Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
In Re vs Dilip Kumar Saini on 17 March, 2026
Bench: Farjand Ali, Yogendra Kumar Purohit
[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (1 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Contempt Petition No. 3/2019
In Re, Bhilwara (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Dilip Kumar Saini, Additional Superintendent of Police
(Headquarters), Bhilwara, District Bhilwara, Rajasthan.
2. Bhooraram Khileri, son of Purkharam, caste Jat, aged 46
years, resident of Ramsari, Police Station Degana, District
Nagaur, Rajasthan; presently posted as Station House Officer
(SHO), Police Station Mandalgarh.
3. Megharam, son of Parmaram, caste Jat, aged 30 years,
resident of Ajitsar, Police Station Sardarshehar, District Churu;
presently Constable No. 276, Police Station Mandalgarh, District
Bhilwara, Rajasthan.
4. Nathusingh, son of Shambhusingh, caste Rajput, aged 58
years, resident of Sabalpura, Police Station Kareda; presently
Head Constable No. 1170, Police Station Mandalgarh, District
Bhilwara, Rajasthan.
5. Ramsingh, son of Nandaram, caste Meena, aged 40 years,
resident of Bhawanipura, Police Station Jahazpur, District
Bhilwara; presently Head Constable No. 852, Police Station
Mandalgarh, District Bhilwara, Rajasthan.
6. Gopal Lal, son of Ladulal, caste Bairwa, aged 42 years,
resident of Tikad, Police Station Hanumangarh; presently
Assistant Sub-Inspector, Police Station Mandalgarh, District
Bhilwara, Rajasthan.
7. Saroj, wife of Devilal, caste Jakhad Jat, aged 28 years,
resident of Bhopatpura, Police Station Reengus, District Sikar;
presently Woman Constable No. 1656, Police Station
Mandalgarh, District Bhilwara, Rajasthan.
----Respondent
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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sajjan Singh Rathore, AAG
For Respondent(s) : None Present
Present-in-Person : Mr. Dilip Kumar Saini, Additional S.P.
Mr. Bhura Ram Khillery, CO,
Bhopalgarh, Jodhpur
Mr. Megha Ram FC 276 PS Bigod,
Bhilwara
Ms. Saroj Jakhar, FC 1656, CO
Mandalgarh
Mr. Nathu Singh, Head Constable,
Bhilwara
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT
Order
REPORTABLE
DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS : 24/01/2026
DATE ON WHICH ORDER IS RESERVED : 24/01/2026
FULL ORDER OR OPERATIVE PART : Full Order
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 17/03/2026
BY THE COURT:- (Per Hon'ble Mr. Farjand Ali,J)
Lord Denning in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commisioner, Ex parte
Blackburn (No.2) observed that:-
Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction
as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on
surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who
speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we
resent it. For there is something far more important at
stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (3 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]INTRODUCTION
1. This Court has received the present matter through an
official communication transmitted by the Registry of the
Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, in the form of a U.O. Note. The
said U.O. Note encloses a letter dated 14.08.2019 forwarded by
the learned District & Sessions Judge, Bhilwara, along with an
application dated 08.08.2019 addressed by the Presiding Officer,
Senior Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Mandalgarh, District Bhilwara (hereinafter to be referred as
“Presiding Officer”), accompanied by relevant documents and
enclosures.
2. As per the contents of the aforesaid communications, it is
stated that during the course of hearing of Criminal Case arising
out of FIR No. 130/2019 registered at Police Station Mandalgarh
for offences under Sections 376, 420, 389, 120-B, 166-A and 509
of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be referred as “IPC“), the
Presiding Officer noticed certain acts which allegedly constituting
an act of contempt of court. Consequently, a reference seeking
initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
(hereinafter to be referred as “the Act of 1971”) against the non-
applicants named therein was made and transmitted through the
proper administrative channel. The original reference along with
supporting material has thus been placed before this Court for
information and for taking further action, as deemed appropriate
in accordance with law.
2.1 The matter has been taken up. Notices were issued and the
same stand served. Learned counsel for the parties have been
heard.
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BACKGROUND AND GENESIS OF THE PRESENT
PROCEEDINGS
3. The present proceedings arose out of allegations that certain
police officials (present contemnors) have committed criminal
contempt of court on account of statements made by them during
an inquiry conducted by an Additional Superintendent of Police.
3.1 The factual matrix, in brief, is that in the principal case
allegations were levelled against the accused, namely Mahaveer
Prasad Acharya, that he had established relationship with the
complainant on the basis of a promise to marry. There are further
allegations in the FIR No. 130/2019 against the then SHO, Shri
Bhura Ram Khillery, to the effect that victim “M” went to the Police
Station to lodge the FIR but the needful was not done instead she
was behaved unruly and subjected to abuse. Whereupon, she sent
a report to SP Bhilwara on 15.04.2019, the copies of which were
sent to DIG, DG, CM, Home Minister and Women Commission, still
the FIR was not lodged. Upon receiving the complaint, the learned
Magistrate sought a report from Police Station and wherefrom it
was informed that no such report got lodged at the instance of the
victim in this fact situation.
3.2 The learned Magistrate, upon due consideration of the
material placed on record, has proceeded to pass an order under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., whereby it has been observed that, prima
facie, the allegations levelled disclose commission of cognizable
offences. It has been specifically noted that offences punishable
under Sections 376, 420, 389 and 120-B of the IPC are made out
against Mahaveer Prasad Acharya. Furthermore, the learned
Magistrate has also recorded a prima facie satisfaction that the
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role of the concerned SHO is not beyond scrutiny, and that
offences under Sections 166-A, 509 and 120-B IPC are also
disclosed against him. Consequently, in exercise of powers under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., a direction has been issued to the SHO
concerned to register the FIR and undertake investigation in
accordance with law. It has further been directed that, upon
completion of investigation, a report to that effect shall be
forwarded.
3.3 It is revealed from the record that the FIR came to be lodged
on 16.05.2019 and the investigation pursuant thereto
commenced. During the course of investigation, the victim “M”
moved an application before the learned Presiding Ofiicer on
27.06.2019, inter alia praying that the investigation had not been
concluded in correct perspective and that a progress report of the
investigation be called for. She further averred in the application
that the SHO and the accused are acting in connivance with each
other, and, in furtherance thereof, are exerting undue pressure
upon her to arrive at a compromise in respect of the dispute in
question. Upon which, the learned Presiding Officer, by order
dated 01.07.2019, directed the Investigating Officer to produce
the case diary along with a progress report regarding the status of
investigation to be presented before the Court on 08.07.2019. In
compliance thereof, on 05.07.2019, a report was submitted before
the Court stating that investigation had substantially been carried
out and, on the basis of the material collected thus far, the
offences alleged against the accused person namely Mahaveer
Prasad Acharya appeared to be prima facie established, though
certain formal aspects of investigation were yet to be completed.
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The record further indicates that the investigation was, at the
relevant time, being conducted under the supervision of the
Additional Superintendent of Police and was still underway.
Thereafter, the learned Magistrate passed a detailed order on
08.07.2019 observing, inter alia, that the involvement of accused
Mahaveer Prasad Acharya appeared to have been accepted in the
course of investigation, but the investigation with regard to the
second accused, Bhura Ram Khillery, in respect of his incalcitrant
behaviour and abdication from the duties had not been carried out
in a fair and proper manner. The matter was again forwarded to
the Additional Superintendent of Police with a direction to
investigate the matter properly in respect of the second accused,
SHO, in accordance with law and to ensure his presence on
22.07.2019. In pursuance of the direction passed vide order dated
08.07.2019, the Additional Superintendent of Police initiated an
inquiry and on 16.07.2019 and 19.07.2019 recorded the
statements of the concerned police officials during the course of
investigation. He sought explanations from the concerned police
officials regarding the allegations of improper investigation and
the circumstances that led to the passing of the order directing
further investigation. It is during the course of this inquiry that the
concerned police officials narrated their version of events and
expressed certain grievances relating to the alleged behaviour of
an individual. The question that arises for consideration before this
Court is whether these statements passed during an inquiry
amount to criminal contempt of court.
