02.03.2026 vs State Of H.P. And Others on 21 April, 2026

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    Himachal Pradesh High Court

    Reserved On: 02.03.2026 vs State Of H.P. And Others on 21 April, 2026

                                                                                               2026:HHC:12491
    
    
    
    
          IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
    
                                                  Cr. MMO No. 774 of 2025
                                                  Reserved on: 02.03.2026
    
    
    
    
                                                                                       .
    
                                                  Date of Decision: 21.04.2026.
    
        Abhishek Kumar                                                                ...Petitioner
    
    
    
    
    
                                               Versus
    
        State of H.P. and others                                                     ...Respondents
    
    
    
    
                                                        of
        Coram
        Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
                            rt
        Whether approved for reporting?1                   No.
    
        For the Petitioner                          :      Mr Ram Lal Thakur, Advocate.
        For Respondents/State                       :      Mr   Ajit   Sharma,                 Deputy
                                                           Advocate General.
    
    
    
        Rakesh Kainthla, Judge:
    

    The petitioner has filed the present petition for

    quashing of FIR No. 0056 of 2025, dated 10.04.2025, registered

    SPONSORED

    for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 121(1),

    132, 190, 191(2), 324(4), and 333 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita

    (BNS), 2023 and Section 3 of Prevention of Damage to Public

    Property (PDP) Act, 1984 at Police Station Dehra, District Kangra,

    H.P. and also consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR.

    1

    Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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    2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the

    informant, Head Constable Surender Singh, was posted as

    .

    Investigating Officer in Police Post Dadasiba. He was present in

    the Police Post on 09.04.2025 along with his staff. Constable

    Yusuf Deen was sitting outside the Police Post. The petitioner

    Abhishek Kumar, his brother, Parikshit, Om Dutt, Lucky, Kalu

    of
    and two other people came to the Police Station and told

    Constable Yusuf Deen that they had to make a complaint about a
    rt
    threat extended to Lucky by liquor contractors from Punjab.

    Ankush alias Hondo, Aashu and Anku also reached the spot, in

    two different vehicles with 10-12 people. Ankush alias Hondo

    enquired as to who was saying that he would sell illicit liquor.

    Petitioner Abhisek Kumar started video recording the incident.

    Ankush and other people asked the petitioner why he was video

    recording the incident. The petitioner replied that he was a

    journalist and was preparing a video of the incident. Both parties

    started quarrelling with each other outside the Police Post. The

    informant was carrying out the investigation, and he was

    obstructed in the discharge of his duties. He came out of the

    Police Post and requested the people not to quarrel with each

    other. However, both parties continued to abuse each other. Ashu

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    and Kalu caught each other by the throat and started beating each

    other. The informant and other police officials tried to rescue

    .

    Ashu, Kalu and other persons. The petitioner entered the police

    Post while video recording the incident. Ashu, Kalu and other

    people also tried to enter the Police Post. Constable Yusuf Deen

    tried to prevent them from entering the Police Post. However, he

    of
    was pushed, and the door of the Police Post was damaged. The

    articles lying inside the Police Post were picked up by the persons
    rt
    and thrown at each other. The laptop, keyboard and mouse were

    damaged in the incident. The informant asked the people to go

    outside the Police Post, but they refused. They pushed the

    informant, and he sustained injuries. All the persons except the

    petitioner left the Police Post, and the petitioner continued to

    video record the incident. The people who had gone outside the

    Police Post tried to re-enter the post. The matter was reported to

    the police, and the police investigated the FIR.

    3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the

    petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that he has been

    a journalist since 2022. He was present at Dadasiba to cover news

    events. He went to the Police Post after hearing the noise and

    started covering the incident happening outside the Police Post

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    Dadasiba. The petitioner had not caused any interruption to the

    police in the discharge of their official duties. He had also not

    .

    caused any damage to the public property. The petitioner was

    prevented from video recording the incident, and he had made a

    complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Dehra, District

    Kangra, H.P., regarding the incident. The allegations of the FIR,

    of
    even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission

    of any cognizable offence; therefore, it was prayed that the FIR
    rt
    and the proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed against the

    petitioner.

    4. The petition is opposed by filing a status report

    reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that the

    petitioner was asked to produce the documents regarding his

    status as a journalist, but he did not produce any documents and

    went outside the Police Post. The petitioner’s brothers were asked

    to call the petitioner, but his phone was found to be busy. Om

    Dutt revealed subsequently that the petitioner had circulated a

    live video in which he was threatening to commit suicide. The

    petitioner was found on the riverbank of the Beas River, and he

    had consumed some poison. He was admitted to the hospital, and

    his samples were preserved. The accused had damaged the door

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    of the Police Post, which was worth ₹19,186/-. Many cases were

    registered against the petitioner. The CCTV footage of the

    .

    incident was seized. As per the report of RFSL, Dharamshala,

    Phenol was detected in the petitioner’s samples. The petitioner

    has wrongly asserted in his petition that he was present at the

    place of the incident as a journalist. He was involved in the

    of
    commission of the offence with the other co-accused. Hence, the

    status report.

