Gujarat High Court
Mahendra Kantilal Panchal vs The Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad … on 20 April, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8997 of 2021
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
================================================================
MAHENDRA KANTILAL PANCHAL
Versus
THE MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER, AHMEDABAD MUNCIPAL
CORPORATION & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR C S MOHANAN(6814) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR HAMESH C NAIDU(5335) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 20/04/2026
JUDGMENT
1. At the outset, Mr. Naidu, learned advocate would
state under the instruction that during the pendency of
this petition, the amount of Rs. 79,050/-, a balance P.F.
amount, is already paid to the petitioner. The said fact is
confirmed by Mr. Mohanan, learned advocate.
Accordingly, learned advocate for the petitioner, request
this Court to adjudicate and grant the prayer – A made in
para – 25 of the petition.
2. Heard Mr. C.S. Mohanan, learned advocate for the
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petitioner and Mr. Hamesh C. Naidu, learned advocate
for the respondent, at length.
3. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr. Hamesh Naidu,
learned advocate waives service of rule on behalf of the
respondent. With the consent of the learned advocates for
the respective parties, the matter was taken up for
hearing.
4. The present petition is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India seeking following reliefs:
“(A) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a
writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction in the nature of mandamus
holding and declaring that the order dated 27-3-
2019 at Annexure-A, passed by respondent No.2,
to the extent it denies arrears of difference of
pay, arrears of increments and other benefits
accrued to the petitioner during the period of
suspension from 2-7-1998 to 19-3-2002 and for
the period of dismissal from service from 25-3-
2003 to 30-6-2007 which period has been treated
as period spent on duty and as in continuous
service, by counting the said period notionally, is
arbitrary, discriminatory and in violation of the
provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India;
(B) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct
the respondent authorities to pay the arrears of
difference of pay and increments for the period of
suspension from 2-7-1998 to 19-3-2002 and for
the period of dismissal from service from 25-3-
2003 to 30-6-2007, which period has been
treated as period spent on duty and as in
continuous service, be paid to the petitioner
forthwith with interest; and be further pleased to
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direct the respondent authorities to pay the
balance amount of Rs.79,050/- standing to the
credit of the petitioner in his provident fund
account; and also the amount of leave
encashment for the remaining 60 days, with
interest;
(C) Pending hearing and final disposal of this
petition, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to
direct the respondent authority to pay to the
petitioner the arrears of difference of pay and
increments and other allowances for the period of
suspension from 2-7-1998 to 19-3-2002 and for
the period of dismissal from service from 25-3-
2003 to 30-6-2007 which period has been treated
as period spent on duty and as in continuous
service; and to pay the balance amount of
Rs.79,050/- standing to the credit of the
petitioner in his provident fund account and also
the amount of leave encashment for the
remaining 60 days;
(D) Be pleased to pass such other and further
orders as may be deemed just and proper in the
nature and circumstances of the case; and
(E) Be pleased to allow this petition with costs.”
SHORT FACTS:
5. The petitioner was appointed as a Sanitary Inspector
with Sardarnagar Nagar Palika on 08.08.1974. The said
Nagarpalika was merged with respondent – Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “the
Corporation”) in the year 1986. The petitioner was
promoted to the post of Sanitation Superintendent.
5.1. On 04.06.1998, the petitioner was booked under
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offence under Sections 7, 12, 13(d) and 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred
to as “the Corruption Act“). The Corporation suspended
the petitioner vide order dated 02.07.1998 which came to
be reviewed on 19.03.2002, whereby the petitioner came
to be reinstated in service.
5.2. The learned Special Judge found the petitioner guilty
of the aforesaid offences, whereby the petitioner was
convicted vide judgment and order dated 19.09.2002. The
Corporation appears to have issued a final show-cause
notice before termination of the petitioner and finally
terminated his service vide its order dated 25.02.2003. At
the relevant time, the petitioner unsuccessfully
challenged his dismissal before the concerned Labour
Court, Ahmedabad as his reference being LCA No.
758/2003 was dismissed by Labour Court vide its award
dated 31.10.2012.
5.3. The petitioner appears to have challenged his
conviction before this Court by way of filing an appeal
being Criminal Appeal No. 817 of 2002 which came to be
allowed by learned Single judge of this Court vide its
order and judgment dated 24.01.2017, whereby this
Court has quashed and set aside the order of conviction.
