Chattisgarh High Court
Leela Ram Baghel vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 29 April, 2026
1
Digitally signed
by RAMESH
KUMAR VATTI 2026:CGHC:19868
Date: 2026.05.07
11:19:54 +0530 NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 5153 of 2022
* - Leela Ram Baghel S/o Shri Laikhan Ram Aged About 52 Years Sub
Inspector (Ministerial), Police Training Centre, Borgaon District Kondagoan,
R/o 29, Tiranga Chowk, Ambedkar Ward No. 29, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur),
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Home Affairs
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 - Director General Of Police Chhattisgarh Police Headquarters, Atal Nagar,
Naya Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Additional Director General Of Police Chhattisgarh Police Headquarters,
Atal Nagar Naya Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - Deputy Inspector General Of Police (Administration) Police Headquarters,
Atal Nagar Naya Raipur,, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 - Commandant Police Training Centre, Borgaon,, District : Kondagaon,
Chhattisgarh
6 - Shri Kolharam Nagwanshi, Inspector (Earlier Subedar-M) working Under
The Office Of Superintendent Of Police Jashpur, District : Jashpur,
Chhattisgarh
7 - Shri Francis Xavier, Inspector, (Earlier Subedar-M), Working Under The
Office Of Superintendent Of Police Korea, Police Station Baikunthpur,, District
: Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Shrijan Pandey, Advocate
For Respondents No. 1 to 5 : Mr. T.L. Bareth, Panel Lawyer
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
29/04/2026
1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):-
2
“10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for
the entire records in relation to the case of the petitioner from
the possession of respondents for its kind perusal.
10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue
a writ or writs/order or orders directing the respondent
authorities to provide promotion to the petitioner on the post of
Inspector (ministerial) [earlier Subedar (Aa)] w.e.f. 20.09.2013
and place him above respondent no. 6 & 7 in the seniority list.
10.3 That, this Hon’ble Court may direct the respondent
authorities to provide consequential benefits to petitioner in
terms of salary, pay, increments etc. pursuant to such
promotion.
10.4 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct
the respondent authorities to provide promotion to the
petitioner on the post of Sub-Inspector (ministerial) since
20.04.2006.
10.5 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant
any other relief/relief’s in favour of the petitioner, which the
Hon’ble Court deemed fit & just in the facts and circumstances
of the case, including awarding of the costs to the petitioner.”
2. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of
Assistant Sub Inspector (Ministerial) in Police Department 26.07.1995.
Subsequently the petitioner was promoted to the post of Sub Inspector
(Ministerial) vide order dated 02.01.2009. It is pleaded that the
petitioner belongs to scheduled tribe category, but he has wrongly been
shown as general category, therefore, there is mistake on the part of
the respondent authorities and the petitioner is continuously being
deprived of timely promotions. In seniority list of Sub Inspector
(Ministerial) dated 01.04.2018, the petitioner has rightly been shown to
be scheduled tribe category, but he has not been given the benefit of
promotion on the post of Inspector (Ministerial). It is further pleaded
that though the petitioner was entitled for promotion to the post of Sub
Inspector (Ministerial) since 20.04.2006 and to the post of Inspector
(Ministerial) since 20.09.2013, but his name was not considered by the
3
respondent authorities. It is also pleaded that the petitioner made
representation before the respondents which was rejected vide order
dated 15.11.2019 and against said order, this petition has been
preferred.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the
petitioner was appointed as Assistant Sub Inspector (Ministerial). He
would further submit that the petitioner was eligible to be promoted
next higher post. but his name was not considered by the respondent
authorities. He would argue that similarly situated employees /
respondents No. 6 and 7 who are juniors to the petitioner were
appointed on 31.07.1995 and 04.09.1995 and they were promoted to
the post of Sub Inspector (Ministerial) on 20.04.2006 and 15.02.2007.
He would contend that the petitioner was promoted to the post of Sub
Inspector (Ministerial) on 02.01.2009. He would further contend that
earlier the petitioner preferred WPS No. 5831/2019 which was
disposed of vide order dated 06.08.2019 wherein the respondent
authorities were directed to decide the representation of the petitioner.
