Chattisgarh High Court
M/S Ganesh Traders vs Specturm Infonet Pvt. Ltd on 7 April, 2026
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2026:CGHC:15752
SOURABH
BHILWAR
NAFR
Digitally signed by
SOURABH
BHILWAR
Date: 2026.04.09
10:43:02 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SA No. 644 of 2024
1 - M/s Ganesh Traders Through Its Proprietor Lalit Kumar Bondia, Son
Of Late Rajaram Bondia, Presently Aged Around 67 Years, (Aadhar No.-
4079 4047 4851), R/o, House No. 191/3, Ward No. 18, Chhaju Gali,
Behind Gandhi Ganj, Raigarh, Tahsil And District- Raigarh
(Chhattisgarh)
2 - M/s Neelam Stores Through Its Proprietor Natthulal Tayal, S/o Late
Sagarmal Tayal, Presently Aged Around 74 Years, (Aadhar No.- 6243
0707 5243), R/o, House No. 209, Ward No. 12, Arya Bhawan, Bidpara,
Raigarh, Tahsil And District- Raigarh (Chhattisgarh)
3 - M/s Kosa Silk Emporium Through Its Present Proprietor- Ashish
Agrawal, Son Of Sanjay Agrawal, Presently Aged Around 29 Years,
(Aadhar No.- 6925 5543 5849), R/o, Pooja Handloom, Kotra Road,
Raigarh, Tahsil And District- Raigarh (Chhattisgarh)
... Appellant(s)
versus
1 - Specturm Infonet Pvt. Ltd. Through Its Director- Bharat Agrawal, Son
Of Vijay Agrawal, Aged Around 38 Years, R/o Chakradhar Nagar,
Raigarh, Tahsil And District- Raigarh (Chhattisgarh)
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2 - Smt. Sarita Devi Jagatramka W/o Suresh Kumar Jagatramka Aged
About 55 Years R/o Gandhi Chowk, Station Road, Raigarh (C.G.)
3 - Suresh Kumar Jagatramka S/o Late Banwarilal Jagatramka, Aged
Around 55 Years, R/o Gandhi Chowk, Station Road, Raigarh
(Chhattisgarh)
4 - Smt. Pushpa Saraf W/o Premkumar Saraf Aged About 68 Years
Resident Of 3/1, Siddeshwari Road, Kolkata (West Bengal)
5 - Raghvendra Pratap Singh S/o R.K. Singh Aged About 35 Years R/o
Maharana Pratap Nagar, Tifra, Tahsil And District- Bilaspur
(Chhattisgarh)
6 - Sub-Divisional Officer Cum Rent Controlling Authority Raigarh,
Chhattisgarh
.... Respondent(s)
(Cause title is taken from CIS)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Hari Agrawal, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Lekhram Dhruw, Panel Lawyer
Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru
Judgment on Board
07/04/2026
1. The present Second Appeal has been filed by the appellants/
plaintiffs under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.08.2024
passed by the learned 3rd District & Additional Sessions Judge,
Raigarh (C.G.) in Regular Civil Appeal No. 05/2020 (M/s Ganesh
Traders & Ors. vs. Spectrum Infonet Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.), whereby
the learned Appellate Court affirmed the impugned order dated
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19.12.2019 passed by the learned Second Civil Judge, Junior
Division, Raigarh (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 273-A/2019 (M/s
Ganesh Traders & Ors. vs. Spectrum Infonet Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.),
whereby the learned trial Court allowed the application filed by the
defendant No.1 under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC and dismissed the
suit on the ground that the same is prohibited under Order 35
Rule 5 of CPC and Section 6 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control
Act, 2011 (for short ‘the Act, 2011’). For the sake of convenience,
the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status
before the Trial Court.
2. (i) The case of the plaintiffs as averred in the plaint is that the
plaintiffs are tenants in peaceful possession of three shops
situated at Station Road, Gandhi Chowk, as described in
Schedule ‘A’. The tenancy commenced in the year 1973 under the
original owner, late Prakashwati Jagatramka, and thereafter rent
was paid to her husband Banwarilal Jagatramka and
subsequently to their daughter, Defendant No. 4 Smt. Pushpa
Devi Saraf, who last received rent from the plaintiffs. It is averred
that the plaintiffs have neither paid rent to any other person nor
entered into any tenancy agreement with any of the other
defendants. However, Defendant No. 1, claiming himself to be the
owner of the suit property, has instituted eviction proceedings
against the plaintiffs before the Rent Controller.
(ii) Similarly, Defendant No. 2 Smt. Sarita Devi Jagatramka,
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daughter-in-law of the original owner, has also initiated separate
eviction proceedings against the plaintiffs and has issued notice
claiming herself to be the owner/landlord. In the said proceedings,
Defendant No. 3, being the son of the original owner, has got
himself impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC asserting his own
ownership rights over the suit property. Further, Defendant No. 5
Raghvendra Pratap Singh has also issued notice to the plaintiffs
claiming himself to be the owner of the suit property and
demanding payment of rent. At the same time, Defendant No. 4
Smt. Pushpa Devi Saraf, who had been receiving rent from the
plaintiffs, has also issued a notice directing the plaintiffs to pay
rent exclusively to her and not to any other person.