3.4 Thereafter, a report dated 20.07.2019 was submitted before
the Court stating that statements of various persons had been
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recorded in relation to the second accused and that inquiries had
also been conducted with respect to the alleged offences under
Sections 166-A and 509 IPC. It was further stated that the
investigation in the matter was still in progress and the case diary
was accordingly produced before the Court. Upon consideration
thereof, the learned Presiding Officer, by order dated 22.07.2019,
reiterated that a proper investigation was required to be
conducted against the second accused, SHO, and directed that a
further progress report be submitted before the Court on
13.08.2019. It is pertinent to note that in the meanwhile, on
08.08.2019, the learned Presiding Officer proceeded to file an
application seeking initiation of contempt proceedings under
Sections 2, 6 and 12 of the Act of 1971 which forms the basis of
the present petition before this Bench.
ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY THE APPLICANT
4. The complaint of the Presiding Officer states that the SHO
himself reiterated earlier vigilance allegations and accused him of
habitually insulting police personnel, passing false and
unwarranted orders, and regarding the behaviour of the Presiding
Officer. He further submitted that judicial orders passed by this
Court can only be assailed through an appeal, revision or inherent
jurisdiction and cannot be branded as false or malicious through
police officers statements during an inquiry. The conduct of the
SHO, his subordinates, and the Investigating Officer in recording
and propagating such irrelevant, defamatory and intimidating
statements amounts to criminal contempt, as it scandalizes the
court, lowers the authority of the judiciary, interferes with the due
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course of judicial proceedings, and is calculated to pressurize a
sitting judicial officer.
4.1 It is further alleged that the Investigating Officer deliberately
diverted the investigation to shield the accused SHO under Section
166-A IPC while orchestrating a narrative against the Presiding
Officer, thereby subverting the justice delivery system. On these
grounds, the applicant prays that proceedings under Sections 2
and 12 of the Act of 1971 be initiated against the Investigating
Officer Dilip Kumar Saini, SHO Bhuraram, and the police officials
Gopal Lal, Nathusingh, Ramsingh, Saroj and Megharam, to uphold
the dignity of the judiciary, deter future conspiracies against the
Presiding officers, and preserve public confidence in the rule of
law.
REPLY BY THE CONTEMNERS
5. Respondent No.1, Additional Superintendent of Police
(Investigating Officer) has submitted that he never intended to
commit contempt or influence judicial proceedings. He further
submits that while investigating the complaint filed by victim “M”
pursuant to the order of the learned Presiding Officer, he merely
recorded statements of witnesses as stated by them and
submitted investigation reports before the Court in due
compliance of judicial directions. It is asserted that no statement
was made with the intention to tarnish the image of the Court or
to create a fearful atmosphere. The respondent further states that
the complainant later retracted her allegations and the matter
ultimately culminated in acceptance of the negative final report in
the National Lok Adalat. Hence, it is prayed that the contempt
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proceedings against him be dismissed and the notice be
discharged.
5.1 Respondent No.2 to Respondent No.7 contends that the
statements made by them were only in the course of investigation
and were based on factual circumstances, including alleged
instances of misbehavior by the Presiding Officer, which were also
raised before appropriate authorities. It is further submitted that
the statements were never intended to tarnish the image of the
Court or create a fearful atmosphere. The respondents emphasizes
that they have always obeyed court orders and that the
complainant later withdrew her allegations, leading to the filing
and acceptance of a negative final report. Hence, dismissal of the
contempt proceedings against them have been prayed for.
5.2 At the very threshold, the respondents have raised a
preliminary objection touching upon the maintainability of the
present reference, contending, inter alia, that the alleged
utterances were made strictly within the confines of an official
inquiry, there has been no publication, circulation, or
dissemination of the said statements in the public domain and no
judicial proceeding has been shown to have been prejudiced,
impeded, or subverted on account thereof.
OBSERVATION OF THE COURT
6. We have heard the respondents present-in-person and
learned Additional Advocate General.
7. The instant contempt reference has been placed before this
Court alleging commission of criminal contempt within the
meaning and contemplation of the Act of 1971. The substratum of
the accusation emanates from certain statements alleged to have
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been made by the respondents during the course of an inquiry
conducted by the Additional Superintendent of Police, which
inquiry itself was undertaken pursuant to directions issued by the
learned Presiding Officer. It is the case of the reference that such
statements, purportedly directed against the Court and/or the
concerned Presiding Officer, tend to scandalise the authority of the
judiciary and erode the institutional dignity and majesty of this
Court.
7.1 It is pertinent to note that the contemnors did not, at any
point of time, make any disclosure or statement regarding the
learned Presiding Officer. In fact, the learned Court, vide order
dated 08.07.2019, had directed the Investigating Officer to
conduct an inquiry with regard to the role of Bhura Ram Khillery
and other concerned persons in relation to the alleged offences
under Section 166-A IPC and allied provisions. Pursuant to the
said directions, the Investigating Officer, namely the Additional
Superintendent of Police, proceeded to undertake the
inquiry/investigation in compliance with the order of the Court.
During the course of such investigation, the contemnors were
interrogated in connection with the allegations levelled against
Bhura Ram Khillery and others. It is submitted that during the
course of such interrogation, the contemnors merely stated, in
response to the queries put to them, as to why the learned
Presiding Officer appeared to be dissatisfied with their conduct.
The said statement was thus made only in the course of the
investigation being carried out pursuant to the order dated
08.07.2019 and was not voluntarily conveyed by the contemnors
to any person or authority outside the scope of the investigation.
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8. At the outset and before proceeding further, it is deemed
appropriate to advert to the contents of the statements placed on
record and to briefly delineate the import that can be gathered
therefrom by this Court. It is to be noted that the aforesaid
assertions emanate from the case diary, which is not a document
in the public domain and is intended for the limited use of the
Court under Section 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973;
hence, the contents thereof are being referred to only in a
summarised and circumspect manner.
8.1 A perusal of the material placed on record reveals that the
contemnors, in substance, seek to convey certain grievances
arising out of their interactions with the Presiding Officer
concerned during the course of judicial proceedings. Without
reproducing the contents in extenso, it appears that the tenor of
the assertions is to the effect that the contemnors perceived
instances of discourteous conduct and strained exchanges within
the courtroom and in ancillary proceedings. It is further indicated
that certain directions or observations were, according to them,
conveyed in a manner which was perceived to be improper or
disproportionate to the situation at hand. The contemnors further
appear to allege, in substance, that they were at times
unnecessarily summoned or made to wait, and were subjected,
according to their perception, to undesirable treatment, including
use of inappropriate language, misbehaviour and handling which
they consider to be improper in the course of official interactions.
References have also been made to situations where subordinate
staff and police officials allegedly felt aggrieved by the manner of
their treatment while attending court proceedings.
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8.2 In this regard, an instance has also been indicated, where a
constable, who had brought and produced an accused under a
warrant of arrest, was ordered to be detained in court perhaps on
the pretext of late compliance of the order and was directed to be
released on furnishing bail bonds on short notice, despite no prior
summons or warrant being issued to him. When a police officials
went to the court and made request to accept his surety for the
release of the constable, the presiding officer declined and told
that he wont accept surety of a policeman expressing concern that
the surer police personnel might not be traceable later. As a result,
bail had to arrange through a private individual with the help of an
advocate. It was told that the constable was subjected to
misbehave worst than the warrantee. As a result, bail had to be
arranged through a private individual. This incident has been cited
by the contemnors to illustrate their perception of differential or
skeptical treatment meted out to them in the course of judicial
dealings.
8.3 Additionally, there is an underlying assertion that certain
steps taken in proceedings were perceived by the contemnors as
unduly harsh or precipitate, particularly in the context of taking
cognizance or passing coercive directions, without, as alleged,
adequate opportunity being afforded. It further transpires that the
applicants have attempted to portray a broader pattern of
conduct, suggesting that their prior actions, including making
complaints before higher forums, may have had a bearing,
according to their perception, on subsequent interactions and
proceedings before the court concerned.
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9. Upon a careful reading and holistic appreciation of the
statements made by the police officers and witnesses, as
reproduced hereinabove, this Court observes that the allegations
levelled against the Presiding Officer, in substance and in essence,
may broadly be culled out under the following heads. These are a
concise heads of what the contemnors allege:-
(a) The police officers have alleged that the Presiding Officer was
personally aggrieved and harboured resentment against them,
particularly on account of a complaint made against him before
administrative authority of this Court. It has been stated that such
alleged resentment manifested in the form of taking cognizance
against police officers with an intent to harass and pressurise
them rather than for bona fide judicial reasons.
(b) It has further been alleged that he frequently misbehaved
with police personnel and court staff, used harsh, humiliating, and
allegedly abusive language in open court, and adopted an
intimidating tone while dealing with matters relating to police
investigation, remand, and filing of charge-sheets and final
reports.