Since the petitioner’s service was terminated by
Corporation due to this conviction and as such, without
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holding any inquiry, upon his acquittal from the aforesaid
offence, the Corporation vide its order dated 27.03.2019
treated the period of suspension, i.e., 2.07.1988 to
19.03.2002 as well as date of his termination until his
superannuation, i.e., 25.03.2003 to 30.06.2007, as spent
on duty, thereby granted benefit of continuity of service.
Nonetheless, the said period is considered notional to
grant the benefits. Accordingly, the petitioner is paid
retiral benefits like gratuity, pension, commuted pension,
etc.
5.4. Thus, by way of this petition, the petitioner has
questioned the aforesaid order as the period of his
suspension as well as period from his dismissal until
superannuation is considered as notional.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER:
6. Mr. Mohanan, learned advocate for the petitioner
would submit that Corporation has committed gross
illegality in considering the period of suspension as well
as from dismissal till superannuation as notional. It is
submitted that the petitioner is entitled to receive actual
service benefit including pay and increments for the said
period.
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6.1. Mr. Mohanan, would further submit that issue
germane in the matter is squarely covered by the decision
of the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of
Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel & Ors. V/s. Municipal
Commissioner, AMC dated 03.03.2017 passed in
Special Civil Application No. 10548 of 2011 and allied
matters.
6.2. Mr. Mohanan, learned advocate would further
submit that during the suspension period, the petitioner
was not allowed to resume duty and for no fault of the
petitioner, he was remained under suspension for a long
period of time which ought to have been reviewed by the
Corporation at regular intervals. It is submitted that once
the petitioner is acquitted by this Court from the
aforesaid offence, the petitioner is entitled to receive all
benefits during the period of suspension as well as after
dismissal till his superannuation.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:
7. Per contra, Mr. Naidu, learned advocate for the
Corporation has vehemently opposed this petition and
relied upon the reply filed by the Corporation in this
matter. It is submitted that Corporation has correctly
considered the period of suspension as well as the period
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from dismissal to the superannuation of the petitioner as
notional because of the fact that the petitioner was facing
serious charge of corruption and found guilty by the
Special Court.
7.1. It is submitted that due to charge of corruption
levelled against the petitioner being a Sanitary Inspector,
the petitioner was required to be suspended and
accordingly suspended by the Corporation. It is further
submitted that the Corporation vide its order dated
19.03.2002 along with other similarly situated person
reviewed the decision of suspension of the petitioner and
accordingly reinstated him in the service and for the
period of suspension, as per Rules, the subsistence
allowance was also paid to the petitioner.
7.2. Mr. Naidu, learned advocate would further submit
that there is no absolute proposition of law that in a case
of acquittal by this Court, the petitioner would
automatically entitle to receive the backwages, including
full pay during the suspension period and other periods,
as the case may be. It is submitted that whatever retiral
benefits are available to the petitioner, all such benefits
have been paid to the petitioner by the Corporation and
as such, the claim of the petitioner is nothing but an
afterthought as the impugned order was passed in the
year 2019 and the present petition is filed in the year
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2021.
7.3. To buttress his argument, he would rely upon the
following judgments:
(i) Banshidhar vs. State of Rajasthan reported
in (2007) 1 SCC 324.
(ii)Dr. Lalchand N. Jumani vs. Municipal
Corporation, Greater Mumbai, dated
25.03.2026 passed by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No.
1137/2014.
(iii)Rajnikant Motibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation, dated 13.03.2023
passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Special Civil Application No. 14507/2021.
POINT FOR DETERMINATION:
8. Having heard learned counsels for the respective
parties and upon perusal of the pleadings, the following
question is germane to my consideration:
(i) Whether, in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the
impugned order dated 27.03.2019 passed by
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the Corporation, whereby notional benefits
were granted for the period of suspension of
the petitioner from 02.07.1998 to 19.03.2002
as well as for the period from the date of
petitioner’s dismissal from 25.03.2003 until
his superannuation on 13.06.2007, is
sustainable in law.
ANALYSIS:
9. The facts which are observed herein above are not in
dispute. The petitioner during the course of service with
Corporation came to be suspended on 02.07.1998 as he
was booked for the offence under Corruption Act as
aforesaid. The Corporation appears to have reviewed its
decision of suspending the petitioner vide its order dated
19.03.2002, whereby petitioner was reinstated in service.