He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matter of G.P. Doval and Others Vs. Chief
Secretary, Government of U.P. and Others reported in (1984) 4 SCC
329. He would pray to allow this petition.
4. On the other hand, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the
State/respondents No. 1 to 5 would oppose. He would submit that the
petitioner has claimed promotion to the post of Sub Inspector
(Ministerial) from 20.04.2006 and to the post of Inspector (Ministerial)
from 20.09.2013 and he has filed this petition on 17.07.2022. He would
submit that the petition filed by the petitioner is hit by delay and laches,
4
and thus the present petition is liable to be dismissed on the grounds
of delay and laches.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents.
6. Perusal of the documents would show that the petitioner has claimed
promotion to the post of Sub Inspector (Ministerial) from 20.04.2006
and to the post of Inspector (Ministerial) from 20.09.2013 and has filed
this petition on 17.07.2022. The representation of the petitioner was
rejected on 15.11.2019 vide Annexure P-1, thereafter, again petitioner
took 03 years to approach this Court and filed this petition on
17.07.2022. In para- 7 of writ petition, he has stated that there is no
delay in filing instant writ petition.
7. In G.P. Doval (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme, in para- 16, has observed
as under:-
“16. A grievance was made that the petitioners have
moved this Court after a long unexplained delay and the
Court should not grant any relief to them. It was pointed
out that the provisional seniority list was drawn up on
March 22, 1971 and the petitions have been filed in the
year 1983. The respondents therefore submitted that the
Court should throw out the petitions on the ground of
delay, laches and acquiescence. It was said that
promotions granted on the basis of impugned seniority list
were not questioned by the petitioners and they have
acquiesced, into it. We are not disposed to accede to this
request because respondents 1 to 3 have not finalised
the seniority list for a period of more than 12 years and
are operating the same for further promotion to the utter
disadvantage of the petitioners. Petitioners went on
making representations after representations which did
not yield any response, reply or relief. Coupled with this is
the fact that the petitioners belong to the lower echelons
of service and it is not difficult to visualise that they may
find it extremely difficult to rush to the court. Therefore,
contention must be rejected.”
5
In the above case, cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner,
wherein respondents 1 to 3 have not finalised the seniority list for a
period of more than 12 years, therefore, the facts of the present case
are distinguishable from the facts of the cited case.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali
Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 held as under:-
’17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’
delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not
to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize
whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any
justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated
approach gains more significance as the respondent
employee being absolutely careless to his duty and
nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had
remain unauthorizedly absent on the pretext of some kind
of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that
remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not
foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in
injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may
have impact on others’ ripened rights and may
unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in
acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to
have attained finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons -who compete with
“Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle” . In our
considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court
should have thrown the petition overboard at the very
threshold.
9. Recently, the Apex Court in the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai
Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation reported in 2022 SCC
Online SC 64 held as under:-
‘9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter
statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of
repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary
opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state
of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have
expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the
6foundations of greater public interest for three reasons,
namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty
than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost
the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that
persons with good causes of action (who are able to
enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable
diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3
SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn.,
Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68
(2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or
character, creation of third party rights over a period of
time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in
dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why
period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation
does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested
with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as
delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure
the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury,
quicken diligence, and prevent oppression.(see Popat and
Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association
(2005) 7 SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and
judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with
favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons
suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts
for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the
rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have
observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and
are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan
during which a person must approach the court for their
remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty
as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N.
Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC 123.
Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court,
way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President,
Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred
to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The
Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong
Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in
the following words:
” Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either
because the party has, by his conduct, done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by this conduct and neglect he
has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case,if an argument against relief, which
7otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere
delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far
as relates to the remedy.”
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bichitrananda Behera
Vs. State of Orissa and others reported in 2023 Livelaw (SC) 883,
under relevant para 21 held as under:-
“21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passagesfrom
certain decisions of this Court:
(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim
will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where
remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation
(where remedy is sought by an application to the
Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said
rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a
service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief
can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking
remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing
wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a
continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the
exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or
administrative decision which related to or affected several
others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect
the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment
or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in
spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third
parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority
or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the
claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied.
Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears
for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to
recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence,
the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating
to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the
date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied)
(B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:
“Delay, laches and acquiescence
8
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on
many occasions. However, they have their distinct
characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay
is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are
species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a
species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a
case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches.