    5.
    rt
    I have heard Mr Ram Lal Thakur, Ld. counsel for the

    petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General,

    for the respondent/State.

    6. Mr Ram Lal Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner,

    submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely

    implicated. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be

    correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable

    offence. The petitioner is a journalist, and he was video recording

    the incident. He had not caused any obstruction to any police

    official. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and

    the FIR registered against the petitioner, and the proceedings

    arising out of the said FIR be quashed.

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    7. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for

    the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was involved

    .

    in the commission of the crime with the other co-accused. The

    petitioner and the co-accused had damaged the door of the Police

    Post Dadasiba and obstructed the informant in the discharge of

    his official duties. The police have completed the investigation

    of
    and filed the charge sheet before the Court. This Court should not

    exercise the inherent jurisdiction vested with it and should leave
    rt
    the matter to the learned Trial Court, which is seized of the

    matter. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

    8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

    made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

    9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by

    the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC

    OnLine SC 7 as under: –

    “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
    is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
    be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
    decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
    1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
    some of the principles under which
    FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
    following words:

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    “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
    various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
    XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
    in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the

    .

    extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent

    powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
    extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
    categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such

    power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
    process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
    justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any

    of
    precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
    inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
    exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
    power should be exercised.

    rt (1) Where the allegations made in the first
    information report or the complaint, even if they are

    taken at their face value and accepted in their
    entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
    make out a case against the accused.

    (2) Where the allegations in the first information

    report and other materials, if any, accompanying
    the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
    justifying an investigation by police officers

    under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an
    order of a Magistrate within the purview of

    Section 155(2) of the Code.

    (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
    the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in

    support of the same do not disclose the
    commission of any offence and make out a case
    against the accused.

    (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
    a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
    cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
    police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
    contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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    (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
    complaint are so absurd and inherently
    improbable based on which no prudent person
    can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

    .

    sufficient ground for proceeding against the

    accused.

    (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
    any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act

    (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
    the institution and continuance of the proceedings,
    and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code

    of
    or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
    the grievance of the aggrieved party.

    (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
    attended with mala fide and/or where the
    rt proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
    ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

    accused and with a view to spite him due to a
    private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

    8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would
    be of relevance to us in this case.

    In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
    allegations made in the first information report or the

    complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
    accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any

    offence or make out a case against the accused, then the
    FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

    As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not

    constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
    cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
    police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
    contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
    such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
    Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
    express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
    CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal

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    proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
    quashed.”

    10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

    .

    Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

    “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
    extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may

    issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
    secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
    neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory

    of
    provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
    of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
    The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
    within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
    rt
    Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
    intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

    9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
    several decades, has laid down the principles and
    guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
    criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-

    empting the Prosecution from building its case before the
    Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
    contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal

    complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
    represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie

    offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.)
    the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
    and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the

    dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
    (1) SCC 335)

    11. The present petition is to be decided as per the

    parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

    12. The allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner and

    his brother had visited the Police Post along with some other

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    persons, complaining of a threat advanced to Lucky. The other

    persons came to the spot, and both parties started quarrelling

    .

    with each other. The petitioner started video recording the

    incident. He entered the Police Post and continued to video record

    the incident. The fact that the petitioner was video recording the

    whole incident right from the beginning till the end clearly shows

    of
    that he was not involved in beating any person or obstructing any

    police official in the discharge of their official duties.

    13.
    rt
    The informant asserted in the FIR that he was carrying

    out the investigation, and the quarrel between the persons caused

    obstructions to him. This is not sufficient. It was laid down by the

    Supreme Court B.N. John (supra) that there must be an assault or

    criminal force meant to deter a public servant from discharging

    his official duties. It was observed:

    “23. For a prohibited act to come within the scope of the
    offence under Section 353 of the IPC, such an act must
    qualify either as an assault or criminal force meant to deter

    a public servant from the discharge of his duty. Obviously,
    such an act cannot be a mere act of obstruction, which is an
    offence under Section 186 of the IPC. The offence
    contemplated under Section 353 of the IPC is of a more
    serious nature involving criminal force, or assault, which
    attracts more stringent punishment that may extend to
    two years. On the other hand, the offence of obstruction
    covered under Section 186 of the IPC is punishable by

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    imprisonment, which may extend to three months at the
    maximum.

    A close examination of Section 353 of the IPC would
    indicate that to invoke the aforesaid offence, there must be

    .

    use of criminal force or assault on any public servant in the

    execution of his official duty or with the intent to prevent
    or deter such public servant from discharging his duty. It
    would be clear from a reading of the provisions of Section

    186 as well as Section 353 of the IPC that Section 353 of the
    IPC is the aggravated form of offence where criminal force
    or assault is involved. Unlike in the case of Section 186 of

    of
    the IPC, where voluntarily obstructing any public servant
    in the discharge of his official function is sufficient to
    invoke the said section, in the case of an offence under
    Section 353 of the IPC, as mentioned above, not only
    rt
    obstruction but actual use of criminal force or assault on
    the public servant is necessary.