But the petitioner having found guilty of the aforesaid
offence, the Special Court convicted him vide its
judgment and order dated 19.09.2002. Thus, service of
the petitioner came to be terminated by Corporation on
25.02.2003 after following due process of law. The
petitioner challenged his conviction before this Court by
the Criminal Appeal No. 817 of 2002 which came to be
allowed in his favour as the order of conviction passed by
Special Court was quashed and set aside by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court vide its order and
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judgment dated 24.01.2017. Before passing the aforesaid
order of acquittal, the petitioner reached the age of
superannuation on 13.06.2007. Pursuance to the
aforesaid development, the Corporation passed impugned
order whereby it has decided to grant notional benefit for
the period of suspension as well as from date of dismissal
till superannuation of the petitioner.
9.1. The entire emphasis of the petitioner to receive
actual monetary benefit for the period of suspension and
from the date of dismissal till his superannuation is rest
upon the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court
passed in the case of Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel
(supra).
9.2. Whereas, according to the respondent, the petitioner
is not entitled to receive the full pay during period of sus-
pension as well as from the date of his dismissal till su-
perannuation. The Corporation has placed strong reliance
upon the decision of Coordinate Bench passed in the case
of Rajnikant Motibhai Patel (supra). It is true that prayers
made by the petitioner before the Coordinate Bench in
the said cited case is similar to the prayer made in this
petition. It can be seen that decision in the case of
Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel (supra) was also cited by the
concerned petitioner in said case. Nonetheless, the Coor-
dinate Bench has only placed reliance upon the decision
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of another Coordinate Bench of this Court passed in the
case of Meenaben Kantilal Shrimali, Wd/o. Kantilal
Vashrambhai Shrimali vs. Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation in Special Civil Application No. 12740
of 2016, dated 31.07.2018, thus, the prayers made in
that petition came to be turned down. Yet, the facts and
the issue in the case of Meenaben Kantilal Shrimali
(supra) is not as similar as in the present case.
9.3 Be that as it may, I have minutely gone through the
decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case
of Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel (supra). It appears that
the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Banshidhar (supra) and other decisions refer to herein
after were not brought to the notice of the Coordinate
Bench of this Court and in that circumstance, the
Coordinate Bench appears to have directed the
Corporation to release all the benefits which could have
been released to the petitioners, had they remained on
duty. The law germane to the matter is by now well
settled and will be discussed hereinafter.
10. Before further adverting to the issue, I would first
like to observe that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Banshidhar (supra) has categorically held that there can
be no hard and fast rule laid down in regard to grant of
back wages. It is categorically held that each case has to
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be determined on its own facts. It is observed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in said decision that in the case of
conviction, the delinquent is legally disabled to render his
service to the institution and in such circumstances, if
there is a refusal of back wages by the employer
concerned and same is approved by the High Court, no
error can be found. The relevant observations of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decision needs to be
referred herein below, which read thus:
“[8] It may be true that the reason for long pendency of the
trial or the criminal appeal filed by him may not be attributed
to his acts of omission and commission but the fact remains
that the entire period between 13.7.1976 and the date when he
reached his age of superannuation he did not work. He was
placed under order of suspension validly from 1976 to
2.10.1987. Legality of the order of dismissal on the basis of the
judgment of conviction and sentence dated 25.2.1985 has also
not been questioned. It is true that his services were dispensed
with as he had been convicted in a criminal case involving
grave misconduct. On his acquittal, he was to be reinstated in
service. He has been directed to be paid his pensionary
benefits. The entire period during which he remained under
suspension, thus, would be considered for calculating his
pensionary benefits. Continuity of his service has also not been
denied to him. The only question which arises for
consideration, as noticed hereinbefore, is as to whether in a
situation of this nature back wages should have been granted
to him.
[9] No hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to grant
to back wages. Each case has to be determined on its own
facts. A grave charge of criminal misconduct was alleged
against him. He was also found guilty of the charges levelled
against him by the Special Judge. The High Court while
delivering its judgment dated 16.01.2001 in S.B. Criminal
Appeal No. 68 of 1985 inter alia held that the prosecution has
not been able to prove that any demand had been made by him.
[10] It is now a trite law that judgment of acquittal itself would
not have exonerated him of the charges levelled against him.
He could have been proceeded against in a departmentalPage 12 of 20
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proceeding. [See Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore
v. S. Mani and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 100 and Commissioner of
Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265][11] Departmental proceedings, however, could not be held as
on the date of passing of the judgment of acquittal, he had
already reached his age of superannuation. The learned
counsel may be right that the decisions of this Court referred to
hereinbefore involved the respective appellants therein on
charge of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
but, as noticed, it has also been laid down that each case has to
be considered on its own facts. The High Court refused to
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction having regard to the
aforementioned decision of this Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji
Thakore (supra). We do not see any reason to take a different
view. Grant of back wages, it is well settled, is not automatic.