These principles are common law principles, and perhaps
one could identify that these principles find place in various
statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create
non consideration of condonation in certain circumstances.
They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring
prudence of the court than of a strict application of law.
The underlying principle governing these concepts would
be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an
important issue to be taken note of by the court.
Laches
21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language
meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves
unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim
involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the
other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act
which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore,
must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the
delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As
stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of
the party approaching the court apart from the change in
position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be
unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a
party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a
waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other
party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be
unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court.
Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not
expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.
23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is
no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a
clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a
remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The
said principle may not have any application when the
existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side.
To determine the difference between the concept of laches
and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches,
the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences
that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can
succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff,
while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to
acquiescence.
9
Acquiescence
24. We have already discussed the relationship between
acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on
the other.
25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive
acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In
other words, such an action would qualify a passive
assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it
presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the
knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead
of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform
the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its
terms, and instead being allowed to continue by
consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further,
acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it
reintroduces a new implied agreement between the
parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the
party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance
of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the
conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction
involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is
followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we
are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to
be seen on a case-to-case basis.” (emphasis supplied)(C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2
SCC 301:
“36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a
straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of
days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is
nonexistent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as
acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who
approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without
any justifiable explanation for bringing action after
unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the
order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after
four years and five months, which is certainly highly
belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory
explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the
appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently,
the challenge was primarily on the ground that the
respondent was not allowed to be represented by a
representative of his choice. The respondent knew that
even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has
happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not
be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a
legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also
noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to
10show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the
delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the
question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the
context of the present case.
Xxx
38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union
of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and State of U.P. v. Manohar
[State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court
observed that if the statutory authority has not performed
its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same
by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived
of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for
relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and
thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within
reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to
take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such
cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in
some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem
Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 :
(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of
action.The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the
genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on
their part. However, this general principle would not apply
when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes
that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may
be either express or implied from his conduct.
Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as
has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills
Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax)
144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept
of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v.Jaswant
Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC
464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several
judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in
Halsbury’s Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P.
Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1
SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 12 &13)
“12. The statement of law has also been summarised in
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Para 911,p. 395 as follows:
‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to
amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part;and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the
defendant’s part.
11
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by
while the violation of a right is in progress,but assent after
the violation has been completed and the claimant has
become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a
remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or
where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and
delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests
the doctrine of laches.’
13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above,
the respondents are guilty since the respondents have
acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not
challenge the same in time. If they would have been
vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as
others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears
that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not
rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then
in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting
the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be
taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or
waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties
are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the
present case, if the respondents would have challenged
their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act,
perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to
raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting
their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and
after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ
petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will
definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going
to have serious financial repercussions on the financial
management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to
the rescue of such persons when they themselves are
guilty of waiver and acquiescence?”
39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify
distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and
laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine
which applies when a party having a right stands by and
sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that
right, while the act is in progress and after violation is
completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He
cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture
Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also,
see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das,
1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal
sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit
consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi
Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992)
194 ITR 584] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an
12intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also
to denote conduct from which another party will be justified
in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram
Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34]
Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and
express approbation, or indirect where a person having the
right to set aside the action stands by and sees another
dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite
of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance.
[See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures —
Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.]
However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of
no importance or consequence.
40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both
limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right.
Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable
considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports
even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence
implies active assent and is based upon the rule of
estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party
afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right.
Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent,
which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction
which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is
quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys
the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v.
CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584]
Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence
on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing
of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the
appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the
nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming
violation of the right of fair representation.”
11. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is
to be ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously oblivious
to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it
brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have
impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others
into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been
treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons, such delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on the said ground alone this Court deems it
13
appropriate to dismiss this petition at the very threshold. The doctrine
of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation are
considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There must
be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their
remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the
rights and obligations of the parties.
12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of
the judgments cited above, in my opinion, the petitioner utterly failed to
explain the delay caused in filing instant petition. Accordingly, this
petition is hereby dismissed on account of delay and laches. No costs.
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
vatti