    24. In the present case, however, what can be seen from a
    perusal of the contents of the FIR is that no such allegation
    of assault or use of criminal force has been made. The
    aforesaid FIR is based on the complaint filed by the District

    Probation Officer, which has already been quoted above,
    and the same has been reproduced verbatim in the said
    FIR, in which only the allegation of creating disturbance

    has been made.

    25. In the FIR, there is no allegation of use of criminal force

    or assault by the appellant so as to invoke the provision of
    Section 353 of the IPC. It is to be remembered that a
    criminal process is initiated only with the lodging of an

    FIR. Though FIR is not supposed to be an encyclopedia
    containing all the detailed facts of the incident and it is
    merely a document that triggers and sets into motion the
    criminal legal process, yet it must disclose the nature of
    the offence alleged to have been committed as otherwise, it
    would be susceptible to being quashed as held in Bhajan
    Lal
    ‘s case (supra) (vide clause 1 of Para 102 of the decision).

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    This Court in CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175,
    observed as follows:

    “20. It is well settled that a first information report is
    not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and

    .

    details relating to the offence reported. An informant

    may lodge a report about the commission of an offence,
    though he may not know the name of the victim or his
    assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence

    took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an
    eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all
    aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance

    of
    is that the information given must disclose the commission
    of a cognizable offence, and the information so lodged must
    provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the
    commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage, it is
    rt
    enough if the police officer, on the basis of the
    information given, suspects the commission of a

    cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced
    or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been
    committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of
    information received, that a cognizable offence may

    have been committed, he is bound to record the
    information and conduct an investigation. At this stage,
    it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about

    the truthfulness of the information………………………”

    (emphasis added)

    26. However, a perusal of the FIR in issue does not at all
    indicate the commission of any crime of use of criminal
    force or assault by the appellant against the public servant,

    except for the offence of obstruction, which is punishable
    under Section 186 of the IPC. As such, the ingredients of
    the offence under Section 353 of the IPC are clearly absent
    in the FIR. To that extent, we are in agreement with the
    appellant that since no ingredient for the offence under
    Section 353 of the IPC is found in the FIR, taking
    cognisance by the CJM of an offence that is not made out in
    the FIR does not appear to be correct.”

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    14. In the present case, there is no evidence that any

    assault or criminal force was caused to the informant by the

    .

    petitioner. The status report repeatedly mentions that the

    petitioner continued to video record the incident. Therefore, the

    contents of the status report do not show the commission of an

    offence punishable under Section 132 of the BNS.

    of

    15. The police have registered the FIR for the commission

    of offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 190, 333, 121(1) and
    rt
    324(4) of BNS. Section 121(1) of BNS punishes a person who

    voluntarily causes hurt or grievous hurt to deter a public servant

    from his duty. The status report nowhere mentions that the

    petitioner had caused any hurt to any police official with the

    intent to deter him from discharging his duties. Hence, the

    allegation in the FIR does not satisfy the requirements of Section

    121(1) of BNS.

    16. Section 190 of BNS deals with the members of an

    unlawful assembly, and Section 191 (2) of BNS deals with rioting.

    As per the status report, the petitioner was merely video

    recording the incident. The status report does not show that he

    had caused any hurt to any person or damage to any property.

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    Therefore, the allegations in the status report do not satisfy the

    requirements of these sections.

    .

    17. Section 324 (4) of BNS deals with mischief. The status

    report does not mention that the petitioner had caused damage to

    any property. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 324 (4) and

    Section 3 of the PDPP Act are not satisfied.

    of

    18. Section 333 of the BNS deals with house trespass after

    preparing for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint. The status
    rt
    report specifically mentions that the petitioner had entered the

    Police Post to video record the incident. Therefore, there was no

    house trespass with the intent to cause hurt to any person.

    19. It was submitted that the petitioner had not produced

    any document showing that he was a journalist. This submission

    will not help the State because even if the petitioner were not a

    journalist, video recording the incident did not constitute any

    offence.

    20. Therefore, the submission that the allegations in the

    FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the

    commission of any cognizable offence has to be accepted as

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    correct, and the continuation of the proceedings against the

    petitioner cannot be permitted.

    .

    21. No other point was urged.

    22. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and

    F.I.R. No. 0056 dated 10.04.2025, registered for the commission of

    offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 190, 333, 132, 121(1) and

    of
    324 (4) of BNS, 2023 and Section 3 of PDPP Act, 1984 is ordered to be

    quashed qua the petitioner. Consequent upon the quashing of FIR,
    rt
    criminal proceedings pending/initiated against the petitioner

    (Abhishek Kumar) in pursuance thereof are also ordered to be

    quashed.

    23. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also

    pending applications, if any.

    24. The observations made herein before shall remain

    confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing

    whatsoever on the merits of the case.

    25. Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this judgment,

    downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of Himachal

    Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said authorities

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    shall not insist on the production of a certified copy, but if required,

    may verify passing of the order from the website of the High Court.

    .

    (Rakesh Kainthla)
    Judge
    21st April, 2026

    (ravinder)

    of
    rt

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