(c) Another allegation raised is that he deliberately refused to
accept charge-sheets, final reports, and other police papers,
allegedly threw files in court, and intentionally created procedural
hurdles, resulting in pendency of cases at the police station level.
The officers have also alleged that police officials were made to
wait for long durations, sometimes allegedly in humiliating
circumstances, including outside the court or residence of the
Presiding Officer, and that legitimate requests for police custody
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remand were declined despite, according to them, sufficient
grounds being available.
(d) It is further mentioned by them that cognizance under penal
provisions such as Sections 166, 167, and 219 IPC was taken
mechanically and without affording adequate opportunity of
hearing, and that such judicial orders were allegedly passed with a
pre-determined mindset to demoralise the police machinery.
Certain allegations also touch upon alleged improper expectations,
or extraneous considerations including allegations relating to court
infrastructure or personal errands, which, according to the
contemnors, led to strained relations between the Presiding Officer
and the police officers.
(e) Lastly, it has been alleged that the overall conduct of the
Presiding Officer created an atmosphere of fear among police
officers, adversely affected coordination between the court and
the investigating agency, and resulted in erosion of mutual
institutional respect.
9.1 The Court records that the above are the
allegations/assertions/narration as perceived and articulated by
the police officers themselves, forming the foundation of their
grievance with the judicial officer but not with the Court. Whether
these allegations are true, exaggerated, misconceived, motivated,
or legally sustainable is a matter requiring strict scrutiny in
accordance with law and cannot be presumed merely on the basis
of such assertions.
9.2 It is significant to note that these statements were not made
in a public forum, not in any publication, and not with any
intention to scandalise the institution of the judiciary, but rather in
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response to questions posed by a superior officer during the
course of an official inquiry ordered by the Presiding Officer. These
statements were made in response to the queries raised by the
inquiry officer. The inquiry also had reference to the alleged non-
compliance of statutory duties under Section 166-A IPC, which
obligates public servants to perform certain duties in accordance
with law. In this context, the officials were questioned whether
they had lawfully discharged their duties and why the learned
Presiding Officer had deemed it necessary to order further
investigation. The police officials, in response thereto, explained
the circumstances and narrated the sequence of events as
perceived by them. It appears that the contemners sought to
convey before the Inquiry Officer that no illegality or offence had
been committed by them and that the displeasure expressed by
the Presiding Officer was purportedly on account of the complaint
lodged by Bhura Ram Khillery (SHO). It is also borne out from the
record that prior to the said inquiry, two complaints had already
been addressed to the Registrar (Vigilance) of this Court
concerning the alleged conduct of the learned Presiding Officer.
The statements made during the inquiry, therefore, appear to be
consistent with the grievances earlier raised before the
appropriate administrative authority. On the basis of the aforesaid
statements, the issue has arisen as to whether the same amount
to criminal contempt of court.
LINGUISTIC MEANING OF CONTEMPT
10. Moving on to the understanding of the word “contempt”, this
Court deems it appropriate to first examine its ordinary
connotation before adverting to its statutory application under the
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Act of 1971. The word contempt has its linguistic roots in common
law jurisprudence and conveys a sense of disregard towards
authority.
Oxford Dictionary defines contempt as:-
“The feeling that somebody or something is without value and
deserves no respect at all.”
Cambridge Dictionary defines contempt as:-
“A strong feeling of disliking and having no respect for someone or
something.”
In common parlance, therefore, the word contempt denotes
disrespect, disdain or disregard, particularly towards a person or
an institution vested with authority.
APPLICATION OF LAW
Contempt of Court: Civil and Criminal Contempt
11. Coming to the expression “contempt of court” and its
statutory recognition. The expression finds statutory recognition
under the Act of 1971. Section 2(a) of the Act defines the term
and classifies it into two distinct categories. For ready reference,
Section 2(a) is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“2(a) “contempt of court” means civil contempt or
criminal contempt.”
A bare reading of Section 2(a) makes it evident that the Act
recognises two species of contempt, namely, civil contempt and
criminal contempt.
11.1 Civil Contempt, for clarity, Section 2(b) of the Act is
reproduced hereinbelow:-
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (17 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]“2(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of
a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.”
From a plain and literal reading of Section 2(b), it is clear
that civil contempt is attracted where there is wilful disobedience
of a judicial command; or wilful breach of an undertaking given to
the Court. Thus, civil contempt primarily concerns enforcement of
orders and compliance with judicial directions, rather than the
dignity or authority of the Court itself.
11.2 The present matter pertains to criminal contempt, it is
necessary to reproduce Section 2(c) of the Act, which reads as
under:-
“2(c) ‘criminal contempt’ means the publication (whether
by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of
any other act whatsoever which-
(i)scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends
to lower the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with,
the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or
tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any
other manner.”
A bare perusal of Section 2(c) reveals that criminal contempt
is not confined to disobedience of orders, but extends to acts
which strike at the very foundation of the judicial system.
Criminal contempt, therefore, is concerned with preservation of
the authority and dignity of courts; protection of the due course of
judicial proceedings; and safeguarding the administration of
justice from obstruction, interference or erosion of public
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confidence. The definition is deliberately broad and encompasses
not only written or spoken words, but also conduct,
representations, signs or any other acts, which have the tendency
to undermine the authority of the Court; cast unwarranted
aspersions on judicial functioning; or create an impression that
justice is not administered in a fair and impartial manner. At the
same time, it is equally well-settled that the jurisdiction relating to
criminal contempt is exceptional in nature and is to be exercised
with utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the competing values
of judicial dignity and freedom of expression.
12. Before discussing the merits of the present matter, it is
pertinent to notice Section 2(c) of the Act of 1971, which defines
criminal contempt as the publication of any matter or the doing of
any act which scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or
tends to lower the authority of any Court; or prejudices or
interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial
proceeding; or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of
justice in any other manner. In the present case, the allegations
under consideration are required to be examined in the light of the
statutory contours of criminal contempt as delineated under
Section 2(c) of the Act of 1971, keeping in view the nature of the
statements, the context in which they were made, and their
potential impact on the authority of the Court and the
administration of justice. The analysis is confined to assessing
whether the allegations, as made and recorded, satisfy the
essential ingredients of criminal contempt, keeping in view the
settled principles governing the exercise of contempt jurisdiction.
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12.1 The pivotal question that arises for consideration is whether
the narration of grievances by a subordinate police officer before a
superior officer, during the course of an official inquiry, can by
itself constitute criminal contempt of court.
12.2 It is well settled that criminal contempt must involve acts
which:-
(a) scandalise or tend to scandalise the authority of the court;
(b) prejudice or interfere with judicial proceedings; or
(c) obstruct the administration of justice.
12.3 In the present case, the statements by the subordinate
officers during the process of inquiry under Section 166A IPC to
their senior official reveals that they merely narrated the
circumstances as perceived by them and expressed grievances
regarding the behaviour of an individual. The statements do not
appear to contain any criticism of a judicial order, nor do they cast
aspersions upon the majesty of the court or the judicial institution.
A person who has faced humiliation or perceives that he has been
subjected to improper behaviour cannot be expected to remain
silent. The law does not impose a gag order upon truthfully
narrating facts, particularly when such narration is made before a
competent authority conducting an inquiry. If a subordinate officer,
when questioned by his superior, explains the circumstances
leading to the dispute and narrates his version of events, such
conduct cannot automatically be elevated to the level of criminal
contempt.
12.4 An inquiry officer, while conducting an investigation or
departmental inquiry, is duty-bound to ascertain the truth by
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seeking explanations from the concerned individuals. The process
of inquiry necessarily involves asking questions such as:-
(a) What transpired?
(b) Whether any lapse occurred?
(c) What explanation can be offered by the purported accused?
12.5 In response to such queries, the concerned police officers
narrated their version of events. The purpose of these statements
was to explain why the learned Presiding Officer might have
passed an order directing further investigation. It is evident that
the explanation furnished by them was directed towards clarifying
the circumstances in which inquiry was ordered against them and
the allegations made against them by the learned Presiding
Officer. At no point do these statements appear to challenge the
authority of the court or question the validity of any judicial order.
12.6 Another important aspect that cannot be overlooked is that
several individuals who were examined during the course of the
inquiry appear to have stated substantially similar facts regarding
the behaviour of the concerned Presiding Officer. At this
preliminary stage, it would be wholly inappropriate to assume that
all such statements are false or concocted. The question whether
such allegations are true or otherwise can only be determined
after a proper inquiry. Where multiple individuals independently
state similar facts regarding a particular behavioural pattern, the
Court cannot summarily discard their statements as false merely
on presumption.