(iii) Thus, Defendants No. 1 to 5, all claiming through the original
owners, have set up rival and conflicting claims of
ownership/landlordship over the same suit property and have also
initiated multiple eviction proceedings, thereby creating serious
confusion and hardship for the plaintiffs. In these circumstances,
the plaintiffs have been constrained to file the suit in the nature of
an interpleader suit seeking determination as to who among the
defendants is the lawful owner/landlord, so as to enable them to
discharge their obligations and effectively participate in the
pending proceedings before the Rent Controller.
3. Per contra, defendant No. 1 has filed an application under Order
7 Rule 11 of the CPC on 14.11.2019 in the suit before the trial
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Court contending that the plaintiffs have instituted the suit in the
nature of an interpleader, seeking declaration as to which of
Defendants No. 1 to 5 is the lawful landlord along with a relief of
permanent injunction, which is not maintainable in law. It was
submitted that the basis of the suit arises out of proceedings
before the Rent Controlling Authority, and similar issues have
already been considered and rejected by the Rent Controller in
earlier proceedings relating to Sarita Devi. It was further
contended that the sale deed in favour of Defendant No. 1 has
already been upheld in prior civil litigation, wherein Civil Suit No.
116-A/2011 filed for cancellation of sale deed was dismissed by
the competent Court, and the said decision was affirmed by the
High Court in FA No.274 of 2017. Thus, the title of defendant No.
1 stands duly recognized. It is also submitted that defendant No. 1
has already initiated appropriate proceedings before the Rent
Controlling Authority under the provisions of the Rent Control Act,
and tenancy-related disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the said authority, thereby barring the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court. On these grounds, it is urged that the suit is barred by law
and is liable to be rejected.
4. In response, the plaintiffs have filed their reply to the said
application contending that defendants No. 3 to 5 had issued
notices to them claiming themselves to be the landlords of the suit
property. It is specifically averred that the plaintiffs never entered
into any tenancy with defendant No. 1, nor was any agreement,
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oral or written, ever executed with him. Therefore, defendant No.
1 cannot be treated as the landlord of the plaintiffs under any
circumstance. It is further submitted that the civil suit earlier filed
before the Court of the learned First Additional District Judge,
Raigarh, pertains to the same suit property, and the issue of
ownership/title is yet to be conclusively determined by a
competent Civil Court. The present suit is not a suit for eviction
but is an interpleader suit filed under Section 89 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and therefore, the Civil Court has proper
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the same. On these grounds,
the plaintiffs have prayed that the application filed by defendant
No. 1 be rejected.
5. After hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court, vide its order,
allowed the application filed by the defendant No.1 under Order 7
Rule 11 of CPC and rejected the suit of the plaintiffs, holding the
same to be barred under Section 6 of the Act, 2011 as well as
under Order 35 Rule 5 of CPC. Aggrieved by the said judgment,
the plaintiffs preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of
Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The
learned First Appellate Court, vide impugned judgment and
decree dated 30.08.2024, affirmed the order of the learned Trial
Court, holding that by virtue of Section 6 of the Act of 2011, the
Rent Controller has the jurisdiction to decide the question of
ownership and title of the disputed property particularly when
there is a dispute regarding landlord – tenant. Hence, the present
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appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned trial
Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court have erred in
law in holding that the jurisdiction to decide the question of
ownership and title vests with the Rent Controlling Authority by
virtue of Section 6 of the Act, 2011, while completely overlooking
the Explanation thereto, which expressly provides that disputes
relating to title of property shall be adjudicated by the Civil Courts
under the relevant laws. He submits that a conjoint and holistic
reading of the scheme of the Act, including Sections 9 and 12
along with the relevant Schedules, makes it abundantly clear that
the powers of the Rent Controller are confined to regulating the
rights and obligations of landlords and tenants and do not extend
to adjudication of title/ownership disputes. Hence he submits that
the interpleader suit filed by the plaintiffs seeking declaration and
injunction was clearly maintainable before the Civil Court. He
further submits that the finding of both the Courts that the suit is
barred under Order 35 Rule 5 CPC is perverse and contrary to the
settled position of law, inasmuch as the question of maintainability
of an interpleader suit involves mixed questions of law and fact,
which could not have been decided at the threshold under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC without trial. Thus, learned counsel submits that the
impugned judgments suffer from patent illegality and perversity,
giving rise to substantial questions of law for consideration by this
Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed
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reliance upon the judgment passed by the Bombay High Court in
case of Packing Paper Products vs. NICAF Pvt. Ltd. reported
in (2007) 5 MhLJ 34.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of
admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by
the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court
have been carefully examined.
