. The refund of Rs. 10 crores and

    subsequent conversion of the remaining retention amount into a Bank

    Guarantee were actions taken on mutual consent and in conformity with

    the contractual framework. The Petitioner, having voluntarily accepted

    these conditions, cannot now resile from its own agreement or claim

    additional compensation or interest. Moreover, the Tribunal has correctly

    noted that the contract value of Rs. 908.63 crores continued to govern the

    retention computation until the variation order was approved on

    08.11.2016, and even thereafter, the revised contract value was not

    formally concluded. The Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate, through

    evidence or contemporaneous records, any actual financial loss or

    prejudice suffered on account of the timing of the refund. In such

    circumstances, the Tribunal’s finding that the claim is devoid of merit and
    19
    2026:CHC-OS:172
    unsupported by proof is both reasonable and in accordance with law.

    Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the findings of the

    Arbitral Tribunal on Claim No. 3 are sound, reasoned, and consistent with

    the contractual terms as well as the principles governing arbitral

    interference. No ground of perversity, patent illegality, or violation of public

    policy is made out to warrant interference under Section 34 of the

    Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

    49. The Petitioner has relied upon Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (supra),

    OPG Power Generation Pvt. Ltd. (supra), and Ssangyong Engineering

    & Construction Co. Ltd. (supra) to contend that an arbitral award is

    liable to be interfered with where the interpretation of the contract is not

    holistic or where the findings suffer from patent illegality. There is no

    dispute with the settled principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions,

    namely, that contractual provisions must be construed harmoniously, and

    that an arbitral award which is ex facie contrary to the terms of the

    contract or suffers from perversity or irrationality would warrant

    interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

    1996. However, in the context of Claim Nos. 1 and 3, the said decisions do

    not advance the Petitioner’s case. The Arbitral Tribunal has interpreted the

    relevant provisions of the contract, including the General and Special

    Conditions, in a conjoint and consistent manner, and has arrived at

    findings which are borne out from the record. Insofar as Claim No. 1 is

    concerned, the rejection is founded not merely on contractual stipulations

    but also on the Petitioner’s failure to establish actual and unrecovered loss

    through cogent evidence. With respect to Claim No. 3, the Tribunal has

    applied the express contractual mechanism governing retention and its
    20
    2026:CHC-OS:172
    refund, and has taken into account the admitted conduct of the parties,

    including the Petitioner’s consent to the terms of release.

    50. The decisions relied upon by the Petitioner pertain to cases where the

    arbitral award was found to be in disregard of the contractual framework

    or vitiated by manifest illegality. In the present case, the findings of the

    Tribunal neither ignore the contract nor traverse beyond its terms; rather,

    they represent a plausible and reasoned view based on interpretation of

    the contract and appreciation of evidence. In the absence of any

    demonstrable perversity, patent illegality, or violation of public policy, the

    scope of interference under Section 34 remains limited, and the reliance

    placed on the aforesaid judgments is, therefore, misplaced.

    Conclusion

    51. Having considered the entire material on record and the submissions

    advanced on behalf of the parties, this Court is of the view that the

    impugned award does not suffer from any patent illegality, perversity, or

    error apparent on the face of the record so as to warrant interference

    under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is well

    settled that the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 is supervisory

    and not appellate. As reiterated in Ssangyong Engineering &

    Construction Co. Ltd. (Supra) and Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Supra),

    the Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view for that

    of the Arbitral Tribunal merely because an alternative interpretation is

    possible. Interference is warranted only where the award is vitiated by

    patent illegality, is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law, or

    is so unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the Court.
    21

    2026:CHC-OS:172

    52. The award in the present case is a reasoned one, founded upon a coherent

    interpretation of the contractual provisions and a careful evaluation of the

    evidentiary record. The findings returned by the Tribunal on Claim Nos. 1

    and 3 are plausible and consistent with the contractual framework agreed

    between the parties. The Tribunal has neither disregarded the terms of the

    contract nor adopted an impermissible approach in law. On the contrary,

    the conclusions are in consonance with the principles governing arbitral

    adjudication as recognised in Ramnath International Pvt. Ltd. (supra)

    and K. Marappan (supra), which emphasise judicial restraint and

    deference to the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal. Similarly, the

    limited scope of interference and the need to uphold a plausible view taken

    by the arbitrator has been consistently reiterated in OPG Power

    Generation Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

    53. The reliance placed on Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (supra) does not advance the

    Petitioner’s case, as the said decision, too, reiterates that where the

    arbitrator’s view is a possible and reasonable one based on the contract

    and evidence, the Court ought not to interfere. In the present case, no

    ground is made out to demonstrate that the findings of the Tribunal are

    arbitrary, perverse, or in violation of public policy. The conclusions do not

    shock the conscience of this Court and are firmly rooted in the material

    available on record.

    54. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the challenge to the impugned

    arbitral award. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. There shall be no

    order as to costs.

    (GAURANG KANTH, J.)

    SAKIL AMED P.A.



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