12.7 It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that two
complaints regarding the conduct of the concerned judicial officer
had already been submitted before the Registrar (Vigilance) of this
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Court. The administrative mechanism of the judiciary includes
institutional safeguards for addressing grievances regarding the
conduct of judicial officers. The office of the Registrar (Vigilance)
exists precisely to ensure that allegations regarding misconduct or
improper behaviour are examined in a structured and impartial
manner. If the mere act of submitting a complaint regarding the
conduct of a Presiding Officer were to be treated as criminal
contempt, the entire vigilance mechanism would become
redundant and ineffective. Such an interpretation would have the
chilling effect of discouraging individuals from raising genuine
grievances and would ultimately undermine the principles of
fairness, transparency, and institutional accountability.
Provisions of the Act of 1971
12.8 Moving on to the provisions of the Act of 1971, it is stated
that the present things to lead to criminal contempt of court and
for which Section 12 of the Act of 1971 gets attracted which
defines punishment for contempt of Court. For quick reference,
Section 12 of the Act of 1971 id reproduced herein below:-
“12. Punishment for contempt of court.–(1) Save as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law,
a contempt of court may be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months,
or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or
with both:
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the
punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being
made to the satisfaction of the Court.
Explanation.–An apology shall not be rejected merely on
the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused
makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (22 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt
either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section,
where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court,
if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice
and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall,
instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct
that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not
exceeding six months as it may think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in
respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company,
every person who, at the time the contempt was
committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the
company for the conduct of business of the company, as
well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the
contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the
leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each
such person:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
render any such person liable to such punishment if he
proves that the contempt was committed without his
knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent
its commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4),
where the contempt of court referred to therein has been
committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt
has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is
attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director,
manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such
director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be
deemed to 7 be guilty of the contempt and the punishment
may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the
detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary
or other officer.
Explanation.–For the purpose of sub-sections (4) and (5),–
(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a
firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the
firm.”
A bare perusal of Section 12 of the Act of 1971 makes it
evident that it provides for punishment for contempt, which may
extend to simple imprisonment up to six months, or fine, or both.
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At the same time, the provision reflects a lenient and reformative
approach, as the Court may discharge the contemnor upon a bona
fide apology if found genuine. Thus, the section strikes a balance
between maintaining the dignity of the Court and allowing scope
for repentance, ensuring that contempt jurisdiction is exercised
with restraint.
12.9 While going through the statements on record, Section 6 of
the Act of 1971 comes to the fore, which clearly postulates that a
complaint made against the Presiding Officer of a subordinate
court shall not amount to contempt of court, provided that the
statements contained therein are made in good faith. For perusal,
the same id reproduced herein below:-
“6. Complaint against presiding officers of
subordinate courts when not contempt.–A person shall
not be guilty of contempt of court in respect of any
statement made by him in good faith concerning the
presiding officer of any subordinate court to–
(a) any other subordinate court, or
(b) the High Court, to which it is subordinate.
Explanation.–In this section, “subordinate court” means
any court subordinate to a High Court.”
From bare perusal of Section 6 of the Act of 1971 would
reveal that the legislature has consciously carved out a protective
exception in respect of statements made against subordinate
courts. The provision makes it explicit that a person shall not be
held guilty of contempt merely for making a statement by way of
complaint against a presiding officer of a subordinate court,
provided such statement is made in good faith to a superior
authority. It is, thus, manifest that the object of the provision is
to facilitate bona fide grievances against judicial officers being
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brought to the notice of appropriate forums without the looming
threat of contempt proceedings. The law, in its wisdom, recognizes
that accountability within the judicial system must coexist with its
dignity, and therefore, fair and honest complaints, made without
malice and through proper channels, do not amount to contempt.
However, the protection is not unbridled. The sine qua non for
invoking the benefit of this provision is the element of good faith.
Any complaint which is actuated by malice, contains reckless
allegations, or is intended to scandalize the court under the guise
of a complaint, would fall outside the protective ambit of Section 6
of the Act of 1971. Thus, the provision strikes a delicate balance
between safeguarding the dignity of subordinate courts and
preserving the right of an aggrieved person to ventilate legitimate
grievances, ensuring that the contempt jurisdiction is not invoked
to stifle genuine criticism made in good faith.
12.10 In the present matter, statements of the police officials
would reveal that the gravamen of their assertion is merely that
the Presiding Officer appeared to be aggrieved by a complaint
submitted before the Registrar (Vigilance) of this Court and, on
that account, allegedly bore displeasure against Bhura Ram
Khillery, leading to the invocation of Section 166-A IPC. Such a
line of reasoning, if accepted, would lead to a wholly untenable
position in law. It would, in effect, convey that a litigant or citizen
cannot ventilate a bona fide grievance against the Presiding
Officer for fear of attracting proceedings for contempt of court.
This Court is unable to countenance such a proposition. The legal
position, as adumbrated under Section 6 of the Act of 1971,
clearly protects complaints made in good faith against Presiding
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Officers, and the same cannot be construed as contempt merely
on account of the fact that such complaint may have caused
displeasure. Acceptance of such a proposition would not only run
contrary to the settled principles of law but would also send a
deeply disquieting and erroneous message to society, thereby
stifling legitimate grievances and eroding the very foundation of
accountability within the judicial system. The majesty of law does
not demand silence in the face of perceived injustice; rather, it
accommodates fair and bona fide criticism made through lawful
channels.
Contours of Criminal Contempt: Protection of the Court and
Not of the Presiding Officer
13. There exists a fundamental distinction between an individual
and a Court. An individual possesses a personal identity and
reputation, which may be protected under ordinary law. A Court,
however, does not function as a mere individual; it represents the
majesty of justice and the institutional authority of the judicial
system. In the context of criminal contempt, the concern of law is
not the personal feelings or reputation of the individual officer who
happens to be presiding over the Bench. Rather, the law is
intended to safeguard the dignity, authority, and orderly
functioning of the Court as an institution. The jurisdiction relating
to criminal contempt is invoked only when an act tends to
scandalise the Court, lower the authority of the Court, prejudice or
interfere with judicial proceedings, or obstruct the administration
of justice. An officer, when occupying the Bench, does not act in
personal capacity but as an embodiment of the Court itself.
Consequently, any remark, conduct, or allegation must be
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examined from the perspective of whether it undermines the
authority of the Court as an institution or it relates to some
aspersions on the individual Presiding Officer. The law of criminal
contempt is not meant to protect the personal prestige or ego of
Presiding Officer as an individual. Personal criticism or allegations
directed against an individual Presiding Officer, without any
tendency to interfere with the administration of justice or to
scandalise the institution of the Court, would not ordinarily fall
within the ambit of criminal contempt. Thus, the essential
distinction lies in the object of protection. While an individual’s
reputation may be vindicated through ordinary remedies available
in law, the law of contempt is concerned solely with preserving the
dignity, authority, and effective functioning of the Court as an
institution. For an act to constitute criminal contempt, it must be
directed against the Court and must have the tendency to
undermine public confidence in the judicial system, rather than
merely affecting the personal sensibilities of the individual
presiding over the Bench.
13.1 It is to be observed that there exists a fine and well-
recognized distinction between a comment directed against a
judicial order and one aimed at the behaviour of Presiding Officer.
The two, though seemingly overlapping, operate in entirely
different spheres and must be carefully discerned. A judicial order,
once passed, attains finality and binds the field unless set aside or
modified by a competent forum in accordance with law. Any
grievance, therefore, lies against the order itself and is to be
ventilated through appropriate legal remedies. However, where
the comment transgresses into allegations touching upon the
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behaviour and conduct of the Presiding Officer, the same stands
on an altogether different footing. Thus, what emerges is a
delicate and nuanced distinction, whether the criticism is directed
towards the behaviour and conduct of the Presiding Officer, or is
confined to the judicial order passed by him. In the present
context, the police officials, during the course of inquiry, have
deposed with regard to the alleged behaviour of the Presiding
Officer, and not in relation to any judicial order passed by him.
13.2 At this juncture, it would be necessary to advert to the
celebrated observations of Lord Denning, with which the present
order had commenced, and which succinctly encapsulate the issue
at hand. The essence of the observations made by Lord Denning in
R. v. Metropolitan Police Commisioner, Ex parte Blackburn
(No.2) is that the judiciary, as an institution, is neither fragile nor
hypersensitive to criticism. Courts are expected to withstand fair,
even outspoken, comments without perceiving them as an affront.
