Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana vs The State Of Maharashtra on 20 April, 2026
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2260/2026
SHAILESHBHAI GOVINDBHAI MAKWANA ...Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. ...Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard Mr. Sachin Patil, learned counsel for the
appellant and Rukhmini Bobde, learned counsel for the
State. The Defacto complainant, though served, is not
appearing.
3.The appellant seeks quashment of RCC No.328/2021
pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Tuljapur, Taluk Tuljapur, Dist. Osmanabad, Maharashtra.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
KANCHAN CHOUHAN
Date: 2026.04.30
4.
18:16:14 IST
Reason: The said proceedings arise out of a chargesheet filed
for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n), 377 and
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506 of IPC. The chargesheet in turn was filed pursuant to
a First Information Report dated 09.02.2021 lodged by the
respondent no. 2 against the appellant.
5. According to the case of the complainant, complainant
was earlier married to one “K” in the year 1998 but in
2012 due to differences they started living separately.
6. It is admitted in the complaint leading to the First
Information Report that in 2017 itself before the divorce
with “K” was finalised, complainant/respondent no. 2 gave
an advertisement on a matrimonial site and created a
profile for a second marriage.
7. It is the case of the complainant that the appellant
got her number from the matrimonial site and kept in
contact with her; he talked to her affectionately and
video called her. The complainant avers that the appellant
guaranteed that he would marry her. According to the
complainant, on 17.10.2017, the appellant came to Tuljapur
where she was living with her son. He stayed with the
complainant for 2-3 days, helped her with the household
work and also took care of her son. He even talked about
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marrying the complainant. The complainant was told that
even the appellant was in the process of getting divorced
from his first wife. According to the complainant,
believing his words she divorced her husband.
8. The complainant states that one night in Tuljapur,
the appellant against her will had sexual intercourse with
her and also had unnatural intercourse. The complainant
admits that even thereafter the parties were in a
relationship and the appellant visited for 2-3 days and
had a physical relationship. They even stayed in the hotel
in Bhuj, Gujarat for four days and had a physical
relationship.
9. According to the First Information Report, the
physical relationship continued and the parties stayed
together at a hotel in Surat. Further on 03.10.2020, the
physical relationship continued for several days
thereafter. The complainant even states that she
transferred initially a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. Ten
Thousand only) and in all a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rs. Two
lakh fifty thousand only).
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10. It is stated that on 06.02.2021 when she came to
Surat and called the appellant to meet her at night, he
did not come. She called again next morning for which
there was no response. It is stated that in the morning
the appellant called her to Sumul Dairy Road. The
complainant stated that she wanted to marry him but the
appellant’s brother stated that he would not let them get
married and the appellant also refused to marry.
11. It is at this point, the complainant came to
Mahidharpura Police Station to file a complaint on
08.02.2021, stating that after giving a guarantee
that he would marry her, the appellant refused to
marry the complainant.
12. Thereafter, the complainant states that by this
process the appellant lured her with the promise of
marriage against her will and established physical
intercourse including forcible sexual intercourse.
Chargesheet has been filed for the offences punishable
under Sections 376(2)(n), 377 and 506 IPC.
13. The High Court, on being approached, has dismissed
the quash petition primarily on two grounds, one that
earlier quash petition was dismissed as withdrawn and
secondly, the offences required trial.
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14. Mr. Sachin Patil, learned counsel for the appellant
submits that both the appellant and the complainant were
married earlier and it is within their knowledge. More
importantly, he submitted that in 2017 admittedly when
the complainant was not divorced, she put her profile on
the matrimonial site for a second marriage. Admittedly,
for at least a period of 04 years before the FIR was
lodged on 09.02.2021, parties with full knowledge that
they were earlier married, continued in a physical
relationship. The physical relationship continued even at
points when the complainant’s divorce was not finalized.
Since, according to the records, divorce was finalized
only in 2018.
15. In so far as the maintainability of the quash
petition is concerned, Mr. Patil argues that there is no
inviolable rule that the second quash petition will not
be maintainable. Since, the earlier proceedings were
dismissed as withdrawn on the facts and circumstances,
Section 482 petition could not have been thrown out on
maintainability. He relies on the judgment reported in
M.C. Ravi Kumar vs. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors. ([2025] SCC
Online SC 1498) (See also Superintendent & Remembrancer
of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Mohan Singh And Others,
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[(1975) 3 SCC 706]).
16. Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, learned counsel for the
respondent defended the impugned order.
17. We have carefully considered the submissions of the
learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent-
State and perused the records.