Even in cases where principles of natural justice have been
held to have not been complied with, while issuing a direction
of reinstatement, this Court had directed placing of the
delinquent employee under suspension.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10.1.Similarly, in the case of Lalchand N. Jumani (supra),
the Division Bench of Bombay High Court has also felt
that upon acquittal of a suspended employee, he may not
be entitled to receive full salary as a matter of course. It
is held that in the cases where the arrest and detention
results in suspension in bribery cases, the employer
cannot be saddled with financial burden of full salary and
allowance since the suspended employee embroils himself
in the prosecution. The pertinent observation in the
aforesaid decision reads thus:
“15. Upon acquittal of a suspended employee, though
reinstatement is guaranteed, payment of full salary cannot be
an automatic consequence. It depends on facts and
circumstances of each case. In cases involving criminal
prosecution in respect of private affairs of the employee, who
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cannot entail financial burden for the employer to pay him full
salary and allowances during period of suspension. Also, in
cases where the arrest and detention results in suspension in
bribery cases, the employer cannot be saddled with the
financial burden of paying full salary and allowances since
the suspended employee embroils himself in the prosecution.
On the other hand, in cases where the prosecution is lodged
by the employer, say for offenses of fabrication of official
records or for misappropriation of public funds, and the
employee is kept under suspension, the acquittal in such case
may entitle the employee to receive full salary and allowances
since the employer is responsible for his prosecution. Thus,
entitlement of a suspended employee to receive full salary
during period of suspension upon acquittal depends on facts
and circumstances of each case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, the
petitioner was booked under the offences registered
under the Corruption Act and upon his arrest, as per Rule
5(2)(a) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal)
Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules,
1971”), he was suspended by the Corporation on
02.07.1998. The sub-rule 2A of Rule 5 of the Rules, 1971
is inserted on 12.07.2007, thus, at the relevant point of
time, it was not incumbent upon the Corporation to
review its decision in regard to the petitioner’s
suspension within 90 days from the date of suspension. At
the same time, the petitioner did not endeavor as not
requested the Corporation to revoke his suspension.
Nonetheless, it was felt by the Corporation to review the
petitioner’s suspension along with others, accordingly,
the same was reviewed on 19.03.2002 and he was
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reinstated in service. Once the Special Court found the
petitioner guilty of the aforesaid offences, he was
convicted on 19.09.2002. Therefore, it is discernable from
the record of the case that suspension and dismissal of
the petitioner was inevitable and not dehors the Rules,
1971. In fact, the petitioner did not challenge his
suspension and as such, he failed in his attempt when
challenged his dismissal before the concerned Labour
Court, Ahmedabad as his reference being LCA No.
758/2003 was dismissed by Labour Court vide its award
dated 31.10.2012.
12. At this juncture, it is apt to refer to the following
decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, wherein issue
germane to this matter has been clarified.
12.1. In the case of Rajnarain v. Union of India & Ors.
reported in (2019) 5 SCC, it has been held thus:
“6. The decision of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore was
followed by this Court in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh to
refuse back wages to an employee who was initially
convicted for an offence under Section 302 read with Section
34 IPC and later acquitted by the High Court in a criminal
appeal. While refusing to grant relief to the petitioner
therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal would not
entitle an employee to seek back wages. However, this Court
was of the opinion that if the prosecution is launched at the
behest of the department and the employee is acquitted,
different considerations may arise. The learned counsel for
the appellant endeavoured to distinguish the prosecution
launched by the police for involvement of an employee in a
criminal case and the criminal proceedings initiated at the
behest of the employer. The observation made in thePage 15 of 20
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judgment in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh has to be
understood in a manner in which the department would
become liable for back wages in the event of a finding that
the initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala fide or
with vexatious intent. In all other cases, we do not see any
difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings by
the department vis-à-vis a criminal case lodged by the police.
For example, if an employee is involved in embezzlement of
funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with
full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal
court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12.2. Likewise, in the case of Gurpal Singh v. High
Court of Judicature of Rajasthan reported in (2012) 13
SCC, wherein it has been observed and held thus:
“29. The only issue that needs to be resolved at this stage is
as to whether the petitioner would be entitled only to the
subsistence allowance as already paid to him or full salary
and allowances, in view of his acquittal in the criminal
case and the exoneration in departmental proceedings.
Related to the aforesaid issue would be a consequential
issue of notional promotion from the date an officer junior
to him was promoted in the Rajasthan Judicial Service and
the consequential entitlement to the emoluments on the
promotional post, which in turn would determine the amount
of suspension allowance and the retiral benefits.