The underlying principle is that freedom of speech occupies a
higher pedestal in a democratic framework, and therefore,
criticism of judicial functioning, so long as it remains fair and does
not impede the administration of justice, must be tolerated. In
essence, the observations draw a clear line between criticism of
judicial decisions after it attains finality is permissible as long as it
upholds the freedom of speech and criticizing the behavior of a
Presiding Officer is also permissible if it does not hamper the
administration of justice but when it affects the integrity, majesty,
power and honour of the Court, it stands on a different footing.
Thus, the quote reinforces that the strength of the judiciary lies
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not in silencing criticism, but in enduring it while preserving the
sanctity of justice.
SETTLED POSITION OF LAW
14. The contempt jurisdiction, it bears reiteration, is
extraordinary, punitive, and sui generis. Its exercise is hedged
with the requirement of judicial restraint, for it is not intended to
serve as a forum for personal vindication, but as a constitutional
mechanism to preserve the purity, dignity, and effective
functioning of the administration of justice. This Court deems it
appropriate to advert, in some detail, to the judicial principles
governing the exercise of contempt jurisdiction, particularly
criminal contempt, as crystallised through authoritative
pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
14.1 In Brahma Prakash Sharma and Ors. vs. The State of
Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1954 SC 10, the Constitution
Bench laid the foundational principle that the law of contempt is
not intended to protect the dignity of an individual Judge, but to
safeguard the administration of justice itself. The Court
categorically held that mere defamatory or disparaging allegations
against a Judge, howsoever improper or ill-advised, do not ipso
facto amount to contempt unless such allegations are of such a
nature as to create a real and substantial interference with the
due course of justice or undermine public confidence in the judicial
institution. The emphasis, thus, is not on the personal hurt of a
judicial officer, but on the institutional impact of the act
complained of. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the
judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-
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“15. It seems, therefore, that there are two primary
considerations which should weigh with the court when it is
called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of
contempt committed by “scandalising” the court itself. In
the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of
a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties
would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the
exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which
every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the
seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence
in courts can be created. “The path of criticism”, said Lord
Atkin [Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago,
1936 A.C. 335, “is a public way. The wrong headed are
permitted to err therein; provided that members of the
public abstain from imputing motives to those taking part in
the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a
right of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempt to
impair the administration of justice, they are immune.”
16. In the second place, when attacks or comments are
made on a judge or judges, disparaging in character and
derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to
distinguish between what is a libel on the judge and what
amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a
statement is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned
does not necessarily make it a contempt. The distinction
between a libel and a contempt was pointed out by a
Committee of the Privy Council, to which a reference was
made by the Secretary of State in 1892 [In the matter of a
special reference from the Bahama Islands 1893 A.C. 138. A
man in the Bahama Islands, in a letter published in a
colonial newspaper criticised the Chief Justice of the Colony
in an extremely ill-chosen language which was sarcastic and
pungent. There was a veiled insinuation that he was an
incompetent judge and a shirker of work and the writer
suggested in a way that it would be a providential thing if
he were to die. A strong Board constituting of 11 members
reported that the letter complained of, though it might have
been made the subject of proceedings for libel, was not, in
the circumstances, calculated to obstruct or interfere with
the course of justice or the due administration of the law
and therefore did not constitute a contempt of court. The
same principle was reiterated by Lord Atkin in the case of
Devi Prashad v. King Emperor 70 I.A. 216, referred to
above. It was followed and approved of by the High Court of
Australia in King v. Nicholls 12 Bom. L.R. 280, and has been
accepted as sound by this Court in Reddy v. The State of
Madras [1952] S.C.R. 452. The position therefore is that a
defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel so far as the
judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed
against the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. If,
however, the publication of the disparaging statement is
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calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or
proper administration of law by such court, it can be
punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to
the judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the
public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create
an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the
integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual
and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance
upon the court’s administration of justice, or if it is likely to
cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in
the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that
it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has
been an actual interference with the administration of
justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is
enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with
the proper administration of law.”
14.2 The decision in In Re: S. Mulgaokar reported in AIR 1978
SC 727, marks a watershed in the jurisprudence of contempt. The
Supreme Court cautioned against overzealous invocation of
contempt powers and underscored that courts must not react with
hypersensitivity to criticism. The judgment exhorts judicial self-
restraint and reminds that the power of contempt is to be
exercised sparingly, only when the attack is such that it shakes
the very foundations of the judicial process. The Court observed
that judges must possess the fortitude to ignore trivial or ill-
considered remarks, for judicis est jus dicere, non dare, the
function of the judiciary is to declare the law, not to assert
authority through punitive measures.
14.3 In P.N. Dua Vs. P. Shiv Shanker and Ors. reported in AIR
1988 SC 1208, the Supreme Court further refined the contours of
criminal contempt by holding that fair criticism of judicial
functioning or bona fide expression of grievance cannot be
brought within the net of contempt. The Court recognised that in a
constitutional democracy, the judiciary is open to scrutiny and
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reasoned criticism, and that silencing such criticism under the
guise of contempt would be antithetical to democratic values. Only
when criticism crosses the line and becomes a calculated attack
aimed at eroding public confidence in the judiciary does it attract
penal consequences.
14.4 The principle of mens rea was emphatically reiterated in Bal
Thackrey v. Harish Pimpalkhute, AIR 2005 SC 396, wherein
the Supreme Court held that for criminal contempt to be made
out, there must exist a clear intention or a manifest tendency to
interfere with the administration of justice. The Court clarified that
intemperate language or harsh expression, by itself, is insufficient
unless it has the propensity to obstruct justice or prejudice judicial
proceedings. The doctrine of actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
rea was held to be equally applicable to contempt jurisprudence.
14.5 In Indirect Tax Practitioners Association v. R.K. Jain
reported in (2010) 8 SCC 281, the Supreme Court emphasized
that freedom of speech and expression includes the right to fairly
criticize the judiciary and its functioning. Courts have consistently
shown tolerance towards even strong or misguided criticism, so
long as it is made in good faith and without attributing improper
motives. The judgment reiterates that contempt jurisdiction
should be exercised sparingly, only when criticism undermines the
administration of justice or lowers public confidence in courts. Fair,
objective, and constructive criticism is seen as essential for reform
and accountability in judicial institutions. However, malicious,
scandalous, or motive-attributing remarks against judges cross
the permissible limit and may amount to contempt. For the ease
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of reference, the relevant paragepahs of the judgment are
reproduced hereinbelow:-
“14. Before adverting to the second and more important
issue, we deem it necessary to remind ourselves that
freedom of speech and expression has always been
considered as the most cherished right of every human
being. Justice Brennan of U.S. Supreme Court, while dealing
with a case of libel – New York Times Company v. L.B.
Sullivan observed that “it is a prized privilege to speak one’s
mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all
public institutions and this opportunity should be afforded
for vigorous advocacy no less than abstract discussion.” In
all civilized societies, the Courts have exhibited high degree
of tolerance and accepted adverse comments and criticism
of their orders/judgments even though, at times, such
criticism is totally off the mark and the language used is
inappropriate. The right of a member of the public to
criticize the functioning of a judicial institution has been
beautifully described by the Privy Council in Andre Paul
Terence Ambard v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
AIR 1936 PC 141 in the following words:
No wrong is committed by any member of the public
who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing in good
faith in private or public the public act done in the seat
of justice. The path of criticism is a public way: the
wrongheaded are permitted to err therein: provided
that members of the public abstain from imputing
improper motives to those taking part in the
administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising
a right of criticism and not acting in malice or
attempting to impair the administration of justice, they
are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must
be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even
though outspoken comments of ordinary men.
In Debi Prasad Sharma v. The King Emperor AIR 1943 PC
202, Lord Atkin speaking on behalf of the Judicial
Committee observed:
In 1899 this Board pronounced proceedings for this
species of contempt (scandalization) to be obsolete in
this country, though surviving in other parts of the
Empire, but they added that it is a weapon to be used
sparingly and always with reference to the
administration of Justice: McLeod v. St. Auhyn. In re a
Special Reference from the Bahama Islands the test
applied by the very strong Board which heard the
reference was whether the words complained of were
in the circumstances calculated to obstruct or interfere
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (33 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]with the course of justice and the due administration of
the law. In Queen v. Gray it was shown that the offence
of scandalizing the court itself was not obsolete in this
country. A very scandalous attack had been made on a
Judge for his judicial utterances while sitting in a
criminal case on circuit, and it was with the foregoing
opinions on record that Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J.,
adopting the expression of Wilmot, C.J., in his opinion
in Rex v. Almon which is the source of much of the
present law on the subject, spoke of the article
complained of as calculated to lower the authority of
the Judge.
In Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1968)
2 All ER 319, Lord Denning observed:
Let me say at once that we will never use this
jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That
must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to
suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear
criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something
far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom
of speech itself.
It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it,
in the press or over the broadcast, to make fair
comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of
public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully
with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say
that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous,
whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would
ask is that those who criticise us will remember that,
from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their
criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still
less into political controversy. We must rely on our
conduct itself to be its own vindication.
Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing
which is said by this person or that, nothing which is
written by this pen or that, will deter us from doing
what we believe is right; nor, I would add, from saying
what the occasion requires, provided that it is pertinent
to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when
things are ill done.’
“15. In the land of Gautam Buddha, Mahavir and Mahatma
Gandhi, the freedom of speech and expression and freedom
to speak one’s mind have always been respected. After
independence, the Courts have zealously guarded this most
precious freedom of every human being. Fair criticism of the
system of administration of justice or functioning of
institutions or authorities entrusted with the task of deciding
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rights of the parties gives an opportunity to the operators of
the system/institution to remedy the wrong and also bring
about improvements. Such criticism cannot be castigated as
an attempt to scandalize or lower the authority of the Court
or other judicial institutions or as an attempt to interfere
with the administration of justice except when such criticism
is ill motivated or is construed as a deliberate attempt to
run down the institution or an individual Judge is targeted
for extraneous reasons. Ordinarily, the Court would not use
the power to punish for contempt for curbing the right of
freedom of speech and expression, which is guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Only when the
criticism of judicial institutions transgresses all limits of
decency and fairness or there is total lack of objectivity or
there is deliberate attempt to denigrate the institution then
the Court would use this power.”
The judgments of this Court in Re S. Mulgaokar (1978) 3
SCC 339 and P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker (1988) 3 SCC
167 are outstanding examples of this attitude and approach.
In the first case, a three-Judge Bench considered the
question of contempt by newspaper article published in
Indian Express dated 13.12.1977 criticising the Judges of
this Court. The article noted that the High Courts had
strongly reacted to the proposal of introducing a code of
judicial ethics and propriety. In its issue dated December
21, 1977 an article entitled “behaving like a Judge” was
published which inter alia stated that the Supreme Court of
India was “packed” by Mrs Indira Gandhi “with pliant and
submissive judges except for a few”. It was further stated
that the suggestion that a code of ethics should be
formulated by judges themselves was “so utterly inimical to
the independence of the judiciary, violative of the
constitutional safeguards in that respect and offensive to
the self-respect of the judges as to make one wonder how it
was conceived in the first place”. A notice had been issued
to the Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper to show cause why
proceedings for contempt under Article 129 of the
Constitution should not be initiated against him in respect of
the above two news items. After examining the submissions
made at the Bar, the Court dropped the contempt
proceedings. Beg, C.J., expressed his views in the following
words:
Some people perhaps believe that attempts to hold
trials of everything and everybody by publications in
newspapers must include those directed against the
highest Court of Justice in this country and its
pronouncements. If this is done in a reasonable
manner, which pre-supposes accuracy of information
about a matter on which any criticism is offered, and
arguments are directed fairly against any reasoning
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (35 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]adopted, I would, speaking for myself, be the last
person to consider it objectionable even if some
criticism offered is erroneous. In Bennett Coleman &
Co. v. Union of India, I had said (at p. 828) (SCC pp.
827-28):
John Stuart Mill, in his essay on `Liberty’, pointed
out the need for allowing even erroneous opinions
to be expressed on the ground that the correct
ones become more firmly established by what may
be called the `dialectical’ process of a struggle
with wrong ones which exposes errors. Milton, in
his `Areopagitica’ (1644) said:
Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to
play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do
injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt
her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple;
whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free
and open encounter?… Who knows not that Truth
is strong, next to the Almighty; she needs no
policies, no stratagems, no licensings to make her
victorious; those are the shifts and defences that
error makes against her power ….
Political philosophers and historians have taught us that
intellectual advances made by our civilisation would
have been impossible without freedom of speech and
expression. At any rate, political democracy is based on
the assumption that such freedom must be jealously
guarded. Voltaire expressed a democrat’s faith when he
told, an adversary in arguments: “I do not agree with a
word you say, but I will defend to the death your right
to say it”. Champions of human freedom of thought
and expression throughout the ages, have realised that
intellectual paralysis creeps over a society which
denies, in however subtle a form, due freedom of
thought and expression to its members. “Although, our
Constitution does not contain a separate guarantee of
Freedom of the Press, apart from the freedom of
expression and opinion contained in Article 19(l)(a) of
the Constitution, yet, it is well-recognised that the
Press provides the principal vehicle of expression of
their views to citizens. It has been said:
Freedom of the Press is the Ark of the Covenant of
Democracy because public criticism is essential to the
working of its institutions. Never has criticism been
more necessary than today, when the weapons of
propaganda are so strong and so subtle. But, like other
liberties, this also must be limited.” Krishna Iyer, J.
agreed with C.J. Beg and observed:
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (36 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]Poise and peace and inner harmony are so
quintessential to the judicial temper that huff,
“haywire” or even humiliation shall not besiege; nor,
unveracious provocation, frivolous persiflage nor
terminological inexactitude throw into palpitating
tantrums the balanced cerebration of the judicial mind.
The integral yoga of shanti and neeti is so much the
cornerstone of the judicial process that criticism, wild
or valid, authentic or anathematic, shall have little
purchase over the mentation of the Court. I quite
realise how hard it is to resist, with sage silence, the
shafts of acid speech; and, how alluring it is to
succumb to the temptation of argumentation where the
thorn, not the rose, triumphs. Truth’s taciturn strategy,
the testimony of history says, has a higher power than
a hundred thousand tongues or pens. In contempt
jurisdiction, silence is a sign of strength since our
power is wide and we are prosecutor and judge.
In the second case, this Court was called upon to initiate
contempt proceedings against Shri P. Shiv Shanker who, in
his capacity as Minister for Law, Justice and Company
Affairs, delivered a speech in the meeting of Bar Council of
Hyderabad on November 28, 1987 criticising the Supreme
Court. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) referred to
large number of precedents and made the following
observation:
Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed
to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though
outspoken, comments of ordinary men” — said Lord
Atkin in Ambard v. Attorney- General for Trinidad and
Tobago. Administration of justice and judges are open
to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have their
accountability to the society and their accountability
must be judged by their conscience and oath of their
office, that is, to defend and uphold the Constitution
and the laws without fear and favour. This the judges
must do in the light given to them to determine what is
right. And again as has been said in the famous speech
of Abraham Lincoln in 1965: “With malice towards
none, with charity for all, we must strive to do the
right, in the light given to us to determine that right.”
Any criticism about the judicial system or the judges
which hampers the administration of justice or which
erodes the faith in the objective approach of judges
and brings administration of justice into ridicule must
be prevented. The contempt of court proceedings arise
out of that attempt. Judgments can be criticised; the
motives of the judges need not be attributed, it brings
the administration of justice into deep disrepute. Faith
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (37 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]in the administration of justice is one of the pillars
through which democratic institution functions and
sustains. In the free market place of ideas criticisms
about the judicial system or judges should be
welcomed, so long as such criticisms do not impair or
hamper the administration of justice. This is how courts
should approach the powers vested in them as judges
to punish a person for an alleged contempt, be it by
taking notice of the matter suo motu or at the behest
of the litigant or a lawyer.
It has been well said that if judges decay, the contempt
power will not save them and so the other side of the
coin is that judges, like Caesar’s wife, must be above
suspicion, per Krishna Iyer, J. in Baradakanta Mishra v.
Registrar of Orissa High Court. It has to be admitted
frankly and fairly that there has been erosion of faith in
the dignity of the court and in the majesty of law and
that has been caused not so much by the scandalising
remarks made by politicians or ministers but the
inability of the courts of law to deliver quick and
substantial justice to the needy. Many today suffer from
remediless evils which courts of justice are
incompetent to deal with. Justice cries in silence for
long, far too long. The procedural wrangle is eroding
the faith in our justice system. It is a criticism which
the judges and lawyers must make about themselves.