8. In the present case, both the learned Trial Court and the learned
First Appellate Court, upon due consideration of the pleadings,
applications, and the oral and documentary evidence on record,
have concurrently held that the interpleader suit filed by the
plaintiffs was not maintainable. The Trial Court, in its order dated
19.12.2019, noted that the suit was presented as an interpleader
under Section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking
declaration of the landlord among Defendants No. 1 to 5 and
permanent injunction against interference in the possession of the
plaintiffs. The Court observed that the plaintiffs had not complied
with the requirements of Order 35 Rules 1 & 5 CPC for
interpleader suits and that the Rent Control proceedings under
Section 6 of the Act, 2011 were already instituted to resolve
disputes between landlords and tenants regarding rights, title, and
obligations of the parties. Accordingly, the Trial Court allowed the
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and dismissed the
plaintiffs’ suit.
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9. For the sake of convenience, order 35 Rule 1 & 5 of CPC are
reproduced hereinbelow :-
“Order XXXV – INTERPLEADER
Rule 1. Plaint in interpleader-suit- In every suit of
interpleader the plaint shall, in addition to the other
statements necessary for plaints, state-
(a) that the plaintiff claims no interest in the subject-
matter in dispute other than for charges or costs;
(b) the claims made by the defendants severally;
and
(c) that there is no collusion between the plaintiff
and any of the defendants
xxxx xxxx xxxx
Rule 5. Agents and tenants may not institute
interpleader-suits.- Nothing in this Order shall be
deemed to enable agents to sue their principals, or
tenants to sue their landlords, for the purpose of
compelling them to interplead with any persons other
than persons making claim through such principals or
landlords.”
10. Further it is also convenient to note here the Section 6(1) of the
Act, 2011, which states:
“6. Constitution of the Rent Control Tribunal – (1)
10The State Government shall by notification constitute,
within thirty days of this Act, a Tribunal in terms of
Articles 323-B of the Constitution, to be called as
Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, to give effect to the
provisions of this Act, and for the adjudication or trial of
any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to
rent, its regulation and control and tenancy issues
including the rights, title and obligations of landlords
and tenants.
Explanation- Matters relating to transfer of
property and/or disputes regarding title over any
property shall continue to be considered under relevant
laws by the courts of law.”
11. From perusal of the above provisions, it appears that the Act of
2011 specifically provides that the Rent Control Tribunal is
constituted under the Act of 2011 to adjudicate the disputes
regarding title and obligation of landlord. In the present case, the
suit primarily concerned the determination of title and rights of
landlords over the property, which falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and the Chhattisgarh Rent
Control Tribunal as provided under Section 6(1) of the 2011 Act.
The plaintiffs had also failed to comply with the procedural
requirements of interpleader suits under Order 35 Rules 1 & 5
CPC.
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12. The object of the Act, 2011 is to provide for adjudication matters
relating to rent by a Tribunal and to promote leasing of
accommodation by balancing the interests of landlords and
tenants. Thus, the order allowing the application under Order 7
Rule 11 of the CPC filed by the defendant No.1 by the learned trial
Court is just and proper as the suit itself is not maintainable.
13. Subsequently, the First Appellate Court, after re-appreciation of
the submissions and legal provisions, affirmed the findings of the
Trial Court. The Appellate Court held that the interpleader suit
primarily pertained to disputes between landlords and tenants
over ownership and rights of property, which fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and the Chhattisgarh
Rent Control Tribunal under Section 6(1) of the 2011 Act. The
appeal filed by the plaintiffs was thus devoid of merit, and the
Appellate Court confirmed the Trial Court’s order dated
19.12.2019. In this manner, it is clear that the concurrent findings
recorded by both the learned Courts are in accordance with law
and facts, and no perversity, misreading of evidence, or legal
infirmity is demonstrated so as to warrant interference with the
findings recorded by both the Courts in exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
14. Furthermore, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for
the appellants, rendered by the Bombay High Court in case of
Packing Paper Products (supra), is distinguishable and not
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applicable to the facts of the present case, as the same was dealt
with procedural aspects of interpleader in a commercial dispute
and did not involve statutory Rent Control proceedings or disputes
over landlord-tenant ownership and rights under the Chhattisgarh
Rent Control Act, 2011.
15. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely
limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves
a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded
by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings
are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to
settled principles of law.
16. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate
Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of
evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed
to establish his case by placing cogent and sufficient material.
The appellants failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or
misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.
17. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal
essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to
concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any
substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
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18. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of
fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not
ordinarily interfere with the said finding.
19. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal
and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled
proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of
fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point
out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the
pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary
evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and
lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could
reasonably have reached.
20. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for
the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be
regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of
law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions,
in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed
to raise any substantial question of law which is required under
Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not
involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under
Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants
herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial
Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just
and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.
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21. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and on perusal of
the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal
proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no
question of law much less substantial question of law within the
meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and
decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and
legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity
in the same and they do not call for any interference.
22. Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed
resulting in upholding the judgment and decree of the Appellate
Court as also the order passed by the Trial Court.
23. However, the appellants are at liberty to approach the appropriate
forum, as may be available to him under the provisions of law, if
so aggrieved, for redressal of their grievance.
Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
$. Bhilwar