35. We have examined the entire issue keeping the aforesaid
principles in mind. In order to determine the issue relating
to the entitlement of the petitioner to the salary and other
allowance(s) upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be
examined at the different stages/point of time. The first stage
commenced at the time when the petitioner was initially
suspended on 22-12-1985 w.e.f. 20-12-1985. The petitioner,
in our opinion, cannot legitimately protest against his
suspension, at the initial stage, when he had remained in
police custody for more than forty-eight hours, though
unfortunately for circumstances for which he was not
responsible. This suspension was naturally continued when
he was facing the trial for murder.
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39. As noticed above, Mr. Calla has submitted that the
suspension of the petitioner should have been revoked at this
stage. It will not be possible to accept the proposition that as
soon as the trial court had acquitted the petitioner, the
Rajasthan High Court was required to forthwith revoke the
order of suspension. Undoubtedly, the petitioner could have
been given a non-sensitive posting, not involving judicial
functions. But, it was not imperative for the High Court to
revoke the suspension, at that stage. It is a matter of record,
that the prosecuting agency decided to file an appeal
against the judgment and order passed by the trial court,
acquitting the petitioner. The appeal filed by CBI was
admitted by the Delhi High Court and remained pending till
it was decided on 27-9-2005. Therefore, the conclusions
recorded by the trial court, were not final. They were liable
to be reversed in appeal by the High Court. Thus, during the
said period/stage, it cannot be said that the continuance of
the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified.
Merely because the High Court could have revoked the
suspension, would not render the decision to continue the
suspension, wholly unjustified.
52. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject
the submissions of Mr Calla that the suspension of the
petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal
by the trial court. We also reject the submissions of Mr
Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly
unjustified during the pendency of the appeal before the
High Court. We, however, hold that the continued
suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the
departmental proceedings was wholly unjustified. The
petitioner is, therefore, held entitled to full pay and
allowances from 27-9-2005 i.e. the date of the judgment
rendered by the Delhi High Court onwards. We further hold
that the petitioner was entitled to be considered for
promotion notionally from the date when an officer junior to
him was promoted. We, therefore, direct the High Court to
consider the case of the petitioner for promotion (if he
otherwise satisfies the requirements as per the Rules) from
the date when a person junior to him was considered and
promoted to the next higher post. Let such a decision be
taken by the High Court within a period of three months
from the date of receipt of this order.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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12.3. It is thus evident from the ratio of the above
referred decision that if an employee is found indulging in
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the
employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the
acquittal of the person by the Court, unless it is found
that that the prosecution is malicious. Similarly, in the
second decision referred to, it was held that although the
petitioner was found to be entirely innocent, the period of
suspension during the trial was justified, as his
suspensions was inevitable following his arrest in the
criminal case. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Apex Court held
that the petitioner concerned is not entitled to full pay
and allowances for the period of suspension.
13. Keeping in mind the authoritative pronouncement of
law by the Hon’ble Apex Court cited supra, and having
adjudged the claim of the petitioner, it is evident that his
mere acquittal would not ipso facto entitle him to receive
full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. It is
not a case of the petitioner that launching of the
prosecution against him in the Corruption Act, was at
behest of the Corporation in any manner or malicious;
rather, it appears that the petitioner faced such
prosecution due to his own conduct while discharging his
duty as public servant. In these set of facts and
circumstances, I am of the considered view that the
Corporation being employer cannot be mulcted with
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liability to pay entire pay & allowances to the petitioner
for the suspension period. Similarly, for the period from
his dismissal until his superannuation also, the petitioner
is not entitled to receive full pay and allowances, as he
was legally disabled from rendering the service on
account of his conviction for the said period. Resultantly,
the arguments of Mr. Mohanan, learned advocate, cannot
be sustained; rather, it must be rejected.
CONCLUSION:
14. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussions and
applying the legal principles enunciated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court cited supra to the facts of this case, I am of
the considered view that the impugned order dated
27.03.2019 passed by the Corporation, whereby notional
benefits were granted for the period of suspension as well
as for the period from the date of the petitioner’s
dismissal until his superannuation, is sustainable in law.
15. In view of the foregoing reasons and having found
that the impugned order does not suffer from any
illegality, this Court can reach only one conclusion; the
petitioner is not entitled to receive full pay and
allowances during the period of his suspension, nor for
the period from his dismissal until superannuation.
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Consequently, I do not find any substance in this petition,
as it lacks merit.
16. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. Rule
is discharged. No order as to costs.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
SYED SHAHANAZ
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