We must turn the searchlight inward. At the same time
we cannot be oblivious of the attempts made to decry
or denigrate the judicial process, if it is seriously done.
This question was examined in Rama Dayal Markarha v.
State of Madhya Pradesh where it was held that fair
and reasonable criticism of a judgment which is a
public document or which is a public act of a judge
concerned with administration of justice would not
constitute contempt. In fact such fair and reasonable
criticism must be encouraged because after all no one,
much less judges, can claim infallibility. Such a
criticism may fairly assert that the judgment is
incorrect or an error has been committed both with
regard to law or established facts. But when it is said
that the judge had a predisposition to convict or
deliberately took a turn in discussion of evidence
because he had already made up his mind to convict
the accused, or has a wayward bend of mind, is
attributing motives, lack of dispassionate and objective
approach and analysis and prejudging of the issues
which would bring administration of justice into
ridicule. Criticism of the judges would attract greater
attention than others and such criticism sometimes
interferes with the administration of justice and that
must be judged by the yardstick whether it brings the
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (38 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]administration of justice into ridicule or hampers
administration of justice. After all it cannot be denied
that predisposition or subtle prejudice or unconscious
prejudice or what in Indian language is called “sanskar”
are inarticulate major premises in decision making
process. That element in the decision making process
cannot be denied, it should be taken note of.
In Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court
MANU/SC/0071/1973MANU/SC/0071/1973 : (1974) 1 SCC
374, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for himself and P.N. Bhagwati,
J., as he then was emphasized the necessity of maintaining
constitutional balance between two great but occasionally
conflicting principles i.e. freedom of expression which is
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and fair and fearless
justice, referred to “republican justification” suggested in
the American system and observed:
Maybe, we are nearer the republican justification
suggested in the American system:
In this country, all courts derive their authority
from the people, and hold it in trust for their
security and benefit. In this state, all judges are
elected by the people, and hold their authority, in
a double sense, directly from them; the power
they exercise is but the authority of the people
themselves, exercised through courts as their
agents. It is the authority and laws emanating
from the people, which the judges sit to exercise
and enforce. Contempt against these courts, the
administration of their laws, are insults offered to
the authority of the people themselves, and not to
the humble agents of the law, whom they employ
in the conduct of their Government.
This shift in legal philosophy will broaden the base of the
citizen’s right to criticise and render the judicial power more
socially valid. We are not subjects of a king but citizens of a
republic and a blanket ban through the contempt power,
stifling criticism of a strategic institution, namely,
administration of Justice, thus forbidding the right to argue
for reform of the judicial process and to comment on the
performance of the judicial personnel through outspoken or
marginally excessive criticism of the instrumentalities of law
and justice, may be a tall order. For, change through free
speech is basic to our democracy, and to prevent change
through criticism is to petrify the organs of democratic
Government. The judicial instrument is no exception. To cite
vintage rulings of English Courts and to bow to decisions of
British Indian days as absolutes is to ignore the law of all
laws that the rule of law must keep pace with the Rule of(Uploaded on 23/03/2026 at 04:51:38 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (39 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]life. To make our point, we cannot resist quoting Mc
Whinney, who wrote:
The dominant theme in American philosophy of law
today must be the concept of change — or revolution —
in law. In Mr Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ own
aphorism, it is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. prestige argument, from age alone, that
because a claimed legal rule has lasted a certain length
of time it must automatically be valid and binding at
the present day, regardless of changes in basic societal
conditions and expectations, is no longer very
persuasive. According to the basic teachings of the
Legal Realist and policy schools of law, society itself is
in continuing state of flux at the present day; and the
positive law, therefore, if it is to continue to be useful
in the resolution of contemporary major social conflicts
and social problems, must change in measure with the
society. What we have, therefore, concomitantly with
our conception of society in revolution is a conception
of law itself, as being in a condition of flux, of
movement. On this view, law is not a frozen, static
body of rules but rules in a continuous process of
change and adaptation; and the judge, at the final
appellate level anyway, is a part — a determinant part
— of this dynamic process of legal evolution.
This approach must inform Indian law, including contempt
law.
It is very necessary to remember the legal transformation in
our value system on the inauguration of the Constitution,
and the dogmas of the quiet past must change with the
challenges of the stormy present. The great words of Justice
Holmes uttered in a different context bear repetition in this
context:
But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment. Every year, if not every day, we have to
wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon
imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of
our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (40 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of
the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country.
(emphasis supplied)”
14.6 Viewed cumulatively, these precedents lay down a consistent
and unambiguous legal position that criminal contempt is not
attracted by every allegation, criticism, expression of grievance, or
even strong language directed against a judicial officer or the
judicial system. On the contrary, fair, bona fide, and reasonable
criticism of judicial functioning and decisions is permissible, and
indeed forms an integral part of the freedom of speech in a
democratic polity. The law thus draws a clear distinction between
fair criticism, which is made in good faith and in public interest
without attributing improper motives, and those acts which
transgress the bounds of decency, objectivity, and restraint.
Criminal contempt is attracted only where the act complained of is
deliberate, public in nature, and of such gravity that it poses a
real, substantial, and imminent threat to the administration of
justice, or is calculated to undermine the authority of courts and
erode public confidence in the judicial system. Mere expressions of
dissatisfaction, harsh or exaggerated criticism, or even erroneous
statements would not constitute criminal contempt so long as they
remain within the limits of fair comment. However, when such
criticism is malicious, scandalous, or imputes motives to judges,
or is designed to bring the institution into disrepute, the protective
shield of fair criticism is lost. The essence of the offence,
therefore, lies not merely in the words used, but in their tendency
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and effect, whether they are intended to or are likely to interfere
with the due course of justice, obstruct judicial proceedings, or
scandalize the court in a manner that lowers its dignity in the eyes
of the public at large. It is only upon crossing this threshold that
the extraordinary jurisdiction of contempt ought to be invoked.
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 166-A IPC
15. Coming on to the scope and applicability of Section 166-A of
the IPC. Reference has also been made to Section 166-A of the
IPC, which imposes criminal liability upon public servants who
knowingly disobey legal directions in certain situations. For ease of
reference, Section 166-A of IPC is reproduced hereinbelow:-
166A. Public servant disobeying direction under law.
–Whoever, being a public servant,-
(a) knowingly disobeys any direction of the law which
prohibits him from requiring the attendance at any place of
any person for the purpose of investigation into an offence
or any other matter, or
(b) knowingly disobeys, to the prejudice of any person, any
other direction of the law regulating the manner in which he
shall conduct such investigation, or
(c) fails to record any information given to him under sub-
section (1) of section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in relation to cognizable
offence punishable under section 326A, section 326B,
section 354, section 354B, section 370, section 370A,
section 376, section 376A, [section 376AB, section 376B,
section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB],
section 376E or section 509, shall be punished with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months but which may extend to two years, and shall also
be liable to fine.
15.1 Upon a plain reading of Section 166-A of the IPC, it is
manifest that the said provision contemplates liability of a public
servant who knowingly disobeys any direction of law regulating
the manner in which he is required to perform his official duties,
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and such disobedience must be with the intention of causing injury
to any person. The provision primarily addresses situations where
a public servant, despite being under a statutory obligation, fails
to record information relating to specified offences, fails to
investigate such offences in the manner prescribed by law,
neglects to provide necessary medical treatment to the victim, or
omits to record the statement of the victim in accordance with the
procedure mandated by law. Thus, the gravamen of the offence
lies not in a mere irregularity or lapse in the discharge of official
duties, but in a deliberate and conscious disobedience of a legal
mandate by a public servant, coupled with the intention to cause
injury. The provision accordingly prescribes punishment of
rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than six months which
may extend to two years, along with fine.
15.2 The provision was inserted to ensure that public servants,
particularly police officials, discharge their statutory duties with
diligence and do not deliberately abstain from performing their
legal obligations. Thus, when allegations are made that a police
officer has not conducted a fair investigation or has failed to
perform a duty mandated by law, the matter may legitimately
become the subject of inquiry. In such circumstances, the superior
officer conducting the inquiry is duty-bound to ascertain whether
any violation falling within the scope of Section 166-A IPC has
occurred. During such inquiry, the concerned police officials are
naturally required to explain their actions and the circumstances
surrounding the investigation. The explanations furnished by them
in response to such queries cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
be construed as acts amounting to criminal contempt of court.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
16. In view of the above discussion, it is apparent that none of
the alleged contemnors has, in any manner whatsoever, criticised
or denigrated the judicial order passed by the Court. The
statements attributed to them merely pertain to the personal
conduct and behaviour of the Presiding Officer, as has already
been discussed hereinabove. Significantly, not a single sentence in
the alleged statements can be construed as scandalising the
authority of the Court, prejudicing or interfering with the due
course of any judicial proceedings, or lowering the dignity and
majesty of the Court. Equally, there is nothing on record to
suggest that the administration of justice has been obstructed or
hindered in any manner.