18. A careful perusal of the records indicates that:-
(i) Both parties were aware that they were earlier
married to different spouses;
(ii) The complainant at a point when her divorce was
not finalized put up a matrimonial advertisement;
(iii) Admittedly, for over a period of 04 years, the
parties travelled together and established a physical
relationship;
(iv) The physical relationship which the complainant
states to have been forceful was on 17.10.2017;
(v) Admittedly, even after 17.10.2017 parties travelled
together and had a physical relationship;
(vi) No complaint of the incident of 17.10.2017, about
the forcible sexual intercourse and the unnatural sex
was lodged till 09.02.2021.
19. In the above background, the question is whether the
appellant under a promise of marriage deceived the
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respondent? In the light of the admitted facts, parties
had knowledge that they were married to some other spouse
earlier and the admitted fact is that before obtaining a
divorce the respondent-complainant gave a matrimonial
advertisement and before finalization of divorce had
sexual relationship and never complained of any force by
the appellant for 04 years.
20. We are of the opinion that this was not a case where
a promise of marriage resulted in appellant deceiving the
complainant. Parties have happily cohabited together
between 2017 and 2020 and, thereafter, the relationship
soured.
21. In Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.
(2024) 11 SCC 398) this Court held as under: –
“26. The complainant had taken the plea that the
appellant had physical relationship with her
against her consent by making a false promise
that he would marry her. In this regard, it has
to be considered whether making a false promise
to marry amounts to an offence. If a false
promise of marriage is made to a woman by a man,
thus deceiving the woman leading her to engage
in sexual relations, it may amount to
misconception of fact, in which case the consent
given by the woman may be vitiated. In this
regard one may refer to the decision of this
Court in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi)
[Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15
SCC 385] : (SCC p. 398, para 21)“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf
8of the respondents is that the prosecutrix
had given her consent for sexual
relationship under the misconception of
fact, as the accused had given a false
promise to marry her and subsequently he did
not marry, and therefore such consent was no
consent in the eye of law and the case fell
under the Clause — Secondly of Section
375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to
note that there is a difference between
giving a false promise and committing breach
of promise by the accused. In case of false
promise, the accused right from the
beginning would not have any intention to
marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated
or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a
false promise to marry her only with a view
to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of
breach of promise, one cannot deny a
possibility that the accused might have
given a promise with all seriousness to
marry her, and subsequently might have
encountered certain circumstances unforeseen
by him or the circumstances beyond his
control, which prevented him to fulfil his
promise. So, it would be a folly to treat
each breach of promise to marry as a false
promise and to prosecute a person for the
offence under Section 376.”
27. In our view, if a man is accused of having
sexual relationship by making a false promise of
marriage and if he is to be held criminally
liable, any such physical relationship must be
traceable directly to the false promise made and
not qualified by other circumstances or
consideration. A woman may have reasons to have
physical relationship other than the promise of
marriage made by the man, such as personal
liking for the male partner without insisting
upon formal marital ties.
28. Thus, in a situation where physical
relationship is maintained for a prolonged
period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said
9with certainty that the said physical
relationship was purely because of the alleged
promise made by the appellant to marry her.
Thus, unless it can be shown that the physical
relationship was purely because of the promise
of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with
the physical relationship without being
influenced by any other consideration, it cannot
be said that there was vitiation of consent
under misconception of fact.”
22. We are also not convinced with the reasoning of the
High Court that the quash petition was not maintainable,
especially, because in the present case the earlier
petition was withdrawn without any discussion on the
merits. Further when we have examined the facts and found
that the offence alleged is not made out, we feel it will
not be just to throw out the petition on maintainability.
We say so on the special facts of this case.
23. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, RCC
No. 328/21 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Tuljapur, Taluk Tuljapur, Dist. Osmanabad,
Maharashtra would stand quashed.
24. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated
03.09.2025 in Criminal Application No.2335 of 2025,
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench
at Aurangabad is set aside. Bail bonds if any, shall
stand discharged.
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…………………………………………………. J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
…………………………………………………. J.
(MANMOHAN)
New Delhi,
20th April, 2026
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ITEM NO.42 COURT NO.16 SECTION II-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2260/2026
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 03-09-2025
in CRA No. 2335/2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay at Aurangabad]
SHAILESHBHAI GOVINDBHAI MAKWANA Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. Respondent(s)
IA No. 24244/2026 – CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING
IA No. 24245/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT
IA No. 24246/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
Date : 20-04-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. VISWANATHAN
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Sachin Patil, Adv.
Mr. Kailas Bajirao Autade, AOR
For Respondent(s) Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.
Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR
Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv.
Mr. Vinayak Aren, Adv.
Mr. Jatin Dhamija, Adv.
Ms. Aishwarya Nigam, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. The appeal is allowed, in terms of the signed order.
2. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged.
3. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.
(KANCHAN CHOUHAN) (MANOJ KUMAR) SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT COURT MASTER (NSH)
[Signed Order is placed on the file.]