16.1 A plain reading of the statements would reveal that no
allegation or insinuation has been directed against the institution
of the Court. It is also noteworthy that the statements in question
were made in the course of an inquiry conducted by the
Investigating Officer, which itself had been initiated at the instance
of the Presiding officer concerned. The alleged contemnors, while
responding to the inquiry, merely asserted that no offence had
been committed by them and further sought to explain that the
officer appeared to be displeased with them. In that context alone,
they attempted to place before the Investigating Officer the
circumstances which, according to them, might have led to such
displeasure, with a view to satisfy the inquiry being undertaken.
16.2 Such statements, made in the course of explaining one’s
position before an inquiry officer, cannot by any stretch of
imagination be brought within any of the recognised heads of
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criminal contempt. They neither scandalise the Court nor tend to
interfere with the administration of justice. It is also borne out
from the record that the police officers had already submitted
their report. Thereafter, upon a specific direction being issued to
the Additional Superintendent of Police to initiate proceedings
under Section 166-A IPC, the inquiry inevitably required them to
explain the circumstances surrounding the investigation.
16.3 They further explained the sequence of events which led to
the direction requiring action against the Station House Officer.
The explanation tendered by the officers, therefore, was nothing
more than an attempt to clarify why, in their perception, the
Presiding Officer was aggrieved with them.
16.4 The distinction between criticism directed towards the
personal conduct of an individual and an attack upon the authority
of the Court as an institution is both real and significant. Merely
alleging that a person has acted improperly does not amount to
imputing impropriety to the Court or its judicial functioning. An
individual may be criticised for his conduct, but that cannot
automatically be equated with criticism of the Court or its
judgments. The judiciary derives its strength from public
confidence. Such confidence is strengthened not by suppressing
grievances but by ensuring that genuine complaints are examined
in a fair and transparent manner. If allegations regarding
misconduct or improper behaviour are raised, the appropriate
course is to inquire into such allegations, rather than prematurely
branding them as contemptuous. The law does not grant impunity
to any individual to act arbitrarily. Equally, the law does not
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penalise individuals merely for narrating their grievances before
competent authorities.
16.5 Criminal contempt, by its very nature, contemplates acts of a
grave and proximate character, ordinarily committed within the
close precincts of the Court, in the face of the Court, or directly in
the presence of the Presiding Officer, which have an immediate
tendency to obstruct the administration of justice or lower the
authority of the Court. Illustratively, criminal contempt may arise
where a person, in open Court or before the judicial officer,
denounces the Court, hurls filthy or abusive language, behaves in
a disorderly or insolent manner, refuses to comply with or openly
defies a judicial order, or otherwise conducts himself in a manner
that strikes at the dignity and functioning of the Court itself. Such
conduct, when deliberate and direct, may invite the punitive
consequences contemplated under Section 12 of the Act of 1971.
Every act perceived as discourteous, harsh, or unpleasant does
not fall within the statutory definition of criminal contempt.
16.6 The allegations and statements attributed by the alleged
contemners, such as they were being made to wait for some time,
being asked to stand outside in the sun, or a judicial order
whereby judicial custody was granted instead of police custody,
may, at the highest, be perceived as expressions reflecting
dissatisfaction or grievance regarding the conduct of an individual.
Such statements during inquiry, though capable of being described
as harsh or uncharitable towards the personal behaviour of a
judicial officer, do not, by any stretch of legal reasoning, amount
to an act of criminal contempt of court. It is a settled principle that
a judicial officer is expected to function within the bounds of
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judicial restraint and institutional dignity. The majesty of the
institution is not so fragile that it stands diminished by personal
remarks or grievances expressed regarding the conduct of an
individual officer. Criticism, even if couched in strong or
disagreeable language, so long as it pertains to the personal
behaviour of an individual and does not scandalize the institution
of the Court or obstruct the administration of justice, cannot be
brought within the sweep of criminal contempt.
16.7 We are of the considered view, that the statements in
question appear to be no more than expressions of grievance by
police officials regarding the manner in which they were treated.
They neither interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings
nor tend to lower the authority of the Court as an institution. A
Presiding Officer, by virtue of the high office he occupies, is
expected to remain unaffected by such personal remarks and
must not allow them to influence the exercise of judicial power.
However, in the present matter, the initiation of criminal contempt
proceedings appears to convey an impression that the personal
comments or grievances expressed by the police officials were
taken to heart by the learned Presiding Officer concerned, leading
to the invocation of contempt jurisdiction. Such an approach, with
utmost respect, does not align with the settled contours of
criminal contempt jurisprudence, which is meant to protect the
administration of justice and the authority of the institution of the
Court, and not to vindicate the perceived personal affront of an
individual judicial officer. The essence of criminal contempt lies not
in subjective grievance, but in objective interference with the
administration of justice. Unless the conduct complained of
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demonstrates a clear, deliberate, and proximate tendency to
scandalise the Court, obstruct judicial functioning, or erode public
confidence in the justice delivery system, it cannot be elevated to
the status of criminal contempt. In the present context, the
statements passed by the police officials during an inquiry, even if
assumed to be true for the sake of argument, do not fall within
the statutory contours of criminal contempt as defined under
Section 2(c) of the Act of 1971, nor do they attract the penal
consequences envisaged under Section 12 of the Act of 1971
thereof. The contempt jurisdiction, being extraordinary and
punitive, is not intended to adjudicate perceived discourtesy or
dissatisfaction with judicial orders, but to preserve the institutional
integrity of the justice delivery system. Courts must, therefore,
exercise circumspection and restraint, lest this exceptional
jurisdiction be invoked in matters which properly belong to the
domain of appellate or supervisory remedies.
16.8 In view of the foregoing discussion, it becomes evident that
the statements made by the police officials were made during the
course of an inquiry conducted by a superior officer and were
intended to explain the circumstances leading to the dispute. Such
narration of grievances cannot, in the absence of any scandalising
remarks against the court or interference with the administration
of justice, be treated as criminal contempt. The statements appear
to be explanations offered in response to questions posed during
an official inquiry and do not, prima facie, undermine the majesty
of the court or the authority of the judicial institution so as to
attract the rigours of criminal contempt.
CONCLUSION AND VERDICT
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17. The law draws a clear distinction between criticism of judicial
conduct or orders, and acts which scandalise the court or
substantially interfere with the administration of justice. For
criminal contempt to be made out, the act complained of must
have a real and substantial tendency to lower the authority of the
Court in the eyes of the public at large; or interfere with the due
course of judicial proceedings; or obstruct the administration of
justice in a manner that goes beyond individual dissatisfaction.
The reproduced statements, though containing allegations against
the Presiding Officer, were made in the context of the behaviour of
an individual and were recorded as part of an investigation or
grievance mechanism. They do not appear to be publications
calculated to scandalise the judiciary, nor do they demonstrate an
attempt to undermine the institution of the Court as such. At best,
they reflect individual perceptions, grievances, or dissatisfaction
with judicial conduct or orders. Further, criminal contempt
jurisdiction is not intended to silence grievances or shield judicial
officers from criticism, unless such criticism transgresses into
deliberate vilification or an attack on the institution of justice
itself. The threshold for invoking criminal contempt is therefore
high, and the power is to be exercised sparingly and with
circumspection. We are of the considered view that the statements
reproduced hereinabove, even if taken at their face value, do not
satisfy the statutory requirements of criminal contempt as
envisaged under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1971 and does not
deserves punishment under Section 12 of the Act of 1971 as they
neither disclose an act intended to scandalise the Court as an
institution, nor demonstrate interference with the due course of
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[2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB] (49 of 49) [CRLCP-3/2019]
judicial proceedings or obstruction of the administration of justice
in the manner contemplated by law.
18. This Court, upon a careful consideration of the material on
record and the settled principles governing criminal contempt, is
of the view that the ingredients of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 are not attracted. The contempt jurisdiction
being extraordinary and punitive in nature, this Court declines to
invoke the same in the facts of the present case.
19. Accordingly, the contempt reference fails and is accordingly
dismissed.
20. The rule is discharged.
(YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT),J (FARJAND ALI),J
20-Mamta